People,
During the subject time period I was an 18 year old Air National Guard volunteer, soon to be Federalized, to take a series of college equivalency exams, and find myself in a position of surprising responsibility in what was then called Air Technical Intelligence. (the USAF was rapidly staffing up after the insane post WW2 demobilization) While I was involved in propulsion, the strategic realities (or what were believed to be the realities) were matters of everyday discussion. The Boeing B-47 was just entering the inventory in Mid 1951, and it was obvious even then, that the wing was too small to permit optimal weapon delivery. The Boeing B-50 series and the emerging B-36 were the aircraft that would have to win any nuclear war. Its well known that, at this time, RB-50 (Super B-29s with engines that could be depended on) aircraft were routinely crossing the Soviet arctic coast and photographing the interior east of the Urals. Only several years later were (only) two of these aircraft lost during MiG-15 intercepts.
In 1951 here is the situation as I understood it: Soviet Nuclear weapons: Air dropped Bombs: 12 to 16; light devices intended for commercial shipment as unassembled components to Communist agents in Canada and Mexico to be smuggled into the US, unknown but estimated as less than 10.
There were rumors of efforts to establish refueling strips in arctic Canada by at least one bogus oil exploration group with ties to AMTORG or some other Soviet group.
Weapons delivery by Tu 4 series aircraft would be one way (presumably suicide) efforts by Communist fanatics, tho defectors later indicated that the possibility was extended to land at various preselected smaller airports and fade into the woodwork with the help of local Communists (after all, isn't this how they got the bomb in the first place?).
A Soviet nuclear attack on the West resulting from our use of atomic weapons on Red China or North Korea in 1951 was an absolute impossibility. The response would have been endless street demonstrations and strikes. In accord with then existing doctrine, only when the Soviet 'correlation of forces' indicated probable Red victory, would a massive attack take place- then only preemptive surrender could forestall it.
Interesting times to live through.
Dynasoar