Soviet Strategic Bombing During WW2

As far as I know the only serious Soviet strategic bombing efforts were at the very start of the war and, due to chaos and confusion, were generally ineffective. Most of the DBAK (Strategic bomber) formations were destroyed and never rebuilt. Strategic bombing attacks for the rest of the war were limited.

So, my question is, how would the VVS conduct a serious strategic bombing campaign if it wasn't destroyed within the first weeks of war, how effective would it be, and how would it develop over time (Say 2-3 years)?
 
It wouldn't, strategic bombing is a luxury reserved for those with a secure position on the ground, which the Soviets don't have.
 
It wouldn't, strategic bombing is a luxury reserved for those with a secure position on the ground, which the Soviets don't have.

The Crimea is a stable position to launch raids against Romania and Bulgaria, and the Baltic bases were used until they were overrun. Part of the assumption in this scenario is that the Soviets are doing well enough (Or at least better than OTL) that a strategic bombing campaign can be executed.
 
For a start, Stalin wasn't a fan of strategic bombing. Secondly, the designer of the only Soviet heavy bomber was thrown into NKVD prison, along with a number of top structural and aerodynamics engineers. He got to watch his subsequent design, the Pe-2 fly from prison. Thirdly, there were more important things to build, such as the Pe-2. Strategic bombing is something you have to really want to do, at great expense, for it to be successful.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Crimea is a stable position to launch raids against Romania and Bulgaria, and the Baltic bases were used until they were overrun. Part of the assumption in this scenario is that the Soviets are doing well enough (Or at least better than OTL) that a strategic bombing campaign can be executed.

Well they did use the Crimea IOTL to bomb Romanian oil storage facilities, IIRC destroying some 90k tons of oil before the Germans overran their bases and pushed them out of range. Their bomber forces suffered badly in the process of bombing before just being unable to hit anything worthwhile, then deciding to just focus on tactical/operational bombing until the end of the war and let the US and Britain handle the strategic bombing from 1942 on (also when they lost the Crimea). The Soviets needed to focus on ground combat and recovering their own territory and had the luxury of having allies that could bomber their enemy for them; in fact that was the only active front, so it made no sense for the Soviets to do so at all, as it would just be a duplication of effort when maximum resources were needed to keep up the ground war.

The only way the Soviets would have kept it up is if they kept bases in the Crimea somehow or stopped the Germans in Baltic so they had bases in range of Germany. Then they could throw badly needed resources down that hole, while giving Germany even more reason to develop her (and Romania's) strategic bombing defenses. So in a sense Germany might benefit, as it has to devote resources earlier to building up domestic and Romanian bomber defenses, instead of remaining ignorant of the need to do so until 1943. The Soviets then spend resources wastefully on bombing Central European targets with heavy losses for little gain, just like IOTL until they were pushed back too far to bomb any worthwhile strategic target.
 
According to Glantz, the Soviet use of long range bombing units in a tactical and operational role was because of the severe losses incurred in the early stages of the war. As the DBAK formations were mostly in STAVKA reserve, they suffered less during the initial stages of Barbarossa, and thus were thrown into battle in a tactical role. The result was that they were annihilated, and by December 1941 only 135 bombers remained. The loss of experienced crews meant that by the time the front stabilized and STAVKA began reforming DBAK into the ADD there were few trained crews remaining. Despite this, by early-mid 1943 the ADD was larger than it was pre-war! But due to poor crew training and the lack of good bases it was again used operationally and tactically.

So it seems that, if the VVS isn't destroyed pre-war, and if the Red Army is able to retain the use of the Crimea or various Baltic bases, the DBAK will be in a position where STAVKA could use it in a concerted strategic campaign, rather than piecemeal raids of less than 100 bombers. There were a number of German/Axis allied industrial areas, rail centers, oilfields, etc which were out of range of Allied bombers until much later in the war.

While I agree that Soviet efforts would be very costly and unlikely to produce immediate results, OTL that shows they had the resources to invest into long range bomber forces. But it seems that with increased experience and development, several hundred more aircraft and crews than IOTL ready for raids, and useable bases, a strategic bombing campaign could do quite a bit of damage. Not decisive in and itself, but certainly more than a wasted effort.
 
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