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So Evident a Danger: The Consequences of War between Britain, Prussia and Russia in 1791
- Thread starter Gwrtheyrn Annwn
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Unfortunately, I’m on iPad . But thanks for telling.
Chapter 1 - Part 8 - "By long forbearing is a prince persuaded, and a soft tongue breaketh the bone." Proverbs 25:15
Part 8 - "By long forbearing is a prince persuaded, and a soft tongue breaketh the bone." Proverbs 25:15
Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, Prince Grigory Potemkin and Sir Charles Whitworth
Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, Prince Grigory Potemkin and Sir Charles Whitworth
The Battle of Wenden, despite the Prussian tactical victory, marked the end of the original campaign plan that had been conceived in January 1791. Russia, or more aptly Empress Catherine II, had demonstrated through a year of campaigning that it had no intention of bowing to intimidation. The events in Poland-Lithuania had further shifted the strategic calculus. Including Poland in strategic planning was nothing new to Prussia, who had, as recently as 1790, produced plans to attack the Habsburg Dominions with the help of Polish armies. Those rumours had been enough for Potemkin to move an army of 40,000 men to the Polish border, the declaration of the 3rd May Constitution and the Polish appeals to Britain and Prussia were enough to heal the earlier rift between Potemkin and Catherine II in St Petersburg. Potemkin had remained in St Petersburg and completely abandoned the Ottoman war to concentrate on Poland, which was now the focal point of his ambitions. As Potemkin plotted schemes to bring about the end of Poland-Lithuania, Count Pyotr Rumyantsev was appointed to the command of the war with Prussia by Catherine II, which became a sore point between Catherine II and Potemkin and reflected the latter's waning influence. This marked a point of hope for the Triple Alliance and Poland-Lithuania. Potemkin and Catherine II now agreed on opposing Poland-Lithuania but evidently not the circumstance of doing so. Catherine II supported the scheme in principle but preferred to resolve the other conflicts whilst. Potemkin, in contrast, stuck to his volte-face of early 1791 to make near immediate peace with the Ottomans and with the Triple Alliance to crush Poland-Lithuania completely. It could have worked, even been Potemkin's master stroke and the pinnacle of his career if had he managed to persuade Catherine II of the project's wisdom, but for two problems.
The first was either Russian honour or, depending on your viewpoint, stubbornness. Catherine II had desired revenge on since the war was declared and the blows, despite being far less than she might have feared, at Wenden and Ochakov had stung her ego. What is more, to sue for peace now would lend credence to the idea of those two battles being Allied victories and invite the Triple Alliance to demand more from the peace. Her increasingly lack of interest in her former favourite was also a substantial barrier to her supporter his scheme. The second was either British honour, or stubbornness. Having committed to the war when it was unpopular, Pitt now found that withdrawing could be even more damaging to his governmental authority. We have seen how much stronger his position had become in Britain following the 3rd May Constitution, but that same strength was now holding him back. Just as the war became a campaign for liberal freedom so did making peace appear as surrendering to autocracy. This meant that there could be no peace with Britain without assurance over Poland-Lithuania and, though Prussia was far less convinced in its support for Poland than their alliance suggested, the arrogance and ambition of Frederick William II was not enough to outweigh his fear and drive him to abandon both Poland and the Triple Alliance at once. Count Ewald Hertzburg's influence might be waning, much like Potemkin's, but not so much as to give up on his grand strategy completely. Thus there would be no easy diplomatic success for Potemkin and instead, from even before the Battle of Wenden, a diplomatic war first ran alongside and then supplanted the efforts of opposing soldiery.
Of the British envoys extraordinary, Joseph Ewart in Berlin, Daniel Hailes in Warsaw and Sir Charles Whitworth, recently recalled from St Petersburg, were the most important and through them the war of words largely flowed. Whitworth was strongly opposed to and contemptuous of Russia whilst Ewart and Hailes were ambitious beyond their brief and government and dreamt of turning the Triple Alliance into a pan-European alliance against Russia. Hailes, in particular, pressed for this to save the Polish nation that he had become immensely sympathetic towards. Ewart also had the task of keeping Frederick William II and Prussia fighting in the war at Britain's behest, having earlier played the opposite role of persuading William Pitt and Britain to fight at Prussia's behest. They were not the only envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary kept busy in this period of course, their counterparts in Vienna would become similarly active and the Prussian and Russian diplomatic corps were also striving to put the projects of their masters and their own plans into action. Ewart in Berlin, for instance, was opposed by the efforts of his Russian counterpart, Maximilian von Alopaeus who had gained favour with Frederick William II since his arrival in 1789. von Alopaeus would be responsible for delivering the most significant diplomatic manoeuvre in second half of 1791. As part of Potemkin's strategy, he proposed a second partition of Poland to tempt Frederick William II's ambition and draw him away from the Triple Alliance.
This scheme, variously known as the October Plan or, somewhat unfairly, the Alopaeus Plan, involved Prussia changing sides to join Russia, invading Poland-Lithuania to quash the dangerous new constitution and then divide it up between them. Russia, naturally, would take the lion share of territory by annexing swathes of the eastern Commonwealth, including Courland, Minsk and the rest of Ruthenia. Prussia would gain its chief prizes, Danzig and Thorn, as well as Posen and Krakow. The final incentive for Frederick William II was for Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, to be placed on the Polish throne instead of Stanislaus II August. Karl August had been used once in a similar manner as part of a proposed scheme to support a Hungarian revolt against Emperor Joseph II and so he was a natural choice. Exactly how much Frederick William II considered this scheme, we can't know for sure but Ewart did write an appalled latter on the 5th November fearing that "the Prussian monarch and the malinfluences of his court are greatly succoured by a love of despotism and the prospect of an easier victory." If this was true and not merely Ewart getting paranoid, then they were not succoured for long. Only 3 weeks later, Whitworth writes of "a great blow to [Potemkin's] scheming" as news reached St Petersburg of the failure of Potemkin's opening bid. Indeed, the principle long-term impact of the October Plan was to rouse the Habsburgs.
The first was either Russian honour or, depending on your viewpoint, stubbornness. Catherine II had desired revenge on since the war was declared and the blows, despite being far less than she might have feared, at Wenden and Ochakov had stung her ego. What is more, to sue for peace now would lend credence to the idea of those two battles being Allied victories and invite the Triple Alliance to demand more from the peace. Her increasingly lack of interest in her former favourite was also a substantial barrier to her supporter his scheme. The second was either British honour, or stubbornness. Having committed to the war when it was unpopular, Pitt now found that withdrawing could be even more damaging to his governmental authority. We have seen how much stronger his position had become in Britain following the 3rd May Constitution, but that same strength was now holding him back. Just as the war became a campaign for liberal freedom so did making peace appear as surrendering to autocracy. This meant that there could be no peace with Britain without assurance over Poland-Lithuania and, though Prussia was far less convinced in its support for Poland than their alliance suggested, the arrogance and ambition of Frederick William II was not enough to outweigh his fear and drive him to abandon both Poland and the Triple Alliance at once. Count Ewald Hertzburg's influence might be waning, much like Potemkin's, but not so much as to give up on his grand strategy completely. Thus there would be no easy diplomatic success for Potemkin and instead, from even before the Battle of Wenden, a diplomatic war first ran alongside and then supplanted the efforts of opposing soldiery.
Of the British envoys extraordinary, Joseph Ewart in Berlin, Daniel Hailes in Warsaw and Sir Charles Whitworth, recently recalled from St Petersburg, were the most important and through them the war of words largely flowed. Whitworth was strongly opposed to and contemptuous of Russia whilst Ewart and Hailes were ambitious beyond their brief and government and dreamt of turning the Triple Alliance into a pan-European alliance against Russia. Hailes, in particular, pressed for this to save the Polish nation that he had become immensely sympathetic towards. Ewart also had the task of keeping Frederick William II and Prussia fighting in the war at Britain's behest, having earlier played the opposite role of persuading William Pitt and Britain to fight at Prussia's behest. They were not the only envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary kept busy in this period of course, their counterparts in Vienna would become similarly active and the Prussian and Russian diplomatic corps were also striving to put the projects of their masters and their own plans into action. Ewart in Berlin, for instance, was opposed by the efforts of his Russian counterpart, Maximilian von Alopaeus who had gained favour with Frederick William II since his arrival in 1789. von Alopaeus would be responsible for delivering the most significant diplomatic manoeuvre in second half of 1791. As part of Potemkin's strategy, he proposed a second partition of Poland to tempt Frederick William II's ambition and draw him away from the Triple Alliance.
This scheme, variously known as the October Plan or, somewhat unfairly, the Alopaeus Plan, involved Prussia changing sides to join Russia, invading Poland-Lithuania to quash the dangerous new constitution and then divide it up between them. Russia, naturally, would take the lion share of territory by annexing swathes of the eastern Commonwealth, including Courland, Minsk and the rest of Ruthenia. Prussia would gain its chief prizes, Danzig and Thorn, as well as Posen and Krakow. The final incentive for Frederick William II was for Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, to be placed on the Polish throne instead of Stanislaus II August. Karl August had been used once in a similar manner as part of a proposed scheme to support a Hungarian revolt against Emperor Joseph II and so he was a natural choice. Exactly how much Frederick William II considered this scheme, we can't know for sure but Ewart did write an appalled latter on the 5th November fearing that "the Prussian monarch and the malinfluences of his court are greatly succoured by a love of despotism and the prospect of an easier victory." If this was true and not merely Ewart getting paranoid, then they were not succoured for long. Only 3 weeks later, Whitworth writes of "a great blow to [Potemkin's] scheming" as news reached St Petersburg of the failure of Potemkin's opening bid. Indeed, the principle long-term impact of the October Plan was to rouse the Habsburgs.
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Thank you!
Poland is definitely in the firing line, even with the various forms of official and unofficial help that they're getting. The big thing now tho, is how far the Habsburgs will be roped in and in what terms...
Excellent work, and very glad you crossosted to the map thread so I could be directed here. Lovely writing and great timeline thus far, keep it up.
Ah. If it helps, Inkscape is a vector drawing programme so there might be some equivalents for ipad. A quick search suggests this as one example for instance: https://inkpad.art/
Too deep to back down pretty much sums it up yeah, the shifting of the war to centre around Poland is both a blessing and a curse in that regard. As for thwarting the Polish partition, I think it would be fairer to say enough to thwart a Polish Partition at this point.
Thank you! I'm glad the crossposting has brought some people over as well, that's always the hope whenever I do that. And that's for the positive feedback on the writing too, it means a lot!
Ugh, I was afraid of that. But it wouldn't be terribly surprising if Poland still eventually fell victim to some kind of partition, unfortunately.
It is certainly an inviting target but there are still ways through the current mess and having so many great and minor powers involved, most of them opposing a Polish partition, gives them a much better chance than IOTL.
Yes, that's what I was hoping. I think that's what's really interesting about this timeline, is not just that it's a way for the Polish state to survive into the 19th century but it's a late POD so it's potentially a way forward from the 1791 Constitution, extending the life of the reformed Polish state.
That last line is great! Rousing the habsburgs has all sorts of fun implications and actions that could happen! Maybe Leopold refuses to return Bosnia and Serbia or demands a trade for something else, maybe polish or prussian territory, unlikely but possible, odd territorial deals were par for the course in the 18th century. The TTL Pillnitz declaration could be (more) about Poland and the Turks than in OTL.
Exactly! That's partly what drew me to the POD, its something that can feel quite small when its overshadowed by the French Revolution but there's so much potential for changes.
I don't want to get any hopes for major Habsburg action, but they're certainly about to do...something. From what I can find on Leopold II (information on him is surprisingly sparse, even in academic texts!), diplomacy was his weapon of choice so Pillnitz, or rather TTL's equivalent, will probably be a focal point of Austro-Prussian relations now.
This time you managed to make me completely confused. 😉
Let me check if I’m still close to what’s going on:
- CII clearly losses her marbles:
- She keeps/sends both of her best generals (Rumyantsev and Suvorov) to the theater where nothing of importance is going to happen even in a fantastic schema of the Austrians joining the Ottomans. To make this even more bizarre, she does not send any additional troops there making it impossible to scare the Ottomans into making peace. So what’s the purpose of the whole exercise?
- On the theater demanding the immediate decisive action (Prussia) she leaves a second rate general with a small army which is not being strengthened instead of making the obvious effort of kicking Prussia out of war.
- Potemkin, who is by that time known for mental inability to any decisive action is in the capital meddling into (not quite clear) CIIs plans while somehow sending 40,000 to the Polish border. Which troops and what are they supposed to do? IIRC, in OTL he was planning some Polish schemas all the way to making him a king of Poland but this was just one of his fantasies: he was kicked out of the capital to the already meaningless South.
- What exactly the British ambassador is doing in St.Petersburg if the countries are officially at war?
- Prussia is doing something unclear but definitely not advancing any of its obvious interests and is seemingly fully relying upon the vague British promises to perhaps give it something at the Polish expense but perhaps not because now Britain’s main goal is to defend territorial integrity of Poland because … it adopted the constitution, which (AFAIK) Britain did not have and which at that time would be associated with the revolutionary France, not Britain.
- Leopold is supposed to do something just because the Brits say so. Why the Brits in this scenario can dictate anything to the Hapburg emperor is slightly beyond me and the same goes for the anti-Russian angle: the Austrians are already beaten by the Ottomans so is his idea of a good life to be beaten by the Russians as well, just for the fun of it? Or perhaps because the constitution of the PLC is so near and dear to his heart that he is ready to go to war for it? Anyway, he can’t get any tangible games at the Russian expense even if just because there is no common border.
Alright, let me attempt to make this a bit clearer.
1. Russia: Catherine II and Potemkin are focussing on Poland, but there is a rift on how exactly to do so. Potemkin wants to make immediate peace with the Ottomans, Catherine wants to continue to war to avoid losing that leverage and the loss of prestige from what will surely be a difficult peace. Rumyantsev is given the charge of ending the Ottoman war but it is not a priority and, AFAIK, the Russian strategy in the Ottoman war was never to invade and destroy the Ottomans. Their willingness to slog it out and the supply line difficulties that you mentioned in previous posts make that incredibly difficult, even before the Ottomans were backed by two great powers (plus the Dutch). Suvorov was already there, as you know, and with Potemkin still meddling there is no impulse to move him. Saltykov's army against Prussia IS being reinforced, but that was not the focus of this chapter (nor the next one) as it is concentrating on diplomatic matters. Potemkin has returned/remained in the capital ITTL and is actively planning how to invade Poland and preparing to ready troops, but the 40,000 mentioned are from a previous (OTL) incident in 1790 when there was a Prussian plan to invade Austria with Polish help.
The point about the ambassador is a good catch tho, an oversight on my part.
2. Prussia is stuck between a rock and a hard place. It has thrown itself into a war and tied itself up in multiple alliances. These are also, as you note, not entirely to their interests. Frederick William II, however, is as paranoid as he is ambitious and throwing away all of that to try and grab a bit of Poland is simply too big a step. He's not relying on British promises to give it something at Poland's expense. That was never part of the plan. The goal was to restrict Russian gains, that remains the case but with the added complication of Poland getting itself involved by invoking Prussian protection and seeking British protection also. Abandoning that all for the October Plan can certainly be argued to be in 'Prussia's obvious interests' but Frederick William II is, IMHO, neither visionary enough nor bold enough to do so. Not only for the links to Britain but also the fact that Austria appears a real threat with 100,000 men in Bohemia. Oh and there is still hope that the ongoing war can be leveraged into a territorial exchange, largely at the instigation at Hertzburg. For instance, Prussia covets Danzig and Thorn and Poland has previously refused that exchange. Defending Poland against Russia could produce a difference outcome in future negotiations, especially is Britain is still going to participate in the negotiations to achieve Pitt's scheme.
3. Britain. There seems to be some confusion about what is going on in Britain here. There are several goals going on in Britain at once, as I have tried to show in the various discussions of British policy in the TL so far. To reiterate them more succinctly then, Pitt's goals are to pin back Russian advances and establish an alternative source of naval supplies. These are largely endorsed by the Cabinet, but Prussia is a frustrating ally. The Admiralty believed the war to be easily winnable and is now stuck in a situation where its prestige is being damaged and withdrawing would be a stain on their honour. The British opposition, in reality a ragbag group of factions but containing powerful political figures (several of whom have been name-checked) who IOTL blocked Pitt's attempt to confront Russia, began as opposed to the war but pushed over. They have since be galvanised by the May Constitution to be the war's main cheerleaders and to oppose Catherine II as an autocrat. If they were strong enough to block Pitt IOTL, then their support ITTL will make it, at best, incredibly political damaging for Pitt to withdraw now. Their support for Poland and opposition to Catherine II in this is entirely OTL, Fox, Burke, et al. made speeches calling for Pitt to intervene to support Poland repeatedly after the May Constitution through to the Second Partition and even the Kościuszko Uprising. The public subscriptions for guns in the previous chapter are also directly based on IOTL, they really happened, just in different circumstances. So Pitt is now in a position of defending Poland for several reasons 1) to continue his own scheme to make Poland the new supplier of naval goods 2) the Admiralty want to get their victory against the Russians 3) the opposition are demanding he continue to defend liberty. There will be some discussion of how he can't continue to do so in the same manner or at the same rate as he began the war with in upcoming chapters, mainly due to the economic issues, but hopefully that clear up why large parts of the British political establishment are invested in defending Poland despite having no constitution themselves.
As for the French Revolutionary association, that's a yes but also no from my research (as the paper I principally drew on for Britain's response to the May Constitution and subsequent Partitions is freely available, I can link it if that would be of interest). That association mainly came from Russia, and then Prussia when it got involved in the second partition, to justify their opposition to the constituency and portray the Poles as basically Jacobins. No doubt that were some in Britain who agreed but Burke for instance, who ofc wrote Reflections on the French Revolution as a major conservative opposition piece, regarded the May Constitution as the way political reform should be done (subsequent invasion by Russia aside). So in many ways, the May 'revolution' was the 'safe revolution', unless you're Russia.
4. Lastly, Leopold and the Habsburgs. I'm not quite sure where this idea that Leopold has to do something because the British say so has come from. The British have done almost nothing in relation to the court in Vienna, either in what has been discussed in the chapters so far or in the background. Its only a year or so since they rejected Leopold II's overtures for an alliance after all! So let me reassure you there immediately, the British are not dictating anything to the Habsburgs, haven't done so and will not.
I disagree with your assessment of the Habsburg position, however. Since this is the entire topic of the next chapter, I won't into too much detail here but do want to clear up some things immediately. Firstly, the Austrians have NOT been beaten by the Ottomans. Even Leopold II and Joseph II in the depths of their grand strategy panic didn't think that. Yes, there was the embarrassing loss in the attempt to capture Giurgiu in Wallachia in 1790 but that did little to effect the rest of that year's campaigning. The Habsburgs spent that year on all-out attack to attempt to force the Ottomans to surrender and routed an Ottoman army at Kalefat three weeks after the Giurgiu defeat. They were on the threshold of Vidin, Czettin was seized in Croatia, most of Wallachia had been taken prior to the defeat and they already held Belgrade and New Orsova. The move to first agree an armistice and then enter formal peace negotiations came from Leopold II's conviction that the Habsburg Monarchy was on the verge of collapse (it wasn't) and his subsequent signing of Treaty of Reichenbach with Prussia. This was intended to save Austria from Prussian aggression (as briefly mentioned in the previous chapter and, again, to be discussed further in the next) but also included abandoning Austrian conquests against the Ottomans. 'Defeat' did partly stem from Ottoman stubborn resistance it is true but was the primarily product of a grand strategic fear bordering on paranoia. By this point ITTL, Leopold II is not facing the same issues and at the same time IOTL was much more willing to engage more boldly in foreign policy.
To clear up a bit about Poland as well, Leopold II's interest in Poland is the same as Britain's and Prussia's and the product of a policy shared by his brother. The desire to limit Russian gains. This might sound absurd when the Habsburg helped Russia to make gains against the Ottomans but that appears to have been something compelled by treaty obligations. The Habsburg strategy in the war was certainly aimed at smashing the Ottomans into a quick peace with honour to meet the obligations and then get out of it. There was absolutely no effort to facilitate Potemkin and Catherine II's great ambitions of destroying the Ottoman Empire completely, something the Habsburgs strongly opposed. Further Russian gains in Poland, and especially a two party partition excluding the Habsburgs entirely, is just as unconscionable. Leopold II does seem to have been a Polonophile as well, but this is more grand strategy. Even if he's not particularly interested in Poland for it's own sake, it is still undeniable that it would be foolish to pursue what might be his real goal (France) without attempting to settle the Eastern European issues first. But that's enough on that topic, there will be further expansion on this in the next chapter.
Hopefully this all clears up your confusion though!
Thanks for the attempt to clarify situation but the more I’m thinking about it, the more problems I have. Don’t take this as a personal offense, please.
In OTL: the OE started the war demanding the Crimea back. By 1791 they were kicked out of all Black Sea’s northern coast and Repnin crossed the Danube and defeated the Grand Vizier at Machin while in a Caucasus the Ottomans lost Anapa. Even within your TL the Ottomans are nowhere close to the intended revenge and it was demonstrated that the British help is pretty much irrelevant in achieving that goal. So the issue is not the Russian march on Constantinople but a clear Ottoman failure to get back the CH or even to return the lost fortresses. As far as they are involved, they are just losing money, troops and taxes from the destroyed/occupied areas. All that in exchange for the unsubstantiated promises.
Putting Rumyantsev in charge there (in the South) does not make any practical sense because Repnin is doing just fine pushing the Ottomans as hard as physically possible and Rumyantsev can’t “end the war” just by the simple fact of his appearance on the theater. It would just unnecessarily offend Repnin. It would be different if Rumyantsev is getting a strong reinforcement allowing the large scale operations like complete occupation of Bulgaria or march across the Balkans (logistics of 1830s was not much better).
Sorry, but this does not work. To start with, if Potemkin still “meddling” (whatever this means), Rumyantsev will not accept command. After the shit that already happened, this would be a non-starter. Second, marching on Constantinople was not the only way to win a war against the Ottomans, as was already proven more than once and in your TL “backing” by two Great Powers produced zero results so for the Ottomans situation is not too different from the previous wars. The Ottomans are losing the battles, their towns are destroyed, the critical border fortresses are lost and they already lost control of the Danube Principalities. More stubbornness, and they may lose them forever with Russia being able to offer part of that pie to the Austrians as a bonus.
Suvorov, at least in OTL, was out of the theater and all the way to the Finnish border. If you decided to leave him there, it is fine, but this means that Repnin is free for other assignment. Ditto for Rumyantsev.
Why would in this situation invasion of Poland is a priority? The PLC is not attacking Russia but Prussia does. Second comment is that you are either going close to the OTL or you are going to assume that CII is getting seriously senile: by 1791 Potemkin as a military leader and the leading politician was thoroughly compromised. The proprieties were preserved (or she’d have to acknowledge that she is just an old fool) but he was kicked out of the Russian politics and military affairs. Repnin was in charge against the Ottomans and Potemkin was just playing idiotic games sitting in his “court”. Of course, you can change this but see above about CIIs mental health.
Not that I understood too much out of this schema except that FWII is an obsessed idiot who tries to force the Russians to cede Ochakov back to the Ottomans by unsuccessfully attacking Riga without any clear reward in sight. In OTL he played Old Fritz, aka bluffed and blackmailed but here he jumps right into the s—t quite voluntarily without guaranteeing award for himself. This, IMO, immediately removes value of his OTL bluff against Austria: he can’t fight two Great Powers or even a single one.
Defense of the PLC is a noble goal but so far nobody is attacking it and there are no clear plans on this account. Even worse, there is no invasion army and none of the prominent Russian generals is anywhere close to the Polish border. So far, the schema looks as a case of a paranoia a little bit too complicated even for the XVIII politics. 😉
I got this and out of all possible plans this looks by far the most idiotic. Why don’t simply negotiate the acceptable custom dues in the Baltic ports?
Of course. Instead of buying supplies through the Prussian Baltic ports Pitt & Co are telling FWII: “we are going to kill your Baltic trade and for this you have to start war with Russia to help us to achieve our goal. BTW, you’ll not going to get anything as a reward.” How convincing is this?
Just as FWII and any other crowned head in Europe? Perhaps Britain must join the Revolutionary France. 😂
But this is a completely different story. Making speeches calling political opponent to do something he does not like is an old trick. But getting country into a messy war against its own economic interests is a completely different story.
Private individuals can afford to behave as the idiots, it does not put country under any obligations.
Getting back to the initial question: who attacked Poland? AFAIK, nobody so he is defending it against nobody.
Rather difficult because nothing happens on the Baltic and Poland does not have an access to the Black Sea.
In France as well? And, speaking of the liberty, how about that recent misunderstanding in the colonies? The Brits of 1791 as the liberty defenders would be joke of the year.
As I keep saying, the “defending” part is hanging in the air. Not that the Brits could do any.
No need: the repeating stress of the constitution vs. absolutism is clearly applicable across the board. Of course, this never prevented the Brits from making selective choices but their political demagoguery over the centuries was quite …er… “creative”.
Now, CII was paranoid on the subject and went against her own early policies. This is an obvious fact. But this does not explain what the Brits are getting excited about and why pre-terror France does not qualify. 😉
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No personal offence taken! I wouldn't have done two degrees in history if I didn't like discussing historical interpretation. I'm quite happy to be corrected over Russia as, of all the countries involved here, it is the one I know the least. That said, I have to admit that some of your objections outside Russian issues are as confusing to me as situation is to you; no offence intended either.
I agree with the facts stated here. The Ottomans have had a disaster in the war it is true. And yet, from everything I can find about the war, the Ottomans' entire strategy after the attempt to retake Crimea failed is to just hold and hold and hold and wear the Russians out. The spectre of foreign intervention alone was enough to keep them going IOTL well after the war was clearly lost from any 'rational' perspective. See the peace talks at Sistova. They took 9 months as the Ottomans kept quibbling, and even seemed willing to restart the fight, despite having repeatedly lost to the Austrians and continuing to repeatedly losing to the Russians. To me, this shows that the Sublime Porte is both insanely stubborn and incredibly optimistic, almost delusional, under Selim III. They didn't seem to care about how much rampaging around the Austrians and Russians did, as long as Constantinople was not threatened they had little inclination to agree peace. Admittedly, a big driver of their refusal to agree peace with the Austrians, even when the Austrian were offering status quo ante bellum, was Prussian diplomatic pressure. But wait, that's just diplomatic pressure. ITTL, Prussia is at war helping them and so is Britain, so why would there be any more urgency to agree peace than IOTL? Sure, the help of the great powers hasn't really achieved much yet but the very existence of that help puts the Ottoman situation way beyond that of IOTL when they were just as stubborn about peace.
Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but it appears that you think the Ottomans should have sued for peace with the Russians already? On the basis that they have no real way to resist and the Russians are just smashing them repeatedly? Well, you're not wrong. The Ottomans are certainly in trouble, and I've pointed that out several times, and the war is effectively drifting. But at the same time, the war hadn't actually ended at this point IOTL. Peace was agreed at Jassy in January 1792 after, much like at Sistova, incredibly long negotiations. ITTL, the Ottomans are buoyed by genuine support by the great powers which has actually manifested. I don't quite grasp why you think that would make so little difference. I've noted above how diplomatic pressure was enough to make a major difference at Sistova IOTL, IMHO it logically follows that real support would make a greater difference. I will admit tho, I have made an oversight in tracking the timeline of the Ottoman war whilst focussing on Prussia and Britain. They should be nearer to peace negotiations than I've previously allowed.
I don't mind admitting an error on Russian issues tho. I sent Rumyantsev there to replace Potemkin in effect, given Potemkin has abandoned that military command. And also as a point of spite by Catherine II, deliberately sending Potemkin's arrival to a new command to make point. If that is,however, a pointless thing to do then I'm quite happy to retcon it.
This seems to be a slightly more forthright reiterating of the previous point! So I'll refer to my above answer for the issues of Ottoman stubbornness and great power backing.
For the rest, first Potemkin's meddling. Well, as I've said. Potemkin's 'meddling' means he still has some influence of Russian foreign and military policy and is using it to push for war with Poland. From my, admittedly limited compared to yours, understanding of Russian politics at this time, this was a policy change that is entirely OTL for Potemkin and something he more or less did exactly IOTL. It also follows with Catherine II's immediate and strong objection to the May Constitution and her subsequent threats to invade and indeed actual invasion in 1792 IOTL. So I'm not quite grasping what the major issue here is?
Second I am aware that Rumyantsev and Potemkin had major issues with each other. I was under the impression that this was mainly from Potemkin blocking Rumyantsev from commands out of jealousy, hence the logic of a) Catherine II appointing Rumyantsev deliberately as a counterstroke to show Potemkin's declining influence and b) Rumyantsev accepting/being forced to accept an offer of appointment. I was not aware of this being Rumyantsev refusing appointments because of Potemkin, happy to be corrected on that if I'm wrong.
Third, Repnin. This point confuses me. Suvorov is indeed still in the Ottoman war, for now at least. No recall due to different circumstances ITTL. But I fail to see how this can effect Repnin's place in the Ottoman war when he was, afaik, already there commanding Russian forces along with Suvorov and contributed to the fall of Izmail. But is there something I'm missing here?
Fourthly, the point about Russia offering more of the pie to the Austrians. This goes back to my previous answer on Leopold and the Habsburgs and will also be partly explained by the next chapter. The long and short of it tho is, the Habsburgs aren't interested in it. Some Austrian commentators are certainly, Kaunitz IIRC was a strong advocate of Austria seizing both Moldavia and Wallachia in Joseph II's reign and the original Hertzburg Plan offered the Austrians the Danubian Principalities in return for giving up Galicia and Lodomeria but both suggestions were refused. (Side note, Joseph II was also noted as wanting to do exactly that exchange at other points in his reign, but by the late 1780s seems to have decided against it) Leopold II meanwhile is a monarch far more interested in a quick peace than getting slices of Wallachia and Moldavia, as will discussed further in the next chapter. So IMHO this isn't the great offer to the Austrians nor the great threat to the Ottomans that you seem to think. If anything, it would actually be more inclined to get the Habsburgs drawn into the war, with their substantial army, because they explicitly opposed significant Russian gains, especially annexations of the Danubian Principalities and Potemkin's Kingdom of Dacia plan.
Its a priority because the Russian court believes that the the PLC is going to join with the Prussians and British. Why do it believe this, because the PLC has deliberately courted Prussian and British protection. They did so IOTL repeatedly and it makes sense that they would do so here when it doesn't take a genius to realise that Russia is going to take immediate issue with the constitution and the PLC's two main potential allies are already fighting the war that the PLC would want them to fight. As for why Russia feels able to, in my understanding. Short answer is, as you have noted before, they can raise a massive amount of men and the Prussian and British war effort can be seen as 'irritations'.
Now, Potemkin being compromised as a military leader and politician. Again, I am very happy to be corrected on my understanding of the Russian situation but I will say what I have drawn on. I understand that Potemkin was increasingly having disputes with Catherine towards the end of his life. I decided to reflected this in the rift between the two over Potemkin trying to persuade Catherine to make immediate peace with the Triple Alliance and the Ottomans after their ultimatum. She obviously rejected that, leading to Potemkin being side-lined from the Ottoman war entirely and focussing on his Polish schemes. As I understand it, he did so IOTL even before the May Constitution and the end of the Ottoman war and indeed was planning to march straight on from Jassy into Poland before he died. ITTL, there is an acceleration of this shift from his political rift with Catherine, a rift which is then partly mended by events. He is saved by events as it were. The May Constitution, appeals for help, etc. lend credence to Potemkin's ambitions to crush Poland and so on. If that is a symptom of increasing senility then so be it, but I have tried to stick to chains of logic and cause and effect rather handwave things on the grounds of just poor decision making and senility.
To be honest, I don't entirely understand why the Prussians thought the scheme was such a good idea either. And yet they did, so I'm rolling with it. The question of reward is answered by one simple point, the reward was to prevent Russia gaining territory. I know that sounds like a trivial reward hardly worth bothering about but that doesn't mean it didn't matter to the Prussians at the time. I have seen some theorising that Frederick William II, and Pitt ofc, was attempting to replicate the success of intimidating Leopold II into agreeing a status quo ante bellum peace with the Ottomans. That would certainly align with the utter conviction that the British and Prussians had that Russian would immediately roll over. And yet, if he was anticipating that Catherine II would just give up immediately, why did he draw up a full campaign plan and mass soldiers in eastern Prussia for the war? That to me suggests that he was committed to fighting Russia, even if the only reward he anticipated was preventing Russia gaining anything - it should not be forgotten that that would be a success in balance of power grand strategy.
Also, 'played Old Fritz' is quite apt. He attempted to be Old Fritz but had little of the genius and less of the boldness. He blundered around attempting intimidation and his only real 'success' was the 1787 Dutch intervention. ITTL, he blundered around into an actual war that he can't easily get out of.
As discussed above, there are preparations for war (or at least threat of war) with the PLC and Russia's opposition to the May Constitution are known. Its not really paranoia, its more a further attempt to the situation to his advantage. In this case by blackmailing Poland-Lithuania into giving up Danzig and Thorn if it wants Prussian help against Russia. If Russia don't invade Poland-Lithuania then never mind, no harm done, it wouldn't be the first of Frederick William II's grand plans to be abandoned in changing circumstances. If they do, then Prussia is already at war with Russia and it's a way to gain those territorial rewards that, as you point out, they're lacking from the current form of the war. Its not a noble goal or paranoia, its more self-interest within the situation that Prussia is in.
Which Baltic ports are you referring to here? The Russian ports or the Polish ones?
This is circling back to the original POD and makes me concerned that I haven't explained things properly so far despite devoting a chapter to trying to establish all the moving parts here. If that's the case then my bad, I'll try to clear things up.
This war, as ridiculous as it might sound with hindsight, was Prussia's idea. As noted above, Frederick William II was absolutely full of overly ambitious schemes and this was one of them. Their goal/reward, as noted above, is to prevent Russians gains.
IOTL, Prussia repeatedly pushed Pitt into action between October 1790 and March 1791 and it was Pitt who first agreed, then prevaricated and finally withdrew. The reason he agreed IOTL and ITTL is the same, he got into his head that Russia needed to be pinned back to status quo ante bellum to prevent the annexation of Ochakov, which would block the trade route to Poland up the Southern Bug. So if you want to argue about unconvincing arguments, then it is Britain who have fallen for an unconvincing project! And yet the only change from OTL to get this war to actually happen is that Gustav III was bought out for a lower price. I haven't changed anyone's willingness to undertake this plan, it is all entirely OTL.
At this point I'm not sure if you're joking or genuinely asking. Yes, its a certain amount of picking and choosing, even cognitive dissonance. But I assure you that I'm following OTL attitudes here.
If their goal was merely to get Pitt to do something he did not like then the campaign was remarkably committed across an extended period of time (basically from May1791 through to the defeat of Kościuszko) and willing to literally put their money where their mouth was. And you seem to be confusing the causes and effects here. 'They', the opposition factions, did not get Britain into this war. Pitt did, the opposition are now cheerleading it as continuing to fight Russia protects Poland from Russian aggression. Ie. because Pitt is doing what the opposition factions wanted him to do IOTL. Are there economic negatives certainly, I have discussed that previously, but politics can override economics, as the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars would demonstrate after this period IOTL.
Certainly, and there was no claim that it does. The point made about this politically was that it served as a way to embarrass Pitt by contrasting his lack of proactivity in the war with the opposition walking the walk.
Correct, nobody thus far. I've discussed above what is going on here with the belief that Poland will be attacked and how Russia is increasingly perceived as an autocratic enemy.
I'm sure we're re-treading old ground here. But to respond, Poland does have access to the Black Sea, in the imagination of British planners, down the Southern Bug (the whole point of preventing Russia taking Ochakov) and the big victory doesn't have to be in the Baltic either. Oh and also, trade to Poland is possible through the Batlic. We have previously discussed how agreeing lower tariffs down the Vistula was an alternative option.
Forgive me, this is annoy when where I'm not sure if you're joking or not. On the off chance that you're not, then I will attempt again to elaborate.
First, France. Well, there are certain members of the opposition that would rather like Britain to support the French Revolution, Fox for instance, and this particular stage of the French Revolution was hardly in opposition to Britain and its political opinions. Its only after the Flight to Varennes that things start to escalate from reforming France to something close to a British style system to the Jacobinism that everyone feared and is now most closely associated with the French Revolution. So yeah, why not France? Not because of ideology certainly, more because why would Britain not just let France cause chaos for itself?
Second liberty and Britain as defenders of liberty. I can quite see why, from the modern perspective, one might think Britain in 1791 as defenders of liberty would be the joke of the year (especially if you were to base your opinion of Britain in this era of American historiography). And yet for all that, that is how Britain conceived of itself. The 'misunderstanding in the colonies' as you put it was in no way contradictory to that belief. In the British mindset (barring ironically many of the same opposition who love the idea of Britain defending liberty in 1791), that war was one of crushing ungrateful traitors, in the mindset of their fellow Europeans it was an internal matter of dealing with a colonial rebellion. France didn't help the Americans because it believed in 'no taxation without representation', it helped them to get back at the British in the great power game. It was (and I might even argue is) only Americans who conceived of their war as a war for liberty and Britain as enemies of liberty. To the majority British mindset in 1791 and to the minds of European powers, if they cared at all, there is absolutely nothing about Britain framing itself as defenders of liberty. It is what Pitt did to try to justify the Ochakov Crisis IOTL, it is what the opposition did to try to persuade him to defend Poland in 1792 and 1794 IOTL. It is why Poland appealed to Britain as in 1792 and 1794 IOTL. It is also why Russia feared Britain would intervene to help Poland through the Second and Third Partitions.
I have answered this point multiple times now. But will add that yes, the Brits can do things. They could certainly argue ITTL that they already are, by fulfilling their end of the original campaign plan.
That is a slightly harshly put, but broadly accurate yes. Though i am slightly bemused by some of your other points if you know this.
I have attempted to answer this one already as well. I don't think I can explain it any further without pointing you to the paper I got this all from.
Prussia is not helping them. It is engaged in pursuit of its own goals on the other side of Europe with a remarkable absence of any practical (for OE) result. OTL blackmail of Austria was a much more potent tool because the Hapsburgs could (and seemingly did) imagine the potential consequences which were well beyond the Prussian capacities. Now, the much promised action happened and it proved to be an empty sound even with your active help 😂 (Russia is doing absolutely nothing to deal with Prussia seriously): the bluff was called and proved to be just a hot air. An important (in the previous war) pressure tool was misused and is broken.
The second mighty ally, the self-identified All Powerful Britain sent its famous navy and the result…. “pshik” again. The mighty allied fleet with the numeric advantage of 2:1 not just did not destroy the weaker enemy but suffered much greater losses and the enemy escaped. The British squadron demonstrated no miracles, its commander could not get along with the Ottoman commanders and its captains could not even keep their ships off the shallows. Selim and his advisors had to be really impressed.
So, both mighty allies proved to be of a little help and did not prevent the Russians from crossing the “red line”, the Danube. Sorry to correct you but you are somewhat misinformed about the details. The OTL events included a “trifle”: after Repnin crossed the Danube and defeated the Ottomans on its right bank, the Ottomans signed the 8 months armistice at Galatz at 7.31(8.11) 1791. Negotiations in Jassy, indeed, lasted for few months but the fighting was over: the Ottomans were not as insensitive to the situation as you assume and tended to know when to start talking.
This would be the British idea but not necessarily the Ottoman one. The promised miracle did not happen and why would the Ottoman keep clinging to the empty promises? Just because they are saying that at some unidentified point in a future they are going to be even more helpful than they are now? 😂
Improvement from almost zero is, of course, an improvement but not necessarily good enough. In a meantime the Ottomans already lost beyond return the valuable areas. Russian advance beyond the Danube is moving the list of negotiable items not into the Ottoman favor. Moldavia and Bessarabia are still on the table but this may easily change (in OTL the OE got them back) and neither Prussia nor Britain can do anything about this unless the Ottomans are ready to negotiate. Selim could be quite optimistic but not an idiot.
Yes, because they have nothing, realistically, to gain. Their main reason for declaring the war, return of the CH, clearly turned into a pipe dream and they suffered losses on the Northern Caucasus (admittedly, except for Anapa, these areas were just “titular claim”, but nonetheless) What’s left to fight for? Pitt’s pipe dream of giving Ochakov to the PLC and, implied, British freedom of sailing through the Straits? The Ottomans definitely had to be thrilled. Well, an idea of having the British ships of the line within a firing distance from the Sultan’s palace on the Sea of Marmara must be thrilling but I’m not sure that it would be in a positive thrill. 😉
See above. Obviously, the talks did not start immediately after the armistice was signed (7.31.1791): the meeting place had to be agreed upon and the delegations had to travel there and the talks started in October 1791. The peace conferences with the Ottomans at these times had been prolonged affairs, it was taken for granted and adding Potemkin to the picture was cherry on a cake because he was mentally incapable of doing anything fast. And after his death Bezborodko had to be sent, which, if he was not already in Jassy, would take more time and there were probably communications with both capitals as well. . The treaty was signed on 12.29.1791. In other words, the whole process took less than three month. So there was actually nothing “incredibly long”.
But the war was already over in October.
Well, unless I did not read carefully enough (in which case my apologies ) the practical results of that genuine support, even with your competent help (not a flattery: you are definitely more competent than Pitt in understanding of the situation and, unlike him, are skillfully manipulating the Russian side in the most idiotic scenarios 😉), did not produce any practical results worth mentioning. The Ottomans had been promised miracles on the land and sea and none happened. Moreover, the Ottoman naval establishment is pissed off with the Brits and vise versa.
The only “difference” are the British diplomatic activities but what’s there for the Ottomans? Excitement by Fox & Co about the Polish constitution and demagoguery of the British ambassadors about Russian absolutism? But the OE is an absolutist state itself so what good its government is supposed to expect from a public denouncement of absolutism?
It did impact Austria but Russia is not Austria and its vulnerability to the blackmail is much lower and military might is much greater. Not to mention that by declaring a war both Britain and Prussia threw away “diplomatic pressure” as a tool. The British ambassador is expelled from Russia so how exactly London is going to exercise anything? Especially, with Pitt openly behaving as a rabid dog? OTOH, in not so “diplomatic” area, Russian government would most probably arrest all the British ships and property as Paul did) leaving their owners to enjoy the benefits of the liberty, constitution and whatever else they were told they have to enjoy. On the top of the direct losses, Britain losses profits from the transit trade in which it had almost a monopolistic position. In a meantime, the timber, hemp, flax and iron (and would not for unpredictable number of years because growing and processing things require process and experience pretty much absent in the PLC) are still not coming from the PLC and for how long the Pitt’ fantasies would remain sustainable? Of course, it can be argued that CII and Platon Zubov (and CII’s favorite lapdog) would suffer without a morning coffee but I suspect that even in this area situation is not absolutely hopeless.
Yes, they should. Glad to see that we are on the same page.
Don’t take it as lecturing but at that time RE had a number of very capable generals (later overshadowed by Suvorov), Repnin, Kamensky, Prozorovsky and some lesser figures. Now, the Ottoman theater by 1791 is “dying out” by the natural causes and, with Suvorov gone, a capable general like Repnin would be considered an adequate commander on the theater (which he was).
Rumyantsev would be probably considered an overkill and there was a serious psychological factor: he was pissed off with Potemkin’s behavior and the fact that CII condoned it. Mopping up after Potemkin would be below his dignity. So, short of some more prominent position, he would refuse the command pleading bad health. Commander in a full-scale war with Prussia would be a different issue and, taking into an account that he was arguably the most prominent Russian general of the 7YW, it would have a big psychological effect on both sides of the conflict.
Well, Rumyantsev was not Potemkin’s “rival”. Potemkin was a predominantly court figure and in that area Rumyantsev could not and would not compete with him. But Rumyantsev still was #1 Russian general and Potemkin was, at best, not too talented military amateur. So Rumyantsev had absolutely nothing to prove but may accept an opportunity promising a greater military glory.
Which brings an interesting question about the raising star, Suvorov. He is still not a fieldmarshal and even as such would be junior to Rumyantsev so how about him as a subordinate general? And on this I have a big question mark: so far, Suvorov was so open and unashamed Potemkin’s butt kisser (until Izmail) so how these two may go together I have no idea. To be fair, Suvorov seemingly had a flexible backbone so everything is possible. 😉
Flattery, even undeserved, is always greatly appreciated. 😂
IMO, in OTL situation was a mess: Potemkin had some influential partisans in the PLC and was plotting something. IIRC, it was making himself a king but maybe I’m wrong. Anyway, in OTL he was already out of the active politics even if CII maintained some illusions of his importance. Being kicked out of the court meant the end of his career and his plots did not matter.
ITTL you still keep him around so it is up to you to figure out a degree of his influence. But in OTL he chose the best moment for dying so, unless you want to keep him on life support, he is out of the picture.
Why? You are grasping it but situation is different from OTL and CII, with all her paranoia, may behave differently. In 1792 she did not have any ongoing wars while here she does and her reaction would probably depend upon the specifics which you’ll have to define for the relevant future. Surely, three ongoing wars would be too much for her.
I already addressed this issue. Of course, my ideas could be wrong but, objectively, Rumyantsev had health problems and this was a perfect excuse for refusal of this appointment.
They were “along” (more or less) as long as they were subordinate commanders but Potemkin is gone so who is the top commander? In OTL Suvorov is out but now they are both there, both in the same rank (IIRC), both, AFAIK, not liking each other, and both being ambitious a—holes and there is no superior commander. One of them must be out.
That’s fine: I’m not pushing you to go ahead of the schedule.
Well, the PLC may wish whatever it wants but it takes time to raise and train a modern army so Russia does not have to start the third war without doing something about ongoing two. This is my only point.
Sorry, at least for now I have to stop there: have house chores to run. 😥
The little I have read about Emperor Leopold II indicate that he was much like his older brother just smarter and more pragmatic. So try to imagine what Joseph II would have done, except with greater awareness of his limitations and more willingness to drop a plan if it doesn’t work.