Soviet foreign policy if Stalin lives 2, 3 or 6 more years?

raharris1973

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What if Stalin lived a few years longer, remaining basically in control of his physical and mental faculties for that period.

I'm curious how he would have handled various foreign policy and technical developments of the middle and even later fifties.

Now there has been the wonderful "Twilight of the Red Tsar" timeline but it has multiple dramatic and extreme elements I'm not seeking to explore.

Also, I am a skeptic of ideas that Stalin was readying to carry out a systematic anti-Jewish Holocaust or that he would deliberately start World War Three had he lived.

That said, there are innumerable international events coming up he would have to respond to. How might he respond similarly or differently in comparison to the collective leadership that took over after his death and then Khrushchev?

Here is what was coming up on the foreign policy menu:

a) Korean armistice in 1953

-In OTL, post-Stalin collective leadership went for it in July - would Stalin?

b) Iran coup in 1953

-In OTL the Soviet stance was completely passive, would Stalin have more "game" and pursue a more active policy?

c) Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954

-In OTL the Soviets pushed for the compromise on the 17th parallel, would Stalin push for more, or for avoiding settlement altogether

d) Guatemala coup in 1954

-In OTL the Soviet stance was completely passive, would Stalin have more "game" and pursue a more active policy?

e) The Austrian State Treaty in 1955

-Are the Soviets staying in northeast Austria, and perhaps even attempting to build a Communist state, for as long as Stalin lives?

f) Germany joining NATO in 1955

-Does he react beyond diplomatic protest, harass or blockade Berlin?

g) Formalization of the Warsaw Pact in 1955

-does he take the same approach or leave things more bilateral and informal?

h) Nasser’s quest for weapons in 1955

-Does Stalin facilitate arms and political connections with Arab nationalists at this time, or abstain from involvement?

i) Retrocession of Manchurian ports to China in 1955

-Does Stalin hold on to these as long as he lives?

j) The Bandung Non-Aligned or Afro-Asian conference in 1955

-Moscow was not at all diplomatically hostile to this in OTL as it ended up being more anti-western and anti-colonial than anything else. Does Stalin take the same approach

k) Suez invasion in 1956 (if it happens)

-Does he stick his nose in it a la Khrushchev, or stand-off while others fight

l) Sputnik’s launch in 1957

-How does this success change his outlook in terms of strategic confidence

m) Quemoy and Matsu Crisis in 1958 (if it happens)

n) Iraqi revolution and US intervention in Lebanon in 1958

-Does he warn off western intervention in Iraq like Khrushchev did?

o) Would any uprising even start in the European satellite in 1950-1959

p) Cuban Revolution 1959

-OTL Soviet leaders, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others got excited and enthusiastic to work with Castro once he reached out to Moscow. Would Stalin respond the same way or blow him off?

q) Would Sino-Soviet split become irreparable and public by 1959?

r) Would Stalin domestically allow any reallocation of investment from heavy industry and the military to the consumer sector and light industry?

s) Does Stalin increase welfare benefits as the 1950s Soviet leaders did?
 
Maybe greater push for Stalin Note? United, neutral Germany and Austria in exchange for Korea?

Yugoslavian development would be interesting.
 
What if Stalin lived a few years longer, remaining basically in control of his physical and mental faculties for that period.

He was winding down already a lot long before his death. Some say he never recovered from either a heart attack or stroke in 1945. This is speculation but what is know is that after 1950, he was in poor help, made few public appearances, wrote little and his paranoia was growing. If we assume that his health was better and this reduced his paranoia somewhat then:::


I'm curious how he would have handled various foreign policy and technical developments of the middle and even later fifties.

Now there has been the wonderful "Twilight of the Red Tsar" timeline but it has multiple dramatic and extreme elements I'm not seeking to explore.

Also, I am a skeptic of ideas that Stalin was readying to carry out a systematic anti-Jewish Holocaust

If his health is better so he is more trusting of his doctors, then his antisemitism may not have grown. However he was clearly very disturbed with the obvious attachment of Jews to Israel plus he did not like Jews, he would commit something major. We are talking of a man who deported whole nations, why do you think if he did this to nations he barely knew, why would he not do something to a nation he did not like?


or that he would deliberately start World War Three had he lived.

I tend to agree with this. Stalin made it many times quite clear that he would not take it to the brink as Hitler did and stated that he knew when to stop.

I rearranged the items below to put them in some logical order.

That said, there are innumerable international events coming up he would have to respond to. How might he respond similarly or differently in comparison to the collective leadership that took over after his death and then Khrushchev?

Here is what was coming up on the foreign policy menu:


a) Korean armistice in 1953

-In OTL, post-Stalin collective leadership went for it in July - would Stalin?

As long as it did not bring in Russia he would continue the war. If the war was going to spread to Russia as the American came close to threatening then he would stop the conflict.

b) Iran coup in 1953

-In OTL the Soviet stance was completely passive, would Stalin have more "game" and pursue a more active policy?

c) Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954

-In OTL the Soviets pushed for the compromise on the 17th parallel, would Stalin push for more, or for avoiding settlement altogether

d) Guatemala coup in 1954

-In OTL the Soviet stance was completely passive, would Stalin have more "game" and pursue a more active policy?

h) Nasser’s quest for weapons in 1955

-Does Stalin facilitate arms and political connections with Arab nationalists at this time, or abstain from involvement?

k) Suez invasion in 1956 (if it happens)

-Does he stick his nose in it a la Khrushchev, or stand-off while others fight

m) Quemoy and Matsu Crisis in 1958 (if it happens)

n) Iraqi revolution and US intervention in Lebanon in 1958

-Does he warn off western intervention in Iraq like Khrushchev did?

p) Cuban Revolution 1959

-OTL Soviet leaders, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others got excited and enthusiastic to work with Castro once he reached out to Moscow. Would Stalin respond the same way or blow him off?

j) The Bandung Non-Aligned or Afro-Asian conference in 1955

-Moscow was not at all diplomatically hostile to this in OTL as it ended up being more anti-western and anti-colonial than anything else. Does Stalin take the same approach

Unlike his successor, Stalin was never interested in third world politics. we do not see him chasing third world leaders like the ones that succeeded did. Basically, he would see it as a lot of money and resources for little gain. So I doubt he would do much if it costed him.

e) The Austrian State Treaty in 1955

-Are the Soviets staying in northeast Austria, and perhaps even attempting to build a Communist state, for as long as Stalin lives?

Europe is something that Stalin cannot ignore.

He stays.

f) Germany joining NATO in 1955

-Does he react beyond diplomatic protest, harass or blockade Berlin?

Nothing he can do here. I expect that he would do less then what happened.

g) Formalization of the Warsaw Pact in 1955

-does he take the same approach or leave things more bilateral and informal?

Stalin was very comfortable in making a formalized program as long as he ruled it.

o) Would any uprising even start in the European satellite in 1950-1959

Less likely.


q) Would Sino-Soviet split become irreparable and public by 1959?

i) Retrocession of Manchurian ports to China in 1955

-Does Stalin hold on to these as long as he lives?

Mao would want to be independent like Yugoslavia, so YES.

l) Sputnik’s launch in 1957

-How does this success change his outlook in terms of strategic confidence

Probably little.

r) Would Stalin domestically allow any reallocation of investment from heavy industry and the military to the consumer sector and light industry?

s) Does Stalin increase welfare benefits as the 1950s Soviet leaders did?



No
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Maybe greater push for Stalin Note? United, neutral Germany and Austria in exchange for Korea?

Yugoslavian development would be interesting.

At least according to a post Cold War interpretation, the Stalin Note was never a good faith offer. It was only made when Stalin was made certain everyone agreed the west would reject the idea.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I rearranged the items below to put them in some logical order.

As long as it did not bring in Russia he would continue the war. If the war was going to spread to Russia as the American came close to threatening then he would stop the conflict.

Sounds sensible to me. I guess it comes down to when Stalin's nerves give out and if that happens before the Americans escalate.

Unlike his successor, Stalin was never interested in third world politics. we do not see him chasing third world leaders like the ones that succeeded did. Basically, he would see it as a lot of money and resources for little gain. So I doubt he would do much if it costed him.

I see where you are coming from, based on what we actually saw in the Stalin era versus the Khrushchev.

At the same time, Khrushchev had something going for him in the third world that Stalin did not, basically, Khrushchev and his successors had more political opportunities to engage in the third world, largely brought about by decolonization and local political evolution. Whether or not Stalin takes similar advantage, I suspect those opportunities would emerge around the same time as OTL.

I think Stalin's response may be geographically varied.

Intervention in some form in Iran would not be unlikely, considering his wartime occupation of the Iranian north, interest in Iran postwar, and its proximity to the USSR and his native Georgia.

On Iran, I could easily imagine Stalin trying to disrupt the CIA coup of 1953 if he anticipates it at all. He may seek to ensure the failure of the Shah, possibly through tactical support of Mossadegh, or through encouraging a takeover attempt by the Communist Tudeh party. The latter may be more likely than the former because of Mossadegh’s earlier vigorous opposition to Soviet demands for an oil concession in 1945-1946.

I think keeping the French Indochina War going and sending aid to Ho is not unlikely. The Chinese Communist victory seems to have boosted his enthusiasm for adventurism in Asia, and in his lifetime in the late 1940s, he encouraged an increase in Communist militancy in Southeast Asia. If he was up for stretching out Korea, I don't see why he would not be up for stretching out the Indochina War for as long as he could.

The question mark hovers over whether he thinks Arab nationalists or Latin American nationalists like Arbenz and Castro are worthwhile allies at all.

I think Stalin could go either way with reference to the Arab Middle East –

You are correct that Stalin was stingy rather than profligate with foreign aid. Just because he was a socialist did not mean he was an enthusiast for charity, nor did he want to discourage local communist parties from local fundraising and resourcing.

On the one hand, Stalin near the end of his lifetime seemed to focus his third world policy on East Asian Communist Parties, with leaders with COMINTERN ties and long party membership, rather than on third world bourgeois nationalists.

The Soviet press at first characterized the Free Officers coup in 1952 in Egypt as ushering in a Latin American style military regime – presumed to be reactionary. Stalin might persist in this view and restrict his scope of involvement and partners in the Middle East, beyond the first tier countries directly along the southern Soviet border, to dealing with Communist Party affairs, and may not be any more supportive of Arab nationalists than of Arab monarchs.

However, Stalin at some times and places believed even non-leftist foreign nationalism could be beneficial for sowing divisions among the capitalists. Walter LaFeber argues that Stalin wanted to encourage German and Japanese nationalism postwar, in order to inconvenience the Anglo-American bloc (which was a bloc he at times hoped and expected to fall apart).

It is conceivable for Stalin to come around to a similar approach to Arab nationalism. If Nasser is distinguishing himself with anti-British policies that could theoretically get Stalin’s favorable attention. He may end up, like Khrushchev, determining that extending credit to Egypt for arms purchases in the eastern bloc is beneficial. If he is increasingly anti-Israeli, that would be another bonus of the policy of embracing Arab nationalism.

I think what he could say with high confidence is that Stalin would not leave the USSR to personally tour multiple countries in southern Asia as Khrushchev did in 1955.
Stalin could likely be tempted to try to sow discord in the Anglo-American relationship if there is a Suez war.

When the Iraqi revolution comes along, Stalin will probably be pleased with the collapse of the pro-western monarchy. Since Iraq is closer to the Soviet Union, a neighbor of neighbors, he would probably be more likely to see a Soviet stake in Iraq than in Egypt. Likewise with Syria.

Some precedents even in the Stalin era point to a degree of Soviet interest in the Middle East. Molotov’s proposal for a Soviet-administered trusteeship over former Italian Libya in 1945, for instance, Andrei Zhdanov’s praise of Syrian resistance to western domination in 1947. Meanwhile, during the Hitler-Stalin pact era, the Soviets expressed a special interest in Iran, but also going beyond that, an interest in the Persian Gulf states like Iraq and Kuwait.

-So much for the Middle East, what about Latin America?

The Soviets would likely be as inert on the Guatemalan situation as in OTL, where post-Cold War documents did not reveal anything more than Soviet publishing houses sending letters to collect unpaid bills for delivery of some Marxist books to the Guatemalan Communist Party.

On the other hand, if Soviet or east bloc intelligence or diplomats pick up on the coup and exile invasion plotting, I could imagine them warning Arbenz to try to make things harder for the CIA and maximize the friction involved in the US bringing Guatemala back into line ideologically. Even this would still be without overt Soviet investments of prestige or commitments as Stalin would figure the left could not win on an enduring basis so close to the USA at this time.

Stalin was not entirely indifferent to Latin America in the last eight years of his life. To my surprise when reviewing some his writings or speeches he devoted a few paragraphs about what he saw as maturing Communist movements in South American countries like Brazil and Argentina. He said that things were getting close to the point of some workers uprisings. He said they would be suppressed, but would still be helpful and progressive historical developments because their suppression would publicize Communism, establish a Marxist revolutionary tradition, and harden the worker’s movements for success in a later generation.

As for Stalin’s attitude towards Castro’s revolution in Cuba, it is hard to say anything for certain. Castro was a “walk-in” Marxist, volunteering himself to the cause after taking power. Whatever misgivings Stalin had about Mao or Ho Chi Minh and certainly Tito, the three of them had longstanding contact with the international communist movement. Castro had no track record. Stalin might stand off from Castro because of his lack of credentials and perceived weak prospects of him surviving. Castro might get bored with the USSR and communism if he gets no favorable reception from Communist states in these circumstances.

On the other hand, OTL’s Soviet leaders were euphoric when Castro turned to them and the USSR seized the obvious opportunity to undermine the US. This was quite similar to their enthusiastic reaction to the ultimate success of Mao’s final takeover of China, which was achieved mostly indigenously. At that time, Stalin was even caught up in the excitement about a fresh revolution succeeding. Maybe he would overlooked Castro’s lack of credentials and provided him support similar to OTL’s.

Cuba could be seen as a handy place to have access to, especially if Stalin kept up the large surface-fleet building programs he had planned, that were cancelled after his death.

Nothing he can do here. I expect that he would do less then what happened.

Hmm, I wonder if his retaliation might be to set up a Democratic Republic of Austria


-Getting back to Austria – I would see Soviet troops likely remain in place. Possibly also a move by Stalin to establish an Austrian socialist state from the Soviet occupation zone. There is no guarantee that such a step would have to accompany keeping troops there however, as since 1945, Austria had a national administration run by the Social Democratic Party in all occupation zones, eastern and western, and Stalin had not crushed it by 1953 in favor of an East German style system.
-One more unrelated thing – Stalin would likely hold on to leased bases from Finland longer.
Stalin was very comfortable in making a formalized program as long as he ruled it.

makes sense

Less likely.

Mao would want to be independent like Yugoslavia, so YES.

Brings up an interesting point - If Mao dares to break away from Stalin, the ultimate hardliner, is Mao still going to do it using his historic route, out-hardlining the hardliner? Or will he establish a distinctive Chinese Communist identity as more moderate towards the west than the Soviets?


Yeah, I see it as a toss-up. Benefits for standard of living would probably be incidental at best. He still probably has more prestige projects he can invest in for the remainder of his life.
 
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I am curious why you made not comment about why you feel this.

Also, I am a skeptic of ideas that Stalin was readying to carry out a systematic anti-Jewish Holocaust

I am sure that something big was being planned here.


I see where you are coming from, based on what we actually saw in the Stalin era versus the Khrushchev.

At the same time, Khrushchev had something going for him in the third world that Stalin did not, basically, Khrushchev and his successors had more political opportunities to engage in the third world, largely brought about by decolonization and local political evolution. Whether or not Stalin takes similar advantage, I suspect those opportunities would emerge around the same time as OTL.

This will all take time, to make this POD work you need Stalin brother to take charge which is not impossible.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I am curious why you made not comment about why you feel this.



I am sure that something big was being planned here.

On the Stalin's anti-Jewish Holocaust concept, I guess part of it is that it seems like a common rabbit-hole on living Stalin that I preferred not to focus on. The other part is that it seems a little too convenient to be true. It seems like a perfect fit for a certain American intellectual tendency that really is obsessed with "twinning" Hitler and Stalin. He died, so its non-falsifiable. And on top of that there's various comments David T has said speaking to the lack of substantiation and the provenance of rumor, and I tend to find what he says credible.

This will all take time, to make this POD work you need Stalin brother to take charge which is not impossible.

What do you mean by a "Stalin brother" in this context?
 
On the Stalin's anti-Jewish Holocaust concept, I guess part of it is that it seems like a common rabbit-hole on living Stalin that I preferred not to focus on. The other part is that it seems a little too convenient to be true. It seems like a perfect fit for a certain American intellectual tendency that really is obsessed with "twinning" Hitler and Stalin. He died, so its non-falsifiable. And on top of that there's various comments David T has said speaking to the lack of substantiation and the provenance of rumor, and I tend to find what he says credible.


What is in Stalin mind is unknown, he rarely communicated his thoughts as such partly as he was paranoid so the lack of substantiation and it becoming the provenance of rumor is understandable. I think we could agree that if he wanted too Stalin could and would do it. Now did he want to do it is the question?

For all, it is worth the editors in the wiki are saying YES.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Doctors'_plot


What do you mean by a "Stalin brother" in this context?

Someone who thinks like Stalin and who is younger eg Vyacheslav Molotov, he was about 12 years younger and lived to 1986. Lavrentiy Beria would be another.
 
On the topic of the Doctor’s Plot the news was released in western press at the time by the Soviet’s that a wide conspiracy of supposed terrorist Jew doctors were plotting to kill the party elite and the military among others.

ejcy2x.jpg


The arrests of those the NKVD considered ‘Jewish terrorists’ grew and they made clear they were selling it as the tip of the iceberg of a massive plot inside the Jewish community against the state.

Reading Stalin’s intentions and end goal is a bit difficult. He was clearly highly paranoid and seemingly worried many Jews might have their true loyalty with Israel.
 
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Reading Stalin’s intentions and end goal is a bit difficult. He was clearly highly paranoid and seemingly worried many Jews might have their true loyalty with Israel.

Presumably at Stalin's behest, or at least with his approval, the USSR was at first pro-Israel. In 1948 the Soviets are said to have waxed eloquent about the right of jews to return to their ancestral homeland, and vehemently condemned the arab attack.
Stalin may have just thought the jews's first loyalty was to themselves; they were a state within a state.
 
What is in Stalin mind is unknown, he rarely communicated his thoughts as such partly as he was paranoid so the lack of substantiation and it becoming the provenance of rumor is understandable. I think we could agree that if he wanted too Stalin could and would do it. Now did he want to do it is the question?

For all, it is worth the editors in the wiki are saying YES.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Doctors'_plot




Someone who thinks like Stalin and who is younger eg Vyacheslav Molotov, he was about 12 years younger and lived to 1986. Lavrentiy Beria would be another.

I think it can be generally agreed that Stalin might have had very likely had in mind the deportation of Soviet Jews. Genocide seems less supported by the evidence but possible.
 
Here is David T's thread on whether Stalin would deport Soviet Jews.

That was an excellent read and leaves me skeptical of whether Stalin did indeed plan to internally deport Soviet Jews. At that essay notes, it sounds like any plan might have been to get some Jews to denounce other Jews and carry out a purge of some sort against a set of Jews.
 
Here is David T's thread on whether Stalin would deport Soviet Jews.

Thanks for the share, it is a good read.

Now am I sure that much of the evidence here is not actually relevant, for example before the Holodomor (Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933) camps were not set up earlier either, Ukrainians were often just dumped in the middle of nowhere to die. I doubt that you would find much evidence of the plans for Holodomor either say a year earlier either. With matters like this Stalin often played it as he went into it. This, by the way, is true of Hitler's final solution too.

I do not believe either that you can rule out the testimony of several people like Stalin's successors. Their actions after Stalin's death, clearly show that they felt threatened by this, that they felt something big was happening and they acted immediately. You are not going to tell me that they acted for morality.

That was an excellent read and leaves me skeptical of whether Stalin did indeed plan to internally deport Soviet Jews. At that essay notes, it sounds like any plan might have been to get some Jews to denounce other Jews and carry out a purge of some sort against a set of Jews.

After reading it, I agree with you that something was going to happen to the Jews.
 
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