Social and Cultural effects of Operation Downfall on Japan

By Non supportable argument, do you mean unsound argument? Or invalid argument? Or something else?

What does RTL mean?

Data does not support (DDNS is another acronym for NSA.). The Russians had no sea lift for a full corps level assault. Whether the ON or The Red argument that disputes this fact is sound is a YMMV situation. I happen to know in this case that no shipping=no sustainability, but your mileage may vary.

RTL is real time line.
 
Data does not support (DDNS is another acronym). The Russians had no sea lift for a full corps level assault.

Well, the data is that historically the Soviets moved the equivalent of corps-sized forces by sea, which wouldn’t have been possible if they didn’t have the sea lift to do so.
 

nbcman

Donor
Well, the data is that historically the Soviets moved the equivalent of corps-sized forces by sea, which wouldn’t have been possible if they didn’t have the sea lift to do so.
It took from 20 August 1945 until 2 September 1945 to move the entirety of the 87th Rifle Corps to Sakhalin. See the Soviet Assault on Maoka against a withdrawing Japanese force. So almost 2 weeks to shift that corps between Vladivostok to a port on Sakhalin which was unopposed after the initial landings. Slightly different than moving a corps-sized force in a single lift.
 
But the assault on Hokkaido by your own statement is a corps level lift in one go. And the bungled Sakhalin transport sure as heck shows exactly what I maintained.

On 1400 on 23 August 1945 a new convoy VKMA-2 departed from Vladivostok to the port of Maoka, which transported the 342nd Rifle Division and 215th Artillery Brigade of the 87th Rifle Corps, arriving at 1425 on 26 August 1945 at the port.

Although the 342nd was in the process of being transported to Sakhalin on 25 August, on 22 August Stalin had already ordered Vasilevsky to halt the planned landing preparations on Hokkaido until further notice. However he allowed the transfer of the 87th Rifle Corps to continue to Sakhalin.

By 27 August 1945 the landing operation on was Hokkaido postponed, and then completely abandoned.

At 0920 on 25 August 1945 the convoy VKMA-3 departed Vladivostok with the 264th Rifle Division and staff of the 87th Rifle Corps. Because of a breakdown in the screw propeller in the transport “Leo Tolstoy” the convoy had to berth at the Vladimir Bay, where it stood until 28 August 1945, eventually reaching Maoka at 1330 on 30 August 1945.

At 0000 on 30 August 1945 the 87th RC was transferred to the 2nd Far East Front by order of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. The corps became a part of the 16th Army.

Unloading the last regiment of the 264th RD on Sakhalin was completed at 1900 on 1 September 1945.

On 2 September 1945 the transportation of the 87th Rifle Corps to Sakhalin island was completed.

QED.
 
It took from 20 August 1945 until 2 September 1945 to move the entirety of the 87th Rifle Corps to Sakhalin. See the Soviet Assault on Maoka against a withdrawing Japanese force. So almost 2 weeks to shift that corps between Vladivostok to a port on Sakhalin which was unopposed after the initial landings. Slightly different than moving a corps-sized force in a single lift.

Which took place simultaneously with the movement of a division to the Kuriles (the 101st Rifle) and another division to Korea (Still trying to pin down which one that was). That's three divisions on the move at sea all at once. Or in other words, a corps sized movement. Undoubtedly, had the Soviets decided to ditch or delayed the Kurile and Korean landings, they could have moved the 37th Rifle Corps to Sakhalin all in one go.

Of course, I'm puzzled where you think the Soviets would attempt to make a corps-sized assault as a single-lift. As a doctrinal matter, the Soviets preferred to avoid opposed landings whenever possible and when making a unopposed landing such overwhelming force is hardly necessary. It rather depends on what the Japanese have at and around the specific landing site. If there's no Japanese forces at all, a single battalion would be enough to secure the port and then everything else could be brought in via merchant marine later. If there's just a battalion, which is all that the Japanese actually had in the Rumoi area, then the Soviets only need to bring in anything between a regiment to a division in a single go. The rest of the corps would then be brought in over the next week in just the amphibious shipping, never mind what could be moved via merchant marine. Once an actual port is secured, the Soviets have a large enough merchant marine that they could ultimately bring in and sustain an entire army on Hokkaido over the course of a month or two. We're not talking about the Soviets trying to assault Normandy or Iwo Jima here.

But the assault on Hokkaido by your own statement is a corps level lift in one go.

I never made any such statement that the assault on Hokkaido would be a corps-level assault in one go.

And the bungled Sakhalin transport sure as heck shows exactly what I maintained.

Nothing about a single transport ship being delayed by technical difficulties proves your point. The fact that the Sakhalin transport on the whole was successful, on the other hand, shows rather the opposite of what you maintain.
 
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I just have been thinking about how Japan was able to recover from OTL's WWII with relative ease (and helped by the Korean War) and that Operation Downfall would severely stunt said growth, depending on how destructive the Japanese front gets. Best case-scenario, Japan would recover to OTL South Korean levels, worst-case scenario, OTL's Thai to Filipino levels; all of it provided if the US bothers to help Japan recover from Downfall but a subsequent occupation that would undeniably be more dangerous and unstable than OTL would constantly put it at risk. If Japan was to get to industrialized, developed levels, it might take at least a decade for the country to do so, again if the US occupation goes better over time.
 
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