Soviet Sanity Options 1939-1941

The PPSh-41 and PPS-43 didn't exist when WWII began.
There was a pre-war model, PPD (the first models appeared in 1934), initially intended for the border guards and NKVD. The model 34/38 was decommissioned in 1939 and put back into production in 1940 (model PPD-40). However, attempt of the mass production proved to be impractical: it was too technologically complicated and only 81K were produced in 1940. PPSh was designed in 1940 even if it’s production started only in November 1941. Compare this to PPSh made out of the stamped parts (and having a worse shot grouping): by the spring of 1942 the production was 3,000 per day.
Actually, the main pre-war stress was upon the semi-automatic rifle. A lot had been produced before the war bur war-time production proved to be too expensive and the weapon too complicated for the ill-trained troops.
 
Don't send as much oil to the Germans. Come up with excuses and delays. As soon as the Germans attack, launch an all out bombing raid on Ploesti.
 
Has anyone mentioned not completely ignoring submachine guns for the better part of the 1930s?

I have something similar in mind, as part of a much larger suggestion list which is mostly geared towards getting the Romanian oil. And it starts a little bit earlier, so in this version it would start sep 1 1939

Here is the part about SMGs

Continue production of the PPD34/38, add a muzzle compensator, and massively ramp up production. Few people know this but the USSR only made about 4,000 SMGs before the Winter War, after that war about 80,000 SMGs were made before the German invasion.

Order the research and development of improving the PPD34 and possibly making a new SMG.

Order research and development into stamping steel. Once that is developed use that technique to design and build more small arms.

Production is to be kept running until an acceptable stamped version is being produced and only then start switching out the older production lines.
 
Navally, rather than trying to build 4BBs and 2BCs (without the capacity to build capital ship hulls and being heavily reliant on NAZI F***ING GERMANY for many of their components) why not put those resources into LITERALLY ANYTHING ELSE. And this is coming from a huge BB fanboy.

On the subject of the USSR's Ganguts, keep them all in the Baltic. Forcing Germany to divert more resources and expenditure to its navy means an easier fight on land, and as WWI showed, being able to somewhat contest the Baltic is key to the Northern portion of the front. If Yavuz scares Stalin, then how about he doesn't throw the USSR's cordial relations with Turkey out the window for literally no reason.
 
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Step 2. Shoot Stalin's "yes men".

So, either the whole Soviet Union, or just Beria, depending on how you look at it?

I'm not sure how seriously you mean this, but I know there really are people who think the Stalinist era was a time of spineless lick-spittles doing the bidding of a single psychopath, so please excuse me while I go into this in excessive detail. :)

From the evidence, it is clear that some people absolutely did suck up to Stalin. However, it is also clear now that we have had a look inside Communist Party archives that Stalin also extensively consulted with his subordinates during decision making and was open to having his mind changed by the people in his inner circle. For example Beria, the most egregious lick-spittle I can think of, also was willing to argue with his boss when he thought something needed to be done a certain way.

As such, I think it is a mistake to give Stalin too much credit. He was an extremely important cog in the Soviet machine and is probably the most powerful a human being has ever been inside their society. But nonetheless the system was built on Lenin's bad ideas and the uncompromising effort to impose those ideas whatever real people did in response to those ideas was a big part of what made the Soviet Union so brutal and murderous. Stalin was a particularly bad zealot, but Stalin was often implementing ideas that had general support in the party, so I am pretty confident that the USSR would have still been brutal and murderous if for some reason Stalin had been shot.

There's also the problem of groupthink. Since Stalin had been in given so much power to promote people in the Party from the early 20s on, since the Civil War had been so polarizing and since Lenin was such an apparent beacon of success, many of the people who could succeed Stalin agreed with him on far too many points.

TL;DR, Stalin was powerful, but there was alot more wrong in the Soviet Union than just Stalin.

Couple sources which could be interesting (sorry, I have only these two links saved):
"Порядок в танковых войсках? Куда пропали танки Сталина" Андрей Уланов Дмитрий Владимирович Шеин https://flibusta.is/b/493044
"Механизированные корпуса РККА в бою: История автобронетанковых войск Красной Армии в 1940-1941 годах" Евгений Федорович Дриг https://flibusta.is/b/531534/read

Thankye. :)

Zdhanov was a very strong figure who hold quit a few important positions, including, from 1938 Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and a head of a Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and from 1940 membership in the Military Council of the Red Army.

Were those positions really enough that he'd be in the running for the top job in 1941?

Khruschev was, until 1938, the 1st Party Secretary of both Moscow region and Moscow itself and in 1938 was made the 1st Secretary in Ukraine and full Politburo member in 1939. A purely Party figure with no management experience but most probably with a lot of the Party clientele in Moscow and, which would be a plus, reputation of an easy to manipulate clown. In the case of the internal fight for the top position may look like a suitable compromise figure. :)

Khrushchev getting the top job so early would be quite fascinating. I would be surprised if he was able to decisively centralize power in his hands with the immanent German invasion (heck, he took 4-5 years after Stalin's death to cement his power in OTL), but even as first among equals, I bet he could change things in interesting ways in WW2. And him becoming sole boss in the post WW2 period would be really interesting. I suspect some sort of cold war was inevitable so long as the USSR didn't follow the British path of surrendering in the face of overwhelming US advantage, but it could be very, very different if it started under Khrushchev.

Also, the immediate aftermath of WW2 was probably the best chance of liberalizing the Soviet system without causing the country to implode. I am very, very tempted to write a TL based on this idea.

I need to find a good biography covering this part of Khrushchev's life though though.

Let’s say that we retain Stalinism in a Mikoyanian form. There isn’t the buffer of fraternal states and atomic capacity to allow for Mikoyans preferred labour motivation strategies. There isn’t a consumer industrial capacity. So it’ll be blood and cheap vodka and patriotism. And destabilising Stalin faction aligned younger party members will cost you any gains you get from competence and a willingness to sortition military leadership by competence.

It’s not good.

What was Mikoyan's preferred labour motivation strategy?

Personally I am rather dubious about the "buffer of fraternal states" being remotely worth it. In OTL, the satellites discredited Soviet Communism when they seemed to be doing well and discredited Soviet Communism when they seemed to be doing badly. The whole thing seems a rather graphic illustration of why it is a bad idea to get too involved in the internal politics of your neighbours... Contrast this with Cold War Soviet-Finnish relations, which saw much less Soviet intervention in Finnish internal affairs and a much more useful buffer.

fasquardon
 

McPherson

Banned
So, either the whole Soviet Union, or just Beria, depending on how you look at it?

I'm not sure how seriously you mean this, but I know there really are people who think the Stalinist era was a time of spineless lick-spittles doing the bidding of a single psychopath, so please excuse me while I go into this in excessive detail. :)

From the evidence, it is clear that some people absolutely did suck up to Stalin. However, it is also clear now that we have had a look inside Communist Party archives that Stalin also extensively consulted with his subordinates during decision making and was open to having his mind changed by the people in his inner circle. For example Beria, the most egregious lick-spittle I can think of, also was willing to argue with his boss when he thought something needed to be done a certain way.

As such, I think it is a mistake to give Stalin too much credit. He was an extremely important cog in the Soviet machine and is probably the most powerful a human being has ever been inside their society. But nonetheless the system was built on Lenin's bad ideas and the uncompromising effort to impose those ideas whatever real people did in response to those ideas was a big part of what made the Soviet Union so brutal and murderous. Stalin was a particularly bad zealot, but Stalin was often implementing ideas that had general support in the party, so I am pretty confident that the USSR would have still been brutal and murderous if for some reason Stalin had been shot.

There's also the problem of groupthink. Since Stalin had been in given so much power to promote people in the Party from the early 20s on, since the Civil War had been so polarizing and since Lenin was such an apparent beacon of success, many of the people who could succeed Stalin agreed with him on far too many points.

TL;DR, Stalin was powerful, but there was alot more wrong in the Soviet Union than just Stalin.



Thankye. :)



Were those positions really enough that he'd be in the running for the top job in 1941?



Khrushchev getting the top job so early would be quite fascinating. I would be surprised if he was able to decisively centralize power in his hands with the immanent German invasion (heck, he took 4-5 years after Stalin's death to cement his power in OTL), but even as first among equals, I bet he could change things in interesting ways in WW2. And him becoming sole boss in the post WW2 period would be really interesting. I suspect some sort of cold war was inevitable so long as the USSR didn't follow the British path of surrendering in the face of overwhelming US advantage, but it could be very, very different if it started under Khrushchev.

Also, the immediate aftermath of WW2 was probably the best chance of liberalizing the Soviet system without causing the country to implode. I am very, very tempted to write a TL based on this idea.

I need to find a good biography covering this part of Khrushchev's life though though.



What was Mikoyan's preferred labour motivation strategy?

Personally I am rather dubious about the "buffer of fraternal states" being remotely worth it. In OTL, the satellites discredited Soviet Communism when they seemed to be doing well and discredited Soviet Communism when they seemed to be doing badly. The whole thing seems a rather graphic illustration of why it is a bad idea to get too involved in the internal politics of your neighbours... Contrast this with Cold War Soviet-Finnish relations, which saw much less Soviet intervention in Finnish internal affairs and a much more useful buffer.

fasquardon

Grigory Kulik.

McP.
 
Mikoyan’s preferred labour motivation strategy was more heavily centred on workers participation and in voluntary methods. His preference for Hungary 56 *from a party perspective* and his relative lightness in liquidating a strike in the 60s go to this.

More vodka, use floor bureaucrats against firm level ones, ensure managers can both do their job and be popular with workers (usually the deputy’s jobs).

oh and the buffers were a great idea. Just 53 56 and 68 should have been accelerated.
 
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