Soviet carriers?

Actually, it's even worse than that. To maintain a large enough pool of aviators, you're probably looking at somewhere between 3-4 qualified aircrew per aircraft. Figure 600 pilots (one per aircraft assignrd to an active squadron, more if the a/c requires two pilots like the C-2/E-2) and additional NFOs (maybe 300?). That puts you at 900 just to fill the billets in your active squadrons. You'll probably need another 200-300 qualified NAs and NFOs in your training pipeline to train the next batch. Plus you'll probably have another 900 or so NAs and NFOs at shore postings, staff duty, career courses, staff colleges, etc. PLUS, you need additional NAs and NFOs in active reserve units. Figure another couple hundred there, at least. That puts you at 2,200-2,400 naval officers AT A MINIMUM just to keep the airwings operational. And that number doesn't even include senior command positions like CAGs, Carrier COs, Flag Officers, etc. One final note. The above number is based on USN practice that leans heavily on its senior enlisted personnel for technical specialties. The Soviets tended to use officers were the West would use a Petty Officer. For example, in the USNa plane captain is usually a PO2 or PO1. The Red Navy would probably use a junior officer in that role.

TL;DR: Carriers and their associated airwings are MASSIVE manpower sinks.

2000 -> 4000 men per carrier.

Again that many and more for the escorts. Again that many for the fleet train per task force.

Shore establishment 3x that many (12,000) per task force.

And then we have the civilians and the supply chain back to the shipyards and factory floors.
 
How come USN operated their carriers with draftees during WWII, Korea and Vietnam?

WWII was a time of massive build up and growth for the US; there's no way an all-volunteer force would grow fast enough. So it made do. And I'm sure it caused problems.

As for efectiveness of draftees in normal times, note the ratio of officers/enlisted sailors in the soviet navy submarines vs that in western volunteer services. Soviet subs needed a lot more officers because the enlisted were short-time draftees who were given pretty much basic tasks. The Alfa class carried only officers.
 

SsgtC

Banned
2000 -> 4000 men per carrier.

Again that many and more for the escorts. Again that many for the fleet train per task force.

Shore establishment 3x that many (12,000) per task force.

And then we have the civilians and the supply chain back to the shipyards and factory floors.
Exactly. The number I used was JUST the officer pool needed to keep their airwings viable. And honestly, it's probably higher. For example, the Soviet's used officers for sonar work, so instead of a PO in an ASW helo, you've got an LT.

The one thing I will say, the Red Fleet drafted personnel for three year terms, vs the Red Army's two year terms. Mainly because almost every job in the Navy other than cook required a level of technical training.
 
Last edited:
WWII was a time of massive build up and growth for the US; there's no way an all-volunteer force would grow fast enough. So it made do. And I'm sure it caused problems.

As for efectiveness of draftees in normal times, note the ratio of officers/enlisted sailors in the soviet navy submarines vs that in western volunteer services. Soviet subs needed a lot more officers because the enlisted were short-time draftees who were given pretty much basic tasks. The Alfa class carried only officers.

It was the "draftee navy" that fought at Samar. I honor those guys down to my socks.

Very much agree with the rest.
 

SsgtC

Banned
It was the "draftee navy" that fought at Samar. I honor those guys down to my socks.

Very much agree with the rest.
It was also a much different time. People were MOTIVATED. And the systems in board weren't nearly as complex. You could train a sailor to technical competency much faster than you could today
 
It was also a much different time. People were MOTIVATED. And the systems in board weren't nearly as complex. You could train a sailor to technical competency much faster than you could today
So where sailors not motivated during the Cold War.
 
can't speak about sailors,but I hear the army suffered from quite some motivational problems during that time...

Don't forget the US army was stuck in that hell hole called "Vietnam war" for a long time... that dropped morale like a stone. I've read Afganistan had a similar efect on the sov army.
 

SsgtC

Banned
So where sailors not motivated during the Cold War.
Oh they were. But not in the same way as during WWII. Think about it. In the Cold War, you had an opponent that was a theoretical threat, someone you often got into pissing matches and dick measuring contests against, but only extremely rarely were punches actually thrown. You had a desire to be better than him. Not necessarily a desire to wipe him from the face of the Earth.

Compare that to WWII. Your enemy stabbed you in the back when you weren't looking, killed THOUSANDS of your people, ran roughshod over half the Globe and very clearly despised you. Halsey said it best: "Before we're through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in hell."

There's motivated, and motivated
 
Its really silly to have this level of determinism when talking about Carriers or navies in general. Soviets made a great mistake by not having Carriers, it limited their ability to act around the world and project force, as well as gave US free hand in naval matters. Even a shitty navy is better than none when it comes to projecting force as a superpower.

If Soviets wanted to they could have started a serious Carrier programme, which was even for Americans and Japanese a relatively new branch of navy and way of waging warfare. Carriers transitioned from subsidiary scouting role to main naval force.

The reason why Soviets didn't do it is simply the devastation suffered during WW2 and Stalins decision to focus on internal issues. During that time Soviets had plenty of defectors who could have provided valuable internal insight into Carriers and their design, yet Stalin missed it and by the time he was replaced those that replaced him were less competent.

Now if Soviets decided to have Carriers I would personally keep them in Far East where they have access to open seas and are close to targets that would need naval supremacy. Meanwhile they should have mantained strong sumbarine and surface force without Carriers in Baltica and North Sea. It would force NATO to divide its forces in a disadvantageous way, where they can't deal with both threats. Having Carriers in the east would allow Soviets to threaten Japan, East Indies, Philippines, Panama Canal, America itself, and allow it to impact shipping from both sides of US.

12 or so Carriers should do it.

Geographic determinism has a huge influence on both geopolitics and military strategy - and it should. Every country is provided a set of resources and limitations inherent to it and the best course of action is to maximize your strengths while minimizing your weaknesses. Dismissing this reality is probably not the best choice.

As to their ability to project naval power, please take a look at the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and study the Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Med. As to their ability to project power in general, they had no problems spreading their influence globally without carriers and were able to get a foothold in Latin America and Africa despite insecure supply lines. It just wasnt an issue.

As to the 2nd part, the Soviets didnt need carriers to threaten any of those geographies. Submarines could do handle this with cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads (we're assuming no nukes here because once nukes enter the picture carriers largely become irrelevant as they are huge bullseyes and even less potent than subs) as could a conventional surface task force. There are a few periods in the cold war where carriers could handle this role better than the alternatives but those were earlier and before the Soviets would have mastered carrier operations anyway. Putting 12 carriers in the far east just ensures the US has 20 carriers in the Pacific. Lose/lose.

Building carriers, training the sailors and pilots, and operating them is an enormously expensive endeavor. At best, a Soviet buildup would have resembled Kaiser's Willy's dreadnaught build up pre-WWI. Actually at best, it would have bankrupted the USSR even earlier but that's a whole different point. Either way, from the Soviet point of view, carriers would have been a horrible return on investment.
 
The Soviet carrier issue, along with the rest of the Soviet policies political and military should drive one to read both Mackinder and Mahan - the first describes the Russian perspective, the second the American. Another point, and this is for personnel, even in the 50s a significant number of draftees in the USSR were illiterate or marginally literate, and from the "stans" frequently had quite poor Russian language skills. Additionally the exposure of American 18/19 year olds to things like "mechanics" (working on auto/farm equipment) and electronics (radio shack etc) and in recent past computers compared with those living in USSR/Russia is significantly more. This means the US recruit has a head start, and many Russian recruits/draftees would need most of their 3 years just to get up to speed. Also US enlistments 4 years, and longer if significant training signed up for.
 
Another point, and this is for personnel, even in the 50s a significant number of draftees in the USSR were illiterate or marginally literate, and from the "stans" frequently had quite poor Russian language skills. Additionally the exposure of American 18/19 year olds to things like "mechanics" (working on auto/farm equipment) and electronics (radio shack etc) and in recent past computers compared with those living in USSR/Russia is significantly more. This means the US recruit has a head start, and many Russian recruits/draftees would need most of their 3 years just to get up to speed. Also US enlistments 4 years, and longer if significant training signed up for.

I think this is a massively underrated factor for explaining a lot of military performance. A kid who spent years on the farm or fixing his dad's car is going to find it much easier to repair a tank, ship, or anything else related to industrial warfare. This is a factor for both formal training and the informal adaptation often required on the spot.
 
How come USN operated their carriers with draftees during WWII, Korea and Vietnam?

Lots of career NCOs, Annapolis graduates, NROTC Reservists, and battlefield commissions.

You mean the JF, don't you? That is the Grumman Duck.

Know your history.:p The JFU was the Jap Fucker Upper. A bunch of shipping crates covered by a tarpaulin set aside by the runway. In the shape of a covered aircraft, it was the only "target" that appeared to the Japanese to be an aircraft. Since every other plane stationed on Midway was either searching for Nagumo, launching a strike against him, or in the air defending the airstrips, they went for it, dropping a bomb on our Secret Weapon. The JFU died gloriously,:evilsmile: giving up its existence for Mom, Apple Pie, and Chevrolet.:angel:

The Tu-4 Bull worked, right to the exploding engines catching on fire.

The Soviets didn't have the experience gained from fighting "The Battle of Kansas". It cost them. Then there was the apparatchik order to copy the air-pirated B-29, right down to copying the bullet holes put in the fuselage by the Soviet fighter that pirated it.

It was a failure of coast defense that would and did cost the CCCP the Cold War and would have seen it fall quickly during a hot war. The operation was betrayed by John Walker and his crew, but it went ahead anyway. THAT and the game of "tag, you are dead" fought under the ice-caps showed the Russians they could not ever win even with a first strike. By contrast, how many times do you read about a Russian boat detected off the US coasts? Think detected means a threat? It means tracked torpedo bait.

There's also the issue of the Soviets not having the metallurgy to cast single giant propellors for their subs, forcing them to use much noisier twin blades. Now, with the treason of a Norwegian company selling the Russians the secrets for making those giant blades, that advantages no longer exists.

*SHEESH* You would have thought the US selling all that scrap iron to Imperil Japan would have taught our allies something. For the sake of a few million $$$, this will cost us billions to counter.

WWII was a time of massive build up and growth for the US; there's no way an all-volunteer force would grow fast enough. So it made do. And I'm sure it caused problems.

Especially in the first 18 months.

As for efectiveness of draftees in normal times, note the ratio of officers/enlisted sailors in the soviet navy submarines vs that in western volunteer services. Soviet subs needed a lot more officers because the enlisted were short-time draftees who were given pretty much basic tasks. The Alfa class carried only officers.

An Alfa had a cook that was an officer?

It was the "draftee navy" that fought at Samar. I honor those guys down to my socks.

Very much agree with the rest.

ALL of the US Navy in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in ALL actions, had draftees. I believe you are thinking of the reservists. The Battle of Surigao Strait and the Battle of Samar were the greatest victories ever won by the United States Naval Reserve.:cool:;) Which to be blunt is IMVHO why we see so little reflection in our popular culture of Leyte Gulf. Though it was the largest battle in naval history in terms of firepower and numbers of ships, it also represented a gross humiliation for the US Navy "professionals". That is, the boys from Annapolis. Most of all, for the "hero" William F. Halsey, who got all the headlines, over Kincaid and Ohlendorf, who won all the battles that counted.

can't speak about sailors,but I hear the army suffered from quite some motivational problems during that time...

Up until well into the Reagan buildup, the US Navy has always enjoyed (at least starting in the 1880s) (1) greater largesse and respect than the US Army. Circumstances have changed since Panama and Gulf War One.

1) In 1879, Chile threatened to bombard the US West Coast over an economic dispute. The problem was solved diplomatically. But when Congress (who was to blame in the first place) was told that if Chile's then very powerful fleet had tried to attack the US, there would have been nothing the US could have done to stop them. Thusly, they started the long delayed naval buildup, beginning with the ABCD ships.

Don't forget the US army was stuck in that hell hole called "Vietnam war" for a long time... that dropped morale like a stone. I've read Afganistan had a similar efect on the sov army.

100% correct. Vietnam was MORE hopeless, but the Soviet Army was still stuck in its WWII "damn the casualties" mode, making getting killed proportionately more likely. Even the mujahideen could not believe the readiness that the Soviets displayed to abandon their comrades. Leaving behind troops in a damaged or stalled vehicle, all in the name of "fulfilling the mission". That is, giving up half-a-squad KIA just to complete a routine convoy delivery ON TIME!

Oh they were. But not in the same way as during WWII. Think about it. In the Cold War, you had an opponent that was a theoretical threat, someone you often got into pissing matches and dick measuring contests against, but only extremely rarely were punches actually thrown. You had a desire to be better than him. Not necessarily a desire to wipe him from the face of the Earth.

Compare that to WWII. Your enemy stabbed you in the back when you weren't looking, killed THOUSANDS of your people, ran roughshod over half the Globe and very clearly despised you. Halsey said it best: "Before we're through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in hell."

There's motivated, and then there's motivated

It should be pointed out that other than in thwarting spy missions the US and Sovs were never in a situation where they knowingly engaged each other in active combat. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK's biggest worry was having to engage a Soviet warship.:eek:
 
Last edited:
It should be pointed out that other than in thwarting spy missions the US and Sovs were never in a situation where they knowingly engaged each other in active combat.

Strongly suspected or anecdotally confirmed at the time, and later confirmed by archive release for both Korea and Vietnam. Besides advisors the Soviets had active combatants in both conflicts.
 
An Alfa had a cook that was an officer?

Tbh, I'm not sure it even had a kitchen! It had a crew of only 30/31. Apparently the standing watch was made up of only 8 men, so that's roughly 3 shifts? That small number, plus the small size of the ship, really makes me thing they survived on pre-cooked rations. I've read reports likening the Alpha to a highly specialized interceptor.
 
ALL of the US Navy in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in ALL actions, had draftees. I believe you are thinking of the reservists. The Battle of Surigao Strait and the Battle of Samar were the greatest victories ever won by the United States Naval Reserve.:cool:;) Which to be blunt is IMVHO why we see so little reflection in our popular culture of Leyte Gulf. Though it was the largest battle in naval history in terms of firepower and numbers of ships, it also represented a gross humiliation for the US Navy "professionals". That is, the boys from Annapolis. Most of all, for the "hero" William F. Halsey, who got all the headlines, over Kincaid and Ohlendorf, who won all the battles that counted.

1. It took time to train the draftees and reserves.
2. The "professional navy" was the bunch in the barrel at Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.
3. It was the "professional navy" that fought and died in nineteen surface actions during Cartwheel and attritioned the IJN during the first horrible year.
4. It was an all professional silent service, with even the USNRs being volunteers.

And a lot of those 100 aviators who died defending TAFFY # 3 were just like the guys of VT 3 and VT 8, career professionals.

The destroyer captains were a mix of USNR and Annapolis men. Crews likewise career navy, USNR and draftees.

The term "draftee" as I meant it was all inclusive, meaning the guys at Samar and Surigao Strait were the "second string", not part of the "glamor" or Hollywood Navy.

And the guys who won the critical naval battles that counted at Leyte Gulf?

Clifton Sprague
Thomas Sprague
John McCain Sr.
Jesse Oldendorf
Thomas Kinkaid

and every MANJACK who served under them.

That is why in the numbered US fleets you see, 1st, 2nd, 6th, 5th and 7th Fleet. Nobody wants to talk about the 3rd Fleet.

As for the JFU, yup that is a new one on me. Arcane minutiae. Thanks for the lead bob. Filed in the old CPU I carry between my ears. BUT, there was a Duck at Midway used for liaison and to shuttle AAA ammunition between East and West island, just so you knew...
 
Top