I guess I was a bit snarky, but here is why I find this really improbable.
First, the war itself did immense damage. In 1945 kolkhozes had only 42 percent of the number of horses and 38 percent of the number of working-age men that they had had before the war. Sown area dropped from 117.7 million hectares in 1940 to 84.0 million in 1946.
Now, in 1946, the grain harvest was only 39.6 million tons as compared to 47.3 million in 1945 and 95.5 million in 1940, the last full year before the war.
So this strikes me as a stark difference, that can't be attributable just to a dry year.
Don't forget too in 1946-47 the Soviets were exporting their already limited amount of grain to feed Eastern Europe, despite the famine. Historians think the USSR could have fed itself if it cut grain exports during this period; so perhaps Stalin, in response to a bad harvest, cuts exports to the Third Reich.
Maybe this leads to bread riots, and instability in the Reich.![]()
Interesting figures. They appear to be the official Soviet figures, which are considered by many to be exaggerated for the years 1937-1940, but even the estimates by critics put the numbers in the 86-87 million range, so your point is well taken. The war did take a major toll on Soviet agriculture.
As to how big the devastation was, 1945 is probably not a good comparison year because the Soviets were still mobilized for war for a goodly part of it. In 1947, the harvest was in the 65.9 million tons range, but the Soviets had an extra year to repair some of the worst devastation, so if 1946 had not been a drought year it would have probably been somewhat lower than 1947, but considerably higher than 1945.
To get a general order of magnitude idea of how much of the drop in Soviet production in 1946 was due to drought and how much was due to war, I suspect that a non-drought figure of around 60 million tons for 1946 would be reasonably close. So the war devastation reduced Soviet agricultural production by somewhere around 30-35% in the short-term.
If the 1946 harvest should have been 60 million tons, the drought would reduce the 1946 harvest by roughly 34% compared to what it would be in a non-drought 1946. If we make a 1940 drought reduce the Soviet harvest by a comparable amount, then we can plug in whatever number we think is right for the real world 1940 harvest and divide by three to get the amount of tons the drought would cost the Soviets. It's going to be in the 25-30 million ton range. As to how that would impact the Soviet war effort, I don't know. It would be interesting to look at historic Soviet food stocks in 1941/42 to get some idea how much this would impact them.