Being so unpopular that you're considered less trustworthy than Hitler isn't really speaking to his skills to that point.
Something Stalin didn't bring upon himself (well, not at first), but was there from the outset. Comes with the territory of taking over a revolutionary pariah state.
Of course Stalin was willing to intervene, but was unable to convince anyone that it was the desirable thing to do.
And that inability to convince wasn't because of anything Stalin did.
From 1939-40 Stalin enabled Hitler to launch his wars and then it came back and bit him in the ass, as he continued to supply Hitler even after France fell.
A military misjudgement, not a diplomatic one.
In terms of diplomacy he led a pretty crappy bargain by giving Hitler everything he needed to invade, while pissing him off in the Nazi-Soviet Axis entry negotiations, and then buying into Hitler's letters that convinced him he was on the level about not invading. He tried to buy off Hitler and failed, if anything creating the situation where Hitler could and wanted to invade the USSR. Rather than reading the situation accurately and adjusting policy accordingly he actively created the worst disaster in Russia's history since the Mongol invasion.
Again, largely military-economic mistakes rather then diplomatic.
Contrary to Stalin's personal apologia in 1948, he was quite serious about joining the Axis:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Axis_talks#Bulgarian_pressure_and_a_surprise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Axis_talks#Soviet_counterproposal_agreement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Axis_talks#German_reaction
Of course the lack of a German reply to Stalin's repeated requests for a response should have been a warning in itself.
Again, not seeing any solid indication that the Soviets were serious about entering the Axis, just more cycles of proposal and counter-proposal.
Flexible morally, as he abandoned any efforts to actually stop Hitler and decided to instead take Hitler's deal to divide up Europe. All because Poland wouldn't allow the Soviets to effectively occupy their country without any prospects of leaving.
Stalin's demands in regard to military passage through Poland in 1938-39 was largely limited to just that: military passage. While that would still allow him the room to possibly turn on the Poles once the much superior Soviet forces were intermingled and occupy the country anyways, which was probably what Stalin intended to ultimately do once it was obvious the Germans were losing, but in a ways it was irrelevant. The Poles weren't going to trust the Russians in any such deal, regardless of who led them or how honest they were being. So I'm not seeing how any other decision by Stalin or Soviet leader would have made a difference here.
And yet his performance international was far less stellar than his domestic infighting.
His performance internationally saw him largely achieving everything he wanted, which was identical to the results of his domestic infighting.
Some agency, where that agency drops off chance takes over. Of course there is a pretty solid argument that free will is an illusion, but that philosophical argument is better conducted elsewhere.
Chance itself is subject to agency, particularly in terms of reaction.
On the ground perhaps, but then there is the rebuilding effort which would be compromised, plus their ability to conquer Manchuria/Korea, loot them, and set up communist regimes that would then spread over Asia and start many serious wars all across the region that would cost tens of millions of lives.
Unlikely. As it was, the invasion of Manchuria and particularly Soviet rebuilding was done almost entirely on resources within it's own control. China was liable to still go communist anyways, as that was dictated far more by internal factors established by the end of 1944 then anything the Soviets did*, and the attendant wars would still occur as well. Plus, the Americans wanted the Soviets in the Pacific War as, lacking hindsight, they weren't sure the atomic bomb would work out at all, much less in time for the invasion of Japan, until the summer of '45. So again, as far as their aware, taking a harder line on the Soviets would just mean shooting themselves in the foot. Even as late as June, Truman contemplated it only to be informed by Marshall that the Soviets had the capability to seize those territories anyways.
*Fun fact: due to endemic nationalist corruption and consistent defection of entire armies, by 1946 Chinese Communist forces had far more American weapons then they did Soviet ones, even if one counts the ex-Japanese weapons as "Soviet". In fact, by 1948 American military observers in the country estimated that the Communists had more of the American aid sent to nationalist China then the nationalists did. Mao even praised Chiang Kai-Shek as "our supply officer".(The Coldest Winter, David Halberstam.) In the face of that level of political overmatch, it is impossible to say that Soviet aide made a difference.
As I said the Wallies were buffoonish in diplomacy with the Soviets, which makes Stalin look like a genius in comparison.
The American's weren't. They too got everything they wanted out of the war, with Bretton Woods and everything. Really, it was only the British who got the short-shrift in the end and that was inspite of their diplomacy rather then because of it.
All that was asked was if anyone thought differently;
No, what was asked was if there was a different prospective Soviet leader who thought differently.
Stalin was at fault for buying so deeply into Communist theory. Hence, being the leader of the system and only state run on that ideology, it was his show and with that his fault for putting ideology above all else.
So your argument basically boils down too "Stalin was at fault for being Stalin", which is a tautology of a rather high order...
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