I am presuming the role of the VVS is to support the Ground Forces to invade NATO countries; to act as a sort of flying combat engineers to help with mobility (removing bottlenecks) and counter-mobility (interdicting reinforcements).
I understand the core role of the PVO to be defending the airspace of the Soviet Union, and in an attack on NATO to do their best in the uphill battle to contest NATO air dominance.
For the VVS, I think I would leave runway denial and long range/area interdiction to the army’s rocket artillery as much as possible. NATO would be expected to own their airspace. Bombers might use stand off weapons to augment, hitting railroad yards and ports etc. with sub-munition dispensers.
I would train all arms of the VVS more, which would be expensive in fuel and aircraft maintenance. Particularly I would train in extreme low-level flying. For the tactical bombers, Mig-27s and Su-17s, 24s, and 25s the goal would be to give them a better chance of making it past NATO fighters to reach their targets. For the fighters, it would be so they get comfortable flying low so they can catch NATO anti-tank planes and helicopters flying nap of the earth. I would implement a program training Su-25s to hunt helicopters with their R-60 missiles and cannons.
I would also encourage Ground Forces to create special units of helicopter-hunting helicopters, using missile armed Mi-24s and possibly Ka-50s when they become first available in 1982. These units would run just ahead of armoured break-throughs to speed the tanks along clearing away the NATO anti-tank helicopters.
To the PVO I would add the role of destroying the NATO AWACs, tanker, and surveillance aircraft. The R-33 air-air missile with a range of 120km went into production in 1980. Initially I would convert Mig 25, Su-15, and Tu-28 interceptors to be able to launch the R-33. I would encourage development of longer ranged versions and improved derivatives of the missile. When the Mig-31 goes into production in 1982 it will greatly increase the effectiveness of the R-33 missile for this mission. I expect the anti-AWACS part of the air war campaign to be whack a mole. As an AWACs is shot down, another is brought forward to fill the gap, which becomes another urgent target. Some of these missions can be expected to be kamikaze, with an interceptor dashing into NATO airspace at full mach, hoping to get close enough to get a shot off before being shot down. A secondary mission for these interceptors would be shooting down NATO strategic bombers.
Another suicide-ish mission profile for both PVO and VVS fighter forces would be saturating the airspace over a critical breakout battle to try and gain local air parity or even superiority long enough for VVS tactical bombers to soften the ground for advancing Ground Forces, and to deny the airspace to NATO tactical bombers. I would expect losses to be high and probably unsustainable in these hairball dogfights, but they would be justifiable if the strategic objectives were met on the ground. VVS fighter capability will improve somewhat when the Mig-29 arrives in the early '80s. PVO likewise when they get the Su-27 in the mid-'80s.
A problem I can see is that Ground Force air defences would be expecting anything in the air to be NATO, for good reason, and would fill the skies with SAMs at any provocation. Any doctrine that put Soviet aircraft in closer proximity to Ground forces on the offensive would necessitate inter service training to step up the IFF game and reduce friendly-fire shoot downs.
That’s all I can think of. Of course, anything that made a Soviet invasion of Western Europe more likely to succeed would make it more likely, and the better they fought, the more quickly it would all go nuclear.
