Soviet Foreign Policy/Defense after fall of East Bloc

[FieldMarshal]

This is something I've pondered for a while.

Assuming that the East Bloc still collapses in 1989, but the Soviet Union manages to survive 1991 (most likely by avoiding the August Coup somehow and getting Ukraine onboard with the New Union Treaty). Seeing as one of the most important tenants of both Soviet foreign policy and national defense collapsed with the East Bloc, how would their foreign relations and defense policy develop in the post-East Bloc world?

Would they insist on the neutrality (or even the Finlandization) of the former Warsaw Pact? Would they push for the breakup of NATO to compensate for the loss of the Warsaw Pact? Would they continue to support their old allies in Cuba, North Korea, and the like, or would they try to cozy up to the West and/or China for economic aid?

This old RAND paper from 1988 attempted to answer the national defense side of this, and I think it did so relatively well, space conflict aside (Scenario 11, "War in Space", Page 82). RAND posits that, assuming internal stability, the USSR would shift troops from Eastern Europe to guard it's border with China while also focusing strengthening and modernizing it's navy and air force to match the US.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2614.pdf

Any ideas?

 

[SsgtC]

Except they were broke. Even if we assume they cut their ground forces by 50% and retire their obsolete ships and subs (they still had Foxtrots in service for Christ's sake) they're still going to have a massive shortfall in their budget. Not quite sure how much they could modernize. I think the best they could realistically manage would be to remove obsolete platforms from service as quickly as possible. This is the downside to using period publications like the RAND study. The true state of the Soviet economy wasn't known in the West and it was generally believed to be far stronger than it was.

focusing strengthening and modernizing it's navy and air force to match the US.

 

[FieldMarshal]

Except they were broke. Even if we assume they cut their ground forces by 50% and retire their obsolete ships and subs (they still had Foxtrots in service for Christ's sake) they're still going to have a massive shortfall in their budget. Not quite sure how much they could modernize. I think the best they could realistically manage would be to remove obsolete platforms from service as quickly as possible. This is the downside to using period publications like the RAND study. The true state of the Soviet economy wasn't known in the West and it was generally believed to be far stronger than it was.

That is true. I probably should have specified that it probably wouldn't have been an immediate modernization program, but at least earlier than 2008 like Russia OTL.

 

[SsgtC]

That is definitely more workable. Particularly if they can hang on to Ukraine. I could see them doing something along the lines of, obsolete platforms (ships, tanks, subs, aircraft, artillery, etc) fully retired by 1992 with as much as possible sold to 3rd world nations for who the equipment is still a massive upgrade. The armed forces downsized 50-60% compared to 1988. A conversion to a volunteer military underway by 1993/94. This raises the actual combat capability by orders of magnitude due to the armed forces now being a professional military force and not a conscript one. Then, by 1999 at the earliest or 2002 at the latest, they begin updating in earnest.

I'm not familiar enough with Soviet/Russian surface combatants to get into them, but I could realistically see something like this by 93:

Attack subs: Vicror III and Akula nuclear boats, Tango and Kilo diesel boats.
Boomers: Delta III and Delta IV

Ground forces:
T-72B, with T-90 replacing them as fast as possible following the T-72's abysmal performance against the M1 in the Gulf.
BTR-80 APC and BMP-3 IFV
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter
Standardize on the AK-74 for all ground forces to simplify logistics.

Air Force
MiG-29, Su-27, Su-25, small numbers of MiG-31s. TU-22M and (though I want to retire it) TU-95. I really don't know what they have transport wise, so I'll leave that one alone.

That is true. I probably should have specified that it probably wouldn't have been an immediate modernization program, but at least earlier than 2008 like Russia OTL.

 

[Moltke]

As stated, the fundamental issue (domestic and foreign) is economic recovery. Their FP would be dominated by the needs of the treasury. I would say large coordinated arms sales to any Gulf states buying, or Iran. Probably some really generous trade packages to India, sweetened with some more advanced military tech than Moscow would prefer. Cuba is likely on her own, same for African client states remaining. Unlikely but perhaps some kind of 'pivot to the East' in which some kind of renewed Sino-Soviet pack is made, in which China gets military incentives for buying Soviet junk ... I mean ... goods. The general idea being to focus on some key strategic programs (Subs, and Fighters), and dial back everything else (Ground forces, occupying troops/bases) until the economy can be stabilized.

 

[DemonicToaster]

T-72B, with T-90 replacing them as fast as possible following the T-72's abysmal performance against the M1 in the Gulf

...why don't people realize there is an export versiom of every equipment. And the crew and personnel are shit then you get certain situations like a ISIS managing to take an Iraqi M1 tank with just a technical or an AK.

In fact IIRC the Iraqi tanks were given the steel APFDS. The USSR kept the better tungstun and IIRC depleted uranium ones.

Edit: I think the USSR might make up for its reduction in conventional weapons with a heavier focus on a nuclear retaliation in case of war, since it's conventional forces woudl degrade by a good amount until it stabilizes.

 

[SsgtC]

I'm very aware that there is an export version. However, the T-72s for export aren't that much less capable then the Soviet version. There ammunition, yes. But not the Tank itself. The T-72's armor proved wholly unable to stop APFSDS rounds from American 105mm guns. And the US Army was about to upgrade them to 120mm.

...why don't people realize there is an export versiom of every equipment. And the crew and personnel are shit then you get certain situations like a ISIS managing to take an Iraqi M1 tank with just a technical or an AK.

In fact IIRC the Iraqi tanks were given the steel APFDS. The USSR kept the better tungstun and IIRC depleted uranium ones.

Edit: I think the USSR might make up for its reduction in conventional weapons with a heavier focus on a nuclear retaliation in case of war, since it's conventional forces woudl degrade by a good amount until it stabilizes.

 

[DemonicToaster]

I'm very aware that there is an export version. However, the T-72s for export aren't that much less capable then the Soviet version. There ammunition, yes. But not the Tank itself. The T-72's armor proved wholly unable to stop APFSDS rounds from American 105mm guns. And the US Army was about to upgrade them to 120mm.

...You do realize you skipped the part were I said the Iraqi tanks were crewed by incompetent individuals. And were initiative was discouraged?

There is a reason why I stated even an M1 Abrams could be lost to simply a terrorist with an ak-47 or a technical with no more than a MG.

There is also the fact Iraqi T-72s were missing ERA and various other material..


Such as the home built T-72s having armor being primarily made out of steel.

Its as bad as the the Russian tanks used IIRC in their recent wars with them having very little infantry support.

edit: T-90s are also not cheap. There is a reason why Russia still keeps a certain amount of T-72B3s.

 

[SsgtC]

Yes, I simply skipped it because I wasn't referring to how effectively they were used, but to the fact that their armor is unable to stop APFSDS rounds. And I'm not even going to get into why tanks aren't exactly suited for COIN operations. As for the cost of a T-90, they're actually one of the cheapest MBTs you can buy. In 1999, a T-90 cost 2.1 million. Want to guess how much an Abrams cost in 1999? Try 6.2 million. You could buy 3 T-90s for the price of a single Abrams. Here's a breakdown of roughly equivalent armor:
T-90: 4.5 million in 2011
M1A2 circa 2016: 9 million
Merkava IV: 4.5 million
Leopard 2A6: 5.74 million
Challenger 2: 5.4 million
Arjun: 8.7 million

So basically, even present day, it's pretty damn cheap. In the early 90s, it's even cheaper.

...You do realize you skipped the part were I said the Iraqi tanks were crewed by incompetent individuals. And were initiative was discouraged?

There is a reason why I stated even an M1 Abrams could be lost to simply a terrorist with an ak-47 or a technical with no more than a MG.

There is also the fact Iraqi T-72s were missing ERA and various other material..


Such as the home built T-72s having armor being primarily made out of steel.

Its as bad as the the Russian tanks used IIRC in their recent wars with them having very little infantry support.

edit: T-90s are also not cheap. There is a reason why Russia still keeps a certain amount of T-72B3s.

 

[FieldMarshal]

Here's a few things I've been mulling:

1: Would a surviving Soviet Union insist that the former East Bloc be turned into a sort of neutral Intermarium to keep a buffer between NATO and the USSR? Would NATO have respected that as the years went on? I've seen this appear in one or two TLs, and am thinking of including it in mine.

2: How would relations between the Soviet Union, Iran, and Iraq progress? IOTL, the Soviets and Iranians didn't have the best relations. It took the fall of the USSR for Iran and Russia to achieve better relations, partly due to a shared distrust of American expansion into the Middle East and Central Asia. With the USSR intact, some of the problems that led to the Russo-Iranian partnership we see today are gone. At the same time, however, I recall reading that Saddam royally pissed off the Russians when he invaded Kuwait without telling them first, and some of Moscow's closer Middle Eastern allies (Syria and Libya, for example) supported Iran over Iraq. Is it possible that the Soviets could ditch Saddam in favor of Iran, or will this new USSR continue to support Saddam?

Main reason I'm asking is because I've considered writing a TL in which a surviving USSR pursues closer and closer relations with Iran until finally (in a sort of bizarro version of the Iraq War) the Soviets draw international condemnation after sponsoring a Shiite revolution and Iranian invasion against the Hussein regime in the early 2000s.

3: How will a surviving Soviet Union deal with Afghanistan? After the Soviet withdrawal, Red Afghanistan held out for some time against the mujahideen thanks to continued Soviet support, but the decline of the Soviet economy meant that aid to the DRA declined as well. After the collapse of the USSR, a decision by the new Russian Federation cut off fuel shipments to Afghanistan in 1992 ultimately led to the collapse of the communist Afghan regime as they could not fuel, feed, or arm their army.

While a surviving USSR would still suffer economic problems in the 1990s, I would think that they would be lessened at least a bit as they don't have to deal with much of the hardships the dissolution caused. Furthermore, I can't imagine that they would allow the total collapse of a friendly communist nation right on their borders, and even less so that they would allow an Islamist regime to take hold over the nation after fighting so hard to keep it socialist. Would a surviving Soviet Union be able to prop up Red Afghanistan with aid? Would we see the eventual redeployment of Soviet troops into Afghanistan? Or would the USSR cut it's losses and erect a sturdy border defense against mujahideen incursions?

4: After the collapse of the USSR, Russia sold off all but one of their five aircraft carriers between 1991 and 1996, retired both of it's (outdated) helicopter carriers, and scrapped the unfinished Ulyanovsk nuclear carrier. Meanwhile, Ukraine sold the unfinished Varyag carrier to China in the 1990s. Russia has not built a carrier since, largely due to the fact that they do not have any ports large enough to build one. Ukraine remaining a part of the Union means that the Soviets have the facilities to build carriers. Will a surviving Soviet Union keep at least a few of it's carriers? They would probably keep the Admiral Kuznetsov as in OTL, but after that there are a number of options, none of which are necessarily mutually exclusive, but some are certainly more feasible than others:

- Complete the Varyag
- Complete the nuclear-powered Ulyanovsk
- Convert one or more of the old Kiev-class carriers into STOBAR carriers
- Keep and maintain one or more Kiev-class as they are, and invest in the Yak-141 VTOL fighter instead
- Build completely new carriers later on, after economic recovery

5: What flashpoints between the US and the USSR would exist in this world? I assume they would be similar to US-Russia flashpoints OTL, centered largely in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. If the Intermarium idea is pursued in regards to former East Bloc nations, both NATO and the USSR would regard any moves by the other toward Eastern Europe as a threat to their interests. The Yugoslav Wars might prove interesting, as the Soviets might have to deal with backlash at home from the Muslim SSRs should the Soviets choose to support the Serbs.

The US and USSR would probably continue to butt heads in the Middle East. Continuing Soviet support for communist Afghanistan might be a sticking point for the US and Pakistan, and maybe China as well. Relations could get particularly dangerous if an Arab Spring similar to the one in OTL occurs and both superpowers attempt to undermine the other in the region. If a Syria-type situation develops in this world, it might have an even higher chance of setting off WWIII. On the other hand, the Soviet's continuing status as a military superpower might give both the US and the USSR pause and cause them to take greater action to avoid confrontation for fear of setting off a world-threatening conflict.

Thoughts?

 

[Devvy]

In my highly uneducated opinion regarding Soviet policy!

Here's a few things I've been mulling:

1: Would a surviving Soviet Union insist that the former East Bloc be turned into a sort of neutral Intermarium to keep a buffer between NATO and the USSR? Would NATO have respected that as the years went on? I've seen this appear in one or two TLs, and am thinking of including it in mine.

I'd presume that a shrinking Soviet military would have to face up that Germany is going to unite, and they'll lose East Germany. Austria is likely going to follow and gently drop in to the EC rather then being outright neutral. I'd speculatively imagine the Soviets placing pressure on Finland to not join the EC too, which along with a Norwegian rejection of the EC, leaves Sweden in an interesting dilemma.

I'd guess that Moscow is going to realise that Poland, Czechoslovakia (split or no split), Hungary and the Baltics are going to want to join the EC, and will probably allow that, but seriously push for them to not be allowed to join NATO.

Yugoslavia disintegrating becomes a bigger mess then OTL, as the Soviets back Serbia with the EC either backing Croatia/Slovenia or staying neutral. I'm not sure if NATO would want to intervene here, as it possibly risks a de facto proxy war between NATO and the heavier Soviet-backed Serbians in the Yugoslavian Wars. NATO might fall apart; differences in foreign policy and a lack of a clear raison d'etre for NATO post Cold War leaves it's future a bit shaky.

All in all, a large contraction of Soviet policy in Europe, but I guess it'll do all it can as it draws back to undermine NATO and sow a more independent (and more friendly) European line. Probably pivots to an "Asia-First" policy; that's where all the resources are for a better economy.