South Korea wins Korean war

Not sure, I would say if you allow the KMT to win the Chinese Civil War, they wouldn't support North Korea. However, I would say any POD that allows the KMT to win out, would usually butterfly the Korean War. Maybe if the American organized ceasefire never occurred and Communists were only able to hold Manchuria, they wouldn't have the troops to aid North Korea.
 
South Korea on its own couldn't conquer the North, but if there were no Chinese intervention, then the US-led forces could take the North. The hard part is changing Mao's mind, so that he thinks intervention is too risky.
 
South Korea on its own couldn't conquer the North, but if there were no Chinese intervention, then the US-led forces could take the North. The hard part is changing Mao's mind, so that he thinks intervention is too risky.

In the CCP Politburo there was considerable opposition to intervention, some members "arguing that the enormous tasks of reconstruction and reform in China required vast resources and the energetic attention of the people at al levels. They also stressed the lack of adequate equipment for the Chinese troops. But Mao remained unshaken in his assessment that there was no other way. 'Your arguments are based on good reasons.' he said. 'But all the same, once another socialist nation is in a crisis, we would feel bad if we stood idly by.'" https://books.google.com/books?id=vg4CuFmpkCEC&pg=PA145 With Mao standing firm, the Politburo eventually gave way, even though Lin Biao was among the doubters.

"Mao Zedong seems to have been in little doubt that the PRC would have to intervene for the sake of the Korean revolution and revolutionary movements elsewhere in East Asia. But the majority in the Politburo and among the PLA leadership had serious reservations about sending Chinese troops to Korea. Civilian leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi feared that a new war would throw up immense difficulties for a gradual and well-organized reform process in China. Many military leaders, including Lin Biao, thought that a Chinese offensive in Korea would be logistically and tactically difficult, and could endanger Chinese security in Manchuria and in areas along the coast. For both groups the prospect of an all-out war with the United States must have loomed large: Just as the Chinese revolution was being completed in spite of the constant danger of imperialist intervention, Kim and Stalin were asking the CCP to go to war by their own will with the most powerful imperialist nation in the world.

"At the extended Politburo meeting on 2 October no clear-cut decision could be arrived at, and it took at least three more days of intense discussion before Mao's line won out. The three core arguments that the Chairman put forward in favor of intervention were the CCP's debt to the Koreans who had fought with them during the Chinese civil war, the U.S. threat to Chinese security, and the availability of Soviet support for the war effort. But beyond the persuasiveness of each of these points, it was Mao's immense prestige in military and political affairs that won the day. Mao was the leader who had brought the party victory in the civil war. Even when they disagreed with him, as the majority did in the crucial case of intervention in Korea, his colleagues in the CCP leadership were willing to defer to his wishes, since Mao alone was seen to have the strategic vision that could make the party achieve its political aims...." Westad, *Decisive Encounters,* p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&pg=PA325
 
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No Chinese intervention equals a unified Korea under the ROK. For all of the fact that the USSR had exploded an atomic device in 1949, for all practical purposes the USA had the atomic monopoly still, in numbers and being able to deliver them. The USSR could (and did) provide equipment, "advisors", and other sorts of support but never officially intervened ("advisors" flying jets were ignored by both sides). What led to the stalemate was the huge number of Chinese troops and the willingness of the PRC to accept huge casualty lists. Stalin was not going to risk everything for the DPRK by sending large numbers of troops there, Mao was willing and also openly stated if the US used some atomic weapons so what (lots of Chinese).

Neither the PRC nor the USSR are going to be happy with a US ally on their border and there will be some US bases there, but once the ROK is established as the government of all of Korea, they really don't have much choice. Sure cross-border infiltration and support for local insurgents will be a nuisance for a while, but it won't change things.
 
The main key is the UNO resolution from 1948 that devided the Korean spheres of influence along the 38th parallel. OTL North Korea violated that resolution when it overran Seoul and immediately drew international condemnation so that next to the obvious US military there were contingents from places like Turkey, Thailand and Columbia fighting under the UN banner. Their mandate however was only to stop the Northern aggression. In case of a full-scale campaign into the North, they would by their own reasoning now be the aggressors or in the worst case, if the US -South Korean alliance would decide to go into the North on their own, they would now be morally obliged to fight them under UN legislation. Thus the war ended like it begun with the country split along the 38th parallel according to the UN plan of 1948.

The obvious solution to get around this would be for the UN to respond to the Northern invasion by declaring the 1948 resolution null and void and instead stating that the way to deal with the North was the way they dealt with Nazi Germany. This would obviously draw resistance from the USSR, but they could be persuaded to keep on the sidelines by giving in on some other sticking points like recognizing Maoist mainland China as a member of the security council, or drawing up a 'fair' plan for a future United Korea under UN auspices.

So in the end, the battle for Korea would be decided not along the 38th parallel but on some negotiating tables in Geneva.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
One thing I wonder about a unified Republic of Korea. If the unified Korea follows the basic trajectory of OTL's South Korea, reconstruction and eventual growth, and if the PRC continues its OTL trajectory of having messy and destructive campaigns like the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, might flight/emigration of Korean speakers in northeast China to the unified Korea deplete that population to insignificance?

The obvious solution to get around this would be for the UN to respond to the Northern invasion by declaring the 1948 resolution null and void and instead stating that the way to deal with the North was the way they dealt with Nazi Germany.

By telegraphing that intention even before the Pusan perimeter is consolidated, the UN side could end up triggering an *earlier* Chinese intervention, possibly making things like the Inchon landing impractical and potentially even making it impossible for the ROK to reclaim Seoul and the 38th parallel from Communist occupation?
 
If you have a unified Korea under the ROK, then the flight across the Chinese border due to famine and the economic/political conditions in the DPRK does not happen.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
If you have a unified Korea under the ROK, then the flight across the Chinese border due to famine and the economic/political conditions in the DPRK does not happen.

Indeed true. But Korean Manchurians predated North Korean famine. I was thinking that if there was a unified ROK to flee to, the Manchuria Koreans would flee in the other direction, to northern Korea from China, during the famines of the Great Leap Forward, if not earlier during the excesses of the 1950s PRC land reform campaign.
 
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