I didn't know the Commonwealth troops in Vietnam used the M16. Maybe the SAS-R and NZSAS did? I used to think they used L1A1s and Sterlings.
L1A1s, yes, Sterlings rather less I think. I don't remember hearing about any in use during or after Vietnam. The SAS used whatever they wanted, more or less, and that definitely included the M16. As for the other infantry units, I heard a lot about SLRs (the L1A1), but I also heard about M16s - not many, but a few - so I think they were issued, even if only on a small scale.
The PNP also has G3 in their inventories but according to a colleague of mine who has relatives who served in the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (predecessor of the PNP) during the Cold War, G3s were rarely used because it is heavy for the average Filipino. The 5.56 x 45 mm NATO round is preferred here over the 7.62 x 51 mm NATO round.
7.62 rounds, and the weapons that fire them, are pretty heavy. They also tend to be long, which makes them inconvenient in jungles. I think it's quite noticeable that all the ASEAN states switched to smaller calibres as soon as they reasonably could, and probably for the same reasons you describe.
The factor of terrain and vegetation is often overlooked.
Agreed. A lot of the performance discussions seem to assume ideal conditions, but I don't think they exist in the real world (at least, I've never seen any!). Clear, flat terrain, well-drained, with good road access, and in temperate climates are where people have golf-courses, not wars.
 
I didn't know the Commonwealth troops in Vietnam used the M16. Maybe the SAS-R and NZSAS did? I used to think they used L1A1s and Sterlings.
The Commonwealth as such did not operate in South Vietnam - only the Australians and the New Zealanders (to a lesser extent) did. They were all equipped as per the Australian organisation for infantry units - the section consisted of approximately 10 men, divided into two lead scouts, equipped with a shotgun or an M16 (a matter of personal choice), followed by the Section commander equipped with an M16, followed by the gun group, consisting of a GPMG gunner, with GPMG, accompanied by a number two, equipped with an L1a1 rifle, then by the Section 2-i-c, equipped with a rifle or M16, then there was the rifle team, three equipped with rifles, one with an M79 Grenade Launcher, and finally the "Tail-end-charlie" equipped with a rifle/M16/shotgun (personal choice). Sterling SMGs were only used in the silenced version by the SASR upon occasion. The Owen was used by signallers early on, to be replaced by M16s later. New Zealanders usually operated as part of Australian battalions, in mixed companies as well as Artillery Batteries.
 
7.62 rounds, and the weapons that fire them, are pretty heavy. They also tend to be long, which makes them inconvenient in jungles. I think it's quite noticeable that all the ASEAN states switched to smaller calibres as soon as they reasonably could, and probably for the same reasons you describe.
Correct. That is why the AFP quickly changed from the M14 to the M16 during the 1960s. The M14 was too heavy and cumbersome for the average Filipino serviceman. The M16 was introduced around 1966, when the Philippines sent the PHILCAG-V contingent to Vietnam to support the U.S. and the RVN against the NVA.

This makes me wonder too why M14s weren't really used much in Africa, considering it uses the same ammo as the FAL and G3.
Agreed. A lot of the performance discussions seem to assume ideal conditions, but I don't think they exist in the real world (at least, I've never seen any!). Clear, flat terrain, well-drained, with good road access, and in temperate climates are where people have golf-courses, not wars.
This rings true. War isn't a game of Civilization, Age of Empires, and Empire Earth. One thing most RTS games leave out is the hyper-realistic setting including foliage and obstacles that could affect different types of vehicles.
 
Assuming that Apartheid still ends roughly as per OTL what happens to the presumably much better equipped SADF that hasn't suffered decades of sanctions?

IOTL one of the first things that the new SANDF did was go on a massive buying spree for modern equipment as it attempted to modernise following decades of sanctions leading to the infamous Arms Deal (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Arms_Deal) which has since become known for its allegations of corruption more than anything and ultimately led to former South African President Jacob Zuma being convicted of corruption which itself recently lead to rioting that required the deployment of the South African army to quell.

Recent years have not been kind to SANDF which has seen a steep and seemingly unrelenting decline in its capabilities and reputation as a result of factors such as declining budgets, public sector corruption, a very high proportion of elderly and medically unfit personnel, state capture within the South African defence sector, deterioration in equipment maintenance and serviceability and personnel training standards, ect.

Without the need to modernise to the same extent what would happen to the former SADF's equipment and personnel (including the likely much higher number of professional career personnel) inherited by SANDF?

Would conscription still end with SANDF becoming an all volunteer force or would it continue in some form?

What tasks would this alt SANDF undertake and what new equipment might it procure?

Would the existing SADF structure and organisation remain but open up recruitment to all races or would the forced integration with guerrilla and Bantustan forces still occur?

How would this alt SANDF look today and would it still be afflicted by the problems faced by its OTL counterpart?
 
This makes me wonder too why M14s weren't really used much in Africa, considering it uses the same ammo as the FAL and G3.
The M14 didn't really see much service outside the US and its client states. The US didn't really have anyone in Africa they wanted to support, so there was no reason for M14s to be sent there. The various European powers, on the other hand, did have factions they wanted to support, and they sent whatever they had access to (usually the same gear their own militaries were equipped with).
 
Without the inability to procure equipment from abroad leaving Pretoria with developing and building equipment domestically as it only option how would the South African arms and aerospace industry have developed?

Would it have been handicapped by foreign competition or perhaps be more advanced as a result of having had access to foreign technology and foreign export markets?
 
The drive for domestic designs might be smaller, but I'm sure the government with try to get domestic production, at least, using licence assembly and/or production, getting major support/upgrades to be done locally, etc. It would help employment and the economy, at the very least. Latter on, local requirements plus a developed industry would probably get some local designs up and running, for items no one else has (afaik, no G5/G6 gun existed anywhere else for a long time, and even today it's a prime item) but I don't see high end gear like MBTs or fighters to be fullt SA-developed. They are simply too expensive.
 
If the international community has for reasons best known to themselves decided not to place arms embargos of military sanctions of South Africa might relations be warm enough to see SADF undertaking what is often termed as "Defence Engagement"?
Defence engagement is a form of soft power diplomacy undertaken by a nations military and usually involves things such as naval vessels making good will visits to foreign ports, forces taking part in or even hosting international exercises, personnel exchange programmes, ect.

Could we expect to see SAN ships undertaking foreign port visits (which they were prevented from doing for many years IOTL) and taking part in international exercises or perhaps hosting foreign warships in Simonstown?
The South African Navy in its early days had a very strong relationship with the Royal Navy with many of its officers undertaking training or serving on secondments with the RN. How likely is it that this relationship could have been maintained, especially if South Africa continued to buy British build warships?

Might the South African Army and SAAF have joined overseas military exercises or sent personnel abroad for training (For example sending officers to establishments such as Sandhurst/Cranwell in the UK or similar institutions/staff colleges elsewhere)?

Could the South Africans have hosted foreign militaries undertaking training or exercises? For example IOTL South Africa had a pretty good military relationship with Israel even to the point of cooperating with nuclear weapons development. Might Israeli pilots end up learning to fly far away from home in SAAF training areas where they would have access much more space to play with than in Israel and significantly less risk from nearby hostile Arab air force's?

In 1955 the UK and South Africa signed the SImonstown Agreement. Lasting until 1975 this mutual defence agreement allowed the Royal Navy to make use of the South African naval dockyard at Simonstown. Could this agreement have been extended allowing the RN the use of the port during the Falklands War and might we see other foreign military units stationed in South Africa such as SAAF bases hosting foreign aircraft?
 
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