Soviet nuclear weapons in early 1951

So, I'm reading Turtledove's "The Hot War". The premise is that Truman agrees with use of nuclear weapons in Korea. So, now in early 1951, US and USSR are in nuclear war. So, what do you think how many ( if any ) nuclear weapons ready to be deployed with Tu-4 would Soviets have in early 1951?
 
So, I'm reading Turtledove's "The Hot War". The premise is that Truman agrees with use of nuclear weapons in Korea. So, now in early 1951, US and USSR are in nuclear war. So, what do you think how many ( if any ) nuclear weapons ready to be deployed with Tu-4 would Soviets have in early 1951?

Why would Stalin commit suicide over Kim and Mao? And make no mistake, that's what he'd be doing by getting in a nuclear war with the US in 1951. The US will be lightly damaged, if at all, and in return, the Soviet Union ceases to exist. Albeit not quite as devastatingly final as a nuclear exchange would be later in the timeline...
 
Total Soviet stockpile was AFAIK 25 at the start of the year, 50 at the end, so figure closer to the former than the latter

Of the Tu-4's, only 10 were Tu-4a models that could carry atomic weapons, and that is in total, so fewer than 10 would be ready in early 1951 without an earlier POD to have more made

At this point the US had between 438 and 841 nuclear weapons, with ~225 nuclear capable bombers, most vastly more capable than the Tu-4
 

SsgtC

Banned
Not saying that he would or wouldn't, but I wanted to know- could he?
Realistically, no. His only delivery options are one waying it with TU-4s (B-29skis) and they were dead meat against any modern fighter fielded by the USAF. It's doubtful any actually reach their targets. Meanwhile, the US erases the Soviet Union from the map and replaces it with a sign that says "There be dragons here"
 
Total Soviet stockpile was AFAIK 25 at the start of the year, 50 at the end, so figure closer to the former than the latter

Of the Tu-4's, only 10 were Tu-4a models that could carry atomic weapons, and that is in total, so fewer than 10 would be ready in early 1951 without an earlier POD to have more made

At this point the US had between 438 and 841 nuclear weapons, with ~225 nuclear capable bombers, most vastly more capable than the Tu-4

So, so far I counted that Soviets whacked about a dozen US and European cities. That should be it?
 
So, so far I counted that Soviets whacked about a dozen US and European cities. That should be it?
It should be, but well I had some words about those books in the threads about them in AH Books and Media

Lets just say I'm glad I got them from the library and didn't pay for them
 
People,

During the subject time period I was an 18 year old Air National Guard volunteer, soon to be Federalized, to take a series of college equivalency exams, and find myself in a position of surprising responsibility in what was then called Air Technical Intelligence. (the USAF was rapidly staffing up after the insane post WW2 demobilization) While I was involved in propulsion, the strategic realities (or what were believed to be the realities) were matters of everyday discussion. The Boeing B-47 was just entering the inventory in Mid 1951, and it was obvious even then, that the wing was too small to permit optimal weapon delivery. The Boeing B-50 series and the emerging B-36 were the aircraft that would have to win any nuclear war. Its well known that, at this time, RB-50 (Super B-29s with engines that could be depended on) aircraft were routinely crossing the Soviet arctic coast and photographing the interior east of the Urals. Only several years later were (only) two of these aircraft lost during MiG-15 intercepts.

In 1951 here is the situation as I understood it: Soviet Nuclear weapons: Air dropped Bombs: 12 to 16; light devices intended for commercial shipment as unassembled components to Communist agents in Canada and Mexico to be smuggled into the US, unknown but estimated as less than 10.
There were rumors of efforts to establish refueling strips in arctic Canada by at least one bogus oil exploration group with ties to AMTORG or some other Soviet group.

Weapons delivery by Tu 4 series aircraft would be one way (presumably suicide) efforts by Communist fanatics, tho defectors later indicated that the possibility was extended to land at various preselected smaller airports and fade into the woodwork with the help of local Communists (after all, isn't this how they got the bomb in the first place?).

A Soviet nuclear attack on the West resulting from our use of atomic weapons on Red China or North Korea in 1951 was an absolute impossibility. The response would have been endless street demonstrations and strikes. In accord with then existing doctrine, only when the Soviet 'correlation of forces' indicated probable Red victory, would a massive attack take place- then only preemptive surrender could forestall it.

Interesting times to live through.

Dynasoar
 

Kaze

Banned
The problem is of course is the US arsenal in any hot war in the 1950's. How many bombs did we have at the time? If one takes Eizenhower's personal diary as truth - the US had only five bombs: 2 bombs that were tested to see if the damned thing worked, 2 that were dropped on Japan, the next one was a dud and did not work, and by the time the next one was ready the Soviets had the atom bomb of their own. Before someone cites that we tested bombs during that period, this was a Cold War falsehood ordered personally by Eizenhower to cover up the fact we developed a dud, he wanted the world to believe we had an arsenal when we did not.
 
Looks like a Space Bat has just fluttered through the discussion.

Eisenhower was not in a position to determine US policy until 1953. Between 1946 and the end of 1952 the United states conducted 32 test shots including the Bikini tests before a world audience and the 12 Megaton 'Mike' hydrogen detonation in November 1952. One shot could have been termed a "Dud" since it did not reach full design yield, while another ran away to 250% of design performance.

Dynasoar
 
The problem is of course is the US arsenal in any hot war in the 1950's. How many bombs did we have at the time? If one takes Eizenhower's personal diary as truth - the US had only five bombs: 2 bombs that were tested to see if the damned thing worked, 2 that were dropped on Japan, the next one was a dud and did not work, and by the time the next one was ready the Soviets had the atom bomb of their own. Before someone cites that we tested bombs during that period, this was a Cold War falsehood ordered personally by Eizenhower to cover up the fact we developed a dud, he wanted the world to believe we had an arsenal when we did not.
Uh you can see the results from Crossroads Baker Atomic test of 1946 on Google Earth, Prinz Eugen is lying belly up screws in the air where the bomb left her, plus people have dived the wrecks of some of the other Crossroads Girls, so at least one test had to have happened in 1946
 
Uh you can see the results from Crossroads Baker Atomic test of 1946 on Google Earth, Prinz Eugen is lying belly up screws in the air where the bomb left her, plus people have dived the wrecks of some of the other Crossroads Girls, so at least one test had to have happened in 1946

USS Arkansas after shot Baker

a3bc772a3b78ca13163fa6c190c1a158--black-spot-the-black.jpg


It's the circled dark spot

sketch after sinking
800px-Battleship_Arkansas_diver_sketch.png


The third test, Shot Charlie, was canceled as the ships were too radioactive
 
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Because of the limitations others mentioned in the thread, I find it more plausible that the Soviets would aim their bombs at forward US bases in Britain and Japan so as to degrade American strike capabilities, given that there was still an overall lack of intercontinental capabilities at the time, instead of sending them on one way suicide missions. Even then I’m dubious they’ll make it through Anglo-American air defenses. Soviet air defenses, OTOH, might be able to attrit the US’s own punch enough that the USSR is hurt but not outright destroyed, but that would only be a short respite until the US reassembles enough bombs and aircraft to have another go. And that’s best case for the Soviets.

The problem is of course is the US arsenal in any hot war in the 1950's.

Roughly 500, depending on when precisely your looking. SAC of the early-1950s is a very different beast from what it was in the late-1940s. The shortages of bombs, aircraft, skilled personnel, intelligence, and training had all been solved.
 
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As I posted in other threads, the Soviets had a terrible Early Warning system, as well for lacking overall Radar Coverage in this timeframe
 

Deleted member 9338

I can only see the Soviets using their limited number of bombs by using them with a cordinated offensive on Western Europe. So the Tu-4 would go after European targets.
 
As I posted in other threads, the Soviets had a terrible Early Warning system, as well for lacking overall Radar Coverage in this timeframe

Soviet EW systems seems to have been effective enough at detecting and vectoring in fighters on American attempts at deep reconnaissance overflights into the USSR. Whether it would have been effective enough to blunt a US atomic offensive is frankly unknown and could only be conclusively proven by an event that never happened. It matters little though, since even if the first one is blunted, it’s still liable to be a partial success that allows the second one to succeed where the first failed.
 
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Soviet EW systems seems to have been effective enough at detecting and vectoring in fighters on American attempts at deep reconnaissance overflights into the USSR. Whether it would have been effective enough to blunt a US atomic offensive is frankly unknown and could only be conclusively proven by an event that never happened. It matters little though, since even if the first one is blunted, it’s still liable to be a partial success that allows the second one to succeed where the first failed.[
/QUOTE]

During the time under discussion, neither the USA or the USSR had an air intercept capability that could be relied upon. Knowing the location of a target aircraft and vectoring an interceptor into position to make a firing pass were essentially unsolvable problems given the performance of then available RADARs and the location and performance of the aircraft required to accomplish the intercept. While several successful shoot-downs of aircraft (largely naval) flying predictable, relatively low altitude offshore flights took place in 1950-55, I'm unaware of the loss of any deep penetration aircraft as the result of a vectored intercept (as opposed to a random encounter or operational mischance)

If the bomber's target was within range, US or USSR, it would have been hit. The US SAGE system offered some capability later on. With regard to the loss of a U-2 in May 1960 there is more to the story, but since I have no access to old Norwegian television interviews, it'll have to pass with no comment.

Dynasoar
 
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Soviet EW systems seems to have been effective enough at detecting and vectoring in fighters on American attempts at deep reconnaissance overflights into the USSR. Whether it would have been effective enough to blunt a US atomic offensive is frankly unknown and could only be conclusively proven by an event that never happened. It matters little though, since even if the first one is blunted, it’s still liable to be a partial success that allows the second one to succeed where the first failed.


During the evening of 28-29 April 1954, the RB-45C aircraft were again rolled out of the hangers at RAF Sculthorpe with RAF roundels but no serial numbers, all American insignia had again been blacked out. The routes were similar but a lot longer than the first mission and Crampton again chose the longest, the southern route that penetrated Soviet airspace by about 1000 miles and covered some 30 targets, mainly Soviet Long Range Air Force bases. "These targets were fairly scattered over the southern part of Russia. We were zigzagging from one target to another, in quite a piece of evasive routing, I suppose, which might have added to our safety. I don't know. It certainly prolonged our time over Russia," said Sanders.


The British crews had little idea of the commotion they had caused in Russia. The whole Soviet Air Defence network was alerted. General Vladimir Abramov was the Commander for the Kiev region. In 1993, he described how he ordered his pilots to try and ram Crampton and Sanders' plane. "Since it was the dead of night and our MiGS had no radar then, we tried to direct pilot Batyshev and the second pilot into a head-on collision," he said. One of the Soviet pilots was Lt. Nikolai Sysoev. He now said: "Ideally, we weren't meant to ram head-on, but to ram the most vulnerable parts of the plane." Despite guidance from Soviet ground control radar, the MiG pilots could not find the intruder in the dark. So the British crews knew nothing of the Soviets' kamikaze tactics.

To get around Truman's ban on deep overflights in 1952, LeMay let the RAF 'borrow' RB-45 recon planes and KC-97 tankers, so they could get ELINT and Photo-Recon done by RAF personnel, and would share the intel with SAC

Some other flights were over Moscow and Murmansk
 
To get around Truman's ban on deep overflights in 1952, LeMay let the RAF 'borrow' RB-45 recon planes and KC-97 tankers, so they could get ELINT and Photo-Recon done by RAF personnel, and would share the intel with SAC

Some other flights were over Moscow and Murmansk

That’s nice. But I notice the account you posted leaves out the part where some of the flights came had to abort the mission whenever the fighters started to look like they might get an effective intercept or whenever they came under anti-aircraft fire in order to avoid being shot down. The RAF didn’t suffer losses because of a unusual lack of Soviet ability to down them, the RAF didn’t suffer losses because they were conducting peacetime reconnaissance missions which allowed them to exercise an extreme amount of caution to avoid casualties. As for the Americans, who did this sort of thing much more frequently, even operating under the same luxuries of caution that peacetime and non-time sensitive nature of the missions afford them, lost multiple aircraft to Soviet air defenses. Looking particularly at strategic bomber equivalents, they lost two RB-29s in 1952, an RB-50 in 1953, a RB-50 and another RB-29 in 1954, and a RB-47 in 1955. And that’s just losses to Soviet fighters.

In any case, reconnaissance missions are not the same as bombing missions. In early-1944, the largely successful German reconnaissance overflights of southern England were pretty routine, averaging one every other day, and suffered few losses. Their attempted strategic bombing campaign in Operation Steinbock at the same time and against the same region, on the other hand, got completely slaughtered.
 
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The North American B-45 aircraft is one of the last I'd select for an overflight, since it was relatively slow and had no real altitude capability. The missions were discussed in the unspecified reference (Paul Lashmar?) If so, the book is excellent as far as it goes, but says nothing about RAF Canberra bombers equipped with Spectre rocket engines climbing away from random MiG-15s, or operations conducted by 'Featherweight" B-36s which occasionally sighted MiGs far below them.

Dynasoar
 
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