Deleted member 1487
Manstein's backhand blow, which intended to use the same tactics that had lead to the Russians getting curbstomped at Kharkov twice was extremely risky. This may sound weird coming from me, defending Hitler over Manstein, but Manstein's plan assumed the Soviets would Launch their offensive towards Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk and that they would leave their right flank open to him massing a pazer army around kharkov and pinning them against the sea of Azov. There was no particular reason the Soviets would recklessly follow army group south in a general pull back to the Dneiper, plus this surrendered vital terrain in the Dontez Basin that was vital to supplying the axis war effort. And what Manstein ommitted to mention in his memoirs, was that even if his offensive smashed a few Soviet armies, the front would still be longer than it wasand his own flanks would be incredably vulnerable, giving the Russians a free hand along hundreds of miles of front to cut his supply lines and stop his offensive in its tracks
The smartest thing for the Germans to do would have been to just sit put and keep their tanks in reserve, and take advantage of the powerful defensive lines they built during the end of the winter and the spring... if the germans still have their main striking force near the kursk salient, Stalin will not remove his reserves, in case the Germans do decide to go forward with it at some point, he would then be forced into an attack against a strong positions and the germans would have the advantages of being on the defensive.
Sitting put in their pre-Zitadell positions was not an option for the Germans. They did not have the manpower to hold the line with the Kursk bulge, that was the entire reason why the offensive was necessary in the first place! Germany had to either go forward or go back, they could not sit still.
As it was, they were going to lose the Donetz Basin regardless, so might as well fall back and hold a defensible line with their forces intact. Granted, there was no guarantee that pulling back would cause the Russians to fall for Manstein's plan, but the Germans were far less likely to achieve even a stalemate by attacking. If Manstein's plan worked, he would pull back again, daring the Russians to try to come after him after losing a couple armies. By this point the Wotan line should be ready for anything the Russians want to throw at it and the front solidifies similar to the heavily fortified area in front of Moscow in 1942.