Soviet Sanity Options 1939-1941

[raharris1973]

Stop worrying that your main problem is being left with more work to do against Germany than the western countries and just make sure to start attacking the Germans as soon as they get close enough to attack- full stop. Don’t export to or pay Germany for anything after sept 2 1939.

by the time the Germans are in range of soviet guns and aircraft, the Poles will no longer be willing to fight the Soviets in the East, nor able.

take advantage of three sub-optimal weather seasons, fall rains, winter, and spring rains that are happening before May June 1940 to cut down on the Germans comparative advantage. Don’t expect to roll into Berlin or even necessarily take ground-but make sure to kill Germans, engage reserves, force expenditure of supplies, mobilize your own, and keep the fighting in front of or at the Stalin line. After enough of this Germany won’t be blitzkrieging anybody, East or west.

 

[tomo pauk]

Start preparing for Spring of 1940, attack Germany once majority of German forces are committed against the West. By Spring of 1941, Germany has no fuel. Aircraft have hard time to stay aloft without fuel, tanks & trucks don't like the situation either.

 

[HexWargamer]

First wait for Britain and France to declare war. Then don't attack Poland (and later don't attack Finland). Start digging in on the soviet/polish border instead. Purge the Commisars, release the surviving military leadership from the Gulags. Anounce to the League of Nations that Hiltler is a war mongering madman intent on World Domination and that, at the request of the Romanians the Red Army is being sent into Romania to protect them from Hitler (make sure the Romainian delegation / politicians are in no position to argue with this - the usual threats or bribary should suffice, if not, well, accidents happen). Repudiate the Nazi Soviet Pact and start negotiations with the Japanese to give them whatever they want in the East so you can move the Siberian Divisions west. Have a few 'operatives' in SS unifroms assassinate Chamberlain with a bomb when Halifax is present (and as many as opossible of Clement Attlee, Arthur Greenwood and Sir Archibald Sinclair, all of whom wanted to make peace with Hitler), then have the assassins assinated (hey, it worked in the case of JFK). When Churcill takes over, tell him you are sending the Soviet Baltic fleet to interdict the iron ore shipments from Sweden to Germany via the Baltic, and later in the year via Narvik, and ask for Royal Navy assistance - then let the RN do most of the dirty work. Start negotiations with France and Britain about launching a joint 2 front simultaneous attack. Use the fact that you have not (yet) declared war against Hitler as a bargaining chip to get the Allies off their arses and across Belgium and the Siegfried line ASAP, or at least by the spring of 1940. If the Allies refuse, well let rthem take the full brunt of Hitlers attack to the west. Wait until the British are being evacuated from Dunkirk, then declare war against Germany with the announced intention of 'liberating' Poland from the Nazis. As Hitker tries to decide which way to face, have the Red Army attack from Romanian, through Bulgaria, Czechokslvikia, and Austria ....

 

[Bad@logic]

The Soviets didn't expect France to fall so quickly nor easily - well, nobody did. A lot of the proposals of immediately attacking Nazi Germany don't really make sense unless if you have a degree of ahistorial foresight in realizing that France is going to collapse. Otherwise, the idea of having France and Britain fight Germany until they are both exhausted and then swooping in to pick up the pieces is quite a good idea. Certainly the more risky ideas like trying to assassinate British leaders to change their policy seems like a poor choice, since that stands to make cooperation with foreign countries even more difficult and actually coming close to getting a real international alliance against you if everyone is convinced that you're trying to kill them. The French and British certainly won't help you either if you're attacking - they'd be delighted, that their hoped for dream of the Germans and Soviets fighting it out and killing each other and them not having to do anything has finally come true.

Imo without ahistorical foresight fundamentally the best the Soviets could do is to weaken the Germans enough, by being even more stingy on commercial shipments and making the Germans spend a longer time and take more losses in Poland, but that their realistic options to alter the Battle of France and to make policy on it are limited by not realizing what the actual results of the 1940 campaign will be.

Don't invade Poland. Let the Germans pay for every in of Poland with their own blood. This one has huge impacts and not only really pisses the Germans off, it also puts France in a much better situation. Could have downsides for the Soviets, but even if the Germans tried to invade the USSR after conquering all of Poland, it is probably better than OTL by some way.

On the other hand this means that the Germans are a good 300 kilometres closer, and while they still have to cross this territory which is extremely poor infrastructure wise, they can improve it and build supply infrastructure over a multi-year period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at least bought the Soviets several hundred kilometres of buffer space, even if they used it poorly. It seems like the Soviets would be better served by waiting longer and letting the Germans have to fight against the Poles longer, since OTL they got several territories given back to them by the Germans anyway, rather than not invading at all and hence foregoing the advantage of having several hundred additional kilometres of strategic depth.

 

[SwampTiger]

Attacking Germany in 1940 is not realistic. You need a POD before the purges. The Soviet army in Finland, is the same army which will be attacking Germany, awful. They might reach the German border. However, if the Heer succeeds with the 'Sickle Cut', it may be able to divert troops east by late May. The Russians will be having difficulty with logistics, breakdowns and delaying actions.

 

[marathag]

If possible, tear up all the rail lines between the Stalin Line and the new Soviet-German border.

Soviet border railways, 1941

 

[fasquardon]

On the other hand this means that the Germans are a good 300 kilometres closer, and while they still have to cross this territory which is extremely poor infrastructure wise, they can improve it and build supply infrastructure over a multi-year period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at least bought the Soviets several hundred kilometres of buffer space, even if they used it poorly. It seems like the Soviets would be better served by waiting longer and letting the Germans have to fight against the Poles longer, since OTL they got several territories given back to them by the Germans anyway, rather than not invading at all and hence foregoing the advantage of having several hundred additional kilometres of strategic depth.

Given what the Soviets knew at the time, those are all relevant worries. With hindsight, less so.

The rail lines in Poland were a different gage to the Soviet rail system (and in any case, the infrastructure was very poor) meaning the supply lines didn't exist to use the additional defensive depth. And given that the additional depth drew the Soviets away from the fortifications of the Stalin Line (which was no Maginot line, but had it been fully functional it would have cost the Germans to break through), and away from the properly constructed phone and telegraph lines of the Stalin Line (the exposed phone and telegraph lines on the new border were easily destroyed by the Germans before they launched the invasion proper, and contributed very greatly to the scale of the German victory in those initial battles) I see the advance into Eastern Poland as one of the greatest avoidable mistakes that led to the great Soviet suffering during the Great Patriotic War.

The German army's railway arm was fairly slow to re-do the gage of the rails during the fighting of the Eastern Front, so I am dubious they'd be able to re-track and upgrade the infrastructure in Eastern Poland in time without slowing down some other urgently needed project.

Also, the Germans are on a very short timetable. Heavier casualties in Poland and more Polish troops escaping means a much delayed Battle of France, which the Poles might be ready to take part in and the French will be MUCH more ready to take part in. A few more months for France to prepare means a much stronger AdA, much more ready conscripts and potentially things sorted out with Belgium. The odds of Germany winning the Battle of France goes way down, and with it the chances of launching Barbarossa during the period of Soviet weakness go even further down.

Oh, and betraying the M-R pact would lead to a great decrease in the number of idealists who got disillusioned by the Soviet help for the Nazis.

Soviet border railways, 1941

So does that mean it is possible or not possible?

fasquardon

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Early 1939 the Red Army pumps copious amounts of poison gas into a full meeting of the politburo, purges the NKVD and empties the Gulags of the political prisoners. Shoots anyone who even thinks of getting close to Nazi Germany.

 

[Bad@logic]

The rail lines in Poland were a different gage to the Soviet rail system (and in any case, the infrastructure was very poor) meaning the supply lines didn't exist to use the additional defensive depth. And given that the additional depth drew the Soviets away from the fortifications of the Stalin Line (which was no Maginot line, but had it been fully functional it would have cost the Germans to break through), and away from the properly constructed phone and telegraph lines of the Stalin Line (the exposed phone and telegraph lines on the new border were easily destroyed by the Germans before they launched the invasion proper, and contributed very greatly to the scale of the German victory in those initial battles) I see the advance into Eastern Poland as one of the greatest avoidable mistakes that led to the great Soviet suffering during the Great Patriotic War.

Certainly we can all see that the OTL Soviet decisions for setting up their border defenses were a disaster. But there's nothing which says that the Soviets have to utilize the buffer territory in that way. They could have occupied it with only limited forces and some forward field fortifications, made no efforts to improve the infrastructure - or even have purposefully reduced some of the infrastructure as has been brought up earlier in the thread - and used it as a real buffer zone, with their forces enough to slow down the Germans and disorganize them crossing hundreds of kilometres of poor wasteland, at limited cost to themselves. It still gains the Soviets an additional 300 kilometres that the Germans have to advance across, and even against light combat forces this is much slower than a peace time administrative advance. And then the Germans come up against the real units of the Soviet army and its defenses after having to cross this logistically dismal zone.

The German army's railway arm was fairly slow to re-do the gage of the rails during the fighting of the Eastern Front, so I am dubious they'd be able to re-track and upgrade the infrastructure in Eastern Poland in time without slowing down some other urgently needed project.

Even just building up supply caches, regardless of any infrastructure improvements that they make, is a significant improvement for the Germans. Supply caches without the Soviet annexations from the Molotov Ribbentrop pact can be 300 kilometre further forward, and their vehicles and units will have less wear and tear from administrative rather than combat advances.

Also, the Germans are on a very short timetable. Heavier casualties in Poland and more Polish troops escaping means a much delayed Battle of France, which the Poles might be ready to take part in and the French will be MUCH more ready to take part in. A few more months for France to prepare means a much stronger AdA, much more ready conscripts and potentially things sorted out with Belgium. The odds of Germany winning the Battle of France goes way down, and with it the chances of launching Barbarossa during the period of Soviet weakness go even further down.

But if the Soviets wait longer on their own attack and let the Poles bleed the Germans more, while utilizing the German's dependence on them, then they can achieve much of that and still get the buffer territory - unless if the Germans prove unwilling to give up the captured territory to the Soviets. But OTL the Germans withdrew from several occupied territories in any case.

Oh, and betraying the M-R pact would lead to a great decrease in the number of idealists who got disillusioned by the Soviet help for the Nazis.

Not very important I would say, since it was foreign governments and their policy decisions which were more important than individuals and their views on the Soviet Union. OTL despite signing a pact with the Nazis, despite annexing the Baltic states, despite invading Poland, despite attacking Finland, despite forcibly annexing territory from Romania, despite the purges and gulags and the Holodomor and all the other crimes of the Soviet regime, despite all of that, the Soviets still got what they needed - lend lease support from the Western Allies and active cooperation against Nazi Germany. And yet before any foreign adventures they were never able to gain the trust of Britain and France, much less Poland, in forging a genuine alliance against Nazi Germany. Foreign opinion on the USSR simply doesn't seem that useful compared to the potential advantages that the Soviets draw from their expansion and as they thought in 1939 (although ultimately proven wrong) entangling the Western Allies and Germans in a military conflict to distract their attention.

 

[BooNZ]

Hmm. An invasion of Romania immediately after France fell might be interesting. Potentially it could completely paralyze the Germans, since without Romanian oil they'd have a hard time building up the supplies they need for Barbarossa. Runs the risk of provoking a war with the British though.

This. Romania not only provided fuel, but also a very large volume of manpower for the Axis on the Eastern Front.

More-or-less OTL until the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia on 28 June 1940, but continue until Romania is occupied in its entirety. Withdraw most significant Soviet forces in Poland to the Stalin Line and cut off fuel to Nazi regime from say September 1940. Could look to also appease both Bulgaria and Hungary with Romanian territory and continued fuel supply. Conscript Romanian manpower and prep Poland and Romanian territory in advance for enhanced scorched earth.

 

[The Galaxy]

Hitler himself gave the answer


“I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.

In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.

Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. ”



So do that

Maybe tweak it so that the invasion happens 1-2 weeks after Germany has attacked France.

Maybe tweak it some more, no invasion of Finland, spend all the time since the M-R pact was signed planing the invasion, use the whole of the Red air force for the operation and stop sending resources to Germany once the invasion begins.

Without the Romanian oil the German military can not expand, and will need to shrink. Not only that the military industry will need to shrink and even if it does the German economy may collapse.

Without Soviet grain the Germans will need to shrink their military because the soldiers will be needed in the fields, and without Soviet grain it means that the occupied countries of Europe by the Germans will suffer more and produce less because they have to give up even more of their food. Which all in all means less total production of everything.

 

[docfl]

As to the diffrent rail systems. Would it be possible to build to the diffrent gauge? I insted of regauging all the tracks?

 

[Omar04]

As to the diffrent rail systems. Would it be possible to build to the different gauge? I insted of regauging all the tracks?

The Germans kept a few rail systems on the wide gauge.

On the other side of this coin was the fact that the Germans continued to operate wide gauge trains east of Vyazma to about Rzhev (on the rail line they wanted to convert to standard gauge). Despite the fact that this rail line could only accommodate no more than two trains a day to service the supply needs of HGrM in that area - it was miraculously sufficient for the Germans to hold their own and prevent a Soviet breakthrough.

1943-1945: Between 1943 and 1945, Germany was more and more in a defensive mode. No longer were the Germans concerned about converting Soviet wide gauge lines to standard gauge - now they were concentrating on keeping their ever-shrinking network in operational condition.

[...]
As of 01 January 1943, 22.000 miles (35.000km) of the Soviet rail network were under German control and the majority of that had already been converted to standard gauge by the Germans. Although the Germans were able to "capture" large quantities of Soviet rolling stock and railway construction materials, the captured items were for the most part substandard in quality or antiquated. In the overwhelming number of cases, wide gauge rolling stock was re-wheeled to standard gauge by the Germans. Locomotives could not be converted to any degree of service reliability.

It sounds like the Germans had bigger railroad issues to deal with then the gauge difference, including the direction of the Russian rialroads.

Many of the existing railroad bridges of European Russia were in fact temporary structures. Most of the bridges were built during the First World War to satisfy the military needs of the Czars' Army in 1914-1917. Some of these temporary bridges were in fact, manufactured of sheet steel and simply riveted together. By German and western European standards, these temporary bridges were of no value for the heavier trains (carrying heavier tanks and so on) of the late 1930's and early 1940's. There were also no double-track bridges, and no one in Germany knew why. All Soviet double track lines which had to cross a river did so in a split fashion; that is, each line had its own bridge. The spacing of the two bridges was set at approximately 50 to 100 yards apart.

Soviet coal was not of optimal quality locomotives even by Soviet standards. A number of the larger Soviet rail yards contained coal-processing plants which soaked the Donets coal in (bunker) oil before it was suitable for use in locomotives. Frequently, wood was used as a substitute for coal, especially in the northern regions of the Soviet Union.

Soviet water for locomotives was also not of optimal value. For example, on the rail line between Dniepropetrovsk and Stalino, at each of the 11 water towers, a separate additive had to be mixed with the water to prevent boiler scales from forming in the locomotives.

https://www.feldgrau.com/WW2-German-State-Railway-Deutsche-Reichsbahn

 

[Dwergar]

With POD starting 1st of September, I wouldn't touch the Polish Campaign. RKKA has bungled it enough in OTL, risking disasters by playing games with plans when the invasion is ongoing is risky.
Not dismantling Stalin Line and making Molotov Line much more limited in scope along with less forward deployment of troops would be a good idea, though.

Would it be possible to let willing Polish PoWs be moved to Entente's care and secure something in return? Tech transfers, new factories, acknowledgment of new USSR borders in the West, all that stuff.

Would it be possible to modify T-28 (Throwing out MG turrets and reinforcing armour ahead of shedule) while pushing T-34 to be refined (Like getting a three-man turrets) and to be introduced into service later but in shape more reminiscent of T-34M/T-34-85/T-44? To have a passable medium tank for 1940-early 1941, and to have an excellent medium tank by second half of 1941.

Don't ax all the cavalry formations, in the early period of war they'd make acceptable substitutes for motorized infantry.

 

[alexmilman]

Hmm. How exactly can the Soviets force the Poles to accept their aid?

If it's possible, that would be great. But I struggle to see how...



Orderly retreats are one of the hardest military maneuvers to pull off. The Soviets weren't able to even able to plan competent counter attacks in this period.



I agree about the MR pact.

The Soviets kinda did assume that Hitler would be trying to fulfill his plans though. The problem was, they were so thoroughly disillusioned by their earlier attempts to get Britain and France to form a common front that the slim chance that they could change Hitler's mind or at least delay him long enough to fight Germany one-on-one seemed to be the only chance.

Keep in mind that for most of the 30s the British appeared to be actively assisting the Germans (though the British for most of that thought they were helping a reasonable German leadership recover from the temporary loss of status after WW1). After Munich the idea that the British were serious in their guarantee of Poland - a country that was pretty poorly thought of by the mandarins in the foreign office - was not the most obvious thing in the world. And since France needed Britain's help to stand a chance against Germany, where Britain went, France had to follow. (Though add to this the deep ideological divides in France which the Soviets had some part in exacerbating, which made it rather politically difficult for French governments on either end of the political spectrum to cooperate with the Soviets.)

It would be interesting to see what would have happened if Stalin had decided to keep trying things Litvinov's way. It is possible that had the Soviets continued trying to build international coalitions, some progress would be made. That would require a PoD in 1938 though.



So the Soviets should have gone to full war footing at every false alarm they got during the German build-up? Everyone from the top generals down to the lowest private would be driven to exhaustion like that!

The German preparations to invade weren't exactly a secret. It was a huge international effort right on the Soviet border and they were getting floods of information from their own people and from the British. The problem is, the Soviets didn't know for sure which information was more correct, and the Germans had rattled sabers on the border before as a way to pressure the Soviets when the two powers were embroiled in one of their frequent arguments. So there was a sliver of a chance the massive build-up was to extort more resources from the Soviets in order for the Germans to defeat the British.

It's hard to think of ways that would result in the Soviets taking Sorge's warning more seriously in the context. Especially given how lacking in details it was.



Hmm. An invasion of Romania immediately after France fell might be interesting. Potentially it could completely paralyze the Germans, since without Romanian oil they'd have a hard time building up the supplies they need for Barbarossa. Runs the risk of provoking a war with the British though.

Don't invade Finland. Don't try to annex the Baltic states, just stick with the military bases the Soviets arm-twisted those states into giving them in OTL.

Don't invade Poland. Let the Germans pay for every in of Poland with their own blood. This one has huge impacts and not only really pisses the Germans off, it also puts France in a much better situation. Could have downsides for the Soviets, but even if the Germans tried to invade the USSR after conquering all of Poland, it is probably better than OTL by some way.

If taking Poland and the Baltic states, keep the Stalin Line as the main defensive line in the Soviet Union. If possible, tear up all the rail lines between the Stalin Line and the new Soviet-German border.

fasquardon

Agree with all of the above and there are some extras:
1st, everybody keeps talking about effect of the purges but the problem was not only with the top levels (quite a few of these commanders had not been up to the modern war but let it be) but the problems on the lower levels of the chain of command had been huge. The junior officers routinely were grossly under-trained and the same goes for the non-coms.
2nd, general educational level of the conscripts even in 1940 - 41 was quite low even for the elite motorized units and even worse for those who just finished their service. People in their 30s, who had been called to service later during the war at least had life experience but what are you going to expect from the teenagers or even those 20 years old?
3rd, even with all ongoing industrialization the Soviet industry could not produce enough of the new items and, while it is popular to quote the number of the T-34s and KVs available in 1941, it is much less popular to talk about the spare parts (mostly absent), field-level repair shops (practically absent), shortage of the tractors for moving the broken tanks to the (absent) repair shops, shortage of the ammunition (for the tank units in 1941 well below the regulated level, especially as far as armor piercing shells were involved), and many other similar things. For example, the big numbers of the semi-automatic rifles had been produced before the war but production could not be supported during the war forcing to switch back to the old rifles later augmented by the automatic rifles.
4th, Stalin Line is nice but it was built for a military doctrine of the 1930s according to which the enemy should break its head attacking the fortifications headlong after which the Red Army would counter-attack into the gaps between the fortified regions. A mobile warfare was still a military dream at that time. In a reality, the Germans had been attacking into the gaps and encircling the fortified areas like Kiev Fortified Region. Even if fortifications had been fully armed, the defending troops would still be encircled.
5th, Neither the executed/imprisoned nor the surviving commanders were uniformly competent in a modern warfare. Most of them, being byproducts of the RCW, weren't. So their ability to adjust easily to the new circumstances are highly questionable (as was demonstrated by Blucher at Khasan).
6th, By 1941 the Red Army had a number of the mechanized corps and they were destroyed within the first few weeks of war. Each of them had 2 tank and 1 motorized division and support units.: 30,000 personnel, 1,031 tank, 100 field guns, 36 anti-tank guns, 36 AA guns, 5,165 trucks, 352 tractors, 15 planes, etc. They could not maneuver and coordinate actions of the units. What's even worse, there was no coordination with aviation (story that all Soviet aviation had been destroyed during the first day of war is a legend). Of course, the numbers are "paper" numbers and training of the personal is nowhere to be seen.

 

[fasquardon]

4th, Stalin Line is nice but it was built for a military doctrine of the 1930s according to which the enemy should break its head attacking the fortifications headlong after which the Red Army would counter-attack into the gaps between the fortified regions. A mobile warfare was still a military dream at that time. In a reality, the Germans had been attacking into the gaps and encircling the fortified areas like Kiev Fortified Region. Even if fortifications had been fully armed, the defending troops would still be encircled.

All of your points are very good. Especially pointing out the lack of people low down on the chain of command (indeed, the rapid inflation of the Red Army from 1.3 million men in 1937 to 5 million men before the war, added to the high mortality rates for officers during the war, meant extremely rapid promotions for men with any amount of training or experience, which meant severe shortages of good sergeants and lieutenants throughout the war).

To discuss the Stalin Line in more depth, I fully expect the Stalin Line to be a speed bump for the Germans. It wasn't a continuous line, it wasn't terribly well stocked, it didn't have enough guns, the quality of many of the fortifications was fairly poor. However, it was at least at the end of Soviet railheads, it did at least have some stockpiled supplies behind some sort of fortifications, some parts of the line might at least have properly buried telegraph and phone lines (comms not going down before the initial German attack would be a huge benefit), and being sat in prepared fortifications should give the Soviet soldiers inside them valuable time to figure out how to make serious trouble for the Germans.

So the Germans may end up having to expend alot more effort on the guys at the border (impacting how deeply they are able to push before their soldiers are falling over from exhaustion) and some of the troops stationed on the Stalin line may be able to fight through the encircling Germans and to friendly lines.

The poor guys on the border are going to have a pretty miserable time of it and likely Barbarossa still is absolutely brutal for the unprepared Soviet forces. It will be a tragedy that in all likelyhood only looks good in comparison with OTL.

Interesting question you might know something about: Do you think that if the Soviets had focused their resources more on training up NCOs and officers, instead of building as many fancy machines as they could, that the Soviet forces would have been more or less formidable in total?

fasquardon

 

[alexmilman]

Interesting question you might know something about: Do you think that if the Soviets had focused their resources more on training up NCOs and officers, instead of building as many fancy machines as they could, that the Soviet forces would have been more or less formidable in total?

fasquardon

There were two main sources of the officers:
1. Various military schools and then academies. The obvious questions are who was teaching and what they had been taught? I doubt that even without the repressions there should be a shortage of the qualified teaching cadres: too many of the experienced officers had their experience from the RCW and not necessarily kept themselves up to date. A significant part of the curriculum would be parade ground drill and of course, “political sciences”. Taking into an account that both these disciplines had been considered very important, it is reasonable to assume that quite a few students put most of the efforts to these areas instead of professional subj3cts.
2. Graduates of the civilian colleges. At least some of them had a mandatory military course so the graduate would automatically get a low officer rank (and close to zero military experience).

Low level NCOs were promoted during the mandatory service and at least some of the senior ones had been professionals. They could get practical experience but the problems with a generally low education level would not go away and, again, who wad their instructors?

The Germans after WWI had plenty of highly professional cadres and even some skeleton force that could be expanded with a reasonable ease. The Soviets after the RCW had a big mess on all levels. Don’t be confused by a seemingly large numbers of the former Tsarist officers: most of those with the imperial rank below colonel were the war time cadres either those who passed the fast courses and had been sent to front or the soldiers of a recognized bravery and skill who had been sent to the fast courses and after few months returned as the officers. Some of them had been quite talented people but few of them had a serious military education.

As for the “machines”, it became quite obvious that with everybody building these “machines” the SU can’t afford to have a low-tech army. What they actually had by 1941 were peanuts comparing to the plans formulated by Tukchachevsky in the early 1930s: these numbers never had been achieved. Then again, Russian Empire did not have enough of the engineering cadres and after the RCW even fewer had been available and quite a few of them ended up in GULAG. Soviet education system had been producing a lot of the new ones but a shortage of the high quality teachers impacted the quality of the graduates. As a result, development of the new “machines” quite often involved much more trials and errors that would be needed by a more experienced team. Add to this reasonably low technology, shortage of the resources and other problems. How could the low rank officers and NCO be trained if the weapons and other equipment were not available in a timely fashion and in the necessary numbers?

 

[marathag]

How could the low rank officers and NCO be trained if the weapons and other equipment were not available in a timely fashion and in the necessary numbers?

US Army used Trucks with 'TANK' painted on the sides and Broomsticks in place of real guns, and airplanes dropped sacks of flour for bombs in the 1930s
Lack of gear isn't the problem, lack of decent training is

 

[McPherson]

What it says on the tin. Just try to make the USSR less reliant on the LL, reduced casualties and losses. Time frame: 1st Sept 1939 to 22nd June 1941.

Step 1. Shoot Stalin.

 

[fasquardon]

As for the “machines”, it became quite obvious that with everybody building these “machines” the SU can’t afford to have a low-tech army.

Thanks for the info!

The reason why I ask is because in reading accounts of Barbarossa, over and over there are stories of Soviet units fighting fiercely but without the coordination that would make best use of their equipment. For example tank units attacking without infantry or artillery support. So it makes me wonder if a Soviet army that was armed with a mix of mid-30s and WW1 style equipment (so comparable to Italy) but that had well trained officers and NCOs who were able to keep the Soviet formations organized and working together effectively would be more effective than the OTL situation where the Soviets often had lots of cutting edge stuff but couldn't make effective use of it. (Of course, one must take into account issues like the Soviet units getting cutting edge stuff they didn't have the ammo for, but maybe that would be fixed by better skilled people in the logistics branch?)

Step 1. Shoot Stalin.

So far as I can tell, everyone at the top basically agreed with Stalin though. So I am not sure how much good this would do with such a late PoD. Though, this probably means things go better for the Soviets between 1945 and 1953.

Now, if Stalin died in what appeared to be a German-sponsored assassination, THAT could have interesting impacts on the 1939-1941 timeframe.

fasquardon