How about an attack in Poland instead of Finland.Could the units in that conflict tilt the balance against the cruzon line or the 1939 russo-german border?
The actual invasion is in 1941.
How about an attack in Poland instead of Finland.Could the units in that conflict tilt the balance against the cruzon line or the 1939 russo-german border?
How about an attack in Poland instead of Finland.Could the units in that conflict tilt the balance against the cruzon line or the 1939 russo-german border?
One possible PoD about this is that Hitler tells the Finns to accept the Soviet ultimatum since there is not goint to be any German help and actually he supports Russia on this (making promises that this is a temporary sacrifice and Germay will act to redress it in the near future when the war in the West is won). Now, a little hard to justify it without hindsight (by which it is very wise, keeping the Soviets unaware of how low the Red Army has fallen completely screws them in 1941). Maybe he doesn't want the risk of Stalin conquering Finland or UK-France intervening in Northen Europe. On second thoughts, this is not too outlandish a justification. And no Winter War makes for Soviet overconfidence.
So, a scenario where Finland cedes to Stalin. What about the Terijoki Government? Remember Finland has other close friends besides Germany, that will send support.
U-2 hadn't been considered warplane before 1941. It was basic trainer of Soviet Air Force. I-15 in it's various incarnations ahd been reduced to fighter-bomber/ground attack plane role. I-16 was still the backbone of the airforce numerically.Most of the Soviet airfleet consisted of I-16s, I-15s, U-2s.
To be frank, I see no realistic POD leading to 1941 Soviet attack. Red Army was in the middle of rearming mayhem at this time. 1942 seems to be the earliest possible date. How about longer Balkan adventure for Germans and much more serious Italian screwup in Africa (leading to more massive German involvement here, not puny two divisions of Rommel) to prevent German 1941 attack? And Stalin attacking in the 1942?Ok, thinking about this, the PoD would have to be a different experience in Finland--perhaps the Red Army crushes Finland quickly and installs a puppet regime in that nation.
OK, same "mechanical breakdowns" mantra again. Don't you guys want to take a look at those "old unreliable machines" performing in 1945 against Japanese. These were the same BT-7s, but four years older and worn by permanent use as training vehicles (Soviets used to drill their divisions on Far West or in Siberia, then ship them West without gear and issue heavy gear in Urals or more often European Russia). They should break as soon as they made their first kilometers, aren't they? Not at all. They successfully crossed some most inhospitable terrains known to humans and gave Japanese the royal whooping. So, what was the difference (aside from many logistic ailments, partially fixed by WWII experience)? Soviet units were operating as they were supposed to from the very beginning, single killing strike across vast plains, utilizing weaknesses of enemy's defence. I wouldn't dare to say that something of this nature is possible in the West in 1941-1942, but Red Army would be utterly devastating first hundred to two hundred miles of their march. Which bring us where exactly? Riiiiight, Central Poland regions we were talking about from the very beginning.Don't forget that a sizable part of the huge numbers at hand simply went down to mechanical breakdowns as soon as they made their first kilometers.
German run-of-the-mill field artillery was not of much help against T-34, virtually useless against KVs. Acht-acht was absolutely deadly, but it is one thing to lure T-34 into prepared firetrap and quite another to try to predict where T-34s are going to pop up, when you are dealing with frontline this long.Then there were the newest designs, decidedly a danger to the German panzers. Guess how the Germans dealt with T-34s and KVs? _By luring them to counterattack_. They couldn't get rid of them with their panzers, but if the Soviets _advanced_ towards their 88s, run-of-the-mill field artillery, and less ordinary 105mm cannons, then those Soviet tanks could be eliminated.
And in this scenario, the Germans don't need to stop and lure the Soviets; it's the Soviets offering their tanks for the shoot-out.
Quoting Soviet strength is useless without knowing German strength. So, I don't see anything particularly sobering in statement that not 100% of Soviet planes will be available. This is part of life and it was very well understood by Red Army leadership that non-combat losses will be significant, if your planes are serviced by barely literate peasants, most of whom saw their first horseless carriage less than decade ago.Of the 1771 combat aircraft it had on June 1, 1043 were fighters, a high proportion. So it would seem to be very well off.
But of these 1043 fighters, only 906 were operational. An 86% operational rate, which is very good. It tells us they were on a peacetime status, and that as soon as they started flying seriously, the rate would fall. And it did.
Of these 906 operational fighters, only 220 were modern MiGs and Yak-1s. The rest were aging or totally obsolete Polikarpovs. Whose serviceability rate woul dpredictably be appalling, let alone any enemy intervention.
And for these 220 modern fighters, the Western front had 211 combat-ready pilots (with more pilots than aircraft as to the MiG-1s, and no ready pilot at all for the Yaks).
Kind of sobering math, isn't it.
This math is clear proof of insanity known as "Soviets were going to attack" dogma. No army breaks a peace with under-50% strength of it's supposedly frontline units. Was Stalin about to attack poor peaceful Germans in Summer 1941, those units would be close to it's full strength.Since Michele has demonstrated the inability of the Soviets to dominate the air, here's why they'll have trouble on the ground.
Just a sketch; their Mechanized Corps were to be the vanguard of the armored thrusts reaching, where, Romania. Again, it's sobering maths. I'm just taking the Western Military District and the Southwestern/ Kiev Military District. as examples, since they're the closest to Romania :
Western
# Mech. Corps - Manpower - Percentage of Strength compared to full strength
6 24005 67%
11 21605 60%
13 17809 49%
14 15550 43%
17 16578 46%
20 20389 57%
Kiev/ SWestern
4 28097 78%
8 31927 89%
9 26833 74%
15 33935 94%
16 26380 73%
19 22654 63%
22 24087 67%
24 21556 60%
As you can see, the vanguards are not prepared. Out of that list, only the 15th and 8th has more than 80% of full strength. Both have 707 tanks and 818 tanks respectively. Note that the 13th and 20th Mechanized Corps, at half strength each, which consists of 2 tank divisions (13th : 25th and 31st TDs, 20th 26th and 38th), has ONLY 32 TANKS (13th) and 16 TANKS (20th).
An average of 30% of the tanks had NO/ very little cannon ammunition on June 22nd 1941 and approx. 30-40% never reached the front due to engine, fuel and maintainance problems.![]()
This was actually written out in 'Third Reich Victorious' it was pretty good, but it overlooked the more far reaching aspects of such an attack. There really is no way Roosevelt could back the Soviets and still keep public opinion. The reason Hitler declared war on USA was because the were pretty much at war anyway. If USA is not backing the Soviets, Hitler has less reason to declare war on them, war with USA is unlikely to happen at all. And considering the Soviets have made a phenomenally stupid move, this is beginning to look really bad.
OK, same "mechanical breakdowns" mantra again. Don't you guys want to take a look at those "old unreliable machines" performing in 1945 against Japanese. These were the same BT-7s, but four years older and worn by permanent use as training vehicles (Soviets used to drill their divisions on Far West or in Siberia, then ship them West without gear and issue heavy gear in Urals or more often European Russia). They should break as soon as they made their first kilometers, aren't they? Not at all. They successfully crossed some most inhospitable terrains known to humans and gave Japanese the royal whooping. So, what was the difference (aside from many logistic ailments, partially fixed by WWII experience)? Soviet units were operating as they were supposed to from the very beginning, single killing strike across vast plains, utilizing weaknesses of enemy's defence. I wouldn't dare to say that something of this nature is possible in the West in 1941-1942, but Red Army would be utterly devastating first hundred to two hundred miles of their march. Which bring us where exactly? Riiiiight, Central Poland regions we were talking about from the very beginning.
German run-of-the-mill field artillery was not of much help against T-34, virtually useless against KVs. Acht-acht was absolutely deadly, but it is one thing to lure T-34 into prepared firetrap and quite another to try to predict where T-34s are going to pop up, when you are dealing with frontline this long.
Quoting Soviet strength is useless without knowing German strength. So, I don't see anything particularly sobering in statement that not 100% of Soviet planes will be available. This is part of life and it was very well understood by Red Army leadership that non-combat losses will be significant, if your planes are serviced by barely literate peasants, most of whom saw their first horseless carriage less than decade ago.
Okay, if the Soviet Union is attacking Germany first, this means that they will be operating at full readiness--their units will be at full strength, they will have massed as far forward as they dare, and they certainly will not be tolerating German overflights.
This was not the situation OTL, but perhaps it can be achieved ITTL. Still, even if men are formed up and weapons sent towards the front, Stalin can only change the deployment of the Red Army, not its quality or its doctrine. Indeed, even if a better Red Army attacked in 1941, its main advantage is that there is no "Pearl Harbor" like sudden attack. Germany will not be caught napping--but the world would probably rather that neither side won instead of reluctantly supporting the Soviet Union.
The downside to this 1941 offensive is that Hitler's infallibility might be discarded and his influence reduced, while Germany might be forced to swallow moves made to increase its wartime economy, which will increase its economic power.
Once the Initial Soviet Offensive breaks down Germany will be back with a vengeance, and they will probably play smarter as a result. Without support from the Western Allies, Stalin has no chance to KO Germany and is likely to find his forward forces encircled in Western Poland, instead of Eastern Poland/Ukraine. It is not possible that 1941 has Germany seriously threatening Moscow, but it is very possible that the Soviets fight for it in 1942...
Let me ask you a question. Would you consider anything not brand spanking new as "useless"? Because that's what you come down to. Writing BTs off inidscriminately just because they needed some maintenance. They were lost in 1941 IOTL because Nazi caught USSR with it's pants down, a lot of armoured units were in "summer maintenance" mode, which is nice way of saying "had most of their gear disassembled and all their supplies completely separate from units which should have been using them". Drawing conclusion between IOTL performance and hypotetical "first strike" effectiveness is doubtful at best. August Storm is far better measuring stick, and BTs performed quite impressively there, although against weaker enemy.It's not a "mantra", it's mere reality. I'm not saying that the the BT-7s or T-26s were in poor repair and needing maintenance because they were old, or because I think so; I say that because that's what the official Soviet strength returns said.
Your assumption is safe, but over-simplistic. Would you say "Soviet tanks were not ready to run all the way to Channel or even to Berlin" and I would agree with you. However, the same repressive Soviet machine pretty much ensured that everything referred to as 1st or 2nd category would be up and running at the "hour X", because would it not, unit commanders will have an appointment with NKVD thugs.The official Soviet strength returns, BTW, should be something you should be familiar with if you insist on discussing this issue; and I think it is a safe assumption to think that they would be a tad over-optimistic.
Dirty reality is far more complicated than those shining numbers. 1st category did not mean "100% combat readiness", as both KV and T-34 suffered numerous teething problems (which gradually became deathbed ailments for KV) and crews were in the middle of learning curve. However, it is far more important that "2nd category" weren't all useless junk, at least as far as 1st strike is concerned. It would be pretty tough to find any brand-new BT-5, as production stopped about 7 years before that. BT-7 had been produced until the end of 1940, so some new units could be there, but probably they weren't deployed in this particular district. But, bulk of BT-7s would most likely be of 1936-1938 vintage, still less than 5 years old. A lot of life left in it, most military vehicles serve for 20 or more years. I can only repeat that, would Stalin define date of war, 100% of 1st and 2nd category would be ready for the 1st strike, and probably good chunk of 3rd category (the latter ones at least would be able to move enough to guard supply lines and depots, freeing better machines for active duty).For instance, let's take the Western Special Military District. Its T-34s were all in the 1st readiness category on June 1st, meaning that they were new and perfectly combat ready 228 out of 228. How many of its BT-7s and BT-5s were in the 1st readiness category? 0, zero, out of 593. Zero. 469 were in the 2nd category, which meant used but operational or operational but needing maintenance. 124 were in the 3rd or 4th category, which despite the official description in this situation meant "suitable for the junk yard". In other words, 20% of the tanks officially on strength are not going to leave the depots, and of the remaining 80%, a sizable part "needs maintenance". In the Soviet technical-logistical environment. I think we can draw the obvious conclusions. To complete the picture, the Western Special Military District had 3,345 tanks in all; of these, only 2,383 were not headed for scrapping, that's a 29% reduction. Again of the 71% remaining, some 80% was in the 2nd category.
Well, there's no (very few) invincible designs. Question is, how many chances Germans would have to deploy good gun on the KV's path, if Reds pick time and place of engagement.KV-1s certainly were hard to kill. Now, before we overestimate them, in the Western Special Military District, which had as stated above a total of 2,383 tanks in the 1st and 2nd categories, there were 75 KV-1s. A 3%.
That cleared, yes, a 105mm field howitzer wouldn't work against a KV-1, but it stood fair chances of disabling or even destroying a T-34 of 1940 vintage. To that one may add the 88s, yes, as you said, but also the 105mm cannons, which did take out T-34s and KV-1s.
Taking into account that, according to De Gaulle, more people in French (and, allegedly British) General Staff were concerned with planned strike on Baku than with fighting Nazi as late as 1940, I'd say it would be safe to assume that possibility of Lend-Lease did not bother Stalin more than one thinks today about possibility of Superman coming tomorrow and clearing economical and financial mess with one snap of his fingers. So, hypotetical attack would not take possibility of lend-lease into account. Speaking about coalition, Romania was an Axis power since 1940 and will definitely be attacked. Advantages of denying Romanian oil to Nazi are too great to be bothered about diplomatic niceties. Finland's fate is uncertain ITTL and would depend on their actions as much as Soviet ones. IOTL Finnish Navy were conducting joint operation with Kriegsmarine before June 25, hardly a friendly move toward USSR. So, all major areas of Barbarossa are still fair game ITTL (Slovakian border is relatively short and in heavy mountain country, IOTL Soviets retreated from there only under threat of invation after successfull German strikes North and South).As to the length of the frontage, it is not at all as long as you seem to think. The Germans in OTL had mustered a coalition and attacked not only from Eastern Prussia and former Poland, but also through Finland, Slovakia and Romania. Are you proposing that the Soviet first strike against Germany also attacks these neutral countries? That's a fine way to make sure the British and US don't help the Soviets.
Lend-Lease was a strike of blind luck for USSR IOTL. Forget about it ITTL.By the way as to Lend-Lease, it is a damned-if-you-do,-damned-if-you-don't situation.
I do believe that 1st strike will be pretty successfull, but Soviets will be unable to finish Germany. See my earlier comments in this thread.But if the Soviets attack first and, not only that, they also perform well, as you seem to believe
I would say it will be safe to assume that 9000 of them will be raining death and destruction on Germans on the Day X, if Stalin gets to pick the day of his choosing.The point I was making is that it is quite pointless to state, as the other poster said, that the Soviets had "12,000 planes in West Military District" [sic].
You are aware that "maskirovka" is Russian loanword, aren't you?Hope the Soviets master the art of 'diguised redeployment'
You are aware that "maskirovka" is Russian loanword, aren't you?
Let me ask you a question. Would you consider anything not brand spanking new as "useless"?
Well, there's no (very few) invincible designs. Question is, how many chances Germans would have to deploy good gun on the KV's path, if Reds pick time and place of engagement.
I would say it will be safe to assume that 9000 of them will be raining death and destruction on Germans on the Day X, if Stalin gets to pick the day of his choosing.
You are aware that "maskirovka" is Russian loanword, aren't you?
This "spanking" thingy needs to be looked upon too. One does not need to look farther than Soviet defence of Murmansk in 1941-1944. German attackers enjoyed (as it was brilliantly proven in this thread) complete surprise and all sorts of possible advantages (including advance massing of their forces in Finland, contrary to Finnish claim of not preparing to wage Continuation War before June 25), they attacked in the height of summer and had only several dozen miles to advance (and Soviet defence line was to Finnish as Lada is to Lexus). Result? Complete failure of attack (Murmansk area boasts that it has only piece of old Soviet border Nazis were unable to cross). Soviets had nothing between them and Finnish capital after the "spanking" (and they operated in the dead of Northern winter), and it was mostly Stalin's foolish belief that Finns were scared enough to follow peace agreement what prevented T-28s from parading through Helsinki. Walk through the park (as Soviets hoped it would be) the Winter War was not, but, in a hindsight, Soviets had more to boast about then much-feared Wehrmacht, which smashed Britons in the area under similar conditions into pieces just a year earlier.Is this assuming that the Soviets had still fought the winter war against Finland and been spanked?
Realistically, it would be impossible to hide. However, once in a blue moon it is possible to disfigure it enough so Nazis would be duped in thinking that Red Army is preparing to fight a defensive battle. Once in a blue moon. However, OP assumption is reeking ASB so much in itself, this moon could shine.Yes, but even the Soviets are going to have trouble hiding that much for redeployment.
Forget me if I misunderstood, but I was under the impression that you kinda assumed it, as your argument was along the lines of "Soviet tank strength is of no consequence, as they only had that much T-34s and KVs". If it isn't summary writeoff of older crafts (refusing to take them into account) than what it is?You put "useless" within quotes as if you were quoting me.
But you aren't.
I never said BT-5s or T-26s were "useless".
Categories (which were and are used for logistical purpose, to forecast need for spare parts) are IMHO almost useless here because they are intended for maintenance reasons. As far as hypotetical "Soviets strike first" scenario is concerned, there are only two categories: tanks which would be able to roll out in Day X and ones which would not. And I strongly believe that all "operational but used" vehicles will be deployed on Day X, even if some of "in need of maintenance" will be cannibalized for that (I think it would be mostly Category IV which would be cannibalized).The reason why I put together tanks that were "used but operational" and "operational but in need of maintenance" isn't that I think that only brand new tanks were operational; the reason is that _the Soviets_ put in the same category those two definitions. What I do think is that they did not believe that a tank "operational but used" would be closer to "brand new" than to "operational but in need of maintenance".
Yes and no. Yes, longevity of 1930-vintage tanks was nowhere near that of 1990-vintage cars, but neither were requirements. You don't use tank to commute 50-miles roundtrip 5 days a week for 5-10 years with as little maintenance as oil changes every 5K miles and brake job once in five years. You drive it (across some very tough terrain, true) for 10-20 hours a month tops. It sits in garage rest of the time, being cared for by the crew. And this care includes engine and tranny replacements every cople of hundreds hours of usage, you are right. All in all, I still think that my assumption is correct - anything made in 1937-1938 (years when most BT-7s were built) is as battleworthy in 1941 as same stuff made in 1941. Battleworthy, not as laborous to maintain.As a side note, today we tend to make assumptions that are misleading. We think about a tank in the terms of a car made today, intended to last years and to run hundreds of thousands of kilometers. But in the 1940s, tank engines, transmissions and suspensions were required to last for some _hundred of hours_. That puts a tank of 1940, built in 1930, in a different perspective than a car of today, built in 1998.
Yes, this was the way of thinking which was so successfull for French and British in 1940. We have that much anti-tank stuff between our tank units and AT artillery spread across the front against that much less German tanks (none of which is able to deal with direct hit from anything more than a popgun), they would not be able to break through. Besides, terrain on French-German border makes is so obvious where Panzers would attack. Yeah, right.I'd say the chances of meeting KV-1s with decent guns is pretty good, even if the Soviets choose where to attack. In OTL, the Western Special Military District plus the Baltic Special Military District had 400 between KV-1s and T-34s (I'm counting all categories here). Army Group Center deployed 15 105mm long-barreled battalions (each with three batteries), 21 mixed or heavy FlAK battalions (each of which had a minimum of 3 88cm batteries), plus 3 Panzerjäger battalions which included at least one company of self-propelled mounts carrying those same guns, and Army Group North had 6 105mm gun battalions and 10 mixed or heavy FlAK battalions. Of course the Soviets can try to achieve local concentration, even though geography dictates a few rather obvious high-likelihood areas to defend.
I completely agree with you. That was one of reasons I said from the very begining that I do not believe in "mirrored Barbarossa" (i.e. Soviet tanks knocking at Berlin's gates 3 months after first strike). Soviet strike will be much less successfull.…but the problem is that in OTL, the Germans could do all that damage in the very first days and the first month because they had incredibly extensive recon intel. The Soviets, wary of responding to "provocations", did not stop the recon overflights, which were not one or two, but _hundreds_.
Yes, Soviet attack will not be as much surprise and as much success. You're preaching to converted one. Re: German preparation for the attack, I don't believe that full-scale first strike will be Stalin's responce would he believe that German attack is coming in weeks. Much more likely he'll try to protect "Old Border" and delay Germans as possible, forcing them to deal with every damn fortress from Brest to Moscow. Scenario I'm looking at is more along the lines "Hitler switch his attention away from USSR (I dunno, ASBs messed his brain up or smth. of this nature) and Stalin attack Germans who are either unprepared or assumed defensive posture"So if the Soviets want to attack first (and, with reference to the above, defeat locally the German heavy anti-tank defenses by concentrating their heavy tanks in only a few chosen spots), they are in a double quandary with no solution.
Yes, having either uncontested air superiority or advanced military doctrine does help, as well as keeping Tigers' fuel supply short. However, I don't see Germans enjoying any of this advantages would they face Soviet deep operation.All that said, 88s and long-barrelled 105s are not the only solution to KV-1s. Otherwise, in the winter of 1944 the US troops facing Koenigstigers would have been trampled over all the way to the Channel, and they were not. Likewise, the heaviest French tanks in 1940 were not killed by 88s.
Forget me if I misunderstood, but I was under the impression that you kinda assumed it, as your argument was along the lines of "Soviet tank strength is of no consequence, as they only had that much T-34s and KVs". If it isn't summary writeoff of older crafts (refusing to take them into account) than what it is?
Categories (which were and are used for logistical purpose, to forecast need for spare parts) are IMHO almost useless here because they are intended for maintenance reasons. As far as hypotetical "Soviets strike first" scenario is concerned, there are only two categories: tanks which would be able to roll out in Day X and ones which would not. And I strongly believe that all "operational but used" vehicles will be deployed on Day X, even if some of "in need of maintenance" will be cannibalized for that (I think it would be mostly Category IV which would be cannibalized).
Yes and no. Yes, longevity of 1930-vintage tanks was nowhere near that of 1990-vintage cars, but neither were requirements. You don't use tank to commute 50-miles roundtrip 5 days a week for 5-10 years with as little maintenance as oil changes every 5K miles and brake job once in five years. You drive it (across some very tough terrain, true) for 10-20 hours a month tops. It sits in garage rest of the time, being cared for by the crew. And this care includes engine and tranny replacements every cople of hundreds hours of usage, you are right.
Yes, this was the way of thinking which was so successfull for French and British in 1940. We have that much anti-tank stuff between our tank units and AT artillery spread across the front against that much less German tanks (none of which is able to deal with direct hit from anything more than a popgun), they would not be able to break through. Besides, terrain on French-German border makes is so obvious where Panzers would attack. Yeah, right.
Yes, having either uncontested air superiority or advanced military doctrine does help, as well as keeping Tigers' fuel supply short. However, I don't see Germans enjoying any of this advantages would they face Soviet deep operation.
Finally we're coming to some kind of agreement. Yes, I agree that it is highly unrealistic to expect 100% battle readiness from Soviet tank units of 1941 vintage. However, even at 80% strength (IMHO quite realistic ballpark estimate, given OP scenario) Stalin has truly frightening might at his possession.Soviet tank strength is to be taken with a big pinch of salt. That's what I meant. And _if_ a BT-7 had been in good maintenance conditions, then it would have been quite useful.
There're several technical details I could challenge, but it all more or less fall under "nitpicking" category. Yes, BTs had many problems. However, my scenario assumes that they should be able to travel 200-300 km tops to Central Poland. Remember, that those BTs travelled to Nomonhan under their own power and had been fit enough to crush Japanese. What did happen to those machines between 1939 and 1941-1942 that turned them into barely movable piles of rubbish to "break down after its first kms"?But maintenance problems is exactly the point, since they are what will break down a tank after its first kms...
Once you start intensive operations, you will be piling up those hours really fast, _and_ you won't have that nice workshop at hand every evening. If the intensive operations are offensive, it's worse.
Note that tankers on a battlefield tend to keep the engines running idle even when they aren't moving, because the time to start them up again may be difference between life and death. Note also that the BT tanks had a particularly, especially breakdown-prone engine; and the likelihood of burning it up dramatically increases if instead of driving carefully – which you can do while training – you are trying to get out of an enemy field of fire as fast as you can. To complete the picture, their tracks were also particularly crappy.
Germans were seriously under-equipped comparing to Allies in 1941. French had more and better tanks. Soviets would enjoy overwhelming numerical superiorityThe German success in France in 1940 was nowhere near the cakewalk some believe. It was a very close run thing. It was an extremely risky gamble. And had they come with their original plan, they would have lost.
I couldn't agree with you more on comparison between Wehrmacht and Red Army of 1941. Wouldn't it been so, Reds would be in Berlin by the Autumn of 1941. And I predict their demise somewhere between Bialystok and modern Western border of Poland.And that was the Germans. Now, can anybody here notice a difference between the general background education, training levels, doctrine, C3I, officership, strategy and logistics of the Germans in 1940, and what the Soviets might have had in these fields in 1941?
The other difference is, of course, in the opposition. Will anybody list the differences between the German army of 1941 and the French army of 1940?
I briefly touched on those plagues earlier in the thread when I said that I consider 1941 attack being ASB, so you're preaching to converted again. However, Soviets were not worse (most agree that they were actually better) in 1941 than they were in 1939 (Nomonhan), and they were able to deliver severe blow in 1939.Deep operations? Sure, a fine theory. Like the Italian Guerra Celere, fine in theory. And had the officers in command at each and every level in the Western Districts actually tried that in practice? What was the army that in 1941 was just out of a throughout reform of its armored and mechanized forces? To the point that many of those units had nothing like the official TO&E they should have had? What was the army that had purged most of its officer corps? Sorry to be stating the obvious, but it seems it's needed.