Source for Soviet Manpower issues 1944-45

It’s often stated here Soviets were “running on fumes” with regards to manpower at the end of the war.

Where does this come from? What are the sources? Primary, secondary.
 
Was the USSR Running out of Manpower by 1943?
Soviet manpower-how large exactly?

Bagration, 1944, Osprey Campaign Series -

"Soviet rifle divisions were generally smaller than their German counterparts, averaging 2500-4000 troops. At the time of Operation Bagration a concerted effort was made to bring these units up to an average of 6000 troops. No serious effort was made to bring them up to their nominal TOE strength of 9600 troops."

Red Army Handbook, 1939-1945, by Steven J. Zaloga -

"By this time, however, it was becoming apparent that the Soviet force structure of 500-plus Divisions simply exceeded their capacity to support it. [..] in mid-1944 more drastic action was necessary. Either some of the rifle divisions would have to be demobilized and their personnel used to fill out other units, or divisional strengths far below envisioned norms would have to be accepted. The Stavka opted for the latter alternative."

Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, by Willard C. Frank -

"Soviet sources reflect manpower deficiencies by emphasizing the low strength of rifle units and the draconian measures used to enlist soldiers in liberated regions. By 1945 Soviet rifle divisions were often under strength, with only 3,500 to 5,000 men each."
 
I remember reading about menpower issues in Soviet book on Great Patriotic war in late 80-ties. However I do not remember author or title.
 
It’s often stated here Soviets were “running on fumes” with regards to manpower at the end of the war.

Where does this come from? What are the sources? Primary, secondary.

Mainly by pointing to the decline in Soviet rifle division strength, as History Learner has in his post up there. However, this is not actually adequate evidence as it fixates on a single measurement of manpower strength which ignores that overall Soviet manpower strength was largely static from mid-1943 to the end of the war, which it should not have been if the claim that the Soviets could not find enough replacements is to hold up. So where was the Soviet manpower going? The answer is into the specialist forces: armor, mechanized, artillery, and other combat support units/formations. The proportion of manpower in these forces increased steadily from 25 percent at the start of 1942 to 60 percent by the end of the war in 1945. The monofocus on rifle division strength also ignores Soviet replacement pool manpower. At the time Operation Bagration went off, the Soviets had a half-million replacements who had finished training and were awaiting assignment, with yet more still in-training. When the war ended in May of 1945, they had 1.3 million replacements in training. This context allows us to see that the idea of the Soviets "running on fumes" is more myth then fact. It would be more accurate to say that they were instead funneling their replacements to operate heavy weapons, from which they could derive more combat power, instead of throwing them into the grinder as riflemen.
 
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