Soviet expeditionary force during the cold war

Khanzeer

Banned
The soviets were always handicapped in power projection overseas during the cold war due to lack of a capable of a capable expeditionary force.Sure they had their airborne divisions but no rapidly deployed force through naval assets like the USMC

So let's imagine what kind of a force they can muster at the height of the cold war let's say in 1978 -1980

Goal is to provide some support for their allies in localized conflicts like
Angola civil war
Libya vs Egypt late 70s
South yemen
Horn of africa
Prevent coups against friendly regimes

What kind of naval vessels can they use ?
What kind of units would be most helpful? Mix of airborne troops , marine units , SAM UNIts , some mechanized infantry , ?
Fighter support ?
What kind of logistical support would be need ? How many transport aircraft or supply ships ?
What should be the ideal size of such a force ? Corp strength? Division strength ?
Etc
 
For this they need a navy. Power projection as you describe is more a naval matter than of ground forces. Tho the latter must not be neglected. Theres a reason the British in the 19th Century sometimes referred to their power projection operations as "combined operations".

The Soviet Navy of the Cold war was a region navy. It had roles in the Arctic, North Atlantic, North Western Pacific (Adjacent to Siberia Japan & Korea, and the Mediterranean. Outside those areas its ability was slim.
 
The Soviets operated with a different methodology, utilizing their client regimes as proxies while providing weapons, supplies and key advisors, proving their ability to conduct strategic airlifts and project power swiftly and with good results.
Notable examples are the resupply of Syria in the Yom Kippur War and the way Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov organized the re-arming and re-organizing of the Derg forces in the Ogaden War through the Soviet Military Advisory Group.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
The Soviet Navy of the Cold war was a region navy. It had roles in the Arctic, North Atlantic, North Western Pacific (Adjacent to Siberia Japan & Korea, and the Mediterranean. Outside those areas its ability was slim.
true but soviet naval doctrine was such that even the british, italians and french can form expeditionary naval forces far superior to them, even though these european navies in terms of ships and firepower [ not even counting SSBN and nuclear tipped weapons ] were far inferior to Soviet pacific and Northern fleets

My proposal is with small changes in their force composition and doctrine the soviets can form a similar expeditionary force which can equal atleast that of the French or British [ of the same period] barring ofcourse the AC, and some of that organic firepower can be compensated by having shore based airpower transported to areas of conflict.
Soviets already have the individual ships neccessary for these missions [ again except AC] , its just they need to be moulded into an effective force, obviously they can never be in any way equivalent to USMC nor that is the expectation.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
The Soviets operated with a different methodology, utilizing their client regimes as proxies while providing weapons, supplies and key advisors, proving their ability to conduct strategic airlifts and project power swiftly and with good results.
Notable examples are the resupply of Syria in the Yom Kippur War and the way Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov organized the re-arming and re-organizing of the Derg forces in the Ogaden War through the Soviet Military Advisory Group.
indeed that was their Modus operandi

pros of this policy u already described
cons are
1-far more control to the clients over the military suppplies delivered [ which backfires when allies are not reliable e.g in case of egypt]
2-Far less visible support [ flag showing in 70s is very differnet from lets say 1890s] and inability to influence events on the ground incase things do not go as expected.
 
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Khanzeer

Banned
Is there a possibility of a combined airborne division + naval infantry + air transportable independent units [ like SAM battion, artillery battalion, SSM batteries] forming an expeditionary force in the 1975 to 1985 period ?
 
The Soviets did develop a quite powerful expeditionary power projection by the 1970s. The problem was that the performance of said arm was always contingent on the US not getting in the way.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
The Soviets did develop a quite powerful expeditionary power projection by the 1970s. The problem was that the performance of said arm was always contingent on the US not getting in the way.
But was the Soviet expeditionary force even as powerful as french , British or even Italian power projection?
 
An airborne division shouldn't be a problem. Am I correct in thinking the Soviets maintained a motor rifle brigade in Cuba or was that a load of BS?

I'd say an airborne division, a seperate airborne brigade, a motor rifle division, and a couple of tank brigades could have been deployed to Libya, Syria, Iraq or Angola in the 1980s, but that would be contingent on the US Navy not being willig to engage them.

Today, I'd say a smaller corps could be deployed overseas. The airborne units, fine, and perhaps a couple of mech brigades?
 
90% of the places the Soviets needed to go, they could just drive to.
Everything else, they could just use proxies or was near enough, they just had to hop a short distance.
Power projection, is needed when you are (vastly) physically separated from where you need to be.
And a lot of power projection ends up requiring local clients. Like the US. Or the UK prev’ 1966.
The Soviets could manage that easily.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
90% of the places the Soviets needed to go, they could just drive to.
Everything else, they could just use proxies or was near enough, they just had to hop a short distance.
Power projection, is needed when you are (vastly) physically separated from where you need to be.
And a lot of power projection ends up requiring local clients. Like the US. Or the UK prev’ 1966.
The Soviets could manage that easily.
Soviet help to Egypt, syria , angola , cuba, yemen , Ethiopia are some examples they cannot drive to.
Local clients help but having direct military presence can make a big difference on how you can influence local events
 
The Russian Navy had the Ropucha-class landing ships (28 of them) in that time-period, so they could bring in 2 company sized forces in each of them.
 
As long as none of the other major powers, especially the USA did nothing to interfere, the Soviets could send as many troops as they wanted anywhere. Depending upon the level of resistance, their abilities would rapidly decline for forces far from the USSR. The reality was, during the Cold War, for both the USSR and the USA military intervention/force projection was limited by the other sides willingness to allow it. Neither side was going to "project force" whether an airborne unit or Marines storming the beach if this meant a significant risk of direct "WWIII" confrontation.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
The Russian Navy had the Ropucha-class landing ships (28 of them) in that time-period, so they could bring in 2 company sized forces in each of them.
Problem was escorts
red navy had few warships suited to escort such ship long distances as their primary ASUW weapons were bomber aircraft, SSN and missile corvettes
 
An airborne division shouldn't be a problem. Am I correct in thinking the Soviets maintained a motor rifle brigade in Cuba or was that a load of BS?

I'd say an airborne division, a seperate airborne brigade, a motor rifle division, and a couple of tank brigades could have been deployed to Libya, Syria, Iraq or Angola in the 1980s, but that would be contingent on the US Navy not being willig to engage them.

Your underestimating the Soviets a bit there. The Yom Kippur War gave us a pretty good look at what sort of power projection force the Soviets could theoretically muster up by the 1970s: the Soviets intended to deploy seven VDV divisions and roughly a corps worth of mechanized naval infantry to Syria and Egypt until the USN went "lolno" and forced the Soviets to scale down their deployment to the couple of airborne divisions that they could airlift in. Ultimately, the war ended before the Soviets ever had to go through with any of their plans but it shows that the scale of the Soviets sealift capabilities and it's concurrent impact on their power projection had grown greatly during the 60s and 70s.
 
As long as none of the other major powers, especially the USA did nothing to interfere, the Soviets could send as many troops as they wanted anywhere. Depending upon the level of resistance, their abilities would rapidly decline for forces far from the USSR. The reality was, during the Cold War, for both the USSR and the USA military intervention/force projection was limited by the other sides willingness to allow it. Neither side was going to "project force" whether an airborne unit or Marines storming the beach if this meant a significant risk of direct "WWIII" confrontation.
Do you have any thoughts of the abilities of the Soviets to sustain an expeditionary force in combat without host nation support ? I'm wondering about things such as hospital ships, aero medical evacuation air craft, ability to land supplies "over the beach", abilities to build austere air fields in the middle of no where, abilities to sustain air borne forces in combat by air dropped supplies etc...
 
Your underestimating the Soviets a bit there. The Yom Kippur War gave us a pretty good look at what sort of power projection force the Soviets could theoretically muster up by the 1970s: the Soviets intended to deploy seven VDV divisions and roughly a corps worth of mechanized naval infantry to Syria and Egypt until the USN went "lolno" and forced the Soviets to scale down their deployment to the couple of airborne divisions that they could airlift in. Ultimately, the war ended before the Soviets ever had to go through with any of their plans but it shows that the scale of the Soviets sealift capabilities and it's concurrent impact on their power projection had grown greatly during the 60s and 70s.
I'm not totally convinced that being able to deploy combat forces to help friendly allies implies that the Soviets had the same type of "forced entry" capabilities and the ability to sustain divisional sized units in combat without host nation support that the U.S. did.
 
The USSR never had much capability to sustain an expeditionary force against naval resistance. They could send supplies via merchant vessels, however they had neither the number nor right type of escorts for convoy work let alone against surface forces.
 
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