Soviet Reforms in the 1950s

[Delta Force]

Only a few weeks prior to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Soviets agreed to allow Poland to enact reforms as part of the Polish October. Soviet and Soviet-appointed officials were removed from the Polish government, restrictions on the Catholic Church were lifted, and the 1957 elections had more candidates than seats. As part of the agreement, Poland promised to remain within the Warsaw Pact and not abandon communism.

The Hungarian Revolution was far more radical than the Polish one and actually overthrew the government, but as late as October 30 the Soviets planned to leave the new government in place and even considered withdrawing troops. They changed their mind the next day and decided to intervene due to some Hungarian politicians calling for a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

How far could the Soviets have allowed their Warsaw Pact allies to have gone in implementing reforms? Also, how far might the Soviets themselves have gone? For the purposes of this the Soviet leader doesn't have to be Khrushchev, it could be Beria or any of the other major contenders for leadership after the death of Stalin.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Interesting question.

I would imagine the cold war eases a little. Hard to portray teh evol commies as a totalitarian dictatorship if they allow this much freedom. Of course, the US would try, but Western Europe might be more open to Soviet diplomatic andtrade advances.

Mind you, once you allow the camels nose inside the tent, how do you stop the rest of it? By the mid 60s, Id bet that even if Poland and Huungary were still nominally in the Warsaw Pact, that it would be a pretty nominal membership.

Or that it would, indeed, be viewed more purely as defensive, as it supposedly was in the first place, afaik.

 

[Ramso]

Russia may still consider Kruschev's main its staple crop, changing the world forever.

 

[LHB]

What impact would this have on the USSR if the Polish and Hungarian reforms are successful? Could this lead to similar reforms in the Soviet Union? A USSR that moves to substantive political democracy by the late 1960s would be a very difficult thing to portray as a totalitarian enemy and would lead to a real shift in the Cold War's tensions.

 

[TheYoungPretender]

So you'd have a China under Deng Xiaoping type of situations occurring in Eastern Europe circa 1965 - oligarchies buying a continuation of their own control with limited political rights (and maybe some economic opening?).

 

[katchen]

And strangely enough, that would be a real challenge to a United States gradually moving in a more conservative direction. A United States that respects property rights above all others and has moved from protecting and encouraging land reform in Japan ad South Korea to protecting property rights above all else to the point of destroying the crops of peasants who support Communists who will give them land reform.

 

[Delta Force]

So you'd have a China under Deng Xiaoping type of situations occurring in Eastern Europe circa 1965 - oligarchies buying a continuation of their own control with limited political rights (and maybe some economic opening?).

Perhaps, but the Soviet bloc was much closer to the West in terms of development and technology than the PRC. They don't need American and Western European companies open up shop in their countries to gain access to modern goods. I saw a picture a few weeks ago of a mid-1960s Soviet convertible featuring American muscle car influences and a 110 mile per hour top speed that was rejected by the Politburo itself for being too flashy for the proletariat. That school of thought continued well into the 1980s, as the leadership saw no need to update consumer products that were mechanically sound. Khrushchev and Brezhnev were both trained as metalworkers, which some have speculated led to them failing to comprehend the importance of computers, television, rocketry, automation, and other new technologies for anything other than military and prestige purposes.

 

[Corbell Mark IV]

Interesting question.

I would imagine the cold war eases a little. Hard to portray teh evol commies as a totalitarian dictatorship if they allow this much freedom. Of course, the US would try, but Western Europe might be more open to Soviet diplomatic andtrade advances.

Mind you, once you allow the camels nose inside the tent, how do you stop the rest of it? By the mid 60s, Id bet that even if Poland and Huungary were still nominally in the Warsaw Pact, that it would be a pretty nominal membership.

Or that it would, indeed, be viewed more purely as defensive, as it supposedly was in the first place, afaik.

If Poland and Hungary are just nominally in the Pact, and the Sovs seem ok with that, how long until the Poles and Hungarians ask the Soviets to pull their troops?

The Warsaw Pact was a Russian empire held together with force. This WI suggests the that threat of force is removed, and that the empire survives based on what? Inertia?

And yes, this would, greatly reduce Cold War tensions.

Depending on other Soviet actions, this could END the Cold War.



The Soviets could play a long game, and go for the Third World in a even bigger push.



On the other hand if a reductions of tensions butterflies away Sputnik, then you don't have the missile gap tensions, MAD, ect. ect.

 

[Dunning Kruger]

I would go a different direction. If the Hungarian revolt doesnt happen, do the Soviets open up sooner. From what I have read, Andropov was profoundly affected by the actions in the street during the revolt and genuinely feared insurrection. Without such an experience, would the future head of the KGB and General Secretary been more open to later reforms in Czechoslovakia, Poland, dissidents in the USSR, and the like?

 

[Edward_Elric]

So you'd have a China under Deng Xiaoping type of situations occurring in Eastern Europe circa 1965 - oligarchies buying a continuation of their own control with limited political rights (and maybe some economic opening?).

No, not really. Unlike the post-Mao PRC, which had much of the previous bureaucracy dismembered thanks to the Cultural Revolution, the USSR wasn't a blank slate from which to further build up in the 60's 70s and 80's. Unlike in the PRC at the time of Deng's ascendancy, Soviet native-grown industries was already sufficiently built and established by the time that Khrushchev and later Brezhnev were running things. As a result, there was no immediate incentive for them to create more economic ties w/ western capitalists. Besides, Nixon and co saw in the fiercely anti-"Revisionist(1)" Mao the ultimate ally of convenience against the Soviets.

When discussing ATLs of a successful/tolerated Hungarian uprising, it's important to keep in mind the actual nature of the revolt. Despite being against a Soviet satellite regime, it still had a predominantly left-wing character, with workers' councils and a general strike forming the backbone of the emerging movement - much like Russia 1917, actually. One need only look at the demands that the National council of Free Trade Unionists made to see that (2).

The thing is, those who sent the tanks into Budapest had a position parallel to that of the bureaucrats and yes-men who were the main target of dissatisfaction for Hungarian workers and peasants. For them to tolerate the Hungarian Revolution would be to undermine their own claim to power back home within the Soviet Union itself.

I suppose it could've been possible, but that would probably require a Soviet leadership even more avidly into De-Stalinization than OTL's Khrushchev government.

I would go a different direction. If the Hungarian revolt doesnt happen, do the Soviets open up sooner. From what I have read, Andropov was profoundly affected by the actions in the street during the revolt and genuinely feared insurrection. Without such an experience, would the future head of the KGB and General Secretary been more open to later reforms in Czechoslovakia, Poland, dissidents in the USSR, and the like?

For all we know, Andropov might not even have much of a chance to climb his way up the Soviet power structure in the scenario of a tolerated Hungarian uprising. As for the Soviets "opening up" - see my first paragraph as to why it wouldn't automatically lead to a raising of the floodgates holding back western capital. At the very least, Soviet political discourse might become more open, but it probably wouldn't automatically lead to a Gorbachev-esque condemning of the system and subsequent capitalist restoration - not while many of the Stalinist hardliners (i.e. Mikhail Suslov et al) are alive and kicking.

(1) FYI: In Marxist-Leninist terms, this basically boils down to any post-Stalin leader who doesn't uphold the oh-so glorious ideas and practices (read: oppression and personality cult) of Stalin and/or Mao.

(2) Page 16 of this 1964 pamphlet about the uprising lists out said demands.

 

[Kome]

At the very least, Soviet political discourse might become more open, but it probably wouldn't automatically lead to a Gorbachev-esque condemning of the system and subsequent capitalist restoration - not while many of the Stalinist hardliners (i.e. Mikhail Suslov et al) are alive and kicking.

Not necessarily a bad thing. Remember that the Soviet Union DID collapse after Gorbachev's reforms. Moderation in all things is key.

 

[Delta Force]

Not necessarily a bad thing. Remember that the Soviet Union DID collapse after Gorbachev's reforms. Moderation in all things is key.

It also lead to a hardline military coup attempt, which certainly wouldn't have cooled domestic and international tensions.

 

[LHB]

For all we know, Andropov might not even have much of a chance to climb his way up the Soviet power structure in the scenario of a tolerated Hungarian uprising. As for the Soviets "opening up" - see my first paragraph as to why it wouldn't automatically lead to a raising of the floodgates holding back western capital. At the very least, Soviet political discourse might become more open, but it probably wouldn't automatically lead to a Gorbachev-esque condemning of the system and subsequent capitalist restoration - not while many of the Stalinist hardliners (i.e. Mikhail Suslov et al) are alive and kicking.

Not to mention any real, substantive reforms are likely to be in a more leftist, anticapitalist direction than towards more capitalism. You might see the integration of some ideas that were tinkered with in Yugoslavia and the workers' councils of Hungary into the USSR. If that is coupled with a genuine opening up of the political system to competitive elections then you could end up with a USSR that survives to the modern day with no signs of slowing down and, politically speaking, probably wouldn't be much different from the United States in the broad strokes while being economically VERY distinct from the rest of the world.

Reforms like that could also see greater appeal in the decolonization struggle. If the offer is US proxy dictator vs partnership in the reformed Soviet sphere vs the OTL options of US proxy dictator vs Soviet proxy dictator that's going to change the dynamics of a whole host of conflicts in Africa and Latin America.

 

[Delta Force]

I was planning on having a more conventional Soviet Union in my timeline, but this sounds like a far more interesting and uncommon option. A Soviet reform program in the 1950s can help lead to a pivot towards Asia for the 1960s, as I was planning to do with my timeline. The Soviets go from being totalitarian godless commies to people the West can work with, especially compared to the Maoists and neo-Stalinists who would remain elsewhere. The Sino-Soviet split would likely be deeper and far more severe, with a three way Cold War as the result and capitalist, Soviet style socialist, neo-Stalinist, and Maoist rebels fighting for control of the colonies. I wonder how such reforms would impact Soviet relations with their more neo-Stalinist client states. Might we see a Soviet intervention in East Germany or Romania on the side of reformers? That would certainly be interesting.

There might even be some limited collaboration between the Americans, British, French, and Soviets to contain the PRC and its allies. Perhaps the time will be right for detente before Nixon is forced to leave office in 1965 (in my timeline Eisenhower resigns in 1955). Will they say only Nixon could have gone to Russia?