Different period and a very different regime... Plus Louis XVI and his family were absolutists and not inclined at all to accept a constitutional regime, unlike the Orleans
So Evident a Danger: The Consequences of War between Britain, Prussia and Russia in 1791
- Thread starter Gwrtheyrn Annwn
- Start date
Precedents are establishing foundation, which is important if one relies upon the tradition. Tradition was broken by the revolution, Napoleonic regime and establishing constitutional monarchy and using events of the 1840s as a model for the early 1790s does not make sense. As long as Louis XVI is around, the Bourbon succession/regency issues are handled by the ancient regime rules no matter what is going in France.
Not to mater that abdication is not happening because Luis will not go for it and if he dies in exile than MA is a regent both by the precedent and because she, being Hapsburg, is the only one with a serious backing.
Far be it from me to deny Louis XVI's capacity to make stupid decisions, but appointing someone as unpopular as Antoinette would be one of his stupider ones. I suspect that what was actually done after the Revolution was what non-court society would have preferred in the years immediately after 1789.
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This is not an issue because as long as he is alive Louis is not going to abdicate. MA is a regent only if he dies and her mental capacities are not an issue comparing to her family connections. BTW, neither Maria Medici nor Anne of Austria were famous for their brain power.
This is not an issue because as long as he is alive Louis is not going to abdicate. MA is a regent only if he dies and her mental capacities are not an issue comparing to her family connections. BTW, neither Maria Medici nor Anne of Austria were famous for their brain power.
Maybe a good idea for a future update
Short but sweet, thank you
I'm reading this with popcorn as usual. You're describing a believably French messMaybe a good idea for a future update
Short but sweet, thank you
Haha, thanks Draco! I'm glad its believable, that's mainly what I'm aiming for here, especially with the delightful mess that is the French RevolutionI'm reading this with popcorn as usual. You're describing a believably French mess
Chapter 2- Part 11 - Professor Digory Kirke, 'How the King Fled Twice - France and the Crisis of 1791', 1952
"Whether or not the 'Crisis of 1791' is an accurate name, given the French Revolution had begin in 1789, it neatly summarises how impactful the year was in European history. Some historians prefer to focus on the Ochakov War, from one of several national perspectives, as the point of change in Europe. This is not unjustifiable, for reasons that scholars of this period will not require me to elucidate.
I contend, however, that neither the lack of British contemporary attention to the matter nor the mostly insular nature make events in France any less important. The two flights of Louis XVI forever changed France and also set in motion a series of events that represent the foundation of our modern world. That alone should be enough I feel, but I would also note that France's place in the 'Crisis of 1791' was not even particularly insular. Certainly the events of the Ochakov War diverted all military aid away from the unfortunate Louis XVI, but the Austro-Prussian agreement of October demonstrates how it was still at the forefront of the minds of the crowned heads of Europe. Even Britain, whose government assiduously ignored the matter, had an indirect role to play. A small fraction of the Anglo-Prussian subsidy to Gustav III of Sweden found its way from his treasury to Axel von Fersen's pocket to help organise the Flight to Montmedy.
The two halves of the 'Crisis of 1791' were, and are, inescapably intertwined and both deserve to be remembered as the twin fulcrums upon which European, and ultimately global, history turned."
Professor Digory Kirke, 'How the King Fled Twice - France and the Crisis of 1791', 1952.
I contend, however, that neither the lack of British contemporary attention to the matter nor the mostly insular nature make events in France any less important. The two flights of Louis XVI forever changed France and also set in motion a series of events that represent the foundation of our modern world. That alone should be enough I feel, but I would also note that France's place in the 'Crisis of 1791' was not even particularly insular. Certainly the events of the Ochakov War diverted all military aid away from the unfortunate Louis XVI, but the Austro-Prussian agreement of October demonstrates how it was still at the forefront of the minds of the crowned heads of Europe. Even Britain, whose government assiduously ignored the matter, had an indirect role to play. A small fraction of the Anglo-Prussian subsidy to Gustav III of Sweden found its way from his treasury to Axel von Fersen's pocket to help organise the Flight to Montmedy.
The two halves of the 'Crisis of 1791' were, and are, inescapably intertwined and both deserve to be remembered as the twin fulcrums upon which European, and ultimately global, history turned."
Professor Digory Kirke, 'How the King Fled Twice - France and the Crisis of 1791', 1952.
~ End of Chapter 2 ~
Digory Kirke has to be the most English name I’ve ever heard,lols
That's because OP is apparently fond of a certain Anglo-Irish author.
Well done, @Gwrtheyrn Annwn, I missed that little easter egg on first glance.
It's just as @SenatorChickpea realised! It's a very English name from a very English book.
Fictional historians are strangely hard to find and the Narnia books are a childhood favourite of mine so it felt appropriate. The last historian to make an appearance at the end of Chapter 1 is also an Easter egg but a much more obscure one, I will be quite surprised if anyone figures them out.
Interlude I - "The King’s Way" - Spain and Savoy-Sardinia to 1792
Interlude I - "The King’s Way" - Spain and Savoy-Sardinia to 1792
Carlos IV, King of Spain, Vittorio Amadeo III, King of Sardinia
[1] Maria Luisa of Parma
[2] Royal Academy of Sciences
[3] Both this and the continued existence of the Kingdom of Italy until 1797 seems to be widely forgotten or ignored.
[4] Another detail from OTL that seems to be widely ignored, to the point that I have only seen in referenced in Peter Wilson's The Holy Roman Empire. He's a good enough historian that I will take his word for it but it is a bit frustrating that there doesn't seem to be any further details available.
Carlos IV, King of Spain, Vittorio Amadeo III, King of Sardinia
Out of all of Europe, there were only two regions that had no involvement in either half of the Crisis of 1791. One was the Iberian Peninsula and the other was the Italian Peninsula. Both had become a little lost from European great power politics since the Seven Years' War and faded away from the limelight. Spain had remained in the picture for a long time under the rule of Carlos III, who had instituted a wide-ranging parcel of reforms now generally known as the 'Bourbon Reforms', and for a brief moment in 1789 had looked to be capable, in combination with their Bourbon brethren in France, of facing down Great Britain and her Royal Navy. The humiliating end to the Nootka Sound Crisis had finally ushered them off the stage, at least for the moment, and they had played no role in either the Ochakov War or the French Revolution under the much less active new King Carlos IV. Across the Mediterranean, the Kingdom of Sardinia had gone through something similar with their king and royal reforming ambitions. Just as Carlos III of Spain had led the reforms of his realm, so too had Carlo Emanuele III of Savoy. And just as Carlos IV had proved to be less enthusiastic than his father, so too had Vittorio Amedeo III. It was around this strange parallel that events in each kingdom moved in 1791 and 1792.
It is easy to cast a critical eye over the Spain of 1791. Humiliated in 1789, absent in 1791 and a minor player in the rest of the 1790s, some might even question if they remained a great power by this time. This was a far cry from the confident Spain that had been prepared to got to war with Britain over a Pacific bay. By 1791, Carlos IV had been reduced to Louis XVI's letter-writing companion and being the recipient of many of his cousin's true feelings about the revolution. He would later be involved in a scheme to bring the French royals to Spain, but even this was foiled, albeit by Marie-Antoinette. How had Spain fallen so rapidly?
The answer is not an easy one. Some historians have blamed Carlos IV, his indolence, his domination by his wife[1], and his opposition to his father's reforming efforts. And yet, the latter at least is not entirely true. Having only come to the throne in 1788, he could not have influenced the outcome of the Nootka Sound Crisis without extreme effort. That humiliation could be laid at the door of the collapsing French finances and, at worst, Spanish over-confidence in the Family Compact and their own naval build-up. Nor had he swept away his father's efforts or politicians. José Moñino y Redondo, 1st Conde de Floridablanca, Carlos III's chief minister, had remained in post through the first 3 years of Carlos IV's reign and, when he was replaced in November 1791, he was succeeded by Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, 10th Conde de Aranda. The Conde de Aranda was another prominent politician of Carlos III's rule and, far from a conservative retrenchment, Carlos IV had exchanged one reformer for another. The Conde de Aranda had been preferred for his relatively softer liberal politics and his preference towards neutrality on the matter of France compared with the Conde de Floridablanca's firmer stance. But even this continued in existing patterns, for fear of a war across the Pyrenees had concerned Carlos III as much as it now did Carlos IV.
The royal favourite, and alleged lover of the Queen, Manuel de Godoy, Marqués de Alcúdia, was waiting in the wings but, in the meantime, economic growth continued. It was primarily sustained by increased income from the viceroyalties and, on paper at least, the Bourbon Reforms continued to bear fruit. The earlier rising of Túpac Amaru II in 1780 had hinted that the reconstructing of Spanish Empire away from the old Habsburg systems of rule might not be quite as successful as purely economic measures suggests. There had been a second shock to Spanish colonial policy since the Nootka Sound Crisis as well, an expedition led by Irish Tone brothers had attempted to conquer the Sandwich Islands in 1790, but to most contemporaries Spain was doing well.
So what was the issue? Why did Spain effectively retreat from the stage for a decade or so whilst the other great powers contested global supremacy at the turn of the century? Perhaps there was no issue at all, but merely a choice of policy. Rather than incompetence, or indolence, a deliberate policy of neutrality and a new direction of reform. The Conde de Aranda would not last long in post, before his replacement by the Marqués de Alcúdia, but he would last long enough to begin implementing his ideas for the future of the viceroyalties, a commonwealth of kingdoms.
Just as Spain sought to avoid war over the Pyrenees amidst the general attitude of neutrality towards the French crisis, so too did Savoy seek to avoid war across the Alps. By strange coincidence, a despite of number of obvious differences, Savoy-Sardinia was in a similar position. Vittorio Amedeo III mirrored not only Carlos IV's comparative lack of reforming drive but also his maintenance of his father's existing reforms. Vittorio Amedeo III even went further, turning the Societa Privata into the Accademia Reale delle Scienze [2] in 1783 to demonstrate his Enlightenment credentials. Turin also became the capital of Italian freemasonry during his reign. Savoy-Sardinia also pursued a similar foreign policy to Spain with a French alliance prior to the Revolution. Two Savoyard princesses, Marie Joséphine and Marie Thérèse, had married the Comte de Provence and the Comte d'Artois respectively. This made the Revolution almost as concerning to Vittorio Amedeo III as to Spain or even the Habsburgs. Like both, he would become involved in a number of schemes to restore the Bourbons and also in the French Civil War. Before then, however, Savoy-Sardinia's focus was to the north and to the east. Not to the Ochakov War, which had even less to recommend it to Savoy-Sardinia than to Spain, but to the Kingdom of Germany and the rest of the Holy Roman Empire.
Despite its geographical location and status as Imperial Vicar of Italy, which they still used to claim primacy over the other Italian imperial princes, Savoy-Sardinia actually lay in the Kingdom of Germany and had done so since 1361. [3] Both kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire were now subject to debates around imperial mediatisation. Not a new idea, dating in some form back to Imperial Reform in the 16th century, it had resurfaced in the middle of the War of Austrian Succession when Frederick the Great of Prussia and Charles VII of Bavaria had plotted a number of secularisations of imperial bishoprics. Then it had met with internal outrage and subsequently been abandoned after Charles VII's death, but the idea had persisted and been revived as part of Joseph II's plan for the Bavarian Exchange. It still rumbled on, as did the Bavarian Exchange, with Leopold II and had featured heavily in the negotiations for the Austro-Prussian rapprochements in the Treaties of Reichenbach and of Olmütz. The potential opportunity to annex large swathes of land from neighbouring smaller states was just too good to ignore.
This debate around the reform of the Empire allowed Savoy-Sardinia to put forward their own associated ambitions, which had also led them to supplement the French ties with a Prussian alliance. Savoyard links to Prussia were longstanding, as Savoy had attempted to imitate Prussia's rise from backwater on the edge of the empire to first a military power and then a great one. The parallels were plain, a relatively new kingdom within the empire earned by military support to the Emperor, and Savoy had also heavily imitated Prussian military reforms under both Vittorio Amedeo III and his predecessor Carlo Emanuele III. This has had some success, albeit without really being tested, and since 1788 the Savoyards had been trying to further the Prussian comparison by becoming Electors themselves. [4]
To help push this matter, Vittorio Amedeo III had sought and gained further support from Frederick William II in 1788. If Hertzberg has only thought of it, he could have made his plan of exchanges even more complicated! As it was, Prussia had done little to act on their promised support to Savoy-Sardinia but now, as the Empire returned to peace, Vittorio Amedeo III once again pushed to revive the idea. Bischoffwerder, the new dominant politician in Prussia, was prompted to raise it with the Habsburgs on Savoy-Sardinia's behalf in the post-Olmütz discussions in November 1791 but it failed to get beyond the discussion phase. This idea, and indeed much of the imperial mediatisation debate, could have passed into history but the relatively stable conclusions of both halves of the Crisis of 1791 instead allowed several years for argument, years in which the imperial crowned heads debated the future of the Empire and electoral ambitions consumed Vittorio Amedeo III.
It is easy to cast a critical eye over the Spain of 1791. Humiliated in 1789, absent in 1791 and a minor player in the rest of the 1790s, some might even question if they remained a great power by this time. This was a far cry from the confident Spain that had been prepared to got to war with Britain over a Pacific bay. By 1791, Carlos IV had been reduced to Louis XVI's letter-writing companion and being the recipient of many of his cousin's true feelings about the revolution. He would later be involved in a scheme to bring the French royals to Spain, but even this was foiled, albeit by Marie-Antoinette. How had Spain fallen so rapidly?
The answer is not an easy one. Some historians have blamed Carlos IV, his indolence, his domination by his wife[1], and his opposition to his father's reforming efforts. And yet, the latter at least is not entirely true. Having only come to the throne in 1788, he could not have influenced the outcome of the Nootka Sound Crisis without extreme effort. That humiliation could be laid at the door of the collapsing French finances and, at worst, Spanish over-confidence in the Family Compact and their own naval build-up. Nor had he swept away his father's efforts or politicians. José Moñino y Redondo, 1st Conde de Floridablanca, Carlos III's chief minister, had remained in post through the first 3 years of Carlos IV's reign and, when he was replaced in November 1791, he was succeeded by Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, 10th Conde de Aranda. The Conde de Aranda was another prominent politician of Carlos III's rule and, far from a conservative retrenchment, Carlos IV had exchanged one reformer for another. The Conde de Aranda had been preferred for his relatively softer liberal politics and his preference towards neutrality on the matter of France compared with the Conde de Floridablanca's firmer stance. But even this continued in existing patterns, for fear of a war across the Pyrenees had concerned Carlos III as much as it now did Carlos IV.
The royal favourite, and alleged lover of the Queen, Manuel de Godoy, Marqués de Alcúdia, was waiting in the wings but, in the meantime, economic growth continued. It was primarily sustained by increased income from the viceroyalties and, on paper at least, the Bourbon Reforms continued to bear fruit. The earlier rising of Túpac Amaru II in 1780 had hinted that the reconstructing of Spanish Empire away from the old Habsburg systems of rule might not be quite as successful as purely economic measures suggests. There had been a second shock to Spanish colonial policy since the Nootka Sound Crisis as well, an expedition led by Irish Tone brothers had attempted to conquer the Sandwich Islands in 1790, but to most contemporaries Spain was doing well.
So what was the issue? Why did Spain effectively retreat from the stage for a decade or so whilst the other great powers contested global supremacy at the turn of the century? Perhaps there was no issue at all, but merely a choice of policy. Rather than incompetence, or indolence, a deliberate policy of neutrality and a new direction of reform. The Conde de Aranda would not last long in post, before his replacement by the Marqués de Alcúdia, but he would last long enough to begin implementing his ideas for the future of the viceroyalties, a commonwealth of kingdoms.
Just as Spain sought to avoid war over the Pyrenees amidst the general attitude of neutrality towards the French crisis, so too did Savoy seek to avoid war across the Alps. By strange coincidence, a despite of number of obvious differences, Savoy-Sardinia was in a similar position. Vittorio Amedeo III mirrored not only Carlos IV's comparative lack of reforming drive but also his maintenance of his father's existing reforms. Vittorio Amedeo III even went further, turning the Societa Privata into the Accademia Reale delle Scienze [2] in 1783 to demonstrate his Enlightenment credentials. Turin also became the capital of Italian freemasonry during his reign. Savoy-Sardinia also pursued a similar foreign policy to Spain with a French alliance prior to the Revolution. Two Savoyard princesses, Marie Joséphine and Marie Thérèse, had married the Comte de Provence and the Comte d'Artois respectively. This made the Revolution almost as concerning to Vittorio Amedeo III as to Spain or even the Habsburgs. Like both, he would become involved in a number of schemes to restore the Bourbons and also in the French Civil War. Before then, however, Savoy-Sardinia's focus was to the north and to the east. Not to the Ochakov War, which had even less to recommend it to Savoy-Sardinia than to Spain, but to the Kingdom of Germany and the rest of the Holy Roman Empire.
Despite its geographical location and status as Imperial Vicar of Italy, which they still used to claim primacy over the other Italian imperial princes, Savoy-Sardinia actually lay in the Kingdom of Germany and had done so since 1361. [3] Both kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire were now subject to debates around imperial mediatisation. Not a new idea, dating in some form back to Imperial Reform in the 16th century, it had resurfaced in the middle of the War of Austrian Succession when Frederick the Great of Prussia and Charles VII of Bavaria had plotted a number of secularisations of imperial bishoprics. Then it had met with internal outrage and subsequently been abandoned after Charles VII's death, but the idea had persisted and been revived as part of Joseph II's plan for the Bavarian Exchange. It still rumbled on, as did the Bavarian Exchange, with Leopold II and had featured heavily in the negotiations for the Austro-Prussian rapprochements in the Treaties of Reichenbach and of Olmütz. The potential opportunity to annex large swathes of land from neighbouring smaller states was just too good to ignore.
This debate around the reform of the Empire allowed Savoy-Sardinia to put forward their own associated ambitions, which had also led them to supplement the French ties with a Prussian alliance. Savoyard links to Prussia were longstanding, as Savoy had attempted to imitate Prussia's rise from backwater on the edge of the empire to first a military power and then a great one. The parallels were plain, a relatively new kingdom within the empire earned by military support to the Emperor, and Savoy had also heavily imitated Prussian military reforms under both Vittorio Amedeo III and his predecessor Carlo Emanuele III. This has had some success, albeit without really being tested, and since 1788 the Savoyards had been trying to further the Prussian comparison by becoming Electors themselves. [4]
To help push this matter, Vittorio Amedeo III had sought and gained further support from Frederick William II in 1788. If Hertzberg has only thought of it, he could have made his plan of exchanges even more complicated! As it was, Prussia had done little to act on their promised support to Savoy-Sardinia but now, as the Empire returned to peace, Vittorio Amedeo III once again pushed to revive the idea. Bischoffwerder, the new dominant politician in Prussia, was prompted to raise it with the Habsburgs on Savoy-Sardinia's behalf in the post-Olmütz discussions in November 1791 but it failed to get beyond the discussion phase. This idea, and indeed much of the imperial mediatisation debate, could have passed into history but the relatively stable conclusions of both halves of the Crisis of 1791 instead allowed several years for argument, years in which the imperial crowned heads debated the future of the Empire and electoral ambitions consumed Vittorio Amedeo III.
[1] Maria Luisa of Parma
[2] Royal Academy of Sciences
[3] Both this and the continued existence of the Kingdom of Italy until 1797 seems to be widely forgotten or ignored.
[4] Another detail from OTL that seems to be widely ignored, to the point that I have only seen in referenced in Peter Wilson's The Holy Roman Empire. He's a good enough historian that I will take his word for it but it is a bit frustrating that there doesn't seem to be any further details available.
But AFAIK, Prussia (the duchy) was never in the "Empire". Even after 1815, Prussia was excluded from the German Confederation. The Hohenzollerns' royal title was initially established by recognition from Emperor Leopold I, but they were still independently sovereign in Prussia. The House of Savoy were Kings of Sardinia, also outside the Empire. Also, after Switzerland became independent in 1648, there was effectively no land connection between the Empire and Savoy.
All entirely true, and also further demonstrating the similarities between Prussia (or Brandenburg-Prussia if you prefer) and Savoy (or Savoy-Sardinia). Perhaps it would have been worth a mention, but I felt it would have been labouring the point slightly. 😅
Not the Duchy of Prussia, nor indeed the territories that Prussia gained in the Polish Partitions.
On an unrelated note, I forgot to give some credit to @Tanaka did nothing wrong for inspiring this interlude with a post on page 3 of this thread about the possible effects on Spain of the POD. Thank you!
Thanks for the mention!
About Spain in the last update: it's not exactly that Aranda was more supportive of liberal policies - he was more of an illustrado, interested in strengthening the state, in a vein similar to Floridablanca. Floridablanca was certainly the one who violently pulled the handbrake in 1788 - 1789 by reinforcing censorship and cancelling certain initiatives, but Aranda was the one who raised to the king the potential issue of the spread of revolutionary/subversive ideas among the military and the latter's "contamination"; as for neutrality, this was more the result of a negative estimation of Spain's military capabilities at the time, the fear of an untimely severance of the diplomatic links with France (an anxiety shared by Floridablanca in 1790 - 1791, which resulted in a relative moderation of Spanish policy), and perhaps a belief that public opinion wouldn't be particularly opposed to the developments in France (because it's important to remember that there was considerable pressure from below for action, fomented to a large extent by the clergy). Military preparations continued during his ministry, although it's not clear whether he intended to offer mediation or join the coalition; ITTL, I guess that he would lean more on the former, trying to broker a compromise that would allow the monarchy to be restored in France (the regency would help there) and preserve France as a potent but not overbearing ally (Spanish resentment over French demands had been a running issue since the late 1780s at least); for that he would most likely need Britain and perhaps Prussia to stay out of any conflict. It would be interesting to see how he would try to tackle the question of who would wear the crown in France, and the potential exile of Louis XVI - I could see Charles IV wanting to grant his cousin shelter in Spain, which could be a bone of contention with Aranda.
About Godoy, what would precede him would be important. If Aranda were to secure a mediation before leaving office, avoiding war, then there's a good chance that early opposition to his appointment, which IOTL was quite serious, would persist, without the war of the Pyrenees distracting public opinion, particularly from the anti-illustrados. This, combined with a potential avoidance of a more radical phase of the revolution in France, might lead Godoy to side to a larger extent with the more reformist elements and proponents of proyectismo - after all, Godoy himself was rather supportive of their initiatives and plans in areas such as education. Another potential development is that with France avoiding something like the events of 1792 - 1794, the force of counter-revolution in Spain might be reduced to some extent. Issues like the land question, poverty, and other demands that had been brought to the forefront in France could be more prominent in public discourse, however my guess is that we would most likely not see similar events take place in Spain, although the growth of more liberal and radical currents of political and social thought would most likely occur.
You're very welcome, your original post stuck in my memory and it was good to get a nod to it written now.
Thank you for even more insights to take on board here. The political nuances between Aranda and Floridablanca were a little hard to understand, both seemed fairly similar except possibly on their attitudes to the French Revolution to someone relatively new to Spanish political history of this period. So I really appreciate you clarifying their differences, and the actions Aranda might take, further.
On the topic of Godoy, it is also useful to have some more context around him and the political currents that might develop. I did also have one question about him and Aranda. As far as I can tell IOTL, Aranda was little more than a stand-in to be swept away quickly for Godoy. ITTL I'm intrigued by exploring Aranda lasting a bit longer, not for a particularly long time but just long enough to start some of his own reforms, especially the colonial ones (which if you have any more info on, I would also much appreciate!). Is that really possible or was he also doomed to be a temporary stand-in by this point in Charles IV's reign?
Well, about the first point: Floridablanca and Aranda were indeed fairly similar; about differences, I would say that Aranda had perhaps more links to France, was perhaps more enmeshed in Enlightenment groups, and, were we to judge from his recorded "Aragonese party" allegiance and his colonial plans, perhaps not fully on board with the strong centralisation focus of the Spanish government during the 1760s - 1780s period, which was pursued by Floridablanca and other senior government figures during his ministry like Galvez.
About Godoy and Aranda: it's not exactly clear whether he was meant to simply keep the door open for Godoy. As I had mentioned in a previous post, Aranda and Charles IV hadn't been foreigners to each other, and in 1781, the former had consulted the latter about a potential removal of Floridablanca. While the desire for a prime minister more beholden to the crown was there, as both Charles and Maria Luisa were aghast at the factionalism of the court during the latter years of the reign of Charles III, I don't think Aranda was meant as a stopgap alone - his dismissal came after all after a serious disagreement over his handling of the case of Louis XVI - which was very important personally to Charles IV, and his subsequent outburst at the council. If Aranda were to manage to ensure the survival of Louis XVI and the continuation of the Bourbon monarchy in France, and France avoided the more violent events of OTL, I think Charles wouldn't be that keen on removing him from power, although Aranda's age, other bones of contention (emigres, the place of exile of Louis XVI etc), and Godoy's influence and activity could mean that his ministry would still prove rather short-lived.
I am not sure how Aranda's colonial plan would materialise; the perennial problem was that there weren't enough eligible princes for the task. Ferdinand would be only 8 years old at most and he's off the cards since he's the prince of Asturias, Carlos Isidro only 4 at most, and of Charles' surviving brothers, only infante Antonio is available; furthermore, I doubt Charles IV himself would be willing to accept such an overt diminution of his monarchical powers. I guess Aranda could try to devolve more powers to the viceroys and allow more independence with regard to local matters in order to placate local demands. An interesting question might be perhaps whether a desire to avoid further unrest in the colonies, and the events of the French revolution could reinvigorate the discussion for reforms like taxation of Church property, which had been abandoned in mid 1760s - I think Charles, with the memories of the Esquilache riots of 1766 and not so pressed by factors like the subsidies to the French state and other exigencies, as well as the disruption in the flow of colonial revenues, would probably oppose these, whereas Aranda might be more willing to open these issues.