Soviet and Allied Plans for the Battle/Fall of Moscow?

[Witch0Winter]

Something I'd like to ask for a new map series/mini-TL I've been looking at. I am just starting my research on it, so I figured I'd ask here if there were plans for Soviet and Allied responses to Moscow actually being invaded or even falling?

The goal of this idea is to show that the war would've been far from over with the fall of Moscow, given the sheer amount of Soviet territory unconquered, factories moved into Siberia, etc. that even cursory research shows. That said, were there specific plans for the possibility of a Battle of Moscow taking place or even Fall of Moscow? Things like Allies trying to divert Lend Lease supplies through Central Asia (though I do imagine Astrakhan probably wouldn't fall right after Moscow so the Caspian Sea would at least for the time being be open to Allied shipping), possible locations of a capital in exile, plans to evacuate key Soviet leadership, etc.

Apologies if this has been asked before.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

How does Germany take Moscow? The logistics and Soviet resistance won't allow for a late-August/early-September drive to succeed (indeed, it probably leads to a tide-turning Soviet victory in the winter instead of OTLs indecisive bloodbath) and we all know how the OTL Typhoon turned out. A 1942 assault runs into the problem of massive Soviet defenses concentrated west of the city.

 

[Witch0Winter]

How does Germany take Moscow? The logistics and Soviet resistance won't allow for a late-August/early-September drive to succeed (indeed, it probably leads to a tide-turning Soviet victory in the winter instead of OTLs indecisive bloodbath) and we all know how the OTL Typhoon turned out. A 1942 assault runs into the problem of massive Soviet defenses concentrated west of the city.

I have ideas for that, at least more a Battle of Moscow rather than Fall of Moscow, but I just wanted to know answers if we go ahead and assume, for a moment, Moscow somehow falls.

 

[kodak]

The government was mostly evacuated to Kuybyshev (modern-day Samara) in mid-October, a city on the Volga hundreds of miles from the farthest German penetrations. Had Moscow fallen they would have stayed there.

 

[MattII]

How does Germany take Moscow? The logistics and Soviet resistance won't allow for a late-August/early-September drive to succeed (indeed, it probably leads to a tide-turning Soviet victory in the winter instead of OTLs indecisive bloodbath) and we all know how the OTL Typhoon turned out. A 1942 assault runs into the problem of massive Soviet defenses concentrated west of the city.

Maybe they drive on Moscow instead of trying to crush the Kiev pocket.

 

[M79]

Five immediate possibilities come to mind

-Germans avoid the Kiev pocket and drive straight for Moscow. They reach the city before the severe part of Winter hits and before the Soviets get the bulk of their fortifications in place.

-Shapnoshnikov and/or Zhukov falls in the Purges leaving the Soviet Army decapitated and without effective leadership for longer. Could be a double-edged sword as junior officers with even better combat ability might become Generals later in this case.

-Leningrad falls after either the Finns cut off Lake Lagoda, the Murmansk Railway, or both. Or in the alternative German forces decide to push harder into Leningrad and take the city before Moscow per Hitler's original plan ("Leningrad first, Donetsk Basin second, Moscow third", if memory serves).

-Stalin keeps Voroshilov in charge around Leningrad for another week or two, permitting a less competent defence. Without good organization or tactical thinking, German forces run amok.

-Stalingrad or Leningrad falls in later 1942 with some losses and allows for a later Battle of Moscow with heavy German reinforcements, possibly from two different directions

 

[MattII]

However, ignoring the Kiev pocket is going to come back and bite the Germans.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

-Germans avoid the Kiev pocket and drive straight for Moscow. They reach the city before the severe part of Winter hits and before the Soviets get the bulk of their fortifications in place.

They would almost immediately bog down on tougher Soviet resistance and even worse logistical situation. To begin with, consider the below passage by Martin Van Crewald in Supplying War...

There is no doubt that the logistic situation would not have allowed an advance by Army Group Centre at the end of August. At the very best, a force of between 14 and 17 armored, motorized, and infantry divisions might have been so employed, and whether this would have been enough, even in September 1941, to break through the city's defences is very much open to question. It is arguable, moreover, that since the approaches to Moscow were less suited to mobile warfare than was the Ukraine, not even Panzergruppe 2 could have been supplied.

I bolded a part of this excerpt to point something out: the OTL Operation Typhoon was conducted with a force of some 70 divisions.

Now combine the above fact with the additional note that David Glantz has shown more recently that the Soviet defenses on the Moscow axis were in fact tougher in late-August/early-September. So in essence, people who talk about ignoring Kiev are talking about an attack on Moscow that is only 1/4 as strong at best, even more poorly supplied, and against tougher Soviet resistance. In other words they are expecting a weaker German force to succeed where a much stronger one failed. Frankly, they probably would not even be able to achieve the Vyazma encirclement (and they can't even contemplate the Bryansk encirclement since there is no launch pad for it's southern pincer without the Kiev Operation). With that put in perspective, one can easily see that the Germans successfully reaching Moscow via their own efforts is about as realistic as a successful Sealion and we haven't even started talking about actually taking the city yet. The only conceivable PODs which could permit the city in 1941 to fall are in Soviets hands, not the Germans, and they all preclude any kind of pro-longed battle.

Now successfully taking the city in 1942 is more feasible but it means no Operation Blau and the German forces would likely take as long and suffer as badly as they did trying to take Stalingrad OTL, given the toughness of Soviet forces and defenses in front of Moscow, leaving Army Group Center vulnerable to a winter Soviet counter-offensive on the scale of OTL's Operations Uranus and Saturn. Hence, the Germans would take Moscow just in time for the Soviets to encircle them and take it right back.

 

[Alex1guy]

How does Germany take Moscow? The logistics and Soviet resistance won't allow for a late-August/early-September drive to succeed (indeed, it probably leads to a tide-turning Soviet victory in the winter instead of OTLs indecisive bloodbath) and we all know how the OTL Typhoon turned out. A 1942 assault runs into the problem of massive Soviet defenses concentrated west of the city.

But surely there were plans in place 1940-1941 just in case Moscow fell? What were these plans? Where would the Soviet government continue from, how would it be reclaimed, what were the Allies plans LL wise etc. With hindsight it may have been a difficult objective for Germany, but in 1940-41 this wasn't as apparent to the Allies so there would have been contingency plans in case it happened, ergo the question I think ToixStory is asking.

 

[Witch0Winter]

But surely there were plans in place 1940-1941 just in case Moscow fell? What were these plans? Where would the Soviet government continue from, how would it be reclaimed, what were the Allies plans LL wise etc. With hindsight it may have been a difficult objective for Germany, but in 1940-41 this wasn't as apparent to the Allies so there would have been contingency plans in case it happened, ergo the question I think ToixStory is asking.

That would be correct. I'm not so much interested in how the Nazis take Moscow (in the project they either won't or just barely do but be repelled), but rather in what contingency plans the USSR and Western Allies possessed.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Well, the WAllies plans wouldn't change all that much unless the fall of Moscow causes a general Soviet collapse, since that was the basis with which their plans were designed around. The Soviet's plans were rather straightforward: evacuate to Kyubyshev and continue the fight from there. All of the necessary arrangements were made by late-'41 to run the country from there and many of the necessary departments were evacuated there during the Battle of Moscow, with the remaining (including Stalin) ready to evacuate at short notice should it be necessary.

 

[scottrich]

Didn't Stalin ask for Western divisions when the Germans got close? Probably ASB but the idea of part of the British Eighth Army going from North Africa to Moscow is something I'd like to see.

 

[Magnum]

Well, the WAllies plans wouldn't change all that much unless the fall of Moscow causes a general Soviet collapse, since that was the basis with which their plans were designed around. The Soviet's plans were rather straightforward: evacuate to Kyubyshev and continue the fight from there. All of the necessary arrangements were made by late-'41 to run the country from there and many of the necessary departments were evacuated there during the Battle of Moscow, with the remaining (including Stalin) ready to evacuate at short notice should it be necessary.

I've heard it claimed that Stalin had made his decision to stay in Moscow and that there was no 'armoured train waiting for him, ready to evacuate him to safety'. Do you have any source etc. that proves (as much as such things can be proven) that he was hedging his bets and was readying to leave if things went south ?

 

[ivanotter]

Of course there would have been plenty of alternative plans.

What I think is really telling is that USSR was by no means defeated, even if Moscow should fall.

Of course it would be a set-back, but an example of the confidence shown by Stalin et al was the invasion of Iran from August 1941 and onwards.

According to Wiki, USSR invaded with more than 1,000 tanks. Sure enough that it was a great idea to secure future supply routes, but it showed that they believed that there would be something to supply after all (otherwise a better move would have been to hurl an additional 1,000 tanks at German formations).

Would it have been possible for Germany to get to Moscow? probably, but then what?

Could Germany have taken Leningrad? Probably
Could Germany have taken Moscow? probably
Could Germany have taken Stalingrad? probably

... But not all of it at the same time and that is where the wheels came off.

It would have been disaster if all had fallen, but that was not so likely.

Just to put the question into perspective.

Ivan

 

[Witch0Winter]

Of course there would have been plenty of alternative plans.

What I think is really telling is that USSR was by no means defeated, even if Moscow should fall.

Of course it would be a set-back, but an example of the confidence shown by Stalin et al was the invasion of Iran from August 1941 and onwards.

According to Wiki, USSR invaded with more than 1,000 tanks. Sure enough that it was a great idea to secure future supply routes, but it showed that they believed that there would be something to supply after all (otherwise a better move would have been to hurl an additional 1,000 tanks at German formations).

Would it have been possible for Germany to get to Moscow? probably, but then what?

Could Germany have taken Leningrad? Probably
Could Germany have taken Moscow? probably
Could Germany have taken Stalingrad? probably

... But not all of it at the same time and that is where the wheels came off.

It would have been disaster if all had fallen, but that was not so likely.

Just to put the question into perspective.

Ivan

Well, as I said in the OP, the point of the thought exercise is what would have happened if the Germans had managed to take Moscow while the USSR fought on, as I am under no illusions that the USSR will magically fall if Moscow goes down.

 

[spkaca]

Didn't Stalin ask for Western divisions when the Germans got close? Probably ASB but the idea of part of the British Eighth Army going from North Africa to Moscow is something I'd like to see.

Churchill mentions this in his history of WW2. IIRC Stalin asked for 25 British divisions to enter the line on the Eastern Front. Churchill tried to patiently explain a little thing called logistics, though Stalin seems to have thought it was a capitalist plot.

 

[Deimos]

Well, the WAllies plans wouldn't change all that much unless the fall of Moscow causes a general Soviet collapse, since that was the basis with which their plans were designed around. The Soviet's plans were rather straightforward: evacuate to Kyubyshev and continue the fight from there. All of the necessary arrangements were made by late-'41 to run the country from there and many of the necessary departments were evacuated there during the Battle of Moscow, with the remaining (including Stalin) ready to evacuate at short notice should it be necessary.

I am curious. What were the Soviet contingency plans in case Moscow was lost as a central rail hub?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I've heard it claimed that Stalin had made his decision to stay in Moscow and that there was no 'armoured train waiting for him, ready to evacuate him to safety'. Do you have any source etc. that proves (as much as such things can be proven) that he was hedging his bets and was readying to leave if things went south ?

There was definitely an armored train, I've seen it mentioned in such books as Chris Bellamy's Absolute War and Beevor's Stalingrad. That doesn't necessarily mean that Stalin was readying to leave though. Whether he would have booked it if the Germans had broken into the city is indeed a debatable matter. I would, however, argue that he probably would have fled if the city was on the verge of falling. It is, however, also possible that he might have stayed on...

I am curious. What were the Soviet contingency plans in case Moscow was lost as a central rail hub?

Use the connections further east. The Leningrad and Murmansk railways could still be maintained via connections which ran through Kurovskoe, Kurlovsky, and Murom. Links with railways to the southern Russia and the Caucasus would be maintained via the connections through Kurovskoe, Arzamas, and Kazan. Indeed, when the Germans took Kalinin in October 1941, thereby severing the direct Moscow-Leningrad railway, the Soviets simply redirected traffic through the Kurovskoe-Yaroslovl routes.

Moscow was certainly an important rail hub, but the above connections mean that it's fall would have hardly severed northern Russia from southern as I have seen some claim. In order to totally sever all the north-south links in Central European Russia, the Germans would have to advance another 300 kilometers.

Could Germany have taken Leningrad? Probably
Could Germany have taken Moscow? probably
Could Germany have taken Stalingrad? probably

They couldn't have taken any of these for the same reasons: too inadequate logistics and too much Soviet resistance.

... But not all of it at the same time and that is where the wheels came off.[/QUOTE]They couldn't have taken any of them individually either. Martin Van Crewald also addresses the idea of the Germans concentrating on one objective to the exclusion of others in Supplying War. Needless to say, the infrastructure bottlenecks meant the Germans were always on the very edge of being able to support what they had as far as they had advanced until October '41, at which point their supply chain basically up-and-collapsed.

The difficulties experienced in building up a base for the attack on Moscow also rule out another suggestion that is sometimes made, namely that Hitler, instead of dissipating his forces in simultaneous offensives along three divergent axes, ought to have concentrated them for a single attack against Moscow. The logistic situation ruled out such a solution, however, for the few roads and railroads available would not have allowed such a force to be supplied. Even as it was, the concentration of seventy divisions for the attack early in October gave rise to very great difficulties, especially with the railways and the supply of fuel. It would have been utterly impossible to construct an adequate forward base for a larger force.

 

[CrimsonKing]

Just curious-what kind of logistical system would have been required in order to make the advance on Moscow viable?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Just curious-what kind of logistical system would have been required in order to make the advance on Moscow viable?

A late-war Soviet or American one.

To start by examining the issue of trucks, it was simultaneously one of too many and too few: too few absolute trucks, too many different types of trucks. The Germans invaded the USSR with ~476,000 non-combat motor vehicles of which ~225,000 were in their mobile formations and ~251,000 for hauling supplies. Something like half of the German motor park had actually been looted from the French, Belgian, British, and Dutch armies (without those, the Germans would have simply been unable to motorize any portion of their logistical net). On the whole, this meant the Germans had 2,000 different kinds of trucks... which was naturally a complete nightmare when it came to spare parts, which were short to begin with. All of this meant that the number of working trucks rapidly declined and many of those trucks which were damaged had to be written off because they were not able to be repaired. Perhaps the most damning shortage in this category of all was the 'supply' of tires which, to quote Martin Van Crewald, "was so small as to merit one adjective only - ridiculous."

Not only did they have to convert rails because of the different gauges, but they also had to build whole new coaling and watering stations as the stations (those that weren't destroyed by either the retreating Soviets or advancing Germans) in Russia were too far apart since Soviet locomotives were built to go much longer before having to recoal and rewater. Additionally, in their quest maximize the number of tracks converted the German railway repair teams were forced to neglect equally important matters when it came to operating a rail line, like "access to quays, workshops, and engine sheds, the need to supply locomotives with coal, or even the elementary fact that one double line can carry more than two single ones." (Pg 154)

In summary: the Germans just physically lacked the necessary quantity and quality of spare parts, fuel, train equipment, railway crews, and motor transport as well as the means to manufacture them. The German quartermaster staff pointed all of this out to OKH, who went on to deliberately ignore the issue in the planning and execution of Barbarossa... which just compounded the problem. Had they seriously understood the logistical task in front of them, they probably would have told Hitler that uniformly told Hitler that invasion was out of the question.