Some questions about the Imperial Russian troops

The defining character of the Napoleonic Russian army was its veteran and NCO corps. It was consisted of men drafted into the army for 10, 15, 20, or 25 years, and achieved a level of training and discipline unmatched troughout Europe. (Recognized by people like Antoine-Henri Jomini).

So, did the system fall apart due to disuse? Or was it simply become obsolete?
 
The defining character of the Napoleonic Russian army was its veteran and NCO corps. It was consisted of men drafted into the army for 10, 15, 20, or 25 years, and achieved a level of training and discipline unmatched troughout Europe. (Recognized by people like Antoine-Henri Jomini).

So, did the system fall apart due to disuse? Or was it simply become obsolete?

As said in an Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu book about Russia, the system was hopelessly obsolete, with illiterate serfs, i.e. took longer to learn how to use some material, serving for 25 years, i.e. not very motivated, especially the ones chosen by their mir or their landlord; combine with the fact the logistics system was very bad - an fleet from the French Imperial Navy from Marseilles come quicker to Sebastopol than an infantry regiment from Odessa.
 
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The biggest problem of the Russian post-Napoleonic system was it's petrification in tactical and technological matters. The Russian Army of the Crimean War took a ridiculous amount of focus on drill and ceremonies. Leading to things like spending most of the training of the soldiers on things like proper dress code and a special kind of marching step that was making it almost impossible to even walk properly.
Add to that, that most of the Russian Soldiers (mostly illiterate serfs) were equipped with muskets that were already obsolete for a century, it becomes obvious why the Russian army performed so poorly in the Crimean War.

Even more problems came from the absolutely awful officers. There are examples of officers just ordering their troops to run in the vague direction of the enemy and hiding in a hole and getting drunk for the rest of the battle.

Like Johannes Parisiensis writes, the logistics system was also really bad. During some campaigns, more soldiers died from starvation than actual fighting.

Lastly, the serf system itself could not support as big as a percentage of recruits from the whole population, as the systems of the western nations could. Even slight imbalances in the system (like mobilisation) could lead to famines.
 
Yet throughout the 19th century, the Russians kicked the crap out of the Ottomans, so how crappy were the Turks that these Russians were capable of killing it like they did?
 
Yet throughout the 19th century, the Russians kicked the crap out of the Ottomans, so how crappy were the Turks that these Russians were capable of killing it like they did?

Absolutely horrendously bad. Like really bad. Really really REALLY bad.

Tactics and weapons were at least 200 years old, soldiers from different parts of the empire couldn't understand each other and the Arab auxiliaries had the nasty habit of raiding the own supply lines.

Really really REALLY absolutely horrendously bad.
 
As Johannes said the system was completely obsolete relying on brilliant commanders, brave soldiers, and large formations for success much like Russia in later years (WWII). Much of the Imperial Russian Army's success during the Napoleonic war can be attributed to having great commanders like Suvorov and later Kutuzov. In reality Russia possessed few truly skilled units.

Are we talking about the same army which marched from Moscow to Paris in 1812/13, defeating an Empire richer and more populous than its own?

The biggest problem of the Russian post-Napoleonic system was it's petrification in tactical and technological matters. The Russian Army of the Crimean War took a ridiculous amount of focus on drill and ceremonies. Leading to things like spending most of the training of the soldiers on things like proper dress code and a special kind of marching step that was making it almost impossible to even walk properly.
Add to that, that most of the Russian Soldiers (mostly illiterate serfs) were equipped with muskets that were already obsolete for a century, it becomes obvious why the Russian army performed so poorly in the Crimean War.

Even more problems came from the absolutely awful officers. There are examples of officers just ordering their troops to run in the vague direction of the enemy and hiding in a hole and getting drunk for the rest of the battle.

Like Johannes Parisiensis writes, the logistics system was also really bad. During some campaigns, more soldiers died from starvation than actual fighting.

Lastly, the serf system itself could not support as big as a percentage of recruits from the whole population, as the systems of the western nations could. Even slight imbalances in the system (like mobilisation) could lead to famines.
That made sense, but then why did they win in 1812/13?
What I was asking for was the reason for their difference in performance between Napoleonic Wars and Crimean wars, not some stereotypical judgements about the Russians.

Absolutely horrendously bad. Like really bad. Really really REALLY bad.

Tactics and weapons were at least 200 years old, soldiers from different parts of the empire couldn't understand each other and the Arab auxiliaries had the nasty habit of raiding the own supply lines.

Really really REALLY absolutely horrendously bad.
IIRC, the Ottomans were supplied by the British and always kept a technological edge over the Russians, at least during the 1877-78 wars, which the Russians won despite their inferior firearms.

And anecdotes about some Arab auxiliaries doesn't really same much about the real Turkish fighting forces.
 
That made sense, but then why did they win in 1812/13?
What I was asking for was the reason for their difference in performance between Napoleonic Wars and Crimean wars, not some stereotypical judgements about the Russians.


IIRC, the Ottomans were supplied by the British and always kept a technological edge over the Russians, at least during the 1877-78 wars, which the Russians won despite their inferior firearms.

And anecdotes about some Arab auxiliaries doesn't really same much about the real Turkish fighting forces.

The things I told you are exactly the reasons for the difference in performance. The ridiculous drilling wasn't part of the Russian army of 1812/13 (at least not to the same extent). The ridiculously outdated firearms were not as outdated in 1812 as during the Crimean Wars. The same is true for most of the other issues in tactics.

While the Russia of the 1850ties was led by incompetent generals, in 1812 it had access to some of the best military minds of the world.

The infrastructure issues are a catastrophe during the Crimean War because it was fought at the fringes of the empire and Russia was unable to deploy it's troops to the front and keep them fed. In 1812/13 those same issues were a boon: True, the Russian army also suffered from them, but Napoleons army wasn't defeated by force of arms - it essencially starved itself to death.

It also weren't the Russians who marched alone up to Paris, but a coalition formed by the rest of Europe that dealt Napoleon the deathblow at Leipzig.

The problem isn't so much that the Russian army got worse after the Napoleanic Wars, (it did, but not overly so) the problem is, however, that it didn't get better at a time when all other armies of Europe were improving on technological and tactical levels like never seen before. The Russians remained like frozen in time, fueled solely by the bygone glory of the Napoleonic Wars, with little to no innovation.

Concerning the Ottomans: My statements were referencing loosely the 100-150 years prior to the Crimean War. It is true that after that the Ottomans modernized with British help. The Reasons the Russians won in 1877, are the modernizations of society and army made after the loss of the Crimean War. This, combined with the massive population advantage made a Russian victory possible.

You could say that only the horrors of 1854 transformed the Russian army into a formidable fighting force again.

The comments about the Arabian auxiliaries are important, because the fighting abality of the main turkish fighting force is seriously in danger when the supply lines of said force are raided by the own auxiliaries.
 
The things I told you are exactly the reasons for the difference in performance. The ridiculous drilling wasn't part of the Russian army of 1812/13 (at least not to the same extent). The ridiculously outdated firearms were not as outdated in 1812 as during the Crimean Wars. The same is true for most of the other issues in tactics.

While the Russia of the 1850ties was led by incompetent generals, in 1812 it had access to some of the best military minds of the world.

The infrastructure issues are a catastrophe during the Crimean War because it was fought at the fringes of the empire and Russia was unable to deploy it's troops to the front and keep them fed. In 1812/13 those same issues were a boon: True, the Russian army also suffered from them, but Napoleons army wasn't defeated by force of arms - it essencially starved itself to death.

It also weren't the Russians who marched alone up to Paris, but a coalition formed by the rest of Europe that dealt Napoleon the deathblow at Leipzig.

The problem isn't so much that the Russian army got worse after the Napoleanic Wars, (it did, but not overly so) the problem is, however, that it didn't get better at a time when all other armies of Europe were improving on technological and tactical levels like never seen before. The Russians remained like frozen in time, fueled solely by the bygone glory of the Napoleonic Wars, with little to no innovation.

Concerning the Ottomans: My statements were referencing loosely the 100-150 years prior to the Crimean War. It is true that after that the Ottomans modernized with British help. The Reasons the Russians won in 1877, are the modernizations of society and army made after the loss of the Crimean War. This, combined with the massive population advantage made a Russian victory possible.

You could say that only the horrors of 1854 transformed the Russian army into a formidable fighting force again.

The comments about the Arabian auxiliaries are important, because the fighting abality of the main turkish fighting force is seriously in danger when the supply lines of said force are raided by the own auxiliaries.

Thank you.
 
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