Somerville surprises the Japanese April 1942

[Blackfox5]

In early April 1942 British Admiral Somerville, commander of the British Eastern Fleet, attempted to intercept the Japanese carrier strike force as they raided the Indian Ocean. British intelligence had told him where the Japanese would be going, but after waiting a few days, he decided the intelligence as wrong, and he abandoned his ambush just hours before the Japanese force arrived.

What if he had waited longer and been able to ambush the Japanese before they launched their strike against Ceylon on April 5?

Somerville had three carriers at his disposal - the HMS Indomitable, Fordmidable, and Hermes. The plan was to launch the British torpedo biplanes at night and be directed by their ASV naval radar. The Albacore would have been slaughtered during the daytime, but could have been quite effective at night. I'm not sure of the numbers, but I think Somerville would have had between 30-40 torpedo planes.

The Japanese expected to catch the remnants of the British fleet at anchor. They were surprised that the harbor of Colombo didn't have the British fleet in it. Instead, the fleet had either been moved to a newharbor at Addu Atoll, or was laying in wait. So it's likely that that the three British carriers would have caught the Japanese by surprise sometime after sunset. The Japanese had six carriers of their Kido Butai force present.

What would have happened if Sommerville's plan succeeded on April 4? How likely would he have damaged the Japanese carriers, and would it be enough that his own forces could escape? With confirmation that the Japanese carriers were found, could the British land based plans at Colombo be able to sortie and strike in the morning?

I find this intriguing because the battle could potentially be anything from complete disaster for the British to an earlier Midway style victory.

 

[TxCoatl1970]

Could go all kinds of ways.

The good news for Somerville is that the Albacores'd drop useful torpedoes that would drop to a useful depth, run straight and true, and 80-90% chance of detonating as advertised. So chances of crippling a Japanese CV, 30% in the first wave. With 30-40 TB's, I'd say 2 KB carriers'd be hit badly enough to need serious yard time, a couple damaged but combat-effective, and one-two put completely out of action (scuttled or sunk).

The bad news is did the RN have dive bombers? If they did, then chances of dropping a few through the flight deck and screwing up any planes readying to launch (and thus suppressing the KB's ability to strike back) are good.
If not, the KB gets about an 85-90% chance of massacring the RN's air wing and sink two CV's in broad daylight.

A big X factor in this battle is how much land-based air support can Somerville draw upon from Ceylon both (A) defend his carrier group and (B) maybe put a few bombs in key places to finish off a fubar flattop or (C) direct sub pickets to scratch a crippled CV??

So basically it could go three ways.

10% chance Brits score a Midway in the Indian Ocean, sink 3-4 CV's w/o significant losses of planes or CV's of their own. Somerville gets knighted and feted extensively for turning the tide of the Pacific War. Real impact-PT of WWII speeds up 18 mos. to blockade of Japan by 1943 and surrender in 1944.

60% chance - properly coordinated night attack with decent amount of good hits manages to sink 2 CV's damage two others enough that only 3 KB carriers can launch counter-attack. KB airborne counter-attack slaughters 70-80% of RN air wing but only sinks/ yard parks one RN CV.
British land-based air cover manages to chase off KB strafing runs and direct subs and bombers to finish off third, maybe fourth KB CV. Somerville and Co get tea and medals.
KB abashed at horrendous losses on sideshow campaign. Marshalls/CP raids by USN hit a lot harder. Pacific campaign possibly accelerated 6mos-1yr.

30% chance. -Night attack dismal failure. Miscommunication forces piecemeal RN air attack that barely scratches two KB CV's and maybe sinks a few escorts for 70-80% loss of TB's.
KB Air counter-strike at dawn savages Somerville's CV's sinks 2 CVs or all three and sends another dozen RN vessels to bottom or scrap yard and severely damages Ceylon naval yards for good measure.

British prestige in India takes massive hit. While India doesn't rise as one to overthrow the Raj, unrest simmers, INA recruitment trebles and ties up too many Indian Army units for Chindit campaign to go anywhere. This makes the Japanese in Thailand to feel froggy and probe a lot harder through Burma.
Sadly, due to the monsoons, disease, and logistical CF's galore, effect is nil and IJA/Thai/INA casualties force squalid retreat three mos later. Overall effect on PT- not a lot.

 

[Hyperion]

I'd figure their best bet is to either sink or cripple probably two, maybe three at most either sinking or damaged to the point that Nagumo might have to order the them scuttled.

After that, take the planes back onboard, and run.

Somerville would have enough for one maximum strike, and after that, he has to get out of there or die.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'd figure their best bet is to either sink or cripple probably two, maybe three at most either sinking or damaged to the point that Nagumo might have to order the them scuttled.

After that, take the planes back onboard, and run.

Somerville would have enough for one maximum strike, and after that, he has to get out of there or die.

Which may have been his plan, I've not read the book...

Put yourself in Nagumos position. The Brits just made a sucessfull night torpedo attack & made a hole in a carrier & a cruiser, or two. Now you can launch searches at dawn, and maybe a early strike twoards the suspected enemy location. It is worth a try. But, you also have a couple cripples to nurse along, you have no guarantee the Brits wont pull off the same stunt the next evening, nor do you know what other suprises the Brits might have, and there are those pesky reconnisance aircraft peeking over the horizon.

Odds are Nagumo is not going to hang around to drive home any killer attacks. Especially if Sommerville steps back out of sight by dawn. On 7 December Nagumo did not hang around to take on what he thought was a risky third strike on Pearl Harbor, & at Midway risk avoidance seemed to be uppermost in his mind. So, I'm thinking Nagumo shepards his cripples off to the east the following day, even as he sends aircraft buzzing around across the Indian Ocean.

If Sommerville is unable to dodge back out of reach the Nagumo may try to
do two things at once, save his casualties and smack down the Brits. Multitasking in the middle of a campaign, after a bad night?

 

[Devolved]

IF he succeeds in sinking one carrier and damaging another (best result I think they could get) and the British manage to escape before they are found and pulverized then Midway probably gets cancelled and the Japanese go over to strategic defence. This may actually make it more difficult when the Americans begin their counter ofensive.

 

[Shaby]

Possibly the worst possible outcome (outside the off chance of catastrophic loss, or IO Midway) for the Japanese would be for them to massacre the British force, suffering no or limited losses. This would lift their collective egos even higher (if at all possible) with unlimited amounts of hot air.

The best outcome for the Japanese would, in the long term, be that they lose a carrier (or two) and be on a receiving end of a determined attack. Perhaps this would give them a chance for a self appraisal and an opportunity to learn something.

 

[sharlin]

Shaby and Hyperion are right, the RN would get one chance in a night attack and then it would have to run like hell if the attack didn't succeed or cause enough damage because when the sun comes up the IJN would be fighting mad and looking to launch a massed attack from their surviving flight decks and the FAA's fighters are simply not up to the challenge of facing Zero's.

 

[Just Leo]

Somerville's fleet was only recently established and wasn't necessarily prepared for fleet manoeuvers. The flight crews, as often happened, were not fully trained in night action, although they did have one training exercise. The fleet consisted of two fleet carriers with 45 Albacores, and 35 fighters, Martlets, Sea Hurricanes and Fulmars. There was also Hermes, with nothing. Remember that the Albacore was the torpedo bomber that was taken out of service long before a replacement was available. That's how good it was. It handled worse when equipped with radar. Somerville left the proposed ambush area for replenishment. I don't suppose they were short on tea, and some of his ships had short ranges. While Japanese recce flights were notoriously inadequate, Somerville had, since Birchall's original signal, several sighting reports. The Japanese didn't keep to reported course, and no interception could be made. Worst of all is that Birchall's original sighting resulted in absolutely no action whatsoever. One Ceylon-based Hurricane squadron was attacked during tea, after a half-hour overland flight by Zeroes. Regarding a night strike, this would involve any number of Albacores flying recce missions, which would not be available for attack, since they do not carry torpedoes, and although they could carry flares, they probably wouldn't have fuel reserve to linger. If British carriers are in range for a strike, depending on the time factor, the Japanese survivors are well within range to strike back. Considering the proximity of a major land mass, Ceylon, it would and did make sense to strike from there instead. That strike failed, with loss. I fear that a carrier-based strike would have resulted in a bigger loss, to Somerville, and the RN. The brightest news to come out of Ceylon was that Indomitable and Formidable survived.

 

[HMS Warspite]

The good news for Somerville is that the Albacores'd drop useful torpedoes that would drop to a useful depth, run straight and true, and 80-90% chance of detonating as advertised. So chances of crippling a Japanese CV, 30% in the first wave. With 30-40 TB's, I'd say 2 KB carriers'd be hit badly enough to need serious yard time, a couple damaged but combat-effective, and one-two put completely out of action (scuttled or sunk).

The bad news is did the RN have dive bombers? If they did, then chances of dropping a few through the flight deck and screwing up any planes readying to launch (and thus suppressing the KB's ability to strike back) are good.
Having no divebombers is not so much a problem, as a night attack with divebombers, which cannot see their target visually, is extremely difficult at best, if not outright impossible in a time, when the ordonance was not guided by either radio (FX-1400), or radar as in modern laser guided weapons. British FAA had not developped divebomber tactics, as the true masterweapon was the torpedo, if the target was a ship. bombs were only mainly used against landtargets, with a few exceptions. This had to do with the limmited number of available aircraft, that could be placed on a carrier. Only large airgroups, such as on IJN and USN carriers had plenty of space to deploy divebombers as well as secondary aircraft, after the first line torpedo carrying planes. (Even the obsolete TBD was originally concieved as such, though too old, when war actually started.)
If not, the KB gets about an 85-90% chance of massacring the RN's air wing and sink two CV's in broad daylight.

A big X factor in this battle is how much land-based air support can Somerville draw upon from Ceylon both (A) defend his carrier group and (B) maybe put a few bombs in key places to finish off a fubar flattop or (C) direct sub pickets to scratch a crippled CV??
The FAA had at Ceylon a squadron of Swordfishes, besides two patrolsquadrons of flyingboats. The RAF had around 40+ Bristol Blemheim light bombers and a simmilar number of fighters in the region, besides a number of aircraft further away in Birma, which at the time was not occupied partly. The Blenheims actually did strike the Kido Butai by surprise, but failed in hitting ships, due to their limmited experience in attacking moving targets.

So basically it could go three ways.

10% chance Brits score a Midway in the Indian Ocean, sink 3-4 CV's w/o significant losses of planes or CV's of their own. Somerville gets knighted and feted extensively for turning the tide of the Pacific War. Real impact-PT of WWII speeds up 18 mos. to blockade of Japan by 1943 and surrender in 1944.
This 10% is a bit an over estimation, as the night itself might be a problem. Normally some 50% of the strike fails to locate the target at all, due to the limmited range of the 1942 radar on the Albacore's That only will leave some 20 aircraft at best to strike a moving target, which is more difficult than a stationary one as at Taranto. At Taranto the FAA did deploy 21 aircraft in all, with twelve carrying torpedoes, scoring a total of six hits with torpedoes. Supposed the FAA had all 20 aircraft armed with torpedoes, you simply miss the one carrying the needed flares to light up the target.
The attack on the Bismarck at night on the 25th of May by Esmond's Swordfishes scored just a single hit out of nine torpedoes, while Bismarck at the time was state of the art in electronics and AA firecontrol. The duskattack of Ark Royal scored just 2 hits with 21 torpedoes used. So an average of 10% is about the best possible for a nocturnal torpedostrike, even with limmited visability and guidance by a shadowing ship.

60% chance - properly coordinated night attack with decent amount of good hits manages to sink 2 CV's damage two others enough that only 3 KB carriers can launch counter-attack. KB airborne counter-attack slaughters 70-80% of RN air wing but only sinks/ yard parks one RN CV.
British land-based air cover manages to chase off KB strafing runs and direct subs and bombers to finish off third, maybe fourth KB CV. Somerville and Co get tea and medals.
My guess is that the IJN will survive the attack more or less unscatched, as the target is more than one ship. Also take into account that a nightattack might cause the aircraft to strike at targets not completely identified, making it possible to have them strike at the IJN escorting warships of comparable size. At the time the Sentai-3 (all four Kongo Class BB's) and Sentai 8 (TOne and Chikuma) were present.
KB abashed at horrendous losses on sideshow campaign. Marshalls/CP raids by USN hit a lot harder. Pacific campaign possibly accelerated 6mos-1yr.

30% chance. -Night attack dismal failure. Miscommunication forces piecemeal RN air attack that barely scratches two KB CV's and maybe sinks a few escorts for 70-80% loss of TB's.
KB Air counter-strike at dawn savages Somerville's CV's sinks 2 CVs or all three and sends another dozen RN vessels to bottom or scrap yard and severely damages Ceylon naval yards for good measure.
A likely possibility is that the slower HMS Hermes would be caught, while the faster Illustrious class ships would make a run for it. They might be caught later on, but the time bought by HMS Hermes would give them at least a change. If Sommervile was wise, he would not have the slow, old battleships with him at the time, as these were completely unsuited for this sort of warfare.

British prestige in India takes massive hit. While India doesn't rise as one to overthrow the Raj, unrest simmers, INA recruitment trebles and ties up too many Indian Army units for Chindit campaign to go anywhere. This makes the Japanese in Thailand to feel froggy and probe a lot harder through Burma.
Sadly, due to the monsoons, disease, and logistical CF's galore, effect is nil and IJA/Thai/INA casualties force squalid retreat three mos later. Overall effect on PT- not a lot.

Overall, the odds are very bad as could be predicted before, so Somerville would not likely be the sort of commander to throw away his powerful political instrument of the Fleet in Being. As long as he could posses a fleet, with a potential threat to the IJN in the Indian Ocean, his job was done. Loosing it was not an option, as Force-Z already had made clear.

 

[Shadow Hawk]

OK, speculating away.

Royal Navy succeeds in night air torpedo attack. No matter how much damage the RN does, the Japanese are going to attempt a counter attack. Japanese doctrine at the time is all offense. For example, Midway: with three of his four carriers burning wrecks, Nagumo turned his force toward the enemy to close the range. When the fourth carrier is turned into a burning wreck, the surviving surface force continued to close without air cover in a effort to force a surface action preferably at night. It was only the next morning, when the recon flights showed that the Americans had spent the night falling back, that the Japanese actually gave up and retreated.

I think the best the British could hope for would be to trade carriers, three Japanese for three British. Unless the RN kills/cripples all six of the Kido Butai, the Japanese carriers will launch counter strikes.

Real fun: if the British do cripple all six, the Japanese would still attempt a surface action: two Kongo class BB, two Chikuma class CS, one CL and a half dozen DD vs two Queen Elizabeth class BB, three 'R' class BB, a 'County' class CA and a half dozen destroyers. In a night action, it would depend on whether Japanese lookouts could 'outsee' British radar. In daylight, bet on the RN, five obsolete BBs beat two obsolete BC conversions.

(All order of battle information is from memory, corrections accepted as required.)

 

[Just Leo]

And so, I suppose that makes Somerville a fool, a coward or a traitor. Definitely not the Nelson tradition, OTL.

 

[HMS Warspite]

OK, speculating away.

Royal Navy succeeds in night air torpedo attack. No matter how much damage the RN does, the Japanese are going to attempt a counter attack. Japanese doctrine at the time is all offense. For example, Midway: with three of his four carriers burning wrecks, Nagumo turned his force toward the enemy to close the range. When the fourth carrier is turned into a burning wreck, the surviving surface force continued to close without air cover in a effort to force a surface action preferably at night. It was only the next morning, when the recon flights showed that the Americans had spent the night falling back, that the Japanese actually gave up and retreated.

I think the best the British could hope for would be to trade carriers, three Japanese for three British. Unless the RN kills/cripples all six of the Kido Butai, the Japanese carriers will launch counter strikes.

Real fun: if the British do cripple all six, the Japanese would still attempt a surface action: two Kongo class BB, two Chikuma class CS, one CL and a half dozen DD vs two Queen Elizabeth class BB, three 'R' class BB, a 'County' class CA and a half dozen destroyers. In a night action, it would depend on whether Japanese lookouts could 'outsee' British radar. In daylight, bet on the RN, five obsolete BBs beat two obsolete BC conversions.

(All order of battle information is from memory, corrections accepted as required.)

The Kido Butai in april 1942 consisted of five large aircraft carriers, due to Kaga missing, as she was in the homewaters training up new pilots, after the shipitself had recieved a minor refit on her engines and had her 8 inch ammunition taken of, as the cassematted guns were due for removing, which was scheduled to be done in august 1942. (Had the ship survived Midway, she would have been taken into a major refit in august 1942, with large scale alterations of her equipment and possibly engines as well, since the ship was part of the First Carrier Divission, with the three knots faster Akagi.)

 

[HMS Warspite]

Something more important: the British badly needed every available aircraft carrier for the mediteranean, which was far more imortant than the Indian Ocean. Large scale deployement of the carriers were needed for the Malta campaign, the already scheduled landings in North Africa and also the threat of the German buildup in Norway. Trading carrier for carrier would be answered with the Commander of the Eastern Fleet being courtmarshalled and possibly removed as such, replacing him with a more intelligent commander with more big picture ideas.

As far as priorities, the aircraft carriers were absolutely not expendable. The armored Illustrious class was designed for the close to shoreoperations, primarily the Mediteranean and therefore could not be waisted. weaker carreirs, if still there, could if needed be sacrificed, but not in large numbers. Better was to have the USA loose carriers, as these were less needed in the Germany First campaign, since the USN carriers were nearly all deployed already to the Pacific theater, so the British could retreat to do more important things. The Germany First strategy was agreed upon by all allies.

Best was to leave a potential, but not too practical force of older and relatively obsolete ships in the Indian Ocean for as long as the IJN showed up there. The old Royal Sovereign Class battleships suited this role best, as they were not needed in Europe and already were soon to be decommissioned anyway. This force was to tie up IJN forces, if possible, although the Japanese never paid much atention to it in the OTL. On paper a force of a few battleships looked potent, but was not in reality of the WW2.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Why do people think the Japanese will take out the Brits?

Brits launch for an attack as soon as its dark, attack, the the planes recover, and the british forces get the heck out of the way, gaining a sizeable head start. The brits can withdraw in any of several directions, so the japanese have to search a quadrant of the indian ocean before the can even START pursuit. By the time the japanese find them, if the do, the brits are likely out of range. No?

What am i missing?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Reading back through the posts here I see a bit of uncertainity over the exact situation & manuvers of the two fleets. In fact Sommervilles chance occured during the night of the 5/6th. It is correct as the OP states Sommerville wanted to ambush the Kido Butai much earlier, when the KB was originally to enter the Indian Ocean & did not. ..but there was a second nearly as good opportunity during the actual raid.

Observe the attached map. I'd hoped to find one that included Sommervilles manuver route but this will have to do. It also does not show how nagumo circled about south of Ceylon on the 4th & 5th. Sommerville was operating principally just to the SW & W of where the two cruisers were sunk. When the IJN finally did appear in the IO Sommerville had most of his fleet at anchor in the Maldives. He sortied east & begain stalking the Japanese with his smaller force. For three days he would stand off to the west just at the edge of what he thought the japanese strike range was. At night he stood back to the east & hoped for the opportunity to make a night attack On the evening of the 5th he did recieve a accurate & timely position report of Nagumos location. He launched approx one third of the Albacores on a night search to Nagumos predicted position. The remaining Albacores stood by as the remaining strike force. Unfortunatly for one side or the other Nagumo had at about dusk decided to make a large course change, which swiftly took the KB out of Sommervilles search area.

Note that when the Devonshire & Cornwall were sunk Sommervilles carriers were just 65 nautical miles away, but Nagumo or his staff failed to send a search in the direction the two Brit cruisers were headed. Launching a search in the middle or late afternoon does not seem to have been part of their thinking. A further clue was lost to Nagumos staff when two carrier launched reconnisance aircraft were shot down.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Why do people think the Japanese will take out the Brits?

Brits launch for an attack as soon as its dark, attack, the the planes recover, and the british forces get the heck out of the way, gaining a sizeable head start. The brits can withdraw in any of several directions, so the japanese have to search a quadrant of the indian ocean before the can even START pursuit. By the time the japanese find them, if the do, the brits are likely out of range. No?

What am i missing?

Nothing. As I understand it that was exactly Sommervilles plan. In theory it was possible for Nagumo to chase after the Brits. That had limits a Nagumo would need to refuel his destroyers soon, and that would have been risky in range of the Brits. IIRC that was one of the reasons Nagumo decided to turn back east on the evening of the 5th, so as to get clear of any potential Brit air or surface strike while refueling.

Also in theory Sommerville was at risk on the 4th or 5th. Had the Japanese recon located his force lurking to the west the the KB could have lunged that direction in a effort to catch the Brit fleet before it could dance back out of the way. However IJN fleet air recon was not up to the task, or the KB staff not up to organizing the best searches.

 

[alfredtuomi]

sounds like somerville should have used his fulmars for recon....faster so would be harder to shoot down.might have been able to send a position report back before being shot down.

 

[HMS Warspite]

sounds like somerville should have used his fulmars for recon....faster so would be harder to shoot down.might have been able to send a position report back before being shot down.

The Fairey Fulmar was indeed faster than the biplanes further used in the FAA, but still basically an addapted light bomber (derived from the Fairey Battle of the RAF) and much slower than the A6M-2, currently in use at the time on the IJN carriers. The A6M was at least 260 kph faster anyway. In any sort of direct confrontation the superior speed of the leightweight single seat A6M had the upperhand over the lumbering twin seated large and not so well turning and climing Fairey Fulmar. The slower Swordfish might have had a bigger change to survive, basically as it was very slow, with just around 150 kph or so, forcing the A6M to use drastic measures to slow down and take aim. (By increasing drag, such as lowering the landinggear, also used as a tactic by the even faster Bf-109's during the Chanaldash of the German Brest Fleet.)

FAIREY FULMAR MARK I:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________

spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________

wingspan 14.15 meters 46 feet 5 inches
wing area 31.77 sq_meters 342 sq_feet
length 12.24 meters 40 feet 1 inch
height 4.27 meters 14 feet

empty weight 3,955 kilograms 8,720 pounds
MTO weight 4,855 kilograms 10,700 pounds

max speed at altitude 400 KPH 250 MPH / 215 KT
service ceiling 6,255 meters 21,500 feet
endurance 4 hours
_____________________ _________________ _______________________


Specifications (A6M2 Type 0 Model 21)

Data from The Great Book of Fighters[23]
General characteristics

• Crew: 1
• Length: 9.06 m (29 ft 9 in)
• Wingspan: 12.0 m (39 ft 4 in)
• Height: 3.05 m (10 ft 0 in)
• Wing area: 22.44 m² (241.5 ft²)
• Empty weight: 1,680 kg (3,704 lb)
• Loaded weight: 2,410 kg (5,313 lb)
• Powerplant: 1 × Nakajima Sakae 12 radial engine, 709 kW (950 hp)
• Aspect ratio: 6.4

Performance

• Never exceed speed: 660 km/h (356 kn, 410 mph)
• Maximum speed: 533 km/h (287 kn, 331 mph) at 4,550 m (14,930 ft)
• Range: 3,105 km (1,675 nmi, 1,929 mi)
• Service ceiling: 10,000 m (33,000 ft)
• Rate of climb: 15.7 m/s (3,100 ft/min)
• Wing loading: 107.4 kg/m² (22.0 lb/ft²)
• Power/mass: 294 W/kg (0.18 hp/lb)

Armament

• Guns:
  Divergence of trajectories between 7.7 mm and 20mm ammunition
  
  
  • 2× 7.7 mm (0.303 in) Type 97 light machine guns in the engine cowling, with 500 rounds per gun.
  • 2× 20 mm Type 99 cannon in the wings, with 60 rounds per gun.
• Bombs:
  • 2× 60 kg (132 lb) bombs or
  • 1× fixed 250 kg (551 lb) bomb for kamikaze attacks

 

[HMS Warspite]

Nothing. As I understand it that was exactly Sommervilles plan. In theory it was possible for Nagumo to chase after the Brits. That had limits a Nagumo would need to refuel his destroyers soon, and that would have been risky in range of the Brits. IIRC that was one of the reasons Nagumo decided to turn back east on the evening of the 5th, so as to get clear of any potential Brit air or surface strike while refueling.

Also in theory Sommerville was at risk on the 4th or 5th. Had the Japanese recon located his force lurking to the west the the KB could have lunged that direction in a effort to catch the Brit fleet before it could dance back out of the way. However IJN fleet air recon was not up to the task, or the KB staff not up to organizing the best searches.

Sommerville only had a change, if he was to do a hit and run tactic. His fast fleetcarriers therefore had to operate without the slow battleships and Hermes, as these vessels were simply too slow to be of use anyway. Better put Hermes' airgroup of just a dozen at best Swordfishes on the two other carriers and have the ship itself, with her remaining Sea Gladiator's run for Durban or so, accompanied by the batlteships. The remaining two Illustrious class carriers would operate only with cruisers (Destroyers were hardly there at all) and use their speed to hit and run the kido butai, just only once, as they would only get one csingle change.

As mentioned, then odds were huge and the best the FAA could hope to achieve was distruption of some kind of in the head of the IJN admiral in charge. If they succeeded in hitting something, the better it was, but the mere threat posed by the night capable FAA bombers would cause more trouble for the IJN commander, forcing him to react, rather than dictate terms.

Such an agressive move of the British would likely result in the Kido Butai being withdrawn prematurely, as the IJN priority was to prevent damage to her most important asset in the war so far. The carrierforce had to be maintained for the Pacific operations, as the Indian Ocean was a secondary theater of war for the IJN. With the Kido Butai gone, the Eastern Fleet would have the upperhand again, as long as it was kept in any sort of strength. The later was not the case, as the priorities for the Royal navy were in Europe, which resulted in starving the Eastern Fleet from frontline ships, such as aircraft carriers. HMS Hermes would likely, if she survived, remain as only carrier there, with the obsolete Royal Sovereign Class BB's as core of the Eastern Fleet, occasionally joined by a Queen Elisabeth class battleship, or an Illustrious class CV.

 

[Dupplin Muir]

HMS Warspite wrote:

The A6M was at least 260 kph faster anyway.

Are you sure about that figure? The Fulmar MkII could do at least 272 mph (and allegedly the boost had been tweaked so it may actually have been faster than that), so 331 - 272 = 59 mph = 94 kph.

The Fulmar was also much faster in the dive (it had been tested as a dive-bomber with a 500lb bomb) so it could certainly get away from an A6M in a steep dive.