In the first period of his premiership, Diệm did not have much power in the government; he lacked control of the military and police forces, and the civil system's key positions were still held by French officials. The ideals of the erection of a new society based on enlightened principles and liberated from traditional obscurantism, monarchy, and colonial heritage, acting as a dam against communism, actually hindered Dièm, his US supporters and all their successors.
The French colonists wanted to remove him to protect France's interest in South Vietnam; general Nguyễn Văn Hinh, a Francophile, the leader of National Army was ready to oust Diệm; the leaders of the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài sectarian armies wanted positions in Diệm's cabinet and complete administrative control over the areas in which they had large numbers of followers; and the major threat of Bình Xuyên, an organized crime syndicate that controlled the National Police led by Lê Văn Viễn, whose power was focused in Saigon.
What is called “organized crime” was in fact a loose coalition of semi-secret societies, parties, and sects that had been, prior to 1954, extremely effective at fighting the communists and keeping them out of South Vietnam. The real reason the most powerful of these secret societies, the Binh Xuyen, was targeted, was that it remained loyal to the emperor Bao Dai. In summer 1954, the three organizations (Hoà Hào, Cao Dài and Binh Xuyen) controlled approximately one-third of the territory and population of South Vietnam.
In that situation, besides his own political skills, Diệm had to trust in his relatives, the catholic minority and the backing of his American supporters to overcome the obstacles and neutralize his opponents. Diệm's favoritism towards Catholics and persecution of South Vietnam's Buddhist majority led to the "Buddhist crisis" of 1963. The violence damaged relations with the United States and other previously sympathetic countries, and his regime quickly lost favour with the leadership of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Geneva accords allowed for freedom of movement between the two zones until October 1954; this put a large strain on the south. Diệm had only expected 10,000 refugees, but by August, there were more than 200,000 waiting for evacuation from Hanoi and Hải Phòng. To deal with the refugee situation, Diem's government arranged for their relocation into fertile and under-populated provinces in the western Mekong Delta. The Strategic Hamlet Program was also a failure, alienating more rural Vietnamese than it helped and contributing to the growth in influence of the Viet Cong.
All those land reforms failed as the Catholic Church's landownings in Vietnam were exempted and many landlords evaded the redistribution by transferring the property to the name of family members. Besides, during the 1946–54 war against the French Union forces, the Việt Minh had gained control of parts of southern Vietnam, initiated a harsher land reform, confiscated landlords' land and distributed it to the peasants.
His counter-insurgency tactics based on fear, punishment and intimidation alienated the population, while his dependence on the French then American help destroyed his credibility in a nation that had just been decolonized and already suffered from a long war. Diem and his brother Nhu, with American largesse and logistical support, erected a police state that systematically attacked and destroyed, not the communists, but the traditional anti-communist, monarchist and nationalist factions of South Vietnam.
Most troubling is that Diem’s government was throughout its tenure deeply infiltrated by communist agents. Ministers of various departments were well-known “ex”-Vietminh—most significantly Kieu cong Cung and Albert Pham ngoc Thao, who ran Diem’s secret police and intelligence apparatus, respectively. All their efforts predictably went into dismantling any existing anti-communist and traditionalist factions at the time in South Vietnam.
In my opinion, les vers étaient déjà dans le fruit, when Dièm lost power.
- Failed land reform
- Catholic minority in power
- Dependency on French and US aid (versus nationalism)
- National war fatigue (stronger in the south)
- Corruption due to factionalism and family connections
- Viêt Minh national ideology common to many citizens
- The wish to reunite the country in the hearts of all citizens
- Future junta leaders who assassinated him in his own government
- "Pro-communist" junta leaders : communist agents (or former Viet-Minh)
- Lack of international or US reactions against the coup, leading to more coups
- Destruction of the traditional anti-communist factions and social structures
You need to remove or erase Dièm. I would use the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Nationalist party of Vietnam) as a base for a South Vietnam government, allied with the Cào Dài, secret societies, buddhists and imperial factions.
This party wasn’t based on any particular faith or specific ethnicity, except nationalism, anti-communism and anti-colonization. It has a popular legitimacy due to fighting against the French and is older than the Viêt Minh. They would offer another national ideology aiming at Vietnam unity and social reforms, similarly to the Viêt Minh.
During the Diệm era, VNQDĐ was involved in two failed coups d'état. In November 1960, a paratroop revolt failed after the mutineers agreed to negotiate, giving the Loyalists time to unburden the president. Many of the officers involved are members of VNQDĐ or have links with the party and, after the failure, will leave the borders. In 1963, two leaders of VNQDĐ, Tam and Vũ Hồng Khanh, were among those arrested for their involvement in the plot. In February 1962, two Vietnamese air force pilots (Không Quân Việt Nam), Nguyễn Văn Cử Cử - the son of a major figure of VNQDĐ - and Phạm Phú Quốc, bombed the reunification palace with the aim of killing the president and his family, but their targets emerged unscathed.
Imagine if the first coup attempt was sponsored by the CIA and effectively removed Dièm, before cementing the traditional anti-communist factions and groups, instead breaking them apart.
I will write later about winning the war, but it begins with effective land reforms and pacified internal politics as early as possible in the south. You can’t win such a war with only military tactics, strategies or sophisticated weapons.
Externally, you have to see the Vietnam crisis as a regional one, which means to openly and officially consider all Indochina as one operational theatre. Coordinated political, economic and military actions must thus take place in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with early alliances between the three governments against communism in order to act de concert, while respecting the characteristics and specificities of each countries.
Internally, I would accuse North Vietnam of being a Chinese entity, controlled by China and used to disunite the Vietnamese people. Indeed, China would be a perfect boogeyman in a country that had been infeoded by China in the past and feels humiliated by centuries of foreign domination.
My strategy will be to divide and conquer infiltrating nationalist elements in the North, while ostensibly offering to negotiate with North Vietnamese figures opposed to war or seen as moderate (Giap). I will push internal purges to destroy their politico-military apparatus through orchestrated internal conflicts and well crafted rumors of pro-south treasons.
Faith and traditions will be used to undermine the loyality of the deeply superstitious/God-fearimg population of the northern countryside. A Northern "Peasants party" and its guerilla will be created from scratch to mobilize northern peasants against North Vietnam, while being controlled from the south. My aim is to have the Northern military suppress the peasantry.
Yes, you guessed it. I would use my own "Viêt-cong" against North Vietnam and stir dissent in their country, while they stir dissent in mine, except that South Vietnam will be ITTL far stronger internally without Dièm and his nefarious actions.
I will also try to create a rift between China and North Vietnam leaderships using Mao’s growing paranoia and Vietnamese nationalism. It will be harder to separate Soviet Union and North Vietnam, but it’s not as much a priority. A few visible CIA payments to influential North Vietnamese apparatchiks and nomenklatura members could help.