Soviet Union loses Kurk

Deleted member 1487

Manstein's backhand blow, which intended to use the same tactics that had lead to the Russians getting curbstomped at Kharkov twice was extremely risky. This may sound weird coming from me, defending Hitler over Manstein, but Manstein's plan assumed the Soviets would Launch their offensive towards Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk and that they would leave their right flank open to him massing a pazer army around kharkov and pinning them against the sea of Azov. There was no particular reason the Soviets would recklessly follow army group south in a general pull back to the Dneiper, plus this surrendered vital terrain in the Dontez Basin that was vital to supplying the axis war effort. And what Manstein ommitted to mention in his memoirs, was that even if his offensive smashed a few Soviet armies, the front would still be longer than it was:eek: and his own flanks would be incredably vulnerable, giving the Russians a free hand along hundreds of miles of front to cut his supply lines and stop his offensive in its tracks

The smartest thing for the Germans to do would have been to just sit put and keep their tanks in reserve, and take advantage of the powerful defensive lines they built during the end of the winter and the spring... if the germans still have their main striking force near the kursk salient, Stalin will not remove his reserves, in case the Germans do decide to go forward with it at some point, he would then be forced into an attack against a strong positions and the germans would have the advantages of being on the defensive.

Sitting put in their pre-Zitadell positions was not an option for the Germans. They did not have the manpower to hold the line with the Kursk bulge, that was the entire reason why the offensive was necessary in the first place! Germany had to either go forward or go back, they could not sit still.

As it was, they were going to lose the Donetz Basin regardless, so might as well fall back and hold a defensible line with their forces intact. Granted, there was no guarantee that pulling back would cause the Russians to fall for Manstein's plan, but the Germans were far less likely to achieve even a stalemate by attacking. If Manstein's plan worked, he would pull back again, daring the Russians to try to come after him after losing a couple armies. By this point the Wotan line should be ready for anything the Russians want to throw at it and the front solidifies similar to the heavily fortified area in front of Moscow in 1942.
 

Blair152

Banned
Sitting put in their pre-Zitadell positions was not an option for the Germans. They did not have the manpower to hold the line with the Kursk bulge, that was the entire reason why the offensive was necessary in the first place! Germany had to either go forward or go back, they could not sit still.

As it was, they were going to lose the Donetz Basin regardless, so might as well fall back and hold a defensible line with their forces intact. Granted, there was no guarantee that pulling back would cause the Russians to fall for Manstein's plan, but the Germans were far less likely to achieve even a stalemate by attacking. If Manstein's plan worked, he would pull back again, daring the Russians to try to come after him after losing a couple armies. By this point the Wotan line should be ready for anything the Russians want to throw at it and the front solidifies similar to the heavily fortified area in front of Moscow in 1942.
That's right and the Battle of Kursk turned out to be a foretaste of what they'd get at the Battle of the Bulge.
 
Sitting put in their pre-Zitadell positions was not an option for the Germans. They did not have the manpower to hold the line with the Kursk bulge, that was the entire reason why the offensive was necessary in the first place! Germany had to either go forward or go back, they could not sit still.

As it was, they were going to lose the Donetz Basin regardless, so might as well fall back and hold a defensible line with their forces intact. Granted, there was no guarantee that pulling back would cause the Russians to fall for Manstein's plan, but the Germans were far less likely to achieve even a stalemate by attacking. If Manstein's plan worked, he would pull back again, daring the Russians to try to come after him after losing a couple armies. By this point the Wotan line should be ready for anything the Russians want to throw at it and the front solidifies similar to the heavily fortified area in front of Moscow in 1942.


But Von Manstein's withdrawl plan wouldn't shorten the front. The ratio of force to space in Russia was almost always going to allow breakthroughs. If the Germans needed extra manpower to hold their Kursk positions, they could always evacuate the Orel salient which would allow at least two high quality corps of the 9th army to move into reserve, or reinforce army group south as needed

The way I see it, the Germans had their striking power concentrated at Kursk, Stalin knew this and had his striking power concentrated there too. Lets say Hiter decides on another round of postponements, or Operation Husky goes ahead two weeks earlier than otl, making him think it wise to postpone the offensive again. Stalin would not withdraw his striking power from Kursk for fear the Germans would decide to then move forward with the offensive and pinch off the salient, so Stalin would have two choices, sit tight (sacrificing an entire campaign season) or attack at Kursk... and the German defensive lines at Kursk would slow the Russians down, and the mobile divisions they stockpiled for their own offensive could be used as quick reaction forces to strike at the flanks of any Soviet breakthrough, and force them to defend whatever gains they make. Fighting from the defensive, the Tigers and Panthers could take advantage of the tremendous range advantage their cannons possessed and inflict long distance death. Von Manstein and Model had 2000 tanks and assault guns between them and two dozen fresh infantry divisions. Whilst this proved not enough to capture Kursk which had turned into a fortress, they would be enough to fight a defensive battle (where the Germans allready had fortified lines) and the tanks would be in their more successful role of shock instead of a brute force attempt into thick AT screens
 

Deleted member 1487

But Von Manstein's withdrawl plan wouldn't shorten the front. The ratio of force to space in Russia was almost always going to allow breakthroughs. If the Germans needed extra manpower to hold their Kursk positions, they could always evacuate the Orel salient which would allow at least two high quality corps of the 9th army to move into reserve, or reinforce army group south as needed

The way I see it, the Germans had their striking power concentrated at Kursk, Stalin knew this and had his striking power concentrated there too. Lets say Hiter decides on another round of postponements, or Operation Husky goes ahead two weeks earlier than otl, making him think it wise to postpone the offensive again. Stalin would not withdraw his striking power from Kursk for fear the Germans would decide to then move forward with the offensive and pinch off the salient, so Stalin would have two choices, sit tight (sacrificing an entire campaign season) or attack at Kursk... and the German defensive lines at Kursk would slow the Russians down, and the mobile divisions they stockpiled for their own offensive could be used as quick reaction forces to strike at the flanks of any Soviet breakthrough, and force them to defend whatever gains they make. Fighting from the defensive, the Tigers and Panthers could take advantage of the tremendous range advantage their cannons possessed and inflict long distance death. Von Manstein and Model had 2000 tanks and assault guns between them and two dozen fresh infantry divisions. Whilst this proved not enough to capture Kursk which had turned into a fortress, they would be enough to fight a defensive battle (where the Germans allready had fortified lines) and the tanks would be in their more successful role of shock instead of a brute force attempt into thick AT screens

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_von_Mellenthin
Friedrich von Mellenthin in his book Panzer Battles advocated against a static defense that locked the German army to any terrain feature of 'line'. Basically to beat the Russians its was necessary to maintain mobility where the German army had an advantage, otherwise the Russians would win with a set piece attack and massive numerical advantage. By May 1943 the Russians had pulled away in the numbers of every sort of equipment, weapons, and trained soldier. Even though the Germans inflicted heavier losses on the Russians by launching Kursk, the Russians were able to come back and launch several massive counter offensives that destroyed the German army.

Had the Germans stood still and waited, even by evacuating Orel, they would have be giving the Russians the initiative and letting them use their massive numerical advantage at multiple places on the front to overload the German defenses. The Russians were not stupid and wouldn't attack into the German strongest positions if they could help it. The Germans were weaker several other places on the line besides Kursk, which is where the Russians would launch their offensives and roll them back. It was a bad situation and tough decisions needed to be made. Sitting still beyond a certain point was not an option.

Now, that said, I would agree with practicing operational deception by threatening Kursk for as long as believable before pulling back. Let the Russians finally start shifting out of their defensive stance and pull back before their telegraphed punch finished winding up. This would disjoint their planned offensive, much line the pull back to the Hindenburg line did in 1917. Once they move forward to occupy the abandoned areas and out of their defensive lines, launch several limited counter attacks and wear them down in mobile actions, heavily supported by the Luftwaffe. Not an ideal solution and one that still gives up the Donetz Basin, but the Russians were going to drive the Germans back eventually, might as well fight in favorable circumstances that are dictated by the Germans instead of sitting around and letting the Russians set the pace.
 
Sitting put in their pre-Zitadell positions was not an option for the Germans. They did not have the manpower to hold the line with the Kursk bulge, that was the entire reason why the offensive was necessary in the first place! Germany had to either go forward or go back, they could not sit still.

As it was, they were going to lose the Donetz Basin regardless, so might as well fall back and hold a defensible line with their forces intact. Granted, there was no guarantee that pulling back would cause the Russians to fall for Manstein's plan, but the Germans were far less likely to achieve even a stalemate by attacking. If Manstein's plan worked, he would pull back again, daring the Russians to try to come after him after losing a couple armies. By this point the Wotan line should be ready for anything the Russians want to throw at it and the front solidifies similar to the heavily fortified area in front of Moscow in 1942.

The problem with this backhand blows strategy is that it assumes Soviet military leadership would be locked in their incompetence forever. that they would keep launching offensives which had unreachable goals and were not adequatly supported by logistics.

This line of thinking ignores the fact that by 1943 soviet military was learning fast. Post-Kursk offensive showed that and RA had reachable goals, they only exceeded their capabilities in final stages. In 1943 RA leadership was not yet the brain that brough us Bagration but it was getting there.

So all in all if Germans pull back after holding Orel and Belgorod for months, building up their forces I doubt RA would follow this reatreat blindly, setting themselves for yet another bloody nose only a few months after Kharkov.

As for Tigers and Panthers giving Germans an edge, that is doubtfull. Panthers were still in their unreliable phase and without true baptism of fire the question is how any of those faults would be properly identified and fixed (and when). As for Tigers, they would still face their usual problems, that is high fuel consumption and recovery problems. Fighting on the offensive would make former very problematic, fighting on the defensive, specially on very fluid battlefield, would make later very problematic.

By 1943 germany was running out of options and they needed decissive victories to turn the tide, be it smashing RA offensive capability for a while or keeping Wallies off european continent. Unlike SU they couldn't trade space for time becaue they needed a lot of time and space they would trade would be a big loss for them.
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_von_Mellenthin
Friedrich von Mellenthin in his book Panzer Battles advocated against a static defense that locked the German army to any terrain feature of 'line'. Basically to beat the Russians its was necessary to maintain mobility where the German army had an advantage, otherwise the Russians would win with a set piece attack and massive numerical advantage. By May 1943 the Russians had pulled away in the numbers of every sort of equipment, weapons, and trained soldier. Even though the Germans inflicted heavier losses on the Russians by launching Kursk, the Russians were able to come back and launch several massive counter offensives that destroyed the German army.

Had the Germans stood still and waited, even by evacuating Orel, they would have be giving the Russians the initiative and letting them use their massive numerical advantage at multiple places on the front to overload the German defenses. The Russians were not stupid and wouldn't attack into the German strongest positions if they could help it. The Germans were weaker several other places on the line besides Kursk, which is where the Russians would launch their offensives and roll them back. It was a bad situation and tough decisions needed to be made. Sitting still beyond a certain point was not an option.

Now, that said, I would agree with practicing operational deception by threatening Kursk for as long as believable before pulling back. Let the Russians finally start shifting out of their defensive stance and pull back before their telegraphed punch finished winding up. This would disjoint their planned offensive, much line the pull back to the Hindenburg line did in 1917. Once they move forward to occupy the abandoned areas and out of their defensive lines, launch several limited counter attacks and wear them down in mobile actions, heavily supported by the Luftwaffe. Not an ideal solution and one that still gives up the Donetz Basin, but the Russians were going to drive the Germans back eventually, might as well fight in favorable circumstances that are dictated by the Germans instead of sitting around and letting the Russians set the pace.

I must say not only do I disagree with Mellinthin (who was chief of intel for the Africa Corps for a bit), but so did Rommel and Bayerlin (when Rommel proposed his grand strategy after Aleimein... Bayerlin describes it in war without hate) What the Germans had built in that area wasn't a single line, it was multiple defensive lines. No matter what line the Germans where on and no matter how powerfully they built it, the ratio of force to space would allow the Russians to mass a major strike force, attack one small section of the line, and breakthrough... however, with a well developed defensive system, of the sort that existed at Belgorad, the Russians would break through but the German infantry would endevour to hold the shoulders of the breakthrough in depth, and then the Panzers would be free to attack the advancing Russians in the flank,

Because of the huge mass of German strength at Kursk, Stalin wouldn't be able to attack elsewhere, because it would require thinning out his defenses at Kursk, which could in turn trigger the Germans to open up their offensive against a weakened line (and Stalin was pretty paranoid too, so this plays to that weakness)
 
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