Soviet Union Sans Gorbachev

Greetings and salutations.

Just tossing a thought out there: if we assume a Soviet Union similar to OTL up to the death of Brezhnev, in which Gorbachev has a tragic tractor-related accident while visiting Collective Farm 375 in '76, what sort of trajectory does it follow over the last 30 years? That the Soviet economy was by Brezhnev's death deeply and fundamentally screwed up, kept afloat mainly by high oil prices, is now the general consensus. But what sort of policies might the USSR have followed with leaders that did not follow Gorbachev's "destroy the Communist Party to save the Communist Party" philosophy?

Brezhnev was apparently scared to death of the notion of intervening in Poland when Solidarity was in full bloom, and was very much relieved when Jaruzelski proved loyal and clamped down. Sans a Gorbachev, it's likely another blowup would happen in Eastern Europe before the end of the 80's: would future Soviet leaders be willing to intervene militarily? Results of either: 1. An eastern European pupper government collapsing while the Soviets stood by or 2. military intervention that turns into a total clusterfuck? (IIRC, the Red Army made an utter botch of logistics when invading Czechoslovakia in 1968).

If oild prices had remained high through the 80's (Soviet intervention in the Iranian revolution? Soviet-Arab anti-Israel alliance in full bloom? Arabs just behave like dicks?) would the Soviets have used the breathing space to seriously reform the system, or would they have been more likely to just continue put things off while oil was providing a cushion?

What exactly would Soviet reform have looked like? By the 80's, the Soviet Union hardly _had_ anymore a peasant class like that which OTL started off the great reforms: you had essentially a rural proletariat, which much like the urban workers, pretended to work while the Collective pretended to pay them, and a massive agricultural beureocracy with a stake in preventing change. (Note how slow Russian agriculture was to show any change after 1991). And then there was an economically negative-valued "rust belt" far larger than that of the US, and dwarfing that of China in 1979. What could be done with that except continuing to shoulder the burden, when millions upon millions would be thrown out of work by "rationalization?"

If reform is tried and fails, how will Russians react? Will there be a return to Real Existing Stalinism, or are the post-1953 checks and balances created by the Party for their own protection prevent any efforts at genuine brute-force mass mobilization? In that light, how likely is a military coup? A KGB coup (probably in alliance with the Army)?

What happens in an essentially "gridlocked" situation, where reform requires changes on a scale that it is impossible to implement, because it would upset far too many applecarts? How long can such a stalemate exist, and what forces might break it?

If the economy reaches the "shooting food-rioters in the streets" levels of badness, how long before soldiers start turning their guns on their superiors? The USSR of the pre-Gorbachev 80's, bad as it was, was not North Korea. And if things get that bad, do we get a collapse of authority as in '91, or will there be a fight? If general X takes over the Kremlin and announces an "emergency government", will the provinces obey? The states of Central Asia OTL were quick enough to recognize the coup government, but would they have done so after another decade of slow decay?

Is a Soviet civil war (possibly with nukes) at all possible, or will a collapse of legitamacy at the center simply lead to the local governments going thei own way? Without Gorbachev, will fear still work? If the central government orders mass arrests of "disloyal" local leaders and political oppenents, will the army and KGB obey, or will they twiddle their thumbs until they are sure they aren't going to be on the losing side? Does the USSR still end with a whimper, or with a bang?

Just how big a mess could Eastern Europe turn into, anyway?

The economy was essentially stagnant when Gorbachev came into office, started to shrink when various efforts at reform proved unworkable or damaged the authority and ability of the party to get things done (and often provoked footdragging if not outright sabotage) while oil prices dropped, and went into freefall after 1991 and the breakup of the USSR. What happens to the Soviet economy if the old system is maintained and we simply get a Andropov-ish tightening of controls and perhaps (as in China today) a few symbolic heads roll? Was the system entirely played out or was there perhaps a few more years of (sluggish) economic growth in it?

Could a closer and more effective economic integration of the USSR with Eastern Europe have helped the situation, or would it just be sabotaged by local elites and/or cause Eastern Europe to boil over sooner?

If said Eastern European mess leads to a bloody crackdown, and there is a new US embargo, how hungry do the Soviets get? Can they successfully wean themselves off US food imports?

There was often some speculation that the USSR might indulge in a "short, victorious war" to improve it's position if desperate enough. If the USSR invaded Iran, would that be likely to touch off WWIII? If it backed Saddam Hussiein and placed nuclear missiles in Iraq, would Saddam have held Kuwait, or, again, WWIII?

Silly thought: the USSR's economy was always more about increasing inputs rather than increasing productivity. Population growth was sluggish by the 80's, if still a bit above the First World: what if Soviet Leader Nutzikoff decides, circa 1988, that the Soviet union needs more people and pushed for unrestricted immigration from the third world? How many move to the USSR, and how many try to get back out agains as soon as possible? (Yes, I know - Russian xenophobia makes this improbable.)

How much would it have helped if the Soviets manage somehow to make themselves self-sufficient in food again? (synthetics? Mass use of urban hydroponics? Simply improving storage and transportation might have increased food available at the store end of things by 30%. And heck, it wasn't impossible for a Communist nation to have a decently productive agricultural sector - Hungary made out OK).

How might Soviet ideology evolve in the years that weren't OTL? China is increasingly turning to good ol' nationalism as a glue, but China is over 90% Han: the USSR was only about 50% Greater Russian in its last years, and that's about 36% of the Soviet Block as a whole. A move to "capitalize" the Soviet Union would be an admission that Communism didn't work, which would undermine the legitimacy of the system. Defender of the Third World? A nation By and For the Proletariat? (You could still get some sort of capitalized economy with that line, but it couldn't be anything like OTLs robber-baron capitalism without falling on it's face through sheer absurdity). How could the USSR reform its economy while maintaining the faith that they were different in a good way from the Capitalist nations? Soviet environmentalism, of course, would be a bad joke...

So, thoughts and ideas about how the USSR might evolve without Gorbachev, and given that the economic gap between the US and USSR was likely to increase even if the USSR managed to avoid the massive per capita drop of OTL, what are its failure modes? Where and when do things begin to unravel, and what is the most likely sequence of events? Civil war? Fairly non-violent melting away fo central authority, possibly combined with temporary failed efforts to reverse it, similar to OTL? Utter chaos? Military dictatorship and withdrawal from the less valuable bits of Empire?

Note the question is not "how do we save the USSR": it is, what is the most likely trajectory of events 1982-2010 without Gorbachev? (And if you think the answer is "WWIII: we all die", please show your work. :D )

Now this had been talked about before, but I've found such threads tend to peter out rather quickly. Let's see if we can give the idea a good working over for a change: I just haven't seem very many good "No Gorbachev, USSR survives" TLs, although I vaguely remember some wanks...

Bruce
 
That the Soviet economy was by Brezhnev's death deeply and fundamentally screwed up, kept afloat mainly by high oil prices, is now the general consensus.
I’ll agree with the fundamentally screwed up bit, but I’ll disagree about the oil prices propping the system up. High oil and gold prices did have an effect on Soviet imports from the West, but a lot of the material that was being imported appears to have consistently gone to sectors of the economy that consistently underperformed (textiles, chemicals and timber off the top of my head), and evidence suggests that these imports continued even when the balance of exchange was bad, there was just less of it.

Brezhnev was apparently scared to death of the notion of intervening in Poland when Solidarity was in full bloom, and was very much relieved when Jaruzelski proved loyal and clamped down.
Scared to death is a bit inaccurate IMO. Brezhnev was reluctant to go into Czechoslovakia too, trying all kinds of threats/alternatives, but he did eventually send in the troops. Similarly the Soviets rolled into Afghanistan under Brezhnev around the same time, which shows their willingness to intervene.

Sans a Gorbachev, it's likely another blowup would happen in Eastern Europe before the end of the 80's
Maybe not. Trouble in the Eastern bloc can be tied to what’s going on at the ‘centre’. So for example Hungary got to be a problem soon after Khrushchev’s not particularly secret speech denouncing Stalin (1956). 1968 Czechoslovakia liberalised their economy following the lead of Kosygin’s reforms. 1970 Poland suffers domestic unrest with people demanding consumer goods etc. at a time when Brezhnev is making similar concessions in the USSR. Solidarity in turn can be seen as a product of the fairly lax attitude/stagnation in the kremlin by the 1980s. So in theory a strong hand at the helm might have avoided serious trouble in the Eastern bloc. A situation like Romania, where a Eastern bloc country remain associated but increasingly separate from Moscow is a stronger possibility, although might not have been accepted in say, the GDR.

2. military intervention that turns into a total clusterfuck? (IIRC, the Red Army made an utter botch of logistics when invading Czechoslovakia in 1968).
In other ways the intervention in Czechoslovakia was a great success, with Warsaw Pact forces all over the problem before things could get really out of hand. This probably served as a stern warning to other governments/reformers.

would the Soviets have used the breathing space to seriously reform the system, or would they have been more likely to just continue put things off while oil was providing a cushion?
The added revenues would probably have served to hide the problem, distracting all but the most serious reformers.

What exactly would Soviet reform have looked like? By the 80's, the Soviet Union hardly _had_ anymore a peasant class like that which OTL started off the great reforms: you had essentially a rural proletariat, which much like the urban workers, pretended to work while the Collective pretended to pay them, and a massive agricultural beureocracy with a stake in preventing change. (Note how slow Russian agriculture was to show any change after 1991). And then there was an economically negative-valued "rust belt" far larger than that of the US, and dwarfing that of China in 1979. What could be done with that except continuing to shoulder the burden, when millions upon millions would be thrown out of work by "rationalization?"
Any successful reform in the USSR would have had to have entailed some hardship for workers (agricultural and industrial). Rising wages/welfare under Brezhnev along with reduced threats for ‘crimes’ like absenteeism created a situation where there was even less incentive to work in the system than ever before, which costing the centre a great deal. Cut backs would have been needed, and probably some mechanism to redistribute labour better (some sectors/combines effectively horded workers in case they needed them to fulfil their plan, at the expense of those that needed more).

In that light, how likely is a military coup?
There were a lot of breaks on the military in the Party-State system, and the general political culture of the Soviet military was one of professionalism. This can be seen somewhat in the failure of the coup against Gorbachev by the Gang of Eight.

A KGB coup (probably in alliance with the Army)?
More likely, but there is the greater possibility of failure. The military might even intervene to stop them.

What happens in an essentially "gridlocked" situation, where reform requires changes on a scale that it is impossible to implement, because it would upset far too many applecarts? How long can such a stalemate exist, and what forces might break it?
That would be a repeat of the Brezhnev era surely? ;)

What happens to the Soviet economy if the old system is maintained and we simply get a Andropov-ish tightening of controls and perhaps (as in China today) a few symbolic heads roll?
Andropov’s policy was basically repeated by Gorbachev to start with in the form of the uskorenie policy. They didn’t translate into any success for either Andropov or Gorbachev, because reinforcing the system doesn’t change what was fundamentally wrong with it.

Could a closer and more effective economic integration of the USSR with Eastern Europe have helped the situation, or would it just be sabotaged by local elites and/or cause Eastern Europe to boil over sooner?
It was fairly integrated to begin with through a mess of bilateral agreements. Without something breaking things up, closer ties will only add to the bureaucracy/effort needed to make things run.

If the USSR invaded Iran, would that be likely to touch off WWIII?
Probably not (Iran being somewhat separate from the general East-West division by 1979), but it wouldn’t have been short and probably not victorious. With the Soviets in Afghanistan already (or perhaps recently withdrawn if you assume this is later in the piece) it is hard to see why they would do this.

Silly thought: the USSR's economy was always more about increasing inputs rather than increasing productivity. Population growth was sluggish by the 80's, if still a bit above the First World: what if Soviet Leader Nutzikoff decides, circa 1988, that the Soviet union needs more people and pushed for unrestricted immigration from the third world? How many move to the USSR, and how many try to get back out agains as soon as possible? (Yes, I know - Russian xenophobia makes this improbable.)
Labour productivity was acknowledged as a problem at least by the late 1960s, they just didn’t do a good job in raising it. Immigration within the USSR (say from Central Asia to Russia), was already causing issues, to open it wider still would have caused a fair bit of unrest. Population growth also only adds to the problem of shortages.

How much would it have helped if the Soviets manage somehow to make themselves self-sufficient in food again?
Depending on how it was achieved, it might have helped. It would have changed the balance of imports/exports, but it really depends on what the domestic cost was. Consider a Khmer Rouge solution to self-sufficiency for example as a fairly negative approach ;)

How might Soviet ideology evolve in the years that weren't OTL? China is increasingly turning to good ol' nationalism as a glue, but China is over 90% Han: the USSR was only about 50% Greater Russian in its last years, and that's about 36% of the Soviet Block as a whole. A move to "capitalize" the Soviet Union would be an admission that Communism didn't work, which would undermine the legitimacy of the system. Defender of the Third World? A nation By and For the Proletariat?
Probably a greater emphasis on Khrushchev’s All People’s State and ‘Soviet Nationalism’, which might have been a going concern if the Soviet Union hadn’t been sliding into a joke by the 1980s.

How could the USSR reform its economy while maintaining the faith that they were different in a good way from the Capitalist nations?
Maybe some variation on the idea that a socialist state provides for the people, the capitalist system only profits for some? Honestly, I don’t know... its difficult because Soviet ideological development sort of stalled for a long time, then became quite chaotic in the last few years.

how do we save the USSR
The first step requires a political solution. If we discard probability etc. for a moment it would have been best to start in the early 1970s, when there was still potential. Later starts are somewhat easier (because your opposition will be so old a decrepit), but the situation will have become so much messier.

If you can re-jig the Party balance, if not necessarily the system itself (some changes might be needed in the State), economic reform becomes possible. How? I’m still working on that idea... but what I do know is if the economy could be made to work, whoever did it would be the new golden boy and many of the nascent problems like nationalism and civic unrest might have been avoided.
 
I’ll agree with the fundamentally screwed up bit, but I’ll disagree about the oil prices propping the system up.

But the USSR needs to buy food and other materials abroad. Without a high oil/raw materials revenue, they have to borrow, which means they are increasingly in danger of coming under economic pressure from the capitalist nations which hold their loans. (Weren't the Soviets negotiating a huge loan at the time the troubles broke out in the Baltic states?)

Scared to death is a bit inaccurate IMO. Brezhnev was reluctant to go into Czechoslovakia too, trying all kinds of threats/alternatives, but he did eventually send in the troops. Similarly the Soviets rolled into Afghanistan under Brezhnev around the same time, which shows their willingness to intervene

From the 10th december CPSU CC Politburo meeting: ( http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF56F.PDF )

Anropov: If Cde. Kulikov actually did speak about the
introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly.287 We can't risk such a step. We
do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must
adhere to it until the end. I don't know how things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland
falls under the control of Solidarity, that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries
pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on a variety
of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for us. We must be
concerned above all with our own country and about the strengthening of the Soviet Union.
That is our main line.

Gromyko:

At the same time we must somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and
other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any
introduction of troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our
ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.

Suslov: We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for us to change our
position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so. We have carried out via the UN
such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate peace. What a great effect we have had
from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have
undertaken.296 This has enabled all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet
Union staunchly and consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible
for us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start of the
Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what actions they must pursue.
It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward more decisive actions. But we will, as
earlier, tell the Poles that we regard their actions with understanding.
It seems to me that Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He wants to make
excuses for himself by coming forth with requests to present to the Soviet Union. These
requests, naturally, are beyond our physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well,
look here, I turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.
At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the introduction of
troops. If troops are introduced, that will be a catastrophe. I think we have reached a
unanimous view here on this matter, and there can be no consideration at all of introducing
troops.

Grishin:
The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line of our party
toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the proposal by Jaruzelski to
disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot agree with that. There can be no talk at
all of introducing troops. We will have to look at economic questions and at what can be
given to the Poles.


Of course, opinions might have changed in the case of a total collapse of authority in Poland...




That would be a repeat of the Brezhnev era surely? ;)

Well, I doubt the Brezhnev era was indefinitely extendable... :)


Probably not (Iran being somewhat separate from the general East-West division by 1979), but it wouldn’t have been short and probably not victorious. With the Soviets in Afghanistan already (or perhaps recently withdrawn if you assume this is later in the piece) it is hard to see why they would do this.

Put up the price of oil (see above...), cause economic troubles to the west, warm water ports... :D But I don't see so risky a move as likely, just throwing out ideas.


The first step requires a political solution. If we discard probability etc. for a moment it would have been best to start in the early 1970s, when there was still potential. Later starts are somewhat easier (because your opposition will be so old a decrepit), but the situation will have become so much messier.

If you can re-jig the Party balance, if not necessarily the system itself (some changes might be needed in the State), economic reform becomes possible. How? I’m still working on that idea... but what I do know is if the economy could be made to work, whoever did it would be the new golden boy and many of the nascent problems like nationalism and civic unrest might have been avoided.

I said that SAVING THE USSR ISN'T THE POINT: :mad: I'm ALL ABOUT probability, trying to get a discussion going on what might be _likely_, not a "best case" scenario.

(Although if you can come up with a "USSR survives TL POD after 1982", more power to you. I've never read a convincing one).

best,
Bruce
 
But the USSR needs to buy food and other materials abroad.
The Soviets never had an issue with getting food from abroad, and the materials couldn't be bought because they were displaced were not exactly mission critical. You might wish to look at The Soviet Union Since Khrushchev (editted by Brown and Kaser), the second chapter is about Soviet foreign trade, theories re. import substitution, and why the stats don't add up in the Soviet example.

From the 10th december CPSU CC Politburo meeting:
- You said Brezhnev, and then proceeded to quote a series of people who are not Brezhnev.
- IMO the text shows not people who are scared, but people who are weighing the options.

Well, I doubt the Brezhnev era was indefinitely extendable...
This is true. After all even Gorbachev was effectively placed into his position by arch conservatives (people like Andropov and Gromyko), quite likely because it was recognised that more of the same (ala Chernenko) wasn't going to work.

I said that SAVING THE USSR ISN'T THE POINT

Bah, I was having my own fun.;)

I'm ALL ABOUT probability, trying to get a discussion going on what might be _likely_, not a "best case" scenario.
Fair enough. In order to answer this question you'll have to determine: If not Gorbachev, Who? One of the most notable things about the Politburo going forth from Brezhnev is the lack of viable candidates, and by 1985 (its a fair assumption that Andropov and Chernenko won't live longer if Gorbie is dead in '76) the list is even shorter. Determining who is in charge in turn defines the style of leadership and hence the outcomes.

Yegor Ligachev seems a possible substitute. Both he and Gorbachev were 'clients' of Andropov, and assuming Gorbachev died, he might have gone up a notch. Ligachev comes from an engineering background and went on to serve as Secretary of Ideology. He fell out with Gorbachev over glasnost and elements of perestroika. Unfortunately I can't remember much about his management style, but he did write an autobiography should anyone be interested.

Some quotes by Ligachev (courtesy of wikipedia)
"Public ownership unites, but private ownership disunites people's interests and indisputably causes social stratification of society.... For what purpose was perestroika started? For the purpose of most fully using the potential of socialism. Then does the sale of enterprises into private hands really promote the revealing of the possibilities inherent in the socialist system? No, it does not.... Lately people have begun saying, "Perestroika will develop, with the party or without it". I think otherwise. With the party, and only with the vanguard party, can we move forward on the way of socialist renewal. Without the party of Communists, perestroika is a lost cause...."
"We should not overlook the impending danger of the accelerated reunification of Germany"

Also, while I think about it, without Gorbachev who becomes Secretary of Agriculture after Kulakov?

I'll let someone else run with these ideas for now.
 
Bump.

Well, even without Gorbachev I think we can agree a reformer of some kind was going to get the Big Desk at some point: the economy was bogging down badly, and Capitalism would be rather clearly not dying of its Internal Contradictions.

So we have a Soviet leader that does not renounce brute force as a means of keeping the Empire together, and who is aware of the necessity of people Keeping Their Mouths Shut on certain subjects if the Soviet Union is to maintain some legitimacy. So,

1. How much can he get done with the Party breathing down his neck?

- a lot of applecarts would be upset if any major changes were made. Gorbachev managed to get quite a bit done, but passive resistance made a lot of his efforts quite ineffective, and in doing what he did he deeply undermined the power of the Party itself, which was in turn a major contibuter to the collapse.

2. How much can he get done with the US and the rest of the First World breathing down his neck? If squashing revolts in Eastern Europe or in the USSR leads to another US grain embargo or the discontinuation of loans and investment to the Warsaw Pact nations, can he ride it out?

(BTW, Dave, what exactly are you saying here with "materials couldn't be bought because they were displaced were not exactly mission critical?" And as for the food thing, grain imports led to serious USSR debt in 1981 and 1985, and, as I've heard it, during the embargo Soviet arctic trawlers were busy scraping up fish known only by their scientific names to add some protein to the Soviet diet).


3.) How much can he get done because of who he is?

-As Dave points out, the USSR didn't exactly have a strong bench of potential leaders in the mid-80s.

4.) Chinese-style reforms: harder, much harder, or entirely inapplicable?

-There was always a certain amount of capitalism going on in Mao's China due to the lack of state alternatives, while by the late USSR things were so planned that there were probably turf wars going on between the Ministries of Smarties and Pez.

Lets spot the USSR a couple points. No invasion of Afghanistan, and oil prices don't dip sharply until, say, the end of the 80s. Does this buy any time?

Bruce
 
Hmm. Sounds like crickets out there...

But it's sortof expected that I'd get just one person answering. Soviet Union sans Gorbachev seems a subject that people are just not that interested in going into, although so many brain cells have been killed off to insure a Nazi victory in WWII.

Well, just to keep this from disappearing, I'll just revive this with a post every now and then in hopes of eventually getting a debate started.

So, question:

Foreign debt. How important for the Soviet economy by the mid-80s? How important for the Warsaw Pact Inferior Six and their political stability? Could the USSR wean itself off it, especially after oil prices drop? How much would the need to keep foreign debtors more or less contented narrow Soviet freedom of action?

best,
Bruce
 
Agriculture. Just _why_ was it so hard for the Soviets to feed themselves? Sure, they had a lot of harsh climate areas, but surely they could do better than double the productivity of 1914 peasants. How much would infrastructure/transportation improvements help?

Was a move to for-profit farming possible after 1983 in a step-wise fashion? (OTL, IIRC there were considerable efforts to sabotage such projects by the local party infrastructure).

How about more 'socialist' efforts? (A fish pond in every courtyard, a garden on every roof, home hydroponics and block wardens monitoring for sabotage and wrecking :) ).

On an SFnal side note, could there have been some sort of effort to supplement poor agricultural yields with synthetic foodstuffs? (After all, a lot of basic organic molecules are pretty simple to maufacture). How about that ol' SF standby, food yeasts?

Bruce
 
Agriculture. Just _why_ was it so hard for the Soviets to feed themselves?
No problem at all. Just sane distribution policy. Late USSR problems with food and consumer goods where almost purely artificial. "Nomenklatura" just wanted to starve population a little and force them to accept any radical reforms for "saving the country" sake.

Aim was simple both for central and local party leaders and national elites - split the country and plunder all valuable state property. So they did.
 
Grobchew confessed he intended to abolish the soviet bloc.

His reforms did not make the economy better, they made it worst (thought not as bad as yeltsin´s dictatorship). Except for one, the economy of corruption and bureaucratic dead-weight.

Funny that the Brezhnev era is described as an "era of stagnation", the economy was actually growing back then, people that lived at that time rather describe it as a golden era.
From 1989 to 1993, living standards fell by 50% in Russia, even more in every former SSR south of Russia, with massive increase of difference between those who supported the new regimes and the common people. Yet noon said the yeltsin era, where people actually died of hunger and the parliament was fired uppon, was economically nefarious or undemocratic.


In 1989, the planning was that the governement would go from bureaucratic control to scientifical/technical control.

Agriculture. Just _why_ was it so hard for the Soviets to feed themselves? Sure, they had a lot of harsh climate areas, but surely they could do better than double the productivity of 1914 peasants. How much would infrastructure/transportation improvements help?


Meanwhile, it is argued that the soviet-union exported millions of tonnes of wheat to Germany in 39-41, lol.

Simply because it wasn´t. It was cheaper to import but there was plenty of agricultural infrastructures, most of which was simply abandonned by the "reforms" of the 1990s, production of new material almost completely stopped.
 
Last edited:

MacCaulay

Banned
Brezhnev was apparently scared to death of the notion of intervening in Poland when Solidarity was in full bloom, and was very much relieved when Jaruzelski proved loyal and clamped down. Sans a Gorbachev, it's likely another blowup would happen in Eastern Europe before the end of the 80's: would future Soviet leaders be willing to intervene militarily? Results of either: 1. An eastern European pupper government collapsing while the Soviets stood by or 2. military intervention that turns into a total clusterfuck? (IIRC, the Red Army made an utter botch of logistics when invading Czechoslovakia in 1968).

This is something about the possible Soviet Invasion of Poland, 1981, and and what it says about how the military and political systems operate in the Soviet Union.

The Threat by Andrew Cockburn said:
There could be no clearer example of this process than the astonishing story of Brezhnev's coup against the high command of the ground forces in the winter of 1980-81. The point at issue was Poland. To put it simply: key elements both in the military and in the Politburo wanted to intervene forcibly to put down the Solidarity trade union in all its manifestations (this was a year before the declaration of martial law in Poland). Leonid Brezhnev opposed these ideas, and he got his way.
By the early winter of 1980, matters in Poland appeared to be coming to a head. The Communist government under Stanislaw Kania was steadily retreating before the independent Solidarity organization. That the Soviets might intervene with troops, as they had in Czechoslovakia, was commonly accepted both in Poland and in the West. U.S. intelligence reportaed actual signs of military preparations for intervention toward the end of November. Such visible indications that the tanks might roll as the calling up of reservists and troop maneuvers on the borders were obliquely confirmed in the Soviet press. but the press reports also indicated something else: the decision to prepare for action had met with opposition at the highest level.
On November 17, a Pravda article on the Russian Civil War, which had ended nearly sixty years before, contained this intriguing passage: "Differences of opinion between the Commander in Chief and the command of the fronts" (local military headquarters) had been resolved in favor of "mobilization [and]...urgent measures for strengthening the army. The commander-in-chief, as experienced Pravda readers could understand, was Leonid Brezhnev.
The trouble with the bellicose generals was that although they seemed to have won the political battle, they were less adept at getting ready for a military operation. The actual mobilization turned into a shambles. Reservists called up in key districts next to the Polish border promptly deserted in numbers too large to punish, and coordination between different units and headquarters broke down.
Military intervention had been successfully touted by the generals over the apparent objections of Brezhnev, but they then had been unable to get the troops ready. It did not take long for the wily President of the Soviet Union to make them suffer the consequences. Within two months, six senior Soviet army generals were removed from their key commands inthe Warsaw Pact countries or western Russia and demoted to less important posts elsewhere. General Ivan Pavlovsky, an old Bird's Nest habitue and commander in chief of the Ground Forces since 1967, was dispatched into semi-retirement, where he was shortly joined by General S.P. Vasyagin, chief of the political directorate of the ground forces. General Ye. F. Ivanovsky, commander in chief of the 900,000 Soviet troops in East Germany, was packed off to take charge of the Bylerussian Military District, which has precisely one full strength division. General D.T. Yazov, the commander in Czechoslovakia, was sent even farther away, to the Central Asian Military District.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Agriculture. Just _why_ was it so hard for the Soviets to feed themselves? Sure, they had a lot of harsh climate areas, but surely they could do better than double the productivity of 1914 peasants. How much would infrastructure/transportation improvements help?

Well, it'd help if they could make a good tractor. Some people around here have Belarus-brand tractors that were exported out of Russia, and they're terrible. The only advantage to them is that they're really really simple.

A Belarus made in the 80s matches a John Deere or International Harvestor made the 50s. They take half a freaking corn field to make a turn. They're not very good. They probably can't utilize their land that well with such crappy equipment.
 
Ah, I thought this one had fallen down the list. Hard to keep track of stuff on this forum with all the traffic.

1. How much can he get done with the Party breathing down his neck?
In theory, a strong General Secretary can clean house a bit before he embarks on any major policy changes. That pretty well stopped when Brezhnev took over, it took him years to remove his fairly wishy-washy opponents, not entirely sure why. Maybe such an approach could be repeated. From memory Andropov and Gorbachev pushed quite a few old timers into retirement. Ultimately it probably comes down to the balance of interests in the Politburo.

2. How much can he get done with the US and the rest of the First World breathing down his neck? If squashing revolts in Eastern Europe or in the USSR leads to another US grain embargo or the discontinuation of loans and investment to the Warsaw Pact nations, can he ride it out?
I think the US would hesitate to initiate a serious grain embargo against the USSR. For one it would put the hardline into over drive and they might consider radical solutions to food shortages. Similarly the US would be seen as responsible if another famine broke out. The Soviet agricultural failures would be pointed to, but everyone would know most countries resolve serious famines through imports (I think Amartya Sen discusses this).

Consider the China example, where you have Tiananmen Square (and the general crack down used to keep it out of other cities), but limited foreign policy repercussions.

Dave, what exactly are you saying here with "materials couldn't be bought because they were displaced were not exactly mission critical?"
I kinda garbled that didn’t I... what I was getting at was that Soviet imports were going into sectors that were not critical to the function (although perhaps harmed the efficiency) of the Soviet economy. For example there were significant imports into the shipbuilding industry, which while useful, wouldn’t have brought the whole system down with its slowdown.

4.) Chinese-style reforms: harder, much harder, or entirely inapplicable?
Viable if the Soviets can get the political side of things in order. Most Chinese reforms are very similar to programs tried in the 1960s and early 70s. The Household Responsibility System was basically the same as the Zveno (link) system. There was a similar scheme to attract Western investment through joint-stock companies (although SEZs were not considered, and AFAIK neither was export driven growth). The Kosygin reforms cover the use of market mechanisms to somewhat disciple/reward economic actors. Where there all went wrong was
- Lack of political will
- Sabotage (deliberate and unintended) by the party-state
- Loss of other forms of control/discipline (which I would argue are even more important in a non-free market economy).

Lets spot the USSR a couple points. No invasion of Afghanistan, and oil prices don't dip sharply until, say, the end of the 80s. Does this buy any time?
Some. Certainly helps the foreign trade balance for however takes over in 1985. If the USSR didn’t intervene in Afghanistan, would there have been a trickle over into the Central Asian Republics?

although so many brain cells have been killed off to insure a Nazi victory in WWII.
Ha!

Agriculture. Just _why_ was it so hard for the Soviets to feed themselves?
- Lack of incentive for the farmers to do more than the bare minimum. Even when higher prices were offered the farmers couldn’t buy much with their money. At least they got something nice out of their private plots.
- Poor quality of machinery, and worse maintenance.
- Not sure if it was the case by the 1980s, but in the 60s the Soviets were still having issues with properly implementing the use of fertiliser and mechanisation (largely because of how they were introduced)
- Logistics, as you noted. Grain etc. gets collected... then doesn’t make it to market in time, or spoils.

Aside from feeding themselves, there was also the issue of cost. The Soviets poured a lot into agriculture, and got close to nothing for it. Don’t forget the massive subsides on food. Apparently bread was sometimes cheaper than raw grain...

Was a move to for-profit farming possible after 1983 in a step-wise fashion? (OTL, IIRC there were considerable efforts to sabotage such projects by the local party infrastructure).
Not sure. The kholkoz/sovkhoz system was fairly well established and highly politicised. Opposition to the Zveno experiment tended to come from within the kholkozy it was tested in, from people who missed out in some way.

How about more 'socialist' efforts? (A fish pond in every courtyard, a garden on every roof, home hydroponics and block wardens monitoring for sabotage and wrecking
There was a fair bit of this already. A lot of private plots for urban households, or were associated with a particular factory. They were a bit of a double-edged sword, when you consider that these sidelines could draw off labour from the ‘main’ enterprises. The Soviet system was already having problems with people who had a second unofficial job that they did while on the clock officially.

On an SFnal side note, could there have been some sort of effort to supplement poor agricultural yields with synthetic foodstuffs? (After all, a lot of basic organic molecules are pretty simple to maufacture). How about that ol' SF standby, food yeasts?
I don’t know much about the production of these, but I can imagine how the consumers would have received it. At a time when they were saying they wanted more of the good things in life, I don’t think they would want to eat yeast instead ;)

@Wyragen
Grobchew confessed he intended to abolish the soviet bloc.
Gorbachev might have said this after the collapse, but I wonder how much of this is him trying to said he didn’t fail and this was all ‘part of the plan’ ;).

Funny that the Brezhnev era is described as an "era of stagnation", the economy was actually growing back then, people that lived at that time rather describe it as a golden era.
By the end of the Brezhnev era growth had dropped considerably, and declines in consumer goods output was causing discontent.
 
A Belarus made in the 80s matches a John Deere or International Harvestor made the 50s. They take half a freaking corn field to make a turn. They're not very good. They probably can't utilize their land that well with such crappy equipment.

I suspect a 1955 US farmer on a John Deere was rather more productive than a Soviet one in the 1980s - we were rather successfully feeding ourselves, and exporting a lot too. What percentage of the US labor force were farmers in 1955, I wonder?

Bruce
 
. Yet noon said the yeltsin era, where people actually died of hunger and the parliament was fired uppon, was economically nefarious or undemocratic..


Well, aside from pretty much everyone on the left, anyway. But then they tend to be a bit thin on the ground in the US.

. In 1989, the planning was that the governement would go from bureaucratic control to scientifical/technical control..

:confused:


Bruce
 
I think the US would hesitate to initiate a serious grain embargo against the USSR. For one it would put the hardline into over drive and they might consider radical solutions to food shortages. Similarly the US would be seen as responsible if another famine broke out. The Soviet agricultural failures would be pointed to, but everyone would know most countries resolve serious famines through imports (I think Amartya Sen discusses this).

How "non-serious" was the Carter embargo, and what would radical solutions look like? As you say, if things get famine-bad, the Soviets probably can get some food somewhere, even if they have to sell off the family silver or mortgage half the forests to Japanese lumber companies.

Consider the China example, where you have Tiananmen Square (and the general crack down used to keep it out of other cities), but limited foreign policy repercussions.

Generally, international opinion is pretty darn tolerant on atrocities commited against your own countrymen, less so when committed on your neighbors. And while the US Chinese population might be divided on how the US government should respond, the US Polish/Hungarian/whatever population would not be.

(Finally, I have an unpleasant suspicion dead Asians don't have quite the same impact on most Americans as dead Europeans :( )

Loss of other forms of control/discipline (which I would argue are even more important in a non-free market economy).

I think we can agree that a _more_ totalitarian USSR would in some ways be better fitted for serious changes in the system...


Some. Certainly helps the foreign trade balance for however takes over in 1985. If the USSR didn’t intervene in Afghanistan, would there have been a trickle over into the Central Asian Republics?

Afghanistan was only very marginally a part of the Soviet "system", the border was quite tight, and the news remains censored. I'm not sure why this should be more of a blow to central Asian stability than Egypt kicking out its Russian advisors or Somalia switching its sponsors, or provoke more instability than that caused by the Iranian revolution. Sans the US and USSR backing different sides, the situation in Afghanistan probably resolves itself one way or the other before too long and without bringing anyone as wacky as the Taliban to power.

Another thought: the Central Asian provinces by the late Brezhnev period had to some extent come under the control of local "mafias", corrupt local politicians which were allowed a lot of latitude (freedom to get up to all sorts of corrupt shit) in exchange for loyalty and local quiet. A reforming Soviet Union might try to leave these areas for last in any effort for large-scale reform, but would the leadership be so cautious? OTL, in spite of various articles written about the Soviet's "Muslim problem", these provinces remained loyal to the end, quickly throwing in with the plotters during the anti-Gorbachev coup: but in a "someone other than G. tries reform" scenario, might there be efforts to remove particularly corrupt and change-averse local leadership - which leads to them playing the "nationalist card" against Moscow?

Bruce
 
How "non-serious" was the Carter embargo

I would say it was non-serious in the sense that he wanted to send a message, rather than actually stop the flow of food to Soviet citizens. Hence why it was rolled back

and what would radical solutions look like?

Well, I heard (but have not documentation/source) that NATO war-gamed a scenario where the Soviets invade after a poor harvest threatens their grip on power. This sounds pretty absurd, but hey, who knows. A more likely radical scenario is the Soviet leadership decide that certain areas are relatively expendable and have their food allocations cut back. The Soviets would probably deny this publically, but might hint they it’s really not their fault they can’t import to make up any short fall.

Generally, international opinion is pretty darn tolerant on atrocities commited against your own countrymen, less so when committed on your neighbors.
True, but on the other hand there was little practical action following East Germany in 1953 (?) Hungary, Czechoslovakia or after various flare ups in Poland. The strong response to Afghanistan was something of an aberration, and that was because of the international perceptions of spheres of influence.

Finally, I have an unpleasant suspicion dead Asians don't have quite the same impact on most Americans as dead Europeans
I always feel a little off when someone says something along the lines of ‘life is cheap in places like that’ too.

Afghanistan was only very marginally a part of the Soviet "system", the border was quite tight, and the news remains censored. I'm not sure why this should be more of a blow to central Asian stability than Egypt kicking out its Russian advisors or Somalia switching its sponsors, or provoke more instability than that caused by the Iranian revolution. Sans the US and USSR backing different sides, the situation in Afghanistan probably resolves itself one way or the other before too long and without bringing anyone as wacky as the Taliban to power.
Where Afghanistan got tricky is the ethnic makeup, particularly in the north. There weren’t a lot of Somalis living in the USSR for example, but the Tajiks practically had their own country. At a time when the Soviets were concerned about nationalism/separatism (by association, radical Islam) and certain developmental problems that were emerging in the Central Asian republics (agriculture never worked but population exploding, uneven industrial development), Afghanistan must have looked particularly threatening.

but in a "someone other than G. tries reform" scenario, might there be efforts to remove particularly corrupt and change-averse local leadership - which leads to them playing the "nationalist card" against Moscow?
That’s a good point. Brezhnev was able to reduce tensions in Central Asia essentially because the people in charge were buddies of his (Kunayev in Kazakhstan being prominent). Gorbachev didn’t have such times to my knowledge, but he was less threatening than a more effective reformer. The afore mentioned Ligachev had AFAIK no links in the area, his background was in sunny Siberia.

Whacky idea: General Secretary Saparmurat Niyazov, holding the USSR together through judicious allocations of kickbacks and political insanity.

Anyhow I’m looking to do a bit of a what if (not in narrative style, I can’t write fiction) starting in January 1969 in the next week or so. You might want to keep an eye out for it.
 
I would say it was non-serious in the sense that he wanted to send a message, rather than actually stop the flow of food to Soviet citizens. Hence why it was rolled back

Wasn't it Reagan who reversed it, to please US farmers?

A more likely radical scenario is the Soviet leadership decide that certain areas are relatively expendable and have their food allocations cut back. The Soviets would probably deny this publically, but might hint they it’s really not their fault they can’t import to make up any short fall

Food riots? Shooting people in the streets? Sounds non-fun, but I suppose if the shooters are a different ethnicity from the shootees it might not go entirely pear-shaped from the point of Moscow...

True, but on the other hand there was little practical action following East Germany in 1953 (?) Hungary, Czechoslovakia or after various flare ups in Poland. The strong response to Afghanistan was something of an aberration, and that was because of the international perceptions of spheres of influence

Maybe, but the USSR in the 50s was a lot more economically isolated from the rest of the world than in the 1980s, and we had less levers to use: there wasn't much in the way of options between "wag finger vigorously" and "start WWIII". 1968, the US was rather seriously involved elsewhere, and the USSR _did_ pay a considerable diplomatic price in losing any pull it had with western leftists of all stripes, only the Communist "ditto-heads" hanging tough.

Where Afghanistan got tricky is the ethnic makeup, particularly in the north. There weren’t a lot of Somalis living in the USSR for example, but the Tajiks practically had their own country. At a time when the Soviets were concerned about nationalism/separatism (by association, radical Islam) and certain developmental problems that were emerging in the Central Asian republics (agriculture never worked but population exploding, uneven industrial development), Afghanistan must have looked particularly threatening.

If they felt so, they were probably worrying overly: the central Asian states, as mentioned, remained loyal, and the real radicals and drivers of anti-communist revolution in Afghanistan were the Pashtuns, not the Tajiks. Soviet Tajiks were unlikely to be at all enthused about the notion of breaking away to join a Pashtun-dominated Afghan state.

Whacky idea: General Secretary Saparmurat Niyazov, holding the USSR together through judicious allocations of kickbacks and political insanity

Victory through corruption: well, some US political figures did pretty well that way... :D

Anyhow I’m looking to do a bit of a what if (not in narrative style, I can’t write fiction) starting in January 1969 in the next week or so. You might want to keep an eye out for it.

I'll keep the ol' eyeball peeled.

best,
Bruce
 
Wasn't it Reagan who reversed it, to please US farmers?

You may be right. I’ll look into this.

Food riots? Shooting people in the streets? Sounds non-fun, but I suppose if the shooters are a different ethnicity from the shootees it might not go entirely pear-shaped from the point of Moscow...
It would be a replay of the very early 1920s/early 1930s. As you suggested, troops brought in from outside could be reasonably reliable in extracting grain, or shooting people. Add in the Soviet army has become relatively ‘professional’ by that stage (and thus more inclined to do as ordered), and there is the threat of chaos, it might work for a while. Although by the end of War Communism/Collectivisation, even shooting people wasn’t enough... and sometimes the soldiers shot the ‘wrong’ people. In this scenario there is the added bonuses:
- The party-state can almost get away with blaming someone else.
- There might be a sense that the state is at war, or otherwise under threat. People might not rally to the flag, but they might be ‘reasonable’.

1968, the US was rather seriously involved elsewhere, and the USSR _did_ pay a considerable diplomatic price in losing any pull it had with western leftists of all stripes, only the Communist "ditto-heads" hanging tough.

By the 1980s the Soviets have already burnt their bridges with the Euro-Communists, and need not worry about re-combustion ;). Another thought is just how effective US assistance to a Soviet bloc country could be. Afghanistan was semi-open, making it easier to arm a resistance etc. Meanwhile US aid to the Solidarity union had to be more limited due to logistics and also the difficulties involved in expanding the effort. So that leaves the embargo option, and as discussed that would only be semi-effective.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
I suspect a 1955 US farmer on a John Deere was rather more productive than a Soviet one in the 1980s - we were rather successfully feeding ourselves, and exporting a lot too. What percentage of the US labor force were farmers in 1955, I wonder?

Bruce

Well, we were making just plain better equipment. That's one bit of logic that military planners seemed to leave behind in the Cold War: they asked themselves if the Soviets made better tanks, and convinced themselves that they did. But they never bothered to look at how shitty the tractors were that were coming out of the exact same factories and off the exact same assembly lines and machine shops.

Where I live, in Iowa, we were farming like 90 percent of our soybean and corn with tractors or combines by the end of the 40s. The Soviets weren't even able to get half their farm force mechanized by the mid-50s.
Kruschev didn't visit Iowa for laughs (though the farm he visited was owned by a crazy pig farmer who ended up going to the Kremlin 4 or 5 times, beat Nikita in chess, and advised him on economics policy), he wanted to see how we were so freaking good at making our crops good.

From what I've read, alot of it was logical stuff that came out of mechanization. A horse, for instance, can't pull a large planter because you're using (literally) 1 horsepower. When you get a Super 77 and some cash in your pocket, then you can get, say, a 5 or 10 row planter. This lets you plant your rows in straight lines which saves you on wasted space. The horse, no matter how well you control it, is going to wander this way and that while your guiding it. It's an animal not a GPS sensor, you know?
So even if you take an American field with 100 rows and a Soviet field with 100 rows, the American field would be smaller because the rows are straighter. The farmer would be more likely to have a tractor of his own (as opposed to a communal one) that's in better condition, so the field is also going to be better taken care of, i.e. herbicides, pesticides, and general irrigation.

Now that's not to say the American farmer isn't going to be sharing resources, too. He might be buying his anhydrous ammonia to spray on the fields from the local Farmer's Co-op. But the fact is in America of the 40s, 50s, on up to the present day your average farmer has more resources at his fingertips than a Soviet/Russian farmer.
 
Top