Southern-British Alliance

While the Confederacy is extremely unlikely to conquer all of the Union, they made several attempts at conquering bits of it during the ACW. This wasn't just their attempts to create puppet governments in occupied areas of slave-holding states that did not secede. The Confederacy also seized part of Arizona Territory and attempted highly unsuccessful invasions of California and Colorado.

Actually,the Confederacy didn't "seize" Arizona. They entered Arizona in July 1861 only after the people of Arizona, on March 16, 1861, held a convention and ASKED them to establish a Confederate Territory there. The U.S. Army started a war with the Apaches in 1860, then in early 1861 had basically withdrawn almost all of it's troops protecting the territory from the Apaches. People were being massacred all over the territory and the survivors were looking for SOMEBODY to come in and put the Apaches down. The Union had also withdrawn the overland mail service, effectively cutting the region off from the outside world, and the people of Arizona wanted the Confederacy to restore that, too. So Arizona (which was, at that time, the area of the present-day States of Arizona and New Mexico south of the Gila River) seceded from the Union and asked to join the Confederacy. The Confederacy also never invaded California or Colorado. Had their campaign in New Mexico been successful, they probably would have attempted such an invasion. But it never got that far.
 
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67th Tigers

Banned
Byron Farwell, in Queen Victoria’s Little Wars mentions that in 1858 the British Army was increased to nearly 230,000 men of whom more than 92,000 were in India. Considering the recent Mutiny, British leadership is very unlikely to reduce the number kept there. With India tying down 40% of the British Army and the needed garrisons to guard British territory worldwide, that probably does leave them with 75-85,000 troops for an Expeditionary Force.

92,000 Europeans (which includes a large number of HEIC Europeans as well as HM Regiments), and it did drop, by 1862 the number of Europeans on Indian establishment was about 80,000, of whom some where outside of India (e.g. the Expeditionary Corps in China and a Brigade in New Zealand)

On 01 Jan 1862 India contained 45 Battalions of HM Infantry.

The problem is getting them across the Atlantic. During the Crimean War, the British Army had about 35,000 troops for the Siege of Sevastopol and it took them 9 months to build up to that point. In OTL, during the Trent Crisis, Britain sent 11,000 troops to Canada, raising the number to 22,000.

Bollocks it did, the journey time from Home to the Crimea was about 2 weeks, it was what to do with them that was in question. Even the 5 Infantry Divisions wasn't "all in".

The British reinforcements (18,000 of them, plus a lot that never arrived) for the Trent were present in America 3 weeks after the decision was made (that is, 3 weeks after the decision to reinforce BNA, 18,000 new troops were there, being elements of 1st and 3rd Army Corps).

So a 24,000 field army (which I understand 1862 has) for the British is entirely reasonable in the initial stages. The key point is how fast the British can get the additional 50-60 thousand troops across the Atlantic and whether they can do a better job supplying them than they managed during the Crimean.

Well, very rapidly and very well. Helps when you've more than half the seagoing steamers in the world.

Then there’s the militia. As the American Civil War showed, militias were not exactly impressive troops without training and seasoning and historically the British Army showed little trust in the abilities of colonial militia. And while period Canada has the population to field 150,000 men, they were straining to provide arms and other supplies for half that number.

Not so in this case, and the British provided all the additional arms etc. necessary.

If Canada is equally desperate, that means they have 30,000 militia men for their biggest field army, 23,000 for their second. Assuming 100% of initial British troops serve in field armies, that gives them armies of 52,000 and 45,000 initially, with another 30,000 reinforcements coming for each army later.

Or we could just look at the British warplan rather than your guesses?

The main field army in Canada was to be 65,000 men (plus 20,000 BCRs), another army in the Maritimes was to be 55,000 men.

Though British commanders may well be worse. The Duke of Cambridge, British Commander-in-Chief (though vastly more progressive than he’s usually portrayed) was resistant to doctrinal change and made promotions based on an officer’s social standing, not merit. Unless the British are lucky they’ll get command of the same caliber they had in the Crimean War.

One who wins every battle he engages in then?

At least 4 times as many Irish served in the Union Army as served in the Confederate Army and the Irish public eagerly followed the exploits of the Union Irish Brigade. Later in the war, after mounting casualties and the New York Draft Riots, Irish public opinion did notable cool towards the Union, but at the same time Irish emigration to the US increased significantly.


Source?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Well, that could have given Britain some secondary market sources for grain, but when it came to direct imports, the Union was providing about 40% of their imported wheat. The early years also saw poor harvests in Ireland and France.

8%, and 1861-2 were good harvests (1863 was poor however)

And Russia was probably the strongest European supporter of the Union. Between that and their recent conflict with Britain, there’s a good chance they would have cut off grain to Britain as well.

and lost their largest source of foreign capital? Hardly. The Russians continued to sell to Britain while they were actually at war with Britain.

In 1860, the CSA did provide about 70% of the US exports. Of course, about 60% of the total US exports were cotton. And between surpluses due to previous bumper crops, increased cotton purchases from other sources, and greater emphasis on other sources such as flax, Britain was getting by without southern cotton.

So other than cotton, 75% of all US exports in 1860 were from the North.

Nope, rice and tobacco (the other two major export products) are also southern.

Or to put it another way, the US was perfectly willing to go to war with the UK and Germany during the Venezuulan Crisis.

Which is why they subjected themselves to a humiliating climbdown?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The USN had more ships than Milne’s available force, though Milne outgunned them. Milne’s ironclads had a deeper draught than American ships, so an actual landing would have been heavily dependant on wooden ships vulnerable to Union ironclads

Well, what does the US actually have? They've about a dozen usable steam warships and no ironclads, oh and a whole bunch of civilian ships they've chucked a few guns on, but they're of little fighting value. In fact a search through the archives will show exactly what they had.

Suffice to say, Milne has a *very* large edge in combat power.

Milne was an able administrator and had been in charge of the transports during the Crimean, but that does not guarantee success. The Peninsula Campaign started with the largest seaborne movement to that point in history. Well-planned, it still ended in failure largely due to the commander’s failure of nerve.

And Milne for all his skills had never been directly involved in battle.

The Peninsula campaign was impressive, well done McClellan, but it was hardly "seaborne", they never left the littoral.

Milne's concept of operations was sound, and again, a search through the archives will reveal it.

I’m afraid Milne and many other period British sources disagree with you. Referring to Jamaica, Milne reported conditions that included, “works badly contrived and worse executed – unserviceable guns – decayed gun cartridges – corroded shot – the absence of stores of all kinds and of ammunition, with dilapidated and damp powder magazines.” He asked for reinforcements, complaining his existing forces were barely enough to protect commerce and existing possessions.

Straight out of Bourne, errors and all?
 
The Duke of Cambridge, British Commander-in-Chief (though vastly more progressive than he’s usually portrayed) was resistant to doctrinal change
Highly debateable. For a start, the Duke doesn't oppose doctrinal change- he's in the forefront of procuring new modern weapons for the army. If you're referring to his opposition to the Cardwell-Childers reforms, the majority of his opposition stems from his concern to preserve the regimental system. He argues that short-service is designed primarily to cut the pension bill and actually detracts from the status of the army as a long-service imperial policing force: the fact that Wolseley is reduced to calling up reservists to serve in Egypt in 1882 seems to show that there's a grain of truth in his arguments.

and made promotions based on an officer’s social standing, not merit.
Completely wrong. What he says is that he'll make promotions on the basis of seniority tempered by selection. The reason for this is that he's concerned about the position of Commander-in-Chief, and through it the monarch, becoming politicised. He's concerned that promotion might become a matter of favouritism and influence, and he wants to avoid the phenomenon of able officers on peaceful stations being passed over for promotion.
 
No, it's not a myth. Virginia, New York, and IIRC, Rhode Island all had clauses in their ratification ordinances which allowed them to resume their independence...i.e. secede...at any time, and these ratification ordinances were accepted by the Federal Government.

Researching the clauses, (actually preambles) it's hard to find unbiased commentary. I can certainly see that they could be interpreted as allowing secession for those three states, though I'm unable to find any information on the claim they went uncontested at the time.

Of course, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas made no such assertions of a right to secede when they joined.

And during the Nullification Crisis, the Force Act of 1833, which only one southern senator voted against established Federal Law had precedence over State Law, rendering those clauses to the ratification ordinances moot.
 
Actually, the Confederacy didn't "seize" Arizona. They entered Arizona in July 1861 only after the people of Arizona, on March 16, 1861, held a convention and ASKED them to establish a Confederate Territory there.

Well, some of the people of Arizona did ask to become a Confederate territory, though the votes took place in Mesilla and Tucson, not the territorial capital of Santa Fe. Other residents of the territory actively resisted the Confederate army, such as the New Mexico volunteers at the Battle of Glorietta Pass.

The U.S. Army started a war with the Apaches in 1860, then in early 1861 had basically withdrawn almost all of it's troops protecting the territory from the Apaches. People were being massacred all over the territory and the survivors were looking for SOMEBODY to come in and put the Apaches down.

More correctly, the US Army attacked the Apache in 1861 in retaliation for an Apache attack on local civilians. US troops did not withdraw from the territory, they moved to fight invading Confederate troops, which left them unavailable to fight the Apache. Confederate commander and self-appointed territorial governor John Baylor then dismantled the forts the locals depended on for protection from the Apache, making a bad situation worse.

The Confederacy also never invaded California or Colorado. Had their campaign in New Mexico been successful, they probably would have attempted such an invasion. But it never got that far.

They did not succeed, nor did I claim they did, but the Confederacy definitely attempted to invade both California and Colorado. To quote the Handbook of Texas Online.

“Sibley planned an ambitious campaign. He intended to march north from El Paso, occupy New Mexico, seize the rich mines of Colorado Territory, then turn west through Salt Lake City, and take over the seaports of Los Angeles and San Diego.”

http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/SS/qds3.html
 
Fiver said:
The problem is getting them across the Atlantic. During the Crimean War, the British Army had about 35,000 troops for the Siege of Sevastopol and it took them 9 months to build up to that point. In OTL, during the Trent Crisis, Britain sent 11,000 troops to Canada, raising the number to 22,000.
Bollocks it did, the journey time from Home to the Crimea was about 2 weeks, it was what to do with them that was in question. Even the 5 Infantry Divisions wasn't "all in".

According to the Crimean War Research Society, the first British troops sailed for Turkey on February 23rd, 1854 and arrived on April 5th. That’s significantly longer than 2 weeks.
http://cwrs.russianwar.co.uk/cwrsentry.html

And from the same site, Britain declared war on Russia on March 28th and didn’t land the first troops in the Crimea until September 14th. That’s a lot more than 2 weeks as well.

Fiver said:
The key point is how fast the British can get the additional 50-60 thousand troops across the Atlantic and whether they can do a better job supplying them than they managed during the Crimean.
Well, very rapidly and very well. Helps when you've more than half the seagoing steamers in the world.

Britain had the same naval advantage in the Crimean War. Yet it took them better than 5 months to get half that many poorly-supplied men to Crimea. And another year before they and their French, Turkish, and Piedmontese allies managed to capture Sevastopol.

Or we could just look at the British warplan rather than your guesses?

The main field army in Canada was to be 65,000 men (plus 20,000 BCRs), another army in the Maritimes was to be 55,000 men.

Okay, that’s considerably less than my guesses of 52,000 rising to 82,000 and 45,000 rising to 75,000. The important thing is how swiftly Britain moves the reinforcements in to reach the higher level. How long did the British warplan estimate they would take to reach these numbers of 85,000 and 55,000?

Fiver said:
Unless the British are lucky they’ll get command of the same caliber they had in the Crimean War.
One who wins every battle he engages in then?

Funny, every account I’ve read says the allied forces succeeded in spite of Raglan, not because of him.

To quote just one critic, George McClellan:

“Thus far the allied generals displayed none of the qualities of great commanders : their measures were half-way measures, slow and blundering ; they failed to keep constantly in view the object of the expedition, and to press rapidly and unceasingly towards it.”

“…it is difficult to divine- how any officer could direct such a charge to be made : destruction was inevitable, and nothing could be gained. No doubt there often are cases in which one arm of service may consistently be required to sacrifice itself for the . benefit of the others, but this was not such a case. The most appropriate criticism upon this exhibition of insane and useless valor seems to be that, no doubt, made by a well-known French general : ‘C'est bien maguifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre’.”

"As things went at Inkermann, the result, as far as the English were concerned, appears to have been due to that steady and magnificent courage of their races, which has so often palliated or overbalanced the follies and unskillfulness of their commanders, whether in victory or defeat.”

”As it was, the Russians were undoubtedly driving the exhausted English before them when Bosquet came up. Had the false attack towards Balaklava been properly conducted, Bosquet would have been unable to assist the English; but, soon perceiving that the operations of Gorchakov were confined to a simple cannonade at long-range, he readily divined the true state of affairs, and by his prompt action saved the army.”

Alma was a success; Balaklava was a draw; and while the allies won Inkermann because of Bosquet.


For numbers, most any coverage of the Irish in the war. The Union had more jobs and was a lot more welcoming to immigrants. For attitudes, largely Celts, Catholics, and Copperheads.
 
I'd like to see your sources.

Nope, rice and tobacco (the other two major export products) are also southern.

Let's repeat the math. In 1860:

70% of US exports came from the south.
60% of US exports were cotton.

That leaves

10% of US exports being other goods from the south
30% of US exports being goods from the north.

So not counting cotton, which Britain was getting by fine without, 75% of the rest of US exports came from the north.

Which is why they subjected themselves to a humiliating climbdown?

:confused: What timeline are you from? In ours, the 1897 Venzualan Crisis led to Britain agreeing to the American position of international arbitration. The 1902 Venzuelan Crisis led to Britain and Germany agreeing to the American position of international arbitration and even formally inviting the US President to arbitrate the claims.
 
I see a CSA-UK alliance as a long term liability for the United Kingdom. Such an arrangement is going to create a USA-UK rivalry. While the UK at the time could not possibly know that Germany is going to become unified within a decade of the ACW.

I would agree that a UK-CSA alliance is unlikely and would be a problem for both sides. However if as a result of say a Trent crisis leading to war and then the US becoming as obcessed with revenge as some suggest things would be drastically different. In that case common interests would make informal links mutually beneficial, as would the common economic interests. I would agree that Prussia is still likely to unite Germany within the next decade.

The UK will have picked the wrong horse in global politics. In OTL, the UK decided that they would pursue a friendship with the United States--if the UK is at best a more recent enemy, and at worst outright has guns in what is believed to be American Territory, this would drive the United States into a alliance with Germany--don't forget that the resultant USA after the loss of the South is going to suddenly be much more German and much less English. Cultural ties might shift over to the Fatherland instead of the Victorian Empire.

Very unlikely. Presuming that the US is bent on revenge it is likely to seriously cripple its development more than the loss of the land and resources of the south. Furthermore, an agressive US would drastically change not only N Amercian development but that in the rest of the world.


This is likely to lead to an earlier WW1 that the UK will legitimately lose. For all those who like Deutschwanks, a USA-AH-German alliance against CSA-UK-France and Russia is likely to rip the latter up.

Why? There's a hell of a lot of butterflies here. Also, given the mess it will quite likely be in and its tradition of non-cooperation with other powers, probably agrivated by increased xenophobia how tempting an ally would the US be? Especially onc so much weaker than in OTL.


So, in the long term, it would really be best for the UK to concede the CSA and make whatever agreements are necessary to keep the USA on their side of global politics. I think even if the UK had supported the CSA--perhaps as an escalation to the Trent Affair--it would probably do so only on the basis of a necessary evil.

I agree with the latter point but the former depends on so many variables. If the US goes rabid as suggested then agreeing to throw it the CSA at a later stage would be highly dangerous. Although thinking of the huge task that the US would have taken and holding a CSA that had known a generation of independence. Under those circumstances there would be no northern sympathisers other than the blacks and how many Americans, especially recent immigrants would be willing to be conscripted to expand the US empire?]


The UK handled the ACW very well, at least compared to the disasters that they could have fallen into. The UK would probably bail on the CSA within a single decade, possibly over financial concerns. A prolonged alliance--unlikely because of slavery and essentially creating a massive arms race in North America--is going to see the rise of a Military-Industrial powerhouse in the United States that is going to smash a backwards CSA to pieces and then go for Canada while the UK is overwhelmed by Germany in Europe.

I think an alliance with the CSA would be highly unlikely unless you have the sort of rabid US your proposing. In which case its fair more likely and also you will probably see a fair bit of movement in the south on slavery. You would probably see an arms race, at least compared to anything the US say pre~1950 OTL but it would be nothing like anything seen in Europe. If the US tries that it would rapidly start resembling a Latin American state, improvished, backward and probably militarily dominated. It would be significantly less in population and wealth than OTL US while Canada would be a lot more powerful. Coupled with a probably more powerful UK - due to the weaker US, moderately increased British military spending etc - I think they could handle the sort of US you propose well into the 20thC. Also how and why would Germany be fighting the UK in Europe? Alliances may be vastly different as well as developments.

Even if, highly unlikely as it is, you got a copy of OTL WWI alliances with the CSA and US added to allies and central powers the outcome would be far from certain. Nations will tend to react to circumstances and given the world you suggest, with prolonged Anglo-American antagonism, all the major powers will be likely to adopt different attitudes. Don't rely on ill-researched trash like Turttledove's Great War series. He sticks to unrealistically close parallels to OTL for budgetry reasons but its about an unlikely as the Posleen universe for instance.

Steve
 
Stevep:

I suppose that a large portion of my post suggests that the United States makes getting the south back a large priority, and it sees itself surrounded by enemies--I think this is a likely outcome.

Other options are certainly possible-- the stability of the CSA is questionable, and it is entirely possible that it simply collapses in the face of internal pressures. Part of this is going to be about what the peace deal between the USA and the CSA is going to be--if the CSA winds up including none of the Border states and no territories past Oklahoma, I have probably overstated revanchism over industrial development. That said, I think it very likely that the US Army will never be the tiny thing it was OTL.

You are correct, there are a lot of butterflies here. The UK would have to be REALLY stupid to support the CSA over the USA, particularly if the CSA starts to fall apart. (Recall that even in 1862, pro-union portions of the CSA had already torn holes in the fabric of the state.) Given that Cotton Prices are falling and that South Carolina seems interested in being its own state, the CSA might be vestigial by WW1.

The USA would need to feel seriously threatened in order go Military-Industrial Complex crazy--and the UK sending in the Marines to ransack Washington and force the US government to accept whatever the South Demands is probably going to lead to that German-US alliance, or at least US Neutrality in that conflict.

I suppose the tipping point is just how angry is the US at the UK and how did the Civil War play out. A highly militarist USA is likely to be at least a second rate world power, by virtue of resources and population in play--true, the UK can block out the United States at this point, but Europe is heading for some kind of collision and if the USA views itself as having a national grievance with the UK, well, things will probably not work out well for the UK or the Confederacy.

All things considered, we live in a better world for none of this happening.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
According to the Crimean War Research Society, the first British troops sailed for Turkey on February 23rd, 1854 and arrived on April 5th. That’s significantly longer than 2 weeks.
http://cwrs.russianwar.co.uk/cwrsentry.html

And from the same site, Britain declared war on Russia on March 28th and didn’t land the first troops in the Crimea until September 14th. That’s a lot more than 2 weeks as well.

and?

The problem is you're looking at a timeline with no idea of the events not included. How long did it take the "Eastern Infantry Division" (as indeed the first troops in theatre were styled) to move, when did then split the Division into two divisions? How long were various transport moves? How long were the British in Bulgaria before the Russians collapsed there under weight of Turkish arms (before the Anglo-French could move up and get involved) etc.

The Crimea is about 2 weeks out from Queenstown on a fast steamer. Quebec is 6 days away by the same.

Britain had the same naval advantage in the Crimean War. Yet it took them better than 5 months to get half that many poorly-supplied men to Crimea. And another year before they and their French, Turkish, and Piedmontese allies managed to capture Sevastopol.

No, the expeditionary force was prettymuch complete in theatre mid-April, 6 weeks after the first units were alerted for overseas service (that is Light, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, the 4th, or Reserve Division under Cathcart was dispatched later). They simply did other things before investing Sebastopol. As to the siege of Sebastopol, you might like to read up on it...

Indeed, upto 12th December 1854, 54,736 OR's had been dispatched to the Crimean (i.e. about 60,000 all ranks).

Okay, that’s considerably less than my guesses of 52,000 rising to 82,000 and 45,000 rising to 75,000. The important thing is how swiftly Britain moves the reinforcements in to reach the higher level. How long did the British warplan estimate they would take to reach these numbers of 85,000 and 55,000?

They're waiting at home, and there is transport. The problem is the St. Lawrence was frozen in late 1861-early 1862 so they could be delivered directly to theatre. If a war kicks off when the St. Lawrence is open, it will be relatively rapid.

Funny, every account I’ve read says the allied forces succeeded in spite of Raglan, not because of him.

Question, did McClellan ever witness Raglan's command in the field?

The fact remains, he won at the Alma (in spite of St. Arnaud, who was incredibly bad, but like to blame "les Anglais" for all his mistakes), he won at Balaklava, and he even won at Inkerman (although his influence on the battle didn't really extend to the infantry melee, he certainly won the battle by coordinating the allied artillery and smashing the Russians at long range).

Bosquet's influence at Inkerman is minimal, for the most part he only had a single brigade (Bourbaki's, 6e Ligne and 7e Leger), with his other brigade (d'Autemme's, 3eme Zouaves and 50e Ligne) not engaged. Prince Napoleon had the 2er Zouaves and 20e Ligne on the Lancaster Battery Road, but they weren't engaged either.

I did a lot of research into this last year, in an effort to produce a VNB scenario:

Allied Orbat at Inkerman

Scale: 1 SP = 250men or 3 guns

6am: 2nd Division Pickets on the lip

In Sandbag Battery:
55th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]

On Shell Hill:
41st Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]1

On Home Ridge:
1st Bde, 2nd Division
Pennefather (DC)2
(55th Regiment)
30th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]
95th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]3

2nd Bde, 2nd Division
Adams (BC)
(41st Regiment)
47th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]
49th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]

B Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd (9 pdrs)
G Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd (9 pdrs)

At the Lancaster Battery

1st Div Sharpshooters M7 [ss]4

7.00am

arriving up the Post Road (i.e. behind Home Ridge)

Raglan (AC)

2nd Bde, Light Division
Buller (BC)
88th Regiment M7 [ ] [ ] Shock5
P Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd (9 pdrs)

7.30am

2nd Bde, Light Division
(88th Regiment)
19th Regiment M7 [ ] [ ]
77th Regiment M7 [ ] [ ]
3rd RM Battalion M6 [ ]
Wing/2 Rifles M7 [ss]
(P Bty)

Arriving on the Lancaster Battery Road:

1st Bde, Light Division
Codrington (BC, acting DC)
7th Fusiliers M7 [ ] [ ]
23rd Fusiliers M7 [ ] [ ]
33rd Regiment M6 [ ] [ ]
E Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd (9 pdrs)

8.30am

Arriving up the Post Road

1st Division
Duke of Cambridge (DC)

Guards Brigade
Bentinck (BC)
3rd Gren Gds M7 [ ] [ ] Shock
1st Coldstm Gds M7 [ ] [ ] Shock
1st Scots Fus Gds M7 [ ] [ ] Shock

Light Brigade, Cavalry Division6
Light Brigade M7 [ ] Shock, Heavy Cavalry

4th Division
Cathcart (DC)

1st Bde, 4th Division
Goldie (BC)
20th Regiment M6 [ ] [ ] Partially armed with smoothbores7
21st Regiment M6 [ ] [ ] Partially armed with smoothbores
57th Regiment M7 [ ] [ ] Shock, partially armed with smoothbores

2nd Bde, 4th Division8
Torrens (BC)
63rd Regiment M6 [ ] [ ] Partially armed with smoothbores
68th Light Infantry M7 [ ] [ ] Shock, partially armed with smoothbores
1st Rifles M7 [ss] [ss] Fully armed with rifles

9am

French forces arrive up the Post Road9

2e Division
Bosquet (DC)
2/12 Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd
3/14 Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd

2e Bde, 2e Division
Bourbaki (BC)
6e de Ligne M5 [ ] [ ] [ ]
7e Leger M6 [ ] [ ] [ ]
3eme Chas a Pied M6 [ss] armed with rifles (?)

9.30am

1er Bde, 2e Division
de Autemarre (BC)
3eme Zouaves M7 [ ] [ ]
50 de Ligne M5 [ ] [ ] [ ]
2e Tiralleurs Algerian M6 [ss] armed with rifles (?)

The 2 British siege guns ordered up arrive

Dickson's Tp M6 [ ] Siege (18 pdrs)

11am

Arriving at the Lancaster Battery Road

3eme Division10
Prince Napoleon (DC)
20er Leger M6 [ ] [ ]
2/2er Zouaves M6 [ ]
6/7 Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd
6/13 Bty M6 [ ] [ ] Fd

D'Allonville's Cavalry Brigade
4th Chas d'Afrique M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] Light



Russian Order of Battle

6am

Arriving at Mt Inkerman:

Town Column
Soimonoff (CC)

Column Artillery
2/10 Hvy Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy (12 pdrs)
1/16 Hvy Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy (12 pdrs)
4/17 Light Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
5/17 Light Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd

6th Rifle Bn M5 SKO
57th Don Cossacks M4 Light Cav, SKO

10th Infantry Division (Ex = 15)
Villebois (DC)
L/Tomsk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Tomsk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Kolivansk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Kolivansk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Ekaterinsburg Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Ekaterinsburg Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD

Combined 16th/17th Infantry Division (Ex = 15)
Jacobritsky (DC)
L/Vladimir Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Vladimir Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Sousdal Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Sousdal Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Bourtoursk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Bourtoursk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
Ouglitz Jaegars M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

7am:

Arriving up the Post Road from the north:

River Column

Palov (CC)

Column Artillery11
1/10 Hvy Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy
3/11 Hvy Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy
3/17 Hvy Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy
1/10 Light Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
2/10 Light Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
3/11 Light Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
4/11 Light Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
2 Don Cossack Bty M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd

4th Rifle Bn M5 SKO

11th Infantry Division (Ex = 16)
L/Selenghinsk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Selenghinsk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Iakoutsk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Iakousk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Okhotsk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Okhotsk Regiment M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD

2nd Brigade, 17th Division (Ex = 10)
L/Borodino Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Borodino Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Taroutine Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Taroutine Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD

10am

Crossing the Tchernya?

Flanking Column12

Gortchakov (CC)

Column Artillery
? Hvy Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy
? Hvy Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Hvy
? Light Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
? Light Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Fd
? Horse Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Light
? Horse Bty M5 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Light

12th Infantry Division13 (Ex = 22)
Liprandi (DC)
L/Azov Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Azov Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Dneprovsk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/ Dneprovsk Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Ukrain Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Ukrain Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
L/Odessa Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD
R/Odessa Regt M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] EFD

Cavalry Division (Ex = 8)
Ruzhov (DC)
Ingermanland Hrs M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] light
Kiev Hrs M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] light
Combined Uhlans M4 [ ] [ ] [ ] light, lancers
Ural Cossacks M4 light
Don Cossacks M4 light




Bibliography
Inkerman: 1854 – The Soldiers Battle by Patrick Mercer (Osprey)
Give Them a Volley and Charge: The Battle of Inkerman, 1854 by Patrick
Mercer
The Highland Brigade in the Crimea by Lt Col Anthony Sterling (Brigade
Major of the Highland Brigade)
The Crimean Campaign with the Connaught Rangers by Lt Col Nathaniel
Steevens
Sharpshooter in the Crimea: The Letters of Captain Gerald Goodlake VC
by Michael Springman
A Bearskins Crimea: Lt Col Henry Percy VC and his Brother Officers by
Algernon Percy
The Crimean War by RLV ffrench Blake
The British Army of the Crimean by JBR Nicholson (Osprey)
The Russian Army of the Crimean War 1854-56 by Robert HG Thomas (Osprey)

1 Actually a wing of the 41st and a wing of the 47th, which were
reinforced with the other wing from the camp. In this orbat I've made
the forward wings of the 41st and 47th just the 41st, and the two
wings in camp the 47th.
2 Although 2nd Division Commander, he effectively commanded 1st Bde
during the battle in the absence of a BC.
3 This regiment carried colours at Inkerman, but lacking spare
officers they were carried by 2 sergeants
4 Under Captain Goodlakes command, only 66 ORs and him
5 In fact, only 4 Coys (Grenadier, 5, 7 and Light) arrived at this
time, with 290R&F. 2 Coy and additional reinforcements came up later
the day bring the Bn upto nearly 500. I've chosen not to track the
reinforcements but rather have them "all up". You may choose to reduce
the 88th to 1 SP, and add another wing of 1SP arriving several hours
later.
6 Historically never brought forward of the reserve, due to Lord
Cardigans total lack of initiative, this tiny formation has no leader,
and can only be used if within Lord Raglans command radius.
7 The majority of 4th Division carried smoothbores, but the light coys
and sharpshooters carried Minie rifles. To reflect this, they roll
their full number of dice at musket range, but only 1 die out to rifle
range
8 2 Coys of the 46th were also present, but have been adsorbed into
the rest of the Bde
9 In fact, the leading French battalions were on the field over half
an hour earlier, but refused to move to support the British without
Bourbaki's orders, thus the French arrival has been pushed back until
Bourbaki's arrival.
10 Only a small portion of the Division, consisting of 1st and 2nd Bns
of the 20th Leger and 2nd Bn of the 2nd Zouaves were dispatched from
the French camps, along with the 4th African Cavalry
11 Reserve Bty has been amalgamated into the other Btys
12 In reality they never pressed the attack, and another division was
left on the far bank and not even committed to the diversion
13 Numbers etc. not confirmed


For numbers, most any coverage of the Irish in the war. The Union had more jobs and was a lot more welcoming to immigrants. For attitudes, largely Celts, Catholics, and Copperheads.

Really, again, source?
 
Stevep:

I suppose that a large portion of my post suggests that the United States makes getting the south back a large priority, and it sees itself surrounded by enemies--I think this is a likely outcome.

Other options are certainly possible-- the stability of the CSA is questionable, and it is entirely possible that it simply collapses in the face of internal pressures. Part of this is going to be about what the peace deal between the USA and the CSA is going to be--if the CSA winds up including none of the Border states and no territories past Oklahoma, I have probably overstated revanchism over industrial development. That said, I think it very likely that the US Army will never be the tiny thing it was OTL.

You are correct, there are a lot of butterflies here. The UK would have to be REALLY stupid to support the CSA over the USA, particularly if the CSA starts to fall apart. (Recall that even in 1862, pro-union portions of the CSA had already torn holes in the fabric of the state.) Given that Cotton Prices are falling and that South Carolina seems interested in being its own state, the CSA might be vestigial by WW1.

The USA would need to feel seriously threatened in order go Military-Industrial Complex crazy--and the UK sending in the Marines to ransack Washington and force the US government to accept whatever the South Demands is probably going to lead to that German-US alliance, or at least US Neutrality in that conflict.

I suppose the tipping point is just how angry is the US at the UK and how did the Civil War play out. A highly militarist USA is likely to be at least a second rate world power, by virtue of resources and population in play--true, the UK can block out the United States at this point, but Europe is heading for some kind of collision and if the USA views itself as having a national grievance with the UK, well, things will probably not work out well for the UK or the Confederacy.

All things considered, we live in a better world for none of this happening.


Bluemax

As you say a lot depends on how things develop. The duration and extent of the war that comes out of a combination of the civil war and a Trent Conflict. Also how all 3 powers, along with many others and factions within them develop from those events.

I probably came across as rather belligient on this issue.:eek: Unfortunately I get rather fed up of people posting basically saying that if Britain got dragged into the USCW and the US was defeated, leading to the south gaining independence and possibly land losses to Britain then:
a) The US will be fanatically hostile to both the CSA and Britain/Canada, militarising heavily and at the same time develop economically at exactly the same rate as it did historically. Especially when they assume that dispite the repeated threats of 'revenge' from the US it will still receive all the finance, investment and settlers it did historically.

b) Then there will be a virtially identical copy of WWI only with a heavily militarised US ion the German side and a disorderly CSA on the allied side.

Both ideas are pretty unlikely but they seem to get echoed out every time this basic scenario gets raised and it gets my goat rather.

The probablity is that the CSA will struggle with serious internal problems but its by no means a certainty. Especially with an hostile and agressive US on the northern border. Nothing like a common threat to concentrate the mind. Also while the slavocracy is highly influential its far from certain that it will stay dominant, especially after a long war and with a threat on the border.

I think the key point would be how long the war lasts and how it goes. Very likely that if it lasts more than a year or two the US will lose heavily and quite possibly a lot more territory that the CSA. In that case it could be vengeful but a lot weaker. If it makes peace early on then probably no territorial losses outside whatever the CSA consists of. In that case the US will be stronger and unless its very badly led quickly restore friendly relations, at least for trade purposes with both neighbours.

One significant possibility. Britain's clash is with the US over its behaviour on the Trent. It has no real common link with the south other than that they are fighting the same enemy. If the US was sensible it could well make peace with Britain after a relatively brief and bloodless conflict and still try and conquer the south. [Although that will be a lot more difficult after such a conflict. The blockage of the south would be broken for a period and the latter able to import goods and weapons from outside while the US economy would have received a marked check]. As such you could see an even longer and more costly civil war with both sides even more exhausted.

Agree that both USA and CSA will maintain much larger forces than historically. However they will still be small compared to forces maintained by the European powers unless the US goes over the top. [I say this because it would have to be the US driving things. The CSA wouldn't have the strength to pose a serious threat to the US nor would it the social cohesion to maintain larger forces than the country needed]. Even so the military spending would be a burden on both powers different to what they had undergone before. Not cripplying but it would have an impact on development. Both economically and probably more importantly socially and politically.

If the US did come under the control of an extreme faction that triggered an arms race it would definitely come off the worse. [At least v Britain but would not be easy against the CSA either].

If there is a less heated cold war type period of tension between Britain and the US then the US might break with tradition and seek a European ally. However, presuming events follow roughly the same path in Europe and elsewhere I rather doubt this would be imperial Germany. For basically two reasons.
a) Under Bismarck Germany is pretty much sated and looking to maintain the status quo. Furthermore it will seek above anything else to keep France isolated. As such it will not want to pick a quarrel with Britain.
b) Furthermore while it would be inaccurate, hard-liners in the US are likely to fall back on revolutionary propaganda, the republic in danger and that sort of stance. This will not give it a good reception in conservative, imperial Germany.

On the other hand, presuming a 3rd republic replaces Napoleon III's regime in France it might be the one power that could be open to an alliance with the US. It would be looking for an ally and also given the tensions between Britain and France in the 1880's OTL and traditional rivarly may not be too detered by increasing tension with Britain. [A factor here would be if the heir to the Napoleon dynasty didn't die in the Zulu war and hence Britain is hosting a claimant to the French imperial throne].

In one way this might be a good alliance for the US. France, unless Germany, is likely to have spare capital to invest in the US, which would ease one of its potential serious problems. Also, unlike Germany France also has a major navy and bases which would be far more difficult to blockage. However even so prior to probably the end of the century they will struggle against Britain and a Franco-American alliance could well make Germany and Britain good friends.

If the US does recognise the CSA as a result of a defeat in the war its very unlikely to ever regain the lands. Once the recognition occurs that will have effects on all 3 parties. Foreign powers will recognise the CSA and that means in any new conflict there is the potential of foreign intervention. similarly the fact that a US attack will interfer with foreign trade will be a deterent. There is a world of difference between crushing an internal rebellion and attacking an independent state. Even more importantly with be the internal effects. Once the CSA is recognised then any pro-northern sympathists will either make their peace or head north - as the loyalists largely did after 1783. As such the CSA will have even greater cohesion not to mention the time to prepare defencive positions. Similarly in the north most will accept the loss of the south, especially given the costs, economic, political etc, of organising another war. War hawks will have great difficulties in moblising public opinion for another almost certainly longer and costlier than the 1st. This will be even greater for any new immigrants as they will be looking to improve their economic position, not being conscripted into a bloody war that they will see as pointless.

Steve
 
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