South Vietnamese military ideas

Now for the Navy, the way that I am envisaging the Navy is as the smaller of the three services. Contemplating cutter class vessels and patrol vessels. Patrol vessels will initially be junks built with fibreglass hulls until the new government is able to purchase new vessels.

Still like the idea of the Casco class cutters, patrol boats (will need help with) and a maritime patrol aircraft - thinking HU 16 Amphibians or P - 2 Neptunes eventually. Although I would love to see the Van Spejik or Leander class in South Vietnamese colours. In the late 1960's the Navy will develop a submarine arm, but that is in the future.

Uncertain if I should pursue a Marine Corps or not, my preference at this stage is yes due to the prevalence of the riverine environment and the boarding operations on the coastline. Happy for ideas on this, if I don't go with Marines, then the Navy will have a special forces capability.

Well, in addition to the cutters, the US would have quite a few WW2 DEs (which OTL S Vietnam got a few of) & Auk/Raven class minesweepers available for free or cheap that could make for the larger combatants & patrol craft, & in fact were exported to a number of US allies in this timeframe for just that purpose (and some even still actively serve in those roles in several navies to this day.) If the budget & manpower situations would allow it, they might even be able to swing a couple Benson or Fletcher-class destroyers for pretty cheap as well. They'd probably be good enough to serve most needs as S Vietnam's major surface units other than fighting against modern submarines or facing down air attacks from jet aircraft for a decade or two until a sufficient number of modern frigates can be acquired, assuming your South Vietnam fares rather better than the OTL one.

If there's going to be a lot of coastal/riverine operations, don't forget the amphibious forces- again, the US would have a decent selection of WW2 surplus from small landing craft all the way up to LSTs available for cheap, & some of the landing craft can be converted into river gunboats & troop transports as well like the US did OTL.

Not familiar with what sort of small patrol craft are available at this time to supplement your armed diesel junks, other than the Norwegian Nasty-class PT boats, which were pretty nice as torpedo boats or fitted as fast gunboats, as the US has pretty much disposed of its WW2 leftovers in this area go, so you might want to poke around Wikipedia for a bit & see what sort of craft in this class are being built by European navies at this time for their own use or export.

Don't think anyone;s building dedicated riverine warfare craft at this time, so if something other than converted landing craft & civilian vessels is needed, your South Vietnam and/or their foreign advisers would probably have to get someone to design & build craft such as the OTL Swift boats & PBRs, & anything else that might seem useful.

And don't forget the supporting stuff, such as a couple tenders/repair ships to support the operational units, a few tugs, some coastal minesweepers, a salvage vessel or two, & so on- most of that stuff would be available from WW2 US surplus for cheap, or commercially available civilian vessels bought into service & appropriately refitted for all but the minesweepers.

If transports, cargo ships, & oilers beyond the amphibious forces & converted diesel junks are needed, I'd imagine that a good number of those would be coastal freighters & tankers bought into the service, as although there's a good deal available from the US, a lot of it, such as say, a T2 fitted as an oiler, or a C3 fitted as a stores ship or troop transport would likely be overkill for most needs of a force with a coastal/riverine focus.

Given that focus, a small force of marines that's part of the naval service at the political level but otherwise its own service, designed around boarding, coastal & riverine landings, & a spec-ops component would be useful, say a brigade or 2 to start, as there'd likely be interservice cooperation problems with designating an army unit for that, & a naval infantry force could become kind of the ugly duckling of the navy.

But really, if surplus WW2 hulls would suit most South Vietnamese requirements for a while where it comes to building a navy, then hooking up with the US military assistance programs for this case can make a lot of sense where it comes to getting a bargain on at least some of the hardware.
 
Well, in addition to the cutters, the US would have quite a few WW2 DEs (which OTL S Vietnam got a few of) & Auk/Raven class minesweepers available for free or cheap that could make for the larger combatants & patrol craft, & in fact were exported to a number of US allies in this timeframe for just that purpose (and some even still actively serve in those roles in several navies to this day.) If the budget & manpower situations would allow it, they might even be able to swing a couple Benson or Fletcher-class destroyers for pretty cheap as well. They'd probably be good enough to serve most needs as S Vietnam's major surface units other than fighting against modern submarines or facing down air attacks from jet aircraft for a decade or two until a sufficient number of modern frigates can be acquired, assuming your South Vietnam fares rather better than the OTL one.

If transports, cargo ships, & oilers beyond the amphibious forces & converted diesel junks are needed, I'd imagine that a good number of those would be coastal freighters & tankers bought into the service, as although there's a good deal available from the US, a lot of it, such as say, a T2 fitted as an oiler, or a C3 fitted as a stores ship or troop transport would likely be overkill for most needs of a force with a coastal/riverine focus.

Given that focus, a small force of marines that's part of the naval service at the political level but otherwise its own service, designed around boarding, coastal & riverine landings, & a spec-ops component would be useful, say a brigade or 2 to start, as there'd likely be interservice cooperation problems with designating an army unit for that, & a naval infantry force could become kind of the ugly duckling of the navy.

But really, if surplus WW2 hulls would suit most South Vietnamese requirements for a while where it comes to building a navy, then hooking up with the US military assistance programs for this case can make a lot of sense where it comes to getting a bargain on at least some of the hardware.

You've got some great ideas here I think ideally I will start out with a riverine focus, combined with smaller combatants i.e. patrol boats or converted minesweepers (perhaps Ton class). After two - three years of operating minor war vessels, then I would look at three cutter vessels or DE's depending upon what is available.

In OTL the South Vietnamese Marines had a fearsome reputation, but I am uncertain whether to go with a minature version of the USMC or something along the Royal Marine Commandos lines as the size may be suited to that structure.

Now for me the final question would be how do I integrate the local militias into the defence structure and how do I improve their performance. Personally I feel that logically they should fall under the command of the Interior Ministry and be part of the purview of the National Police Field Force. However I am wary of establishing warlordism as well. Happy for ideas in this case...
 
True, but that's not really the point of this thread as I understand it, as the OP was asking for some help with aspects of foreign military assistance & equipment for his own South Vietnam TL (different leadership included) so the main thread won't get cluttered & sidetracked by things like a hardware discussion.

The problem is that by every military analysis South Vietnam *always* had qualitative weapons superiority relative to the North. More superiority is not the answer, they already were 1,000:1 in a superiority ranking in qualitative terms. The answer would be the improbable means of transforming the Musical Generals into something approximating people able to win when people are shooting back at them with intent to kill, something ARVN simply put had neither the skills, the aptitude, nor the leadership for. ARVN was suited to shoot at civilians and replace its leadership in a game of Musical Generals, no more and no less. It's like making Iraq work in 1991 against the USA from a military POV.
 
The Owen would be just about perfect because it was designed for warfare in the jungle, easy to manufacture in large numbers and because of it'd simple design it would be also easy to care for.

The main thing though is having good leadership for the ARVN and something real to fight for. Even if you keep villagers close to home, if they feel no loyalty to the RVN, why should they fight?

In other words make ARVN into something that can succeed in actually fighting a battle where it's getting shot at like a real army instead of a paper tiger, something neither ARVN's own leadership nor the USA managed to do. The problems ARVN had were not in terms of equipment, they had everything to do with the priorities of ARVN leadership and their natural unwillingness to bleed and die if the USA was going to do it for them.

There is the big problem re Vietnam - It does not matter what weapons you put in their hands or who instructs them if you don't crack the leadership and moral issue as well as its hand maiden corruption. I have been racking my brain for a viable answer. I seem to remember reading that not all the ARVN leadership were losers. Their paras I think were one good example. To give the soldiers a reason to follow one idea would be divide the VC from the people. Where you have a decent head man in a village, support him. Where not have him replaced with some who is up to scratch. Don't over tax them, respect religious views. However unless you have decent leadership in Saigon its going to go the same way as it did in OTL

Unfortunately this requires the USA not try to fight ARVN's war for it. If they do that, why precisely would ARVN *want* to have its soldiers bleed and die if it can get Joe Palooka from the USA to do that for them instead? The ARVN has to fight its own war, which it did a terrible job of against the Viet Cong, taking casualties as disproportionate against the Viet Cong as the USA inflicted on the Viet Cong. Despite having the same firepower advantages relative to the VC that the USA did. Fixing this issue requires changes dating to the period between the end of the First Indochina War and the 1960s, changes that IMHO are virtually impossible to make for the fundamental reason that there are no anti-Communist Vietnamese leaders who weren't tied to the French colonial regime that had already been defeated outside Ngo Dinh Diem who as we saw IOTL had a short and unglamorous period of rule before he died.
 
The problem is that by every military analysis South Vietnam *always* had qualitative weapons superiority relative to the North. More superiority is not the answer, they already were 1,000:1 in a superiority ranking in qualitative terms. The answer would be the improbable means of transforming the Musical Generals into something approximating people able to win when people are shooting back at them with intent to kill, something ARVN simply put had neither the skills, the aptitude, nor the leadership for. ARVN was suited to shoot at civilians and replace its leadership in a game of Musical Generals, no more and no less. It's like making Iraq work in 1991 against the USA from a military POV.

I categorically reject your assertion that the entirety of the ARVN was incompetent or cowardly. There were units that had excellent performances and that were well led by committed professionals, however this did not occur across the Army as a whole.

The problems that beset the ARVN were the same problems that faced several developing countries. A politicised officer class, with a weak junior non commissioned officer base, combined with an insufficient logistical network. One of these three is bad, but all three will render an Army ineffective overall, despite exceptions.

What this thread is about, is how I can develop my TL South Vietnamese military into a competent professional force? This is the question that I am seeking, not why did the ARVN fail in the OTL. With that in mind do you have anything that you wish to contribute?
 
I categorically reject your assertion that the entirety of the ARVN was incompetent or cowardly. There were units that had excellent performances and that were well led by committed professionals, however this did not occur across the Army as a whole.

The problems that beset the ARVN were the same problems that faced several developing countries. A politicised officer class, with a weak junior non commissioned officer base, combined with an insufficient logistical network. One of these three is bad, but all three will render an Army ineffective overall, despite exceptions.

What this thread is about, is how I can develop my TL South Vietnamese military into a competent professional force? This is the question that I am seeking, not why did the ARVN fail in the OTL. With that in mind do you have anything that you wish to contribute?

Some units of the Republican Guard performed brilliantly, too. I suppose that means that the whole of Saddam Hussein's military has an unjustly bad reputation. Mm...no, I don't think that argument holds up.

Yes, namely that the answer to making ARVN a military that can actually fight a war as opposed to its own civilians is not in the technology of war, and this requires PODs well before the Gulf of Tonkin. The gearhead approach is not an answer to warfighting. You need PODs back in the 1950s.
 
Some units of the Republican Guard performed brilliantly, too. I suppose that means that the whole of Saddam Hussein's military has an unjustly bad reputation. Mm...no, I don't think that argument holds up.

Yes, namely that the answer to making ARVN a military that can actually fight a war as opposed to its own civilians is not in the technology of war, and this requires PODs well before the Gulf of Tonkin. The gearhead approach is not an answer to warfighting. You need PODs back in the 1950s.

Snake - my POD is set in 1954 well before large scale American involvement, so my approach is not nor could be mistaken for a gearhead one. There is no point having access to advanced equipment if you are unable to maintain and then use said equipment appropriately. Prior to making any further comments, please read my TL (listed in my signature below) and then make a comment.

Furthermore I fail to see the continued comparison between South Vietnam and Iraq. Or your continued assertion that the ARVN were only capable of committing atrocities against their own populace, did they commit attrocities yes - DID THE NVA AND THE VC commit attrocities DAMN STRAIGHT. Google search 'Massacre at Hue' for your reading.
 
Last edited:
Snake - my POD is set in 1954 well before large scale American involvement, so my approach is not nor could be mistaken for a gearhead one. There is no point having access to advanced equipment if you are unable to maintain and then use said equipment appropriately. Prior to making any further comments, please read my TL (listed in my signature below) and then make a comment.

Furthermore I fail to see the continued comparison between South Vietnam and Iraq. Or your continued assertion that the ARVN were only capable of committing atrocities against their own populace, did they commit attrocities yes - DID THE NVA AND THE VC commit attrocities DAMN STRAIGHT. Google search 'Massacre at Hue' for your reading.

Except all the times when Arab states did exactly that, getting very advanced equipment and completely failing to use it. The factors that led to that still exist in RVN. Your statement that Hanoi did this is true but irrelevant. Hanoi could fight an army and know it would win that fight. Saigon's army was unsuited to fight street gangs with water pistols. After all, there's almost no wars where neither side committed atrocities. But commit them and make yourself look utterly and totally feckless in the process......
 
Except all the times when Arab states did exactly that, getting very advanced equipment and completely failing to use it. The factors that led to that still exist in RVN. Your statement that Hanoi did this is true but irrelevant. Hanoi could fight an army and know it would win that fight. Saigon's army was unsuited to fight street gangs with water pistols. After all, there's almost no wars where neither side committed atrocities. But commit them and make yourself look utterly and totally feckless in the process......

Snake you are missing the point entirely, and have not contributed one iota to my TL. The fact that you responded without even reading my POD that contributes to a more effective South Vietnam is telling and your ignorance is astounding.

I have stated multiple times that I am not interested in advanced equipment and you rehash it. I will ask for this thread to be locked as you are unable to contribute meaningfully.
 
Snake you are missing the point entirely, and have not contributed one iota to my TL. The fact that you responded without even reading my POD that contributes to a more effective South Vietnam is telling and your ignorance is astounding.

I have stated multiple times that I am not interested in advanced equipment and you rehash it. I will ask for this thread to be locked as you are unable to contribute meaningfully.

Oh, I did read it. When you had a pacification campaign work on a model that doesn't apply at all, the problems grew exponentially. It's theoretically possible to save Saigon in the short term if its issues are resolved in a crude, military fashion. Saving it politically is out of the question. You need to alter the fundamental force structure of South Vietnam and force it to orient its military to wanting to actually fight North Vietnam. IOTL that military worked as a generic Third World social club, not a combat force.

Now, this can be done, but not with a pattern like OTL where South Vietnam exists because France just can't let go of all of Vietnam. You need to start with an anti-Communist nationalist force that really exists and let *that* build Saigon. That IOTL did not exist. Now, the occupation of Vietnam by the Japanese is a good POD here, with a POD in the Indochina War providing the existing change that leads to a non-Communist rival to the Hanoi Communists. Otherwise you get a Vietnam that can't exist without a white sugar daddy and if that sugar daddy cuts off the funds that Vietnam withers and dies. And what is that weirdness that a guy whose claim to Emperor is Paris giving him the title is somehow a "native" figure in Vietnamese culture?
 
Last edited:
So when I reboot my TL my second POD will be General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny does not die of cancer and assumeds command earlier in 1948. From my readings if he is able to prevent the mistakes that the French Far Eastern Expeditionary Corps made, how would that effect the political settlement?

For example no Operation Castor, no distinct French defeat, but rather peace with honour? I also think that he would have increased the number of Vietnamese serving earlier as well, this would have certainly helped in the post war situation - thoughts?
 
Rouge Beret, the Vietnam war wasn't exclusively military. It was an ideological/nationalist/anti-colonial war between communist nationalists and a corrupt, discriminatory, dictatorship. Like OTL it doesn't matter how many battles the Americans , French or South Vietnamese win when the north was willing to fight indefinitely with greater legitimacy than South Vietnam . If you want to keep the AVRN as is the best you will get is a breeding ground for rebellious elements, with the best training and equipment.

And to add to Snake's point there wasn't any credible anti-communist force simply since it wasn't a priority in the previous twenty years to fight commis instead of colonizers, that the only movements to succeed were popular ones. There were plenty of natioalist rebellions, but no other ideology that could compete. To save the south you need to make the south revolt successfully, no French regime could succeed there. Of course if the South revolts there might not even be a Vietnam war or a need for the AVRN.

Also part of the TL construction process is criticism, you asked for help and you received. It's not that we aren't helping out with your idea, it's that your idea is flawed in itself and we're trying to help by get that pts across.
 
Last edited:
Unconsensual I am well aware that the wars throughout Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were not merely confined to a military aspect, but reflect a complex interplay of nationalism, ideological conflict and cultural prejudices.

My goal is to create a stable South Vietnam with a sound political structure, a functioning economy and a competent military. Now can you do that after the French have exited, of course but it is difficult. Can I structure the withdrawal of the French so that it can contribute to a functioning state... probably.

In order to do that requires a more enlightened French exit, so having their military and politicians realise that the days of French colonialism are at an end in Vietnam. How can they disengage with a semblance of honour and protect those remaining expatriates? So that will involve further research into the Fourth Republic, and how I can create a stable political system in Vietnam.

Now can the French provide all of the answers no to my end state, of course not but they can contribute significantly to the development of a stable South Vietnam. It is fundamnetally up to the Kinh to seize the opportunities that are presented to them, and develop a state accordingly in the face of an intractable enemy.
 
Unconsensual I am well aware that the wars throughout Vietnam,... and develop a state accordingly in the face of an intractable enemy.

Well that'd be hard, the French were very reluctant to leave their colonies.


  • Up until the final days of french rule they still had a colonial mindset and the problem with changing that mind set requires something that goes back to the 30's when the independence movements were stirring.
  • The mindset change would affect all French colonies yielding a lot of butterflies, especially Algeria which was considered an integral part of France.The mindset change would also clash with French exceptionalism or manifest destiny, which was pretty much French foreign policy for half a century. Isolationism would probably be your best bet.
  • Alternatively you could have Nazi Germany do a much better scorch earth policy in France, leaving it unable to keep its colonies. Of course this is also a double edge sword since the French wouldn't be able to leave much behind.
  • There's Charles de Gaulle, a man who wouldn't give an inch of "french" soil. He needs to be marginalized.
  • The colonies were extractive-prerogative in nature, there wasn't much value over independence. The worst part was that it needed to depend on French markets to continue it's resource extraction. While distasteful I can see other first-world nations doing business instead.
  • France post WWII simply wasn't capable of managing an empire, let alone eager, you can bet that 99cent of every dollar will go to mainland France.
  • Most of the Allied nations didn't really recognize North Vietnam at first, it's hard to come to a peaceful agreement with someone you refuse to acknowledge.
  • You'll need successful land reform, tolerant if not favorable policy for Buddhists, and nationalist legitimacy (so the French/Americans can't be seen as directing the effort).
Also the "King" of Vietnam if he could so be called was a playboy. he was know as the nightclub emperor. I'm not sure if any of the royal family was really qualified to do this and the royal institution was thoroughly discredited by then seen as a puppet of the French/Japanese. What you really need is a Atatürk a great statesman not associated with royalty or communism. Ideally he would be Buddhist to counter communism's atheism.
 
Last edited:
Top