Soviet Attack on Nazi Germany in 1942

[BlairWitch749]

Again, this assumes the Germans are facing the UK and trying to take them out first. If they're fighting with a peacetime economy in wartime, they can't mass-produce enough artillery and armor to handle this, and I repeat that their racism will make the surprise far worse, particularly if Hitler pulls a 1944 and refuses to believe it no matter what. The Soviets also have the advantage of truly being able to pave their road to victory over a bridge of corpses. The Germans *can* survive the initial offensive, no question, but when their armored formations are blown to Hell by T-34s and the Stalin Organs are sending those veterans fleeing into the path of an offensive whose simple scale wrong-footed them utterly and completely all this is a great big heap of nothing. It's the inversion of Barbarossa, and Hitler's regime doesn't have what it takes to win a defensive war and we know from OTL how it handles the best-case scenario in an offensive one.

Their armor was always inferior and was outnumbered more than 4 to 1 at the start of barbarossa; they didn't kill Russian tanks with tanks; they killed them with at guns and air power (and surrounding them and waiting them out till they ran out of fuel and ammo)

The Heer had over 7000 AT guns by the time of sickle cut, and even more pilfered from the French and British; and that doesn't include depressing the barrells of their more than 2000 88mm guns

I don't have a problem stating that this would be net better than Barbarossa for the Russians, even if they took monsterous losses because they don't lose all the territory in white russia and will likely still take less total losses than barbarossa BUT it wouldn't go well

The Russians didn't demonstrate an ability to put together a successful non pyriac offensive against German formations on a serious scale until the Kutsuov and Rumianstev attacks in 1943; by which point their army had 24 months to weed out dead wood from their officer corps, blood the rank and file and most importantly have the west absorb large numbers of LW aircraft away from the theater so that the Red Air Force could at least maintian parity over critical sectors

1942 would not see this; the LW is too numerically strong and would achieve air dominence very rapidly (the LW claimed over 7000 victories in 1941 alone)

it is likely to mirror brody; the russians do well in the beginning due to numerical and technical superiority in their ground forces, BUT the LW pounds the hell out of their combat and rear echelons, zapping tactical effectiveness, and eventually winding the ground forces so that they were defeated by smaller and less technically effective german forces

that said, the line will still reside well inside previously german territory and it will beget an eventual soviet victory

 

[Snake Featherston]

Hitler would be nearly as bad as he was 1944, if anything much closer to his 1940-41 mindset. He let his generals do their own thing a lot of the time and actually made some fairly good calls, particularly restraining Guderian who had unrealistic ideas about what his armored forces could achieve.

The mindset that assumed the Germans killed off Soviet reserves twice in one year? That's......not exactly the best foundation to build on.

Their armor was always inferior and was outnumbered more than 4 to 1 at the start of barbarossa; they didn't kill Russian tanks with tanks; they killed them with at guns and air power (and surrounding them and waiting them out till they ran out of fuel and ammo)

The Heer had over 7000 AT guns by the time of sickle cut, and even more pilfered from the French and British; and that doesn't include depressing the barrells of their more than 2000 88mm guns

I don't have a problem stating that this would be net better than Barbarossa for the Russians, even if they took monsterous losses because they don't lose all the territory in white russia and will likely still take less total losses than barbarossa BUT it wouldn't go well

The Russians didn't demonstrate an ability to put together a successful non pyriac offensive against German formations on a serious scale until the Kutsuov and Rumianstev attacks in 1943; by which point their army had 24 months to weed out dead wood from their officer corps, blood the rank and file and most importantly have the west absorb large numbers of LW aircraft away from the theater so that the Red Air Force could at least maintian parity over critical sectors

1942 would not see this; the LW is too numerically strong and would achieve air dominence very rapidly (the LW claimed over 7000 victories in 1941 alone)

it is likely to mirror brody; the russians do well in the beginning due to numerical and technical superiority in their ground forces, BUT the LW pounds the hell out of their combat and rear echelons, zapping tactical effectiveness, and eventually winding the ground forces so that they were defeated by smaller and less technically effective german forces

that said, the line will still reside well inside previously german territory and it will beget an eventual soviet victory

The Soviet air force will be far improved in both quality and quantity, and the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe both will be fighting this war as with OTL WWII with the weapons of 1939 in 1948, if we're exceptionally generous to them in terms of their strength and convenient Soviet idiocy.

The argument from Barbarossa neglects two factors-one, the Soviet armor which the 1942 army will be glutted with derailed entire German attacks all on its lonesome in OTL Barbarossa. Here the Germans are stuck trying to defend against armor their anti-tank guns are useless against without the manpower, machinery, or wherewithal to meet this offensive. As with Barbarossa what will weaken the Soviets is their force structure's weakness and logistics. The Germans can do jack and shit, and jack left town against a surprise attack.

If you're willing to address the point about German racist ideas blinding them to any impending preparation far worse than the Soviets in 1941 IOTL (they were prepared, they just, in the words of the knight from the Last Crusade chose poorly) and how this impairs everything you describe (like, say, the Soviets smashing German airplanes on the ground at the start with their nifty new fighters, bombers, and the like) then we'll be discussing the same Germans. The Germans were repeatedly surprised by Soviet attacks IOTL with a naivete that's twistedly amusing in 1941 and makes me want to shoot their entire officer corps in 1944. In 1942 they won't see that attack coming, and when they think they can simply push the Soviets away with a display of Herrenvolk superiority and get torn to shreds before getting anywhere near an attack whose scale is not going to be taken seriously for at least a few days, perhaps a week.......

As I said, Barbarossa in inverse: the Soviets will slow down and fail to knock the Germans out in one year, but logistics and problems in the Soviet army are going to do this far more than the Germans will. And then by 1944 Europe's the Greater Soviet Empire.

 

[Julian]

The mindset that assumed the Germans killed off Soviet reserves twice in one year? That's......not exactly the best foundation to build on.

Hitler was not the only one to believe that; most of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi government also believed that based upon their estimates they had hurt the Soviet Union worse than they had. Hitler was delusional about the Soviet Union, but so was everyone else.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Hitler was not the only one to believe that; most of the Wehrmacht and the Nazi government also believed that based upon their estimates they had hurt the Soviet Union worse than they had. Hitler was delusional about the Soviet Union, but so was everyone else.

Hitler, however, was always the one who decided how the shots were going to be called. He makes that mistake when the Soviets shoot first and have more T-34s than they know what to do with, well.......it's going to be really horrific for the Nazis and a mixed blessing for Europe's Jews, exchanging assured death for Soviet "good will."

 

[BlairWitch749]

The mindset that assumed the Germans killed off Soviet reserves twice in one year? That's......not exactly the best foundation to build on.



The Soviet air force will be far improved in both quality and quantity, and the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe both will be fighting this war as with OTL WWII with the weapons of 1939 in 1948, if we're exceptionally generous to them in terms of their strength and convenient Soviet idiocy.

The argument from Barbarossa neglects two factors-one, the Soviet armor which the 1942 army will be glutted with derailed entire German attacks all on its lonesome in OTL Barbarossa. Here the Germans are stuck trying to defend against armor their anti-tank guns are useless against without the manpower, machinery, or wherewithal to meet this offensive. As with Barbarossa what will weaken the Soviets is their force structure's weakness and logistics. The Germans can do jack and shit, and jack left town against a surprise attack.

If you're willing to address the point about German racist ideas blinding them to any impending preparation far worse than the Soviets in 1941 IOTL (they were prepared, they just, in the words of the knight from the Last Crusade chose poorly) and how this impairs everything you describe (like, say, the Soviets smashing German airplanes on the ground at the start with their nifty new fighters, bombers, and the like) then we'll be discussing the same Germans. The Germans were repeatedly surprised by Soviet attacks IOTL with a naivete that's twistedly amusing in 1941 and makes me want to shoot their entire officer corps in 1944. In 1942 they won't see that attack coming, and when they think they can simply push the Soviets away with a display of Herrenvolk superiority and get torn to shreds before getting anywhere near an attack whose scale is not going to be taken seriously for at least a few days, perhaps a week.......

As I said, Barbarossa in inverse: the Soviets will slow down and fail to knock the Germans out in one year, but logistics and problems in the Soviet army are going to do this far more than the Germans will. And then by 1944 Europe's the Greater Soviet Empire.

I don't know much more they would improve in quantity in terms of airforce; in 1941 they had 10k combat aircraft of which 7500 where in white russia; and even at the height of their drives in 44 and 45 they only improved on this number slightly (and that's with lend lease supplying fuel and aircraft)... quality I don't know about either; how are they going to improve in quality? IRL the only way they improved was sustained combat weeding out the failures and then concentrating their aces in guards fighter regiments; the overwhelming majority of their pilots will still be super green versus the LW's experten... also in 1942, the ME-109F and FW-190 are the LW mainstays which are generally superior to most of the Red Air Force's fighter aircraft of the period (especially the FW-190)

The AT in production from 1940-42 are 50mm's and 75mm units as there where enough 37's on hand anyway, and sickle cut had demonstrated the need for larger guns; and continued combat against British tanks such as the matilda drove that point home further

The Germans, even during sickle cut and the run up to barbarossa maintained a defensive posture and position to defend themselves against possible soviet treachery... German racial mindlessness may have blinded them to soviet capabilities, but it didn't to intentions; army group north ran huge war games in november 1940 (as did the russians interestingly enough) to simulate a russian attack witch Manstein commanding the blue german forces and rienhardt commanding the red "soviet" forces....... Zhukov ran a similar exercise to simulate a potential german invasion; neither side completely trusted the other

Even if the ground forces get roughly handled in the opening engagements (which I assume they would) the LW would reinforce very rapidly and make it's experience and technical advantage felt to immediately start taking the wind out of the Soviet sails

France had more and better thanks than Germany; and combined with the British almost as many aircraft; and certainly more and better artillery pieces and AT guns.... technical superiority in your vehicles isn't super valuable when you are being bombed 8x a day from the air

 

[Julian]

It seems to me that the Soviet would be able to consistently contest the air above their forces as they did in 1943; not necessarily win, but it won't be a clean sweep ALA 1941. At Kursk they were basically defeated in their air but better training and higher quality aircraft led to fewer losses and hampered the German's ability to carry out massed bombing attacks, at least to a limited degree. Combined with integrated anti-air assets the Luftwaffe was never able to achieve the same results in 1943 as it did earlier on a consistent basis. It remained a potent force but not a battle winner on its own.

 

[BlairWitch749]

It seems to me that the Soviet would be able to consistently contest the air above their forces as they did in 1943; not necessarily win, but it won't be a clean sweep ALA 1941. At Kursk they were basically defeated in their air but better training and higher quality aircraft led to fewer losses and hampered the German's ability to carry out massed bombing attacks, at least to a limited degree. Combined with integrated anti-air assets the Luftwaffe was never able to achieve the same results in 1943 as it did earlier on a consistent basis. It remained a potent force but not a battle winner on its own.

The Kursk fighter pilots had 24 months combat experience to work out doctrine and group together aces into elite formations

This 1942 storm airforce has no combat experience worthy of note whereas the LW's fighter pilots are largely veterans in technically superior aircraft (at least the fighters)... that is a recipe for the 1941 sweep; minus the destroying aircraft on the ground, which was hugely overrated in otl anyway as the soviets always had more machines than pilots

 

[KACKO]

The Kursk fighter pilots had 24 months combat experience to work out doctrine and group together aces into elite formations

This 1942 storm airforce has no combat experience worthy of note whereas the LW's fighter pilots are largely veterans in technically superior aircraft (at least the fighters)... that is a recipe for the 1941 sweep; minus the destroying aircraft on the ground, which was hugely overrated in otl anyway as the soviets always had more machines than pilots

But in 1942 there could be plenty of Yak-1s, 7s and possibly 9s, LaG-3s a La-5s, MiG-3s. Plenty of inexperienced pilots who died in I-153s and I-16s in summer 1941 could be alive and have one more extra year to master new planes. Also there were plenty of veterans and soviet "experten" from Spain, China and Chalchin-Gol who could have more time to teach youngsters the trade on new plane. Also experience from Finland could be with more time better used.
And don't forget the bomber pilots in SB-2s and Ar-2s or TB-3s whou could be flying much better Pe-2s, T-2s and Il-2s. It could be game changer which would maybe not completely annihilated LW on its airfields, maybe only locally but could gain air superiority for first few days and then at least fight LW on at least even terms or terms similar to years 1944/45.
And don't forget. Would be England out of the war till summer 1942? If not, Germany will still need LW in the West. Will be US already in war and getting stronger by every day in England?
For example one regiment of La-5FN with veteran Czechoslovak pilots in fall 1944 gained more or less superiority over Slovakia. Of course, LW was busy somewhere else. West, East. Slovak front at the time was minor and crushed after two months.

 

[BlairWitch749]

But in 1942 there could be plenty of Yak-1s, 7s and possibly 9s, LaG-3s a La-5s, MiG-3s. Plenty of inexperienced pilots who died in I-153s and I-16s in summer 1941 could be alive and have one more extra year to master new planes. Also there were plenty of veterans and soviet "experten" from Spain, China and Chalchin-Gol who could have more time to teach youngsters the trade on new plane. Also experience from Finland could be with more time better used.
And don't forget the bomber pilots in SB-2s and Ar-2s or TB-3s whou could be flying much better Pe-2s, T-2s and Il-2s. It could be game changer which would maybe not completely annihilated LW on its airfields, maybe only locally but could gain air superiority for first few days and then at least fight LW on at least even terms or terms similar to years 1944/45.
And don't forget. Would be England out of the war till summer 1942? If not, Germany will still need LW in the West. Will be US already in war and getting stronger by every day in England?
For example one regiment of La-5FN with veteran Czechoslovak pilots in fall 1944 gained more or less superiority over Slovakia. Of course, LW was busy somewhere else. West, East. Slovak front at the time was minor and crushed after two months.

The Mig-3 was a piece of dog crap that was outflown and took massive losses to German fighters well beyond the level where you could blame it on pilot inexperience

The YAK-1 had a terrible record against the ME-109F let alone the FW-190; the Lagg 3 was also a piece of shit... the Lagg-5 (a good aircraft) wouldn't be in squadron service yet when storm would be launched, the YAK-7 wasn't competitive with the FW-190 and the YAK-9 (a good aircraft) is also not in squadron service yet


The LW in otl had little difficulty (minus weather) maintaining superiority over the battlefield in the east in 1942

 

[Snake Featherston]

I don't know much more they would improve in quantity in terms of airforce; in 1941 they had 10k combat aircraft of which 7500 where in white russia; and even at the height of their drives in 44 and 45 they only improved on this number slightly (and that's with lend lease supplying fuel and aircraft)... quality I don't know about either; how are they going to improve in quality? IRL the only way they improved was sustained combat weeding out the failures and then concentrating their aces in guards fighter regiments; the overwhelming majority of their pilots will still be super green versus the LW's experten... also in 1942, the ME-109F and FW-190 are the LW mainstays which are generally superior to most of the Red Air Force's fighter aircraft of the period (especially the FW-190)

The AT in production from 1940-42 are 50mm's and 75mm units as there where enough 37's on hand anyway, and sickle cut had demonstrated the need for larger guns; and continued combat against British tanks such as the matilda drove that point home further

The Germans, even during sickle cut and the run up to barbarossa maintained a defensive posture and position to defend themselves against possible soviet treachery... German racial mindlessness may have blinded them to soviet capabilities, but it didn't to intentions; army group north ran huge war games in november 1940 (as did the russians interestingly enough) to simulate a russian attack witch Manstein commanding the blue german forces and rienhardt commanding the red "soviet" forces....... Zhukov ran a similar exercise to simulate a potential german invasion; neither side completely trusted the other

Even if the ground forces get roughly handled in the opening engagements (which I assume they would) the LW would reinforce very rapidly and make it's experience and technical advantage felt to immediately start taking the wind out of the Soviet sails

France had more and better thanks than Germany; and combined with the British almost as many aircraft; and certainly more and better artillery pieces and AT guns.... technical superiority in your vehicles isn't super valuable when you are being bombed 8x a day from the air

Of course you don't know because your TLs and a lot of your comments rest on assumptions about the Wehrmacht that frankly shade rather often and very easily into treating them as war gods, not human beings who were rather less brilliant than they're made out to be and got lucky on the stupidity of their enemies. Of course you're not addressing the question of tactical and strategic surprise based on Nazi racism or the problems of a peacetime economy in wartime and how the Nazis pony up production they never did IOTL in this scenario when Barbarossa is in reverse, because despite the repeated patterns in both the Western and Eastern Front of the invincible almighty Wehrmacht being suckered and beaten into a bloody pulp by its supposedly inferior enemies this would never actually happen or be remotely considered.

In other words, Blair, answer the question I asked you-how does the Wehrmacht react for what will be strategic and tactical surprise that's far worse from the assumption that Slavs and Communist Slavs in particular aren't even fully human, just human dust to be brushed aside by the Master Race? Your arguments use OTL exercises that are unlikely to happen here as Hitler decided on Barbarossa in 1940 with an invasion in 1941, so these exercises will not happen if he decides on something different like waiting until after the UK goes down.

Again, answer the question I asked-the Germans will be surprised and it will be as crippling as 22 June. How are they going to react after? All your statistics answer a different question, answer this one.

 

[Snake Featherston]

The Mig-3 was a piece of dog crap that was outflown and took massive losses to German fighters well beyond the level where you could blame it on pilot inexperience

The YAK-1 had a terrible record against the ME-109F let alone the FW-190; the Lagg 3 was also a piece of shit... the Lagg-5 (a good aircraft) wouldn't be in squadron service yet when storm would be launched, the YAK-7 wasn't competitive with the FW-190 and the YAK-9 (a good aircraft) is also not in squadron service yet


The LW in otl had little difficulty (minus weather) maintaining superiority over the battlefield in the east in 1942

Yes, given that the Soviet air force sustained massive losses from the start and had to make do with what it had in situations that favored the Germans in a scenario where the Nazis took the offensive and jumped them first. Perhaps you can see the difference in a scenario with a much stronger Soviet army attacking the Germans in 1942 as opposed to the general stalemate and logistical shoestring poorly led and failed offensives of the 1942 Germans IOTL after they'd taken over most of the USSR's industrial areas and many of its biggest cities and were to retain a siege around one of them, on top of killing 10 million Soviets in combat and starving to death 3 million POWs? I mean it seems there might be just a slight problem in the analogy here.

 

[Julian]

The Kursk fighter pilots had 24 months combat experience to work out doctrine and group together aces into elite formations

This 1942 storm airforce has no combat experience worthy of note whereas the LW's fighter pilots are largely veterans in technically superior aircraft (at least the fighters)... that is a recipe for the 1941 sweep; minus the destroying aircraft on the ground, which was hugely overrated in otl anyway as the soviets always had more machines than pilots

However the majority of pre-war trained and experienced pilots were also wiped out. The vast majority of Soviet pilots at Kursk were poorly trained and had mixed experience, since most of them were killed of in their first few engagements by superior German pilots. Having a VVS that is both trained and experienced with moderately good aircraft is a pretty big deal, especially with a 5 or 6 to 1 advantage.

 

[Snake Featherston]

However the majority of pre-war trained and experienced pilots were also wiped out. The vast majority of Soviet pilots at Kursk were poorly trained and had mixed experience, since most of them were killed of in their first few engagements by superior German pilots. Having a VVS that is both trained and experienced with moderately good aircraft is a pretty big deal, especially with a 5 or 6 to 1 advantage.

And with the advantage of jumping the LW and catching much of what of it is in the East on the ground and making the Nazis have to improvise with the rest of it and react to what the Soviets do as opposed to doing things themselves to others.

 

[BlairWitch749]

Of course you don't know because your TLs and a lot of your comments rest on assumptions about the Wehrmacht that frankly shade rather often and very easily into treating them as war gods, not human beings who were rather less brilliant than they're made out to be and got lucky on the stupidity of their enemies. Of course you're not addressing the question of tactical and strategic surprise based on Nazi racism or the problems of a peacetime economy in wartime and how the Nazis pony up production they never did IOTL in this scenario when Barbarossa is in reverse, because despite the repeated patterns in both the Western and Eastern Front of the invincible almighty Wehrmacht being suckered and beaten into a bloody pulp by its supposedly inferior enemies this would never actually happen or be remotely considered.

In other words, Blair, answer the question I asked you-how does the Wehrmacht react for what will be strategic and tactical surprise that's far worse from the assumption that Slavs and Communist Slavs in particular aren't even fully human, just human dust to be brushed aside by the Master Race? Your arguments use OTL exercises that are unlikely to happen here as Hitler decided on Barbarossa in 1940 with an invasion in 1941, so these exercises will not happen if he decides on something different like waiting until after the UK goes down.

Again, answer the question I asked-the Germans will be surprised and it will be as crippling as 22 June. How are they going to react after? All your statistics answer a different question, answer this one.

the level of surprise will be tactical and only partially strategic... the germans will be surprised by the SCALE of the attack; not that the Russians would back stab them; the whole concept of nazism was based on an inherrent hate and distrust for communism; and even starting in late 1939 they where making photo recon flights over the border to look for signs of attack

even if they are engaged in a blazing hot war with the british in africa; only a few divisions will be there; the overwhelming majority of the heer will be on the eastern border to defend against that eventuality; it's not like postponing barbarossa would see hitler demobilize the army

the soviets will gain good ground in their initial lunge; but once they have gone 150 miles (or less) they will find resupply extremely difficult in the face of a rapidly appearing and furious LW and aggressive holding actions by the panzer armies

destroying aircraft on the ground is over-rated; the pilots have to be killed or taken prisoner... the LW only destroyed a few hundred aircraft on the ground in their surprise attacks in 41; their destruction of 7000 aircraft was mostly done by the jagdfliegers and so it would be in 1942 as well; given that only a handful of soviet fighter pilots have the experience of engaging a first class opponent, and none in the last 3 years wheras the LW's fighter pilots have been in continuous actions for 3 years and have advanced aircraft and doctrines they will rapidly shoot up the red army's fighter cover

soviet aa defense was always spotty at best, and their columns will find themselves attacked over and over again by JU-88's and stukas which will separate the combat elements from support elements, separate wheeled elements from tracked elements, reduce ability to supply in daylight, and severely hamper bridgeheads (on top of attacks on combat formations)

The LW without the vigors of the 1941 barbarossa campaign (even allowing for OTL's large aircraft committment to the med) would see their strength approach 3000 machines which puts them at a 3 to 1 disadvantage; but this is about 100 percent more favorable than barbarossa 41 for them

The soviets will advance; but they will run out of steam within the single fuel radius of a t-34 and will find it difficult to resupply their spearheads and to displace artillery forward and will likely have some of their penetrations cut off before the line solidifies

in answer to your question; they react like normandy; muddled at first, and committ their reserves as best they can (although here they wont get destroyed from the air) and try to hurl the russians back; which they will fail at, but they will bring them to a stop after about 150 miles of advance at the worst

 

[Snake Featherston]

Again you're refusing to address the crucial element of my point-Nazi ideology, which the German generals were for before they were against, held that Slavs in general and Communist Slavs in particular are not fully human, thus the Nazis have no reason to suspect that not-full-humans could pull off a surprise attack on "superior Aryan might" rolleyes:). Until you address this point of the ideology and its impact on German reactions, and this is the third time I've asked, we'll keep going in circles. My point of surprise attack is based on what historically happened when the Soviets attacked Germans, the Nazi ideology meant that the Nazis spent too much time focusing on what they would do the Soviets and not any time at all on what the Soviets would do to them. And this is IOTL late in the Axis-Soviet War, here, without such a war and playing defense.......

 

[KACKO]

The Mig-3 was a piece of dog crap that was outflown and took massive losses to German fighters well beyond the level where you could blame it on pilot inexperience

The YAK-1 had a terrible record against the ME-109F let alone the FW-190; the Lagg 3 was also a piece of shit... the Lagg-5 (a good aircraft) wouldn't be in squadron service yet when storm would be launched, the YAK-7 wasn't competitive with the FW-190 and the YAK-9 (a good aircraft) is also not in squadron service yet


The LW in otl had little difficulty (minus weather) maintaining superiority over the battlefield in the east in 1942

Pokryshkin loved his MiG-3 and actually kept one in his unit till mechanics were able to service it. Anyway, MIG-3 performance in low altitude rally sucked. It was high altitude fighter and hard on pilots. But if I remeber correctly, Pokryshkin said himself that it needed experienced pilot. Well in 1942 there would be more of them. La-5 came into service in fall/winter 1942. It is pretty possible it would be in service in summer 1942 just to cut down the use of VK engines. Over 6000 LaGs-3 would pretty much made Germans too busy. Of curse the plane had problems but they would have extra year to catch them. So possibility earlier La-5 with more La-5s and less LaG-3s. And La-5 FN of Czechoslovak regiment basically have air supperiority over Slovakia durin Uprising in 1944. Yak-9s came in service in fall 1942, so it is pretty possible they could get them earlier. Soviets were actually getting some Germans planes as a trade till 1941. Somwhere I read they got or were suppose to get last Bf-109 in summer 1941. So if Germans didn't want to attack in 1941 and actually to keep flow of raws materials from Soviet union, they will need to supply some most modern aircraft. It will give Soviets extra year to make improvements.

 

[Julian]

Well the Soviets would also have operational surprise. I consider tactical to mean the 5-15 Kilometers of the tactical depth where front line divisions serve as the border between opposing forces and immediate reserves rest, operational to be the 50-70 Kilometers to the rear that compose most reserves, rear area personnel, and regrouping tactical forces, and strategic to be the entire area controlled by that nation including major industrial areas and cities. Strategically the Soviets would have no immediate surprise; the Nazis know that the Soviets will attack due to political reasons. Operationally however the Nazis know very little; how the Soviets will attack, where, when, what kind of strength they posses, and especially what their operational objectives are. Historically the Soviets consistently were able to confuse the Nazis about what their operational goals were, mainly due to their massive reserves which the Nazis underestimated. The Nazis were constantly trying to guess what Soviet objectives were and failed most of the time except in certain situations like Rzhev and Leningrad where terrain and previous combat dictated objectives quite clearly. In Poland for instance OKH will likely assume that a large Soviet attack will be directed towards East Prussia due to said regions political and social significance, along with its role as a major "Aryan" strong point. The Soviets however were fairly wary about rushing into East Prussia and instead planned only diversionary attacks while advancing mainly through central Poland to encircle East Prussia. Other plans proposed attacks into East Prussia and Hungary but those were rejected as unrealistic. Thus a large German garrison there will essentially be thrown away due to this mis appreciation of Soviet operational goals. Interestingly Warsaw only played a minor role in Soviet plans; the main axis of advance would be to the west between the Vistula and Germany proper. This again would lead to German overcommitment to the Bialystok-Warsaw area while ignoring the front further south, exacerbating the situation.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Not only that, Julian, but the Nazis underestimated the Soviets, full-stop. They never learned, even after the Soviets were clearing regions the size of France and forcing them away from Leningrad, that the Soviets were more than capable of surprise attacks and skillful maneuvering on an operational level. They never learned this and by the end of the war the Soviets were fighting a war as lopsided on land as the last stages of the US-Japanese War. Of course in almost all ATLs from the Axis side this never gets so much as an acknowledgment though it's not really an insignificant thing in terms of improving Axis war performance.

 

[Julian]

Not only that, Julian, but the Nazis underestimated the Soviets, full-stop. They never learned, even after the Soviets were clearing regions the size of France and forcing them away from Leningrad, that the Soviets were more than capable of surprise attacks and skillful maneuvering on an operational level. They never learned this and by the end of the war the Soviets were fighting a war as lopsided on land as the last stages of the US-Japanese War. Of course in almost all ATLs from the Axis side this never gets so much as an acknowledgment though it's not really an insignificant thing in terms of improving Axis war performance.

Yes, the greatest problem will be the generals almost universally underestimating Soviet strength and assuming that it's simply impossible that the Soviets could commit 6 tank corps to one axis while still having another 4 tank armies in reserve to strike along another. This along with having infantry reserves that defied all Nazi estimates makes any defensive plans useless, since the Nazis will assume they can bleed the Soviet out like Imperial Russia was bled out economically and militarily in WW1.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yes, the greatest problem will be the generals almost universally underestimating Soviet strength and assuming that it's simply impossible that the Soviets could commit 6 tank corps to one axis while still having another 4 tank armies in reserve to strike along another. This along with having infantry reserves that defied all Nazi estimates makes any defensive plans useless, since the Nazis will assume they can bleed the Soviet out like Imperial Russia was bled out economically and militarily in WW1.

I'm waiting to see if or when Blair will address this particular reality instead of providing a lot of important facts deprived of this particular context. The Nazis kept screwing up with the WAllies despite their taking them more seriously, when it comes to Soviets jumping them, well......the phrase "teenager in a Freddy Krueger movie" comes to mind.