Soviet Civil War

I wonder why the Soviet Union never had a civil war or seccesion crisis. It was one of the largest countries in modern times, and was not the most reliable goverment. Any ideas on why or something like that?
 
Brute force strangling any rising dissent in the cradle I guess; coupled, of course, with over idealism and blind loyalty on the part of many.

The only good chance I suppose would have been a conflict between Trotsky and Stalin early on, but I guess the Soviets were too idealistic to their "perfect party" and too war weary from the recent civil war.
 
The Soviets *had* a civil war, but it happened in the middle of another civil war and a bevy of foreign invasions, so it weasn't terribly central. They also had a number of secession crises - Finland under Mannerheim, the Ukraine, Vlassov in the early 40s, various guerilla groups in the late 40s and early 50s. But ultimately, the massive weight of the Russians as an ethnicity - militarily, numerically, economically and technologically - tends to hold down ethnic ambitions and political conflicts were fought out in the capital rather than at the periphery.

It probably also helped that the USSR actually was better for the 'natives' than Tsarist rule in the beginning.
 
Chances for ethnic Balkan-type strife were always pretty slim due to absolute numerical domination of Russians. Even assuming that "everyone else" were working together flawlessly, Russians could deal with them all simultaneously (and that does not take into account that Central Asia would need to go through huge wave of civil war to rid ethnic groups of their elites before they can turn against Russia). And any thought of war between groups had been squashed by Soviet Army. Once Union went into decline, there were several spectacular flare-ups (Transnistria, Karabakh, Abkhazia, to name a few). So short, but not exhaustive answer is - one group always carried stick too big to mess with.

As far as non-ethnic Civil War goes, KGB-type security system is capable of wonders, as far as internal dissent is concerned. Remember that in similarly totalitarian systems it took truly desperate situation for the country for someone to try a regime change.

But, with certain reservations, I can give you not one but two examples of violent succession crises in USSR: struggle between Beria and alliance of Krhushchev-Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovitch in 1953 and August putsch of 1991.
 
The Soviets *had* a civil war, but it happened in the middle of another civil war and a bevy of foreign invasions, so it weasn't terribly central. They also had a number of secession crises - Finland under Mannerheim, the Ukraine, Vlassov in the early 40s, various guerilla groups in the late 40s and early 50s. But ultimately, the massive weight of the Russians as an ethnicity - militarily, numerically, economically and technologically - tends to hold down ethnic ambitions and political conflicts were fought out in the capital rather than at the periphery.

Nitpick: Finland or the Ukraine did not secede from the USSR but the Russian Empire. One might, of course, argue like you did that the USSR in its OTL form was the Russian Empire by another name.

(Alternately, one could claim that Finland [or the Ukraine, though here the claim is more tenuous] did not secede from any state but became de facto independent as the Empire fell and the Bolshevik junta in Petrograd did not have a reasonable claim to legitimacy. The latter view was indeed quite popular in Finland at the time.)
 
I just could't understand because they werw SO HUGE!!! Smaller countries had plenty of civil wars, I'm just amazed they didn;t! Or the Romans, for that matter. Like fuul fldeged seccesion.
 
Try Lithuania at the end of the game.

Had the Hard Liner's coup against Gorbachev and Yeltsin been successful, a Communist vs. Reformist civil war could have broken out. I would count that in the ensuing crisis, the Baltic States and the Caucasian States are likely to leave the country, while China and Poland will both make noises about territorial claims.

One critical problem--A Soviet Civil War as a result of the coup attempt involves a stupidly huge number of nuclear warheads under guard, and in OTL, Nuclear Proliferation is already a large problem. This could be a nuclear civil war (although lets hope not)
 
Alternately, one could claim that Finland [or the Ukraine, though here the claim is more tenuous] did not secede from any state but became de facto independent as the Empire fell and the Bolshevik junta in Petrograd did not have a reasonable claim to legitimacy.

Off the top of my head, former Russian Empire had at least hundred "Independent republics" at some point (late 1917-early 1918). Your argument makes as much sense for them as it does for Finland :)

I just could't understand because they werw SO HUGE!!!
Size does guarantees certain stability in and by itself. It takes some time to rock the ship that big

Try Lithuania at the end of the game.
You mean August 1991? You mightily overestimate Sąjūdis's ability to wage a civil war. They had exactly squat in terms of guerilla cadre and weapons. Soviet airborne unit established firm control over Vilnius by early afternoon August 19 (it all started early morning Aug. 19). How do I know? My parents had been at Vilnius at this time and escaped the city (army set up checkpoints around it, just in case) only thanks to quick thinking of my dad and to his Minsk friends, who somehow got a car from Belarussian government's stable and sent it for him immediately. Yours truly had been in Vilnius less then a month before the coup, so I have a pretty clear idea what Lithuanians could and could not do.

Had the Hard Liner's coup against Gorbachev and Yeltsin been successful, a Communist vs. Reformist civil war could have broken out.
As I said, one might consider Aug 19 - 21, 1991 events a civil war that almost happened. Unlike Lithuanians, peoples in Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod were ready to fight. But, truth be told, there were preciously few peoples who would fight for commie dinos at this point. On the flip side, one only needs that much kindling to start a fire.

while China and Poland will both make noises about territorial claims.
Poland undoubtedly would, but for one little problem. It does not share a border with Russia proper, except small Kaliningrad enclave. And, would Civil War break out, it would be fought in Russia between Russians, with Belarus and Ukraine likely making a beeline. Then, attacking Kaliningrad is just stupid. It is very militarized area and, doe to compact size, someone is bound to establish an iron grip there soon. After that, would Poles attack, we would see Soviet airborne guards in Gdansk, not Polish soldiers in Kaliningrad :)
 
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I just could't understand because they werw SO HUGE!!! Smaller countries had plenty of civil wars, I'm just amazed they didn;t! Or the Romans, for that matter. Like fuul fldeged seccesion.

Size isn't all that important for civil wars (look at Australia, that's pretty big, too). They're usually about identity and interests. The problem with Russia/the USSR is that so much of its territory is dominated by a single ethnic group while at the same time depending on economic and political support from the agricultural and industrial heartland. There aren't very many conflicts of interest that secession could resolve. At the periphery - well, you had plenty of attempts there.
 
Off the top of my head, former Russian Empire had at least hundred "Independent republics" at some point (late 1917-early 1918). Your argument makes as much sense for them as it does for Finland :)

Not quite as much, if "legitimacy" is the issue we talk about. Political independence as understood by the Finnish Parliament in 1917 was first and foremost a constitutional question. Very few of those "independent republics" couched their claims to independence in terms of constitutional history and the legality of political power in the same way the Finnish Senate did on 4th December 1917.

Now, one may well claim that the Finnish reading of the situation was dead wrong and the argument of Finland being in a "personal union" with Russia and the concomitant theory that Finland reverted to an old Swedish constitution when the Russian throne had been overthrown was based on myth and deliberate, systematic misunderstanding of the position of the Grand Duchy.

Others might say, however, with some justification that legally the Finnish position was much more potent than to claim that a bunch of violent thugs had the legitimate right to take over the Russian government and expect everyone else to play ball. Finland could (and still does) claim a direct peaceful continuity of government since 1809 and I guess in legal terms something like that trumps revolution every time.
 
Others might say, however, with some justification that legally the Finnish position was much more potent than to claim that a bunch of violent thugs had the legitimate right to take over the Russian government and expect everyone else to play ball. Finland could (and still does) claim a direct peaceful continuity of government since 1809 and I guess in legal terms something like that trumps revolution every time.
Finnish version (quite understandably) omits one key issue in "legality" dispute. Constituent Assembly. Before Bolsheviks disbanded it (January 6, 1918), legal continuity was there. Bolshevist uprising did not break post-February legal continuity (accepted by Finns at this point) before they refused to hand reins over to the Assembly.
 
Finnish version (quite understandably) omits one key issue in "legality" dispute. Constituent Assembly. Before Bolsheviks disbanded it (January 6, 1918), legal continuity was there. Bolshevist uprising did not break post-February legal continuity (accepted by Finns at this point) before they refused to hand reins over to the Assembly.

The Finnish Declaration of Independence, as it was accepted by the Parliament on 6th December contains a direct reference to the Constituent Assembly. In the English translation, it reads

"The people of Russia, after overthrowing Czarism, has several times made it known that it will grant the people of Finland, on the basis of her centuries-old cultural development, the right to decide over its own future. This is supported also by a strong voice carried over the horrors of war reminding, in addition to other objectives of the present Great War, of the principle than no nation should be dependent from another without her will. It is a firm belief of the Finnish people that the free people of Russia and her Constitutional Assembly will not impede Finland's desire to join the other free and sovereign nations."

Thus, one gets the notion that the question of independence is still dependant on the view of the Russian people, in a legitimate Constituent Assembly convened. But as the Bolsheviks disbanded the Assembly, this notion was never tested.

As it turned out, pushed by foreign governments, the Finnish (conservative) government went to the length of asking recognition from the Bolsheviks, even when the Council of the People's Commissars was considered by them to be illegitimate as a Russian government. Had the Constituent Assembly continued its work, Finland would not have had any other option than to heed its view on the issue.
 
Are we talking about a full scale war with some form of fronts and reasonably unified chain of command and so on or just a asymetrical war? The later doesn't depend all that much on numbers, even a relative small minority could keep it going for long.
 
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