Softest and hardest Versailles peace?

[Bad@logic]

Why on earth would they think that making Russia bigger than it was even in Soviet times was a good idea.

How is a bad idea for France? People occasionally say things along the lines that France should have been happy that they had the magnanimous Germans protecting them from the Russians, but the Russians don't have any clashing interests with France(outside possibly of the Middle East), and Imperial Russia isn't going to be marching into Paris anytime soon. Having a strong Russia is a nice counter block to the British as well, if the rivalry resumed post-war with Germany out of the picture.

Of course this is only referring to strategic reasons, ideologically there would be some differences - but this is also Action Francaise, who would quite like the idea of an authoritarian, highly religious and conservative, right wing state as embodied in the form of Russia.

 

[jmc247]

Certain elements of the OTL treaty (the colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen-Malmedy, disposal of the High Seas Fleet) are to be retained.

Break the southern German states off and unify them with Austria.

Give Silesia to Czechoslovakia, give both West and East Prussia to Poland (make the Poles give the Lithuanians Vilnius to slightly offset this).

Give the Danes the entirety of Schleswig.

Give the Dutch something too; East Frisia, perhaps.

Give the Saar to Luxembourg, along with any territory necessary to make it contiguous with the prewar Grand Duchy.

Occupy the Rhineland for long enough to dismantle a significant portion of its industry and ship it back to France and Belgium.

Heligoland goes to Britain.

Transfer of all German patents, as well as the German gold reserves.

British, French and American corporations granted majority shares in a wide range of German industrial concerns, particularly those which might produce anything that can be put to military use. This is set up so that each involved Entente corporation is given control of a set of companies, not so that the majority stake in each German company is divided among multiple corporations. Forbid any sale of shares in any of these companies to German investors for at least twenty or thirty years, except where such shares are explicitly stated to grant no voting rights whatsoever within the corporation.

Ban the Germans from establishing tariffs of any kind, except on such goods as the Entente nations might prefer to be able to purchase more cheaply from Germany.

The Germans are to put some number of their infantry divisions at the disposal of the Entente powers. These divisions will be used up as part of the intervention in the Russian Civil War. They will also be required to supply a certain number of divisions for the use of the League of Nations, each of which will be quartered outside of Germany for the duration of its service.

The German soldiers seconded to the League of Nations will be required to purchase all of their own equipment within Germany, in quantities and at prices to be set by Entente quartermasters. German armaments manufacturers will be required to provide said quantities at said prices.

In short (or not, I suppose), give every one of Germany's neighbors a stake in containing and suppressing it, cripple their economy in such a fashion as to make them little more than an exploitable appendage of the Entente, and send as much of their military as possible to die in Russia and any other place that the Big Three don't want to expend their own lives on.

If the Germans refuse these terms, continue the blockade until either they surrender or they completely disintegrate, whichever comes first.

I can envision the German delegations reaction to be handed that.

 

[Alcsentre Calanice]

Certain elements of the OTL treaty (the colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen-Malmedy, disposal of the High Seas Fleet) are to be retained.

Break the southern German states off and unify them with Austria.

Give Silesia to Czechoslovakia, give both West and East Prussia to Poland (make the Poles give the Lithuanians Vilnius to slightly offset this).

Give the Danes the entirety of Schleswig.

Give the Dutch something too; East Frisia, perhaps.

Give the Saar to Luxembourg, along with any territory necessary to make it contiguous with the prewar Grand Duchy.

Occupy the Rhineland for long enough to dismantle a significant portion of its industry and ship it back to France and Belgium.

Heligoland goes to Britain.

Transfer of all German patents, as well as the German gold reserves.

British, French and American corporations granted majority shares in a wide range of German industrial concerns, particularly those which might produce anything that can be put to military use. This is set up so that each involved Entente corporation is given control of a set of companies, not so that the majority stake in each German company is divided among multiple corporations. Forbid any sale of shares in any of these companies to German investors for at least twenty or thirty years, except where such shares are explicitly stated to grant no voting rights whatsoever within the corporation.

Ban the Germans from establishing tariffs of any kind, except on such goods as the Entente nations might prefer to be able to purchase more cheaply from Germany.

The Germans are to put some number of their infantry divisions at the disposal of the Entente powers. These divisions will be used up as part of the intervention in the Russian Civil War. They will also be required to supply a certain number of divisions for the use of the League of Nations, each of which will be quartered outside of Germany for the duration of its service.

The German soldiers seconded to the League of Nations will be required to purchase all of their own equipment within Germany, in quantities and at prices to be set by Entente quartermasters. German armaments manufacturers will be required to provide said quantities at said prices.

In short (or not, I suppose), give every one of Germany's neighbors a stake in containing and suppressing it, cripple their economy in such a fashion as to make them little more than an exploitable appendage of the Entente, and send as much of their military as possible to die in Russia and any other place that the Big Three don't want to expend their own lives on.

If the Germans refuse these terms, continue the blockade until either they surrender or they completely disintegrate, whichever comes first.

I have a little pressentiment in regard to which ideology the German expedition forces will return with from Russia.

And I have one in regard to which ideology is going to lead the German revolution in 1923.

And I have another one in regard to the formation of the German soviet republic, fighting with Russia a long war against capitalist entente powers to end the Diktat von Versailles.

 

[Bad@logic]

I imagine that it is much easier to achieve a soft peace than a hard peace, as far as alterations from the baselines of original Versailles. It wasn't that Versailles is the harsh monstrosity that it gets portrayed as occasionally, just that the hard elements in it were implemented due to concern over German power and the need to constrain it. If German power isn't much more than otherwise, and German crimes more prevalent, which they wouldn't be without a change happening after the end of WW1 and not before/during it, then there isn't a reason to alter what happened with the harsher elements of the treaty. I guess that it might be possible for France to take the Saar beyond just a protectorate, perhaps some war trials of German leaders, but even those I don't really know enough (Saar I know more, I guess that if the Anglo-Americans don't come up with the idea of the Treaty of Guarantee to France then the French might push much harder for territorial concessions in Germany since they might think they might have to stand alone in the future)

France did approach the Germans to sound out a rapprochement with them, but the Germans rejected that. If that was a stronger impulse on the French side and the Germans didn't decline it immediately, then the French would probably be willing to push for softer terms. I don't know exactly what such softer terms would entail, but reparations burden being softened (France would still want reparations of course, but the sums they proposed were quite a lot smaller than the British sums which were adopted) and some of the more marginal territories (which ones if so?) not being taken could be a good candidate.

 

[Remitonov]

How is a bad idea for France? People occasionally say things along the lines that France should have been happy that they had the magnanimous Germans protecting them from the Russians, but the Russians don't have any clashing interests with France(outside possibly of the Middle East), and Imperial Russia isn't going to be marching into Paris anytime soon. Having a strong Russia is a nice counter block to the British as well, if the rivalry resumed post-war with Germany out of the picture.

Of course this is only referring to strategic reasons, ideologically there would be some differences - but this is also Action Francaise, who would quite like the idea of an authoritarian, highly religious and conservative, right wing state as embodied in the form of Russia.

Makes sense. Neither side had any real conflicting claims for Action Francaise to be legitimately worried about expanding Russian power (would probably encourage it at Britain and Germany's expense). Though, I feel circumstances can change if Russia runs out of Great Powers to compete with.

 

[Remitonov]

Anyway, for the other end of the Versailles peace scale, I had the idea of a softer Versailles peace, after a greater German success in the Spring Offensive (taking Amiens and Hazebrouck) that ironically worn their ranks thinner than OTL. It's somewhat closer to a stalemate than a clear-cut Entente victory, but here goes.

• Germany renounces control over most, if not all of its colonial empire - That one is pretty much a given, considering that the only actual resistance in the colonial fronts by now was Lettow-Vorbeck's Schutztruppe. The German Far East holdings would still go to Australia and Japan, and its African possessions would be partitioned between the Entente. At the very best, the Germans can hope to get a piece of German East Africa back. But that's a stretch by any count, and one the Entente doesn't need to entertain.
  
• Germany renounces control over all puppet states claimed in Brest-Litovsk - Poland, Finland, etc...
• No war responsibility claim - Still didn't understand why this was placed on the Germans, but the French might be pressed to back down on that.
• Germany returns Alsace-Lorraine to France, cedes Poznan to Poland and part of Upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia - OTL
• Danzig and West Prussia remains German due to plebiscite, with provisions given for access to Danzig port facilities and Polish enclaves - Poland will not be happy about this, especially with the Polish enclaves and lack of actual sea access. However, keeping Germany whole might go a long way to stem resentment, thought we might then see Poland becoming the aggressor in the future.
• Eupen-Malmedy subject to plebiscite - similar to OTL, but with a secret ballot. The vote registration did much to fan paranoia among the German residents at the dangers of being labelled 'treasonous' by Belgian authorities. That, of course, pretty much skewed the vote in Belgium's favour with the absent votes.
• Northern Schleswig plebiscite - OTL
• More limited reparations - Don't have a number on it, sadly. Economics isn't my strong suit.
• Less restrictive limits on military - This, I'm not sure. The last thing the Entente wanted was a Germany ready to fight round two on the get-go. If this were a white peace, there might not be any restrictions at all, but here, I'm not so sure if it's plausible to implement more lenient limitations.

Overall, I still have slight doubts about its feasibility at the time. Feel free to enlighten me, if there's any problems.

 

[Twice_Bitten]

No war responsibility claim - Still didn't understand why this was placed on the Germans, but the French might be pressed to back down on that.

I may help you with this. According to the SPIEGEL, a weekly Magazine in Germany www.spiegel.de , 28 week of 2009, had an article, named: "Der Unfrieden von Versailles" aka "The nonpeace of Versailles". The article is available only in german. On page 53 it says:

"Der sogenannte Kriegsschuldartikel ging auf den Anwalt John Foster Dulles zurück, in den fünfziger Jahren als US-Außenminister ein enger Verbündeter von Kanzler Konrad Adenauer. Es war eine Idee von Juristen für Juristen gewesen. Vergleichsweise harmlos.
Dulles wollte mit der Klausel nur den umfassenden Reparationsanspruch der Alliierten rechtlich verankern. Die moralisch aufgeladene Frage, wer den Ausbruch des Weltkriegs 1914 zu verantworten hatte, hatte der Amerikaner so gar nicht stellen wollen. Im Rückblick schrieb er, das habe er wohl „nicht angemessen eingeschätzt“."

Translated as: The warguilt clause is an idea of John Foster Dulles, who as US secretary of foreign affairs in the 1950 was an ally of german chancellor Adenauer. It was an idea of a lawyer for lawyers. By way of comparison harmless.
Dulles wanted to give the comprehensive right to reparations of the Allies by the warguiltclause a legal anchor. The morally charged question, who was responsible for WWI, he did not want to place. Looking back he wrote that he did not properly evaluated it.

 

[Ameise]

Out of curiosity, if a plebiscite were to have been held in A-L, on a district-by-district basis, what would the results likely have been?

 

[oreocruncher]

Out of curiosity, if a plebiscite were to have been held in A-L, on a district-by-district basis, what would the results likely have been?

I think they mostly would have voted to be part of France...

 

[Remitonov]

I may help you with this. According to the SPIEGEL, a weekly Magazine in Germany www.spiegel.de , 28 week of 2009, had an article, named: "Der Unfrieden von Versailles" aka "The nonpeace of Versailles". The article is available only in german. On page 53 it says:

"Der sogenannte Kriegsschuldartikel ging auf den Anwalt John Foster Dulles zurück, in den fünfziger Jahren als US-Außenminister ein enger Verbündeter von Kanzler Konrad Adenauer. Es war eine Idee von Juristen für Juristen gewesen. Vergleichsweise harmlos.
Dulles wollte mit der Klausel nur den umfassenden Reparationsanspruch der Alliierten rechtlich verankern. Die moralisch aufgeladene Frage, wer den Ausbruch des Weltkriegs 1914 zu verantworten hatte, hatte der Amerikaner so gar nicht stellen wollen. Im Rückblick schrieb er, das habe er wohl „nicht angemessen eingeschätzt“."

Translated as: The warguilt clause is an idea of John Foster Dulles, who as US secretary of foreign affairs in the 1950 was an ally of german chancellor Adenauer. It was an idea of a lawyer for lawyers. By way of comparison harmless.
Dulles wanted to give the comprehensive right to reparations of the Allies by the warguiltclause a legal anchor. The morally charged question, who was responsible for WWI, he did not want to place. Looking back he wrote that he did not properly evaluated it.

Ah thanks.

 

[Admiral Halsey]

I think they mostly would have voted to be part of France...

From what i've heard the Northern third would've most likely voted French while the Southern 2/3's would've voted for Germany.

 

[PhilippeO]

Another Question

does anyone know comparison of three reparation on per-capita basis ?
- Prussian reparation to Napoleon
- France reparation after Franco-Prussian War
- Germany reparation to France on WWI

i read the first two is identical, what about WWI compared to other ?

 

[Bad@logic]

Another Question

does anyone know comparison of three reparation on per-capita basis ?
- Prussian reparation to Napoleon
- France reparation after Franco-Prussian War
- Germany reparation to France on WWI

i read the first two is identical, what about WWI compared to other ?

http://www.nber.org/papers/w7438.pdf

This is a useful source I remember reading and just found again.

 

[Perkeo]

I may help you with this. According to the SPIEGEL, a weekly Magazine in Germany www.spiegel.de , 28 week of 2009, had an article, named: "Der Unfrieden von Versailles" aka "The nonpeace of Versailles". The article is available only in german. On page 53 it says:

"Der sogenannte Kriegsschuldartikel ging auf den Anwalt John Foster Dulles zurück, in den fünfziger Jahren als US-Außenminister ein enger Verbündeter von Kanzler Konrad Adenauer. Es war eine Idee von Juristen für Juristen gewesen. Vergleichsweise harmlos.
Dulles wollte mit der Klausel nur den umfassenden Reparationsanspruch der Alliierten rechtlich verankern. Die moralisch aufgeladene Frage, wer den Ausbruch des Weltkriegs 1914 zu verantworten hatte, hatte der Amerikaner so gar nicht stellen wollen. Im Rückblick schrieb er, das habe er wohl „nicht angemessen eingeschätzt“."

Translated as: The warguilt clause is an idea of John Foster Dulles, who as US secretary of foreign affairs in the 1950 was an ally of german chancellor Adenauer. It was an idea of a lawyer for lawyers. By way of comparison harmless.
Dulles wanted to give the comprehensive right to reparations of the Allies by the warguiltclause a legal anchor. The morally charged question, who was responsible for WWI, he did not want to place. Looking back he wrote that he did not properly evaluated it.

I've heard that before, but I'm confused that other 19th century peace treaties - such as the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 - seem to have no trouble to inflict reparations without a war-guilt clause.

However, if the Allies can claim that TOV article 231 means "Germany has to pay as if it was guilty" rather than "Germany is guilty", so can the Germans - one of many examples were the German reception of the TOV did a lot more harm than the treaty itself.

Edit: The actual outcome of the TOV's reparation was the opposite. Germany could not accept the reparations because this would - in theit view - have meant accepting the war guilt as well. Connecting guilt to reparations seems to have been a very very bad idea.

 

[Bad@logic]

I've heard that before, but I'm confused that other 19th century peace treaties - such as the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 - seem to have no trouble to inflict reparations without a war-guilt clause.

However, if the Allies can claim that TOV article 231 means "Germany has to pay as if it was guilty" rather than "Germany is guilty", so can the Germans - one of many examples were the German reception of the TOV did a lot more harm than the treaty itself.

Edit: The actual outcome of the TOV's reparation was the opposite. Germany could not accept the reparations because this would - in theit view - have meant accepting the war guilt as well. Connecting guilt to reparations seems to have been a very very bad idea.

The Allies were aiming for a moral peace, based on reparations for the damages caused to Allied civilians - the shattered lands of northern France, the families of the dead (I understand that this is questionable but they wanted to expand the reparations to include Britain for political reasons), and other destruction. Of course there were important strategic reasons behind it too, but that was the basis, so the Allies needed to connect reparations to the damage caused to Allied civilians. I imagine that the American involvement helped dictate it to an extent, in that simply calling for lump sums of reparations wouldn't fly too well with them.

At least, that is what I assume, I hadn't researched the reasons behind that article to the same extent as its effects.

Apparently the Germans mistranslated that particular clause and got the idea that the Allies were connecting it to Germany's war guilt, and the rest one might say is history…

 

[fhaessig]

Another Question

does anyone know comparison of three reparation on per-capita basis ?
- Prussian reparation to Napoleon
- France reparation after Franco-Prussian War
- Germany reparation to France on WWI

i read the first two is identical, what about WWI compared to other ?

What I read (some time ago, so I might not be able to find it back) is that, proportional to national wealth, what the French paid in 1873, plus the interest they had to pay to get the loans (The germans were occupying half of France until the indemnity was paid, so France choose to pay earlier rather than later) was about equal to what it actually got from Germany following WWI (which was much less than the actual numbers from the ToV)

 

[Perkeo]

The Allies were aiming for a moral peace, based on reparations for the damages caused to Allied civilians - the shattered lands of northern France, the families of the dead (I understand that this is questionable but they wanted to expand the reparations to include Britain for political reasons), and other destruction. Of course there were important strategic reasons behind it too, but that was the basis, so the Allies needed to connect reparations to the damage caused to Allied civilians. I imagine that the American involvement helped dictate it to an extent, in that simply calling for lump sums of reparations wouldn't fly too well with them.

At least, that is what I assume, I hadn't researched the reasons behind that article to the same extent as its effects.

Apparently the Germans mistranslated that particular clause and got the idea that the Allies were connecting it to Germany's war guilt, and the rest one might say is history…

Now I'm even more confused: On the one hand you talk about "moral peace" and connect the reparations to the damages caused to civilians, and on the other hand you call it a "mistranslation" that the Germans interpreted it as the allegation of guilt. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Don't get me wrong, I do NOT think that the German right-wing's - let alone Hitler's - reaction to the TOV was even remotely adequate, but I do think that
a) the German government's revision policy was adequate, and
b) it should have been perfectly obvious that this clause would impede rather than enforce the payment of the reparations, economic recovery and a lasting peace. Everybody would have been happier if the TOV had simply said: "Germany pays the sum of ... by the date ..."-period.

 

[Bad@logic]

Now I'm even more confused: On the one hand you talk about "moral peace" and connect the reparations to the damages caused to civilians, and on the other hand you call it a "mistranslation" that the Germans interpreted it as the allegation of guilt. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Don't get me wrong, I do NOT think that the German right-wing's - let alone Hitler's - reaction to the TOV was even remotely adequate, but I do think that
a) the German government's revision policy was adequate, and
b) it should have been perfectly obvious that this clause would impede rather than enforce the payment of the reparations, economic recovery and a lasting peace. Everybody would have been happier if the TOV had simply said: "Germany pays the sum of ... by ..."-period.

The clause meant German guilt for causing damage to allied civilians, not for starting the war, which is where the Germans mistranslated it and thought that Article 231 meant them being forced to accept the blame for starting the war, which it didn't. Thus the propaganda campaign during the 1920s attempting to shift the blame onto other nations instead of themselves (whether that is true or not can be argued of course), since they thought it would undermine the moral foundation of the Treaty.

 

[matzeskatze]

Whatever it meant, Article 231 did not mention any reason other then German and he allies aggression.

Article 231 was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

As is clear to read it totaly iggnores Serbian inflamed/sponsored terrorism and Russian mobilisation. In that it Imo is a clear guild clause.
Also if it was a "moral" way, shouldn't the German civilian population also be compensated for the hardships imposed by the British blockade? Yes I know, sarcasm it is. But the question of moral right in WWI is more grey then much else.

 

[Tallil2long]

Whatever it meant, Article 231 did not mention any reason other then German and he allies aggression.

Article 231 was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

Snip

Now, I should point out that English is not my primary language ('Murrican is).

But the quote makes plain that German aggression is being depicted as the cause of the war, not merely the cause of specific physical damages to certain areas of France and Belgium. Further, German (and her allies') aggression is depicted as the sole cause of the war.
So, regardless of the claims of apologists, this is indeed a war guilt clause. It states rather clearly that Germany (and her allies) caused the war through their aggression, and thus are responsible for the damages.

Edit: it's really rather interesting. In order for the Entente/Allied nations to be depicted as wholly blameless in the two World Wars, not only do Germany and her allies have to be depicted as solely to blame for causing the First World War, but the Entente has to be depicted as not claiming that Germany and her allies were solely to blame, since German resentment over that claim supposedly contributed to the coming of the Second World War. Unfortunately, this requires denying the obvious meaning of the war guilt clause.

Personally, I think this little bit of mental gymnastics is wholly unnecessary: Germany wasn't solely to blame for the coming of the First War, but that fact in no way justifies Nazi Germany in starting the Second. It's only when one demands a combined uniformly black-and-white explanation for both that problems arise.