Softest and hardest Versailles peace?

Since, even from the very beginning of the Franco-Russian Entente, Tsar Alexander III told Nikolai Giers that, in the event of war between Russia and A-H, the Entente's intention would be to "destroy" Germany and replace it with "a number of small, weak states", I think the hardest possible Versaiiles has to include not only a variable amount of territorial annexation, but also the dismemberment of the German State.

Unfortunately for the Entente leadership, Britain and the U.S. weren't going to countenance such a course, so even though that's what France and Russia desired from the beginning, it didn't happen.

Find a way for the Entente to beat the CP without American involvement, and with much less dependence on British help, and I suppose you might get such an outcome. But I'm not sure that achieving victory under those two conditions is plausible.

The best bet (barring ahistorical displays of utter German incompetence) might be to have A-H accept Serbia's response to the 1914 Ultimatum. Then, as seems likely to me, have France and Russia push a future Balkan incident to the point of war after 1917. If one accepts the view that Russian military reform would eliminate both the viability of the Schlieffen Plan, and any possibility of German victory (both Entente and German leaders thought this at the time), then you could get the Entente beating Germany without either American or British involvement, and thus the possibility for a harsher peace diktat.*

However, while I think it probable that the Franco-Russian Entente would push a war once they felt themselves unbeatable, I strongly doubt the actual efficacy of the Russian military reforms. So a maximally harsh treaty is still unlikely.


* British involvement being presumably avoided since German leaders by this point accept that the Schlieffen Plan cannot possibly succeed, and consider that a more compact defensive front is a better bet. Thus, no German invasion of Belgium.
 
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Perkeo

Banned
To make the challenge more meaningful, I assume that the armistice is the same as IOTL (otherwise we would have to include a CP victory in the discussion)

Anti-German extreme:
- Saarland annexed by France
- East Prussia annexed by Poland and/or Russia
- all of Schleswig annexed by Denmark
- Inhabitants of the above-mentioned regions forced to assimilate to their non-German conquerors or to leave.
- Germany is sliced into three states: Bavaria, (shrunk)Prussia and Rheinland.
- Huge reparations are paid by Prussia, and perhaps some of the other Germanies
To bring this about, the OTL armistice need to fail, similarly to the first round of negotiations in Brest-Litowsk, and/or a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat in Germany. Unlikely, but not impossible.

Pro-German extreme:
- Alsace Lorraine and the corridor to Gdynia still ceded without referendum (not doing so would be ASB)
- Schleswig untouched
- Eupen-Malmedy fails referendum and stays German
- Memelland stays German
- German-Austria including the Sudetenland becomes temporarly independent, but with a backdoor to negotiate an Anschluss if Germany complied with the treaty and paid its reparations.
- The allies accept the German offer for reparations (which ironically would more than double what Germany ended up paying IOTL), either totally suspending the OTL C-Bonds or declaring them a penalty in the case of non-compliance rather than a cheque designed to bounce.
- No economic sanctions as long as Germany pays its reparations.

Why would the Allies be so generous? A mere leap of insight isn't enough. But perhaps more successful or nearly successful Communist uprisings in European countries makes them fear a kind of domino effect more than an intact - but politically stable - Germany.

I may add, that the OTL TOV combined the disadvantages of both approaches: It was far to soft to permanently hold down German irredentism, and not soft enough to allow Germany to keep it's countenance. Most foolish of all the war guilt clause: No effect whatsoever on the Germany's ability to threaten it's neighbors, but a huge impediment to the improvement of the relations to the Entente nations.
 
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I think that anything much more draconian than OTL's Versailles Diktat would result in Germany walking out, a continued Allied invasion into Germany (possibly absent US direct participation), and the eventual complete defeat of a weakened, revolution-wracked nation. Germany would be occupied, and possibly divided (this is not too oultlandish, when one considers that in 1919 most people remembered a time when Germany was not united). Some form of Poland would be restored as would a Czecho-slovak state. France might just claim and annex the Saar outright. Interestingly you might see a 1920's version of OTL's cold war as the Allies attempt to understand and react to communist revolutions in eastern Europe, possibly reinstating a sufficiently compliant and ressurected German state in this defense.

Realistically, assuming the war ends in 1918 with OTL's armistice, I would see the following as the most likely lenient outcome:

-No occupation/demilitarization of the Rhineland
-loss of Alsace-Lorraine
-Allies take Wilson's 14 points seriously and permit Austrian/German union
-No internment of the High Seas Fleet, but a minor punitive reduction (such as requiring Germany to scrap all new construction and negotiate a permanent reduction of its navy to levels that would not threaten Britain
-Negotiating a reduction in the size of the German army (not dictating it) and allowing Germany to remain an airforce (also with a negotiatedsize)
- Border adustments in Prussia to accomodate an independent Poland
-More modest reparations
-No "war guilt" clause
 
I can understand the U.S., but why Britain?:confused:

I haven't read that much about it, but from what I understand, Britain wanted Germany as a trading partner, and felt that more extensive reparations would have a negative impact on the British economy (not sure why).

Knowing a bit about the Great Britain of the period, I personally suspect that she wanted to keep a weakened but still united Germany as a potential counterbalance if France seemed to be becoming too strong -- remember that the rapprochement with France was relatively recent, and nobody could rule out the return of Anglo-French competition.

I really need to make a book on Versailles a priority on my reading list, I just need to find one that seems reasonably objective. Macmillan seems like she just wanted a venue in which to grind her axes against the Uniquely Evil Germans, Wilson, and anyone one else her great grandad didn't much care for; but maybe the reviewers who say such things are wrong, so perhaps I'll try her book.
 
Is it possible for all territorial losses that Germany faced to have legitimate plebiscites, including Alsace and Lorraine?

How about territory Austria lost, including South Tirol?
 
Pro-German extreme:
- Alsace Lorraine and the corridor to Gdynia still ceded without referendum (not doing so would be ASB)
No corridor is far from ASB, improbable yes, but not impossible. Especially with a POD within Poland leading to a far more chaotic situation within Poland during the Conference. No Paderewski would be one way.
 
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How about this in the case of a narrow Allied victory? Perhaps Woodrow Wilson's "lasting peace" goes through or (less likely) the French are more benevolent.
Germany cedes Alsace-Lorraine to France.
Germany cedes most of northern Schleswig to Denmark on the basis of a referendum
German-Austria is allowed to live, and is renamed Austria to avoid confusion.
The Duchy of Troppau/Opava is a neutral state run by Germans and Czechs.
In compensation for no Sudentenland, the new state of Czechoslovakia gains various little terriroial gains. (please ignore the little bit on the Germany-Austria border, forgot to paint that Austria's color)
Germany cedes small parts of West Prussia to Poland.
Germany keeps Malmedy-Eupen.
Any of these territories may change status on the basis of a referendum.
 
As for Elsaß-Lothringen/Alsace-Lorraine: what if it is annexed to Switzerland?

Both sides don't exactly want the other side to have it, so why not hand it over to a neutral neighbour that's linguistically and culturally similar?
 
I really need to make a book on Versailles a priority on my reading list, I just need to find one that seems reasonably objective. Macmillan seems like she just wanted a venue in which to grind her axes against the Uniquely Evil Germans, Wilson, and anyone one else her great grandad didn't much care for; but maybe the reviewers who say such things are wrong, so perhaps I'll try her book.

Macmillian isn't that bad, but in her conclusion she states that the reperations played no role in the rise of nazism giving only flimsy evidence. Does somebody have recommendations for "objective" books (as much as a book about something this controversial can ever be considered objective) on the Versailles treaty?
 
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Macmillian isn't that bad, but in her conclusion she states that the reperations played no role in the rise of nazism giving only flimsy evidence. Does somebody have recommendations for "objective" books (as much as something this controversial can ever be considered objective) on the Versailles treaty?

No such exist. I recommend MacMillan and I think her claims has merit, although nuance might be needed. A somewhat interesting read, although extremely partial, is Lloyd George´s The Truth about the Peace Treaties. I can also recommend FRUS, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. It is freely available and has a search function. For specific issues I might have some tips too.
 
As for Elsaß-Lothringen/Alsace-Lorraine: what if it is annexed to Switzerland?

Both sides don't exactly want the other side to have it, so why not hand it over to a neutral neighbour that's linguistically and culturally similar?

Because both sides consider it part of their core territory. Germans consider Alsace and Lorraine to be German, the French consider it to be French.

It's one of the reasons I think a per-district plebiscite would have been the best solution to solving the "Alsace-Lorraine" problem without continued bitterness.
 
Macmillian isn't that bad, but in her conclusion she states that the reperations played no role in the rise of nazism giving only flimsy evidence. Does somebody have recommendations for "objective" books (as much as a book about something this controversial can ever be considered objective) on the Versailles treaty?


No such exist. I recommend MacMillan and I think her claims has merit, although nuance might be needed. A somewhat interesting read, although extremely partial, is Lloyd George´s The Truth about the Peace Treaties. I can also recommend FRUS, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. It is freely available and has a search function. For specific issues I might have some tips too.

Hmm. Well, I'll read it, then, just with a cautious eye towards the reparations thing. I truly do think some historians have made a bit too much of them, anyway. If I really feel the need, I might pick up Charles Mee's book as well.
Thank you both for your input!
 
Because both sides consider it part of their core territory. Germans consider Alsace and Lorraine to be German, the French consider it to be French.

It's one of the reasons I think a per-district plebiscite would have been the best solution to solving the "Alsace-Lorraine" problem without continued bitterness.

Ah.

Per-district voting is difficult to do neutrally; there'd likely be bickering over the results.

Perhaps the best option would be a Franco-German condominium?
 
Ah.

Per-district voting is difficult to do neutrally; there'd likely be bickering over the results.

Perhaps the best option would be a Franco-German condominium?

A condominium over an insignificant territory like Andorra? Sure. But I can't imagine it would work out well over a territory as demanded by both sides as A-L - just look at Schleswig-Holstein.

Besides, there were only three districts - Upper Alsace, Lower Alsace, and Lothringen. Though I feel they wouldn't be happy with that granularity - there are a LOT of German speakers in Lothringen, and a few border areas in Alsace which speak French.
 
Because both sides consider it part of their core territory. Germans consider Alsace and Lorraine to be German, the French consider it to be French.

It's one of the reasons I think a per-district plebiscite would have been the best solution to solving the "Alsace-Lorraine" problem without continued bitterness.

That would maybe have been the fairest solution, but the french would have gone absolutely bananas if someone proposed such a thing.
 
That would maybe have been the fairest solution, but the french would have gone absolutely bananas if someone proposed such a thing.

I agree. As the defeated party, Germany won't exactly like it, but will accept it with vastly better grace than it did the OTL 'solution'.

But France, as one of the victors, and with 40 years of wounded vainglory behind it, will regard any compromise over Alsace-Lorraine, no matter how slight or 'fair', as the vilest treachery.
 
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I agree. As the defeated party, Germany won't exactly like it, but will accept it with vastly better grace than it did the OTL 'solution'.

But France, as one of the victors, and with 40 years of wounded vainglory behind it, will regard any compromise over Alsace-Lorraine, no matter how slight or 'fair', as the vilest treachery.

But on the other hand, just because they speak a German language/dialect doesn't mean they consider themselves part of Germany though...
 
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