Chapter 9.3
06-01-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Cairo Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ
Urgent 3rd update (personal observations only):
Repeated flare ups between staff officers and commanders among the branches; leading to our frequent removal from GHQ, creating voids in our understanding of the battle
Request senior officers and or members of the government impress on GHQ to honor agreement for "full access" so we can make accurate reports to chain of command
We concur with Ritchie that there is some sort of operational security problem in the theater; we have made this observation and stand by it since February
We presume there to be local spies in Alexandria, Cairo and Suez
Privately GHQ staff officers have conducted interviews with evacuated/wounded troops; they advise many secret documents and maps likely captured by Rommel; which may explain his clever movements around the minefields of the Gazala line, and frequent ambushes of headquarters/rear area units
8th army coordination of supporting arms may be poorer than even previously evaluated, GHQ staff officers advise units are attacking unsuppressed axis emplacements and that artillery and armor use at Knightsbridge was poor
Serious conflicts between Smith and Ritchie, causing tactical and strategic errors
Rumors persist in GHQ that every officer will be relieved by London
Rumors in GHQ that Ritchie will be relieved and replaced by Smith, or that Auchinlek will take direct command of 8th army
Situation at front so grave that even immediate resolution of command impasses may not save the army
Private conversations with Royal Navy staff officers concerning the fate of Malta, in the event of Alexandria falling or being evacuated are very troubling; their staff is discussing cancelation or postponement of Operation Vigorous/Julius
Private conversations with Royal Navy and Air Force give concerning responses about the ability to evacuate troops from Malta if it cannot be safely supplied
Private conversations with GHQ staff officers give concerning responses about the ability of Malta to withstand an invasion if it is not supplied with food and gasoline
Private conversations with GHQ staff officers give concerning responses about the ability to ably battle the DAK in the event Malta falls, and they have more secure supply lines to the main Libyan ports
Atmosphere in GHQ is troubling and can be seen spilling in small but growing amounts into Cairo
Heated exchanges between Ritchie and Smith occurred several times today, and conflict brewed over into staffs, but most especially over failure of attacks out of Knightsbridge, and over identification of either new German units or supernumeraries at Belhamed
Ritchie blames Smith for Knightsbridge attack being "hasty"
Our staff cannot currently obtain reliable status update of the troops at Knightsbridge, the disclosures on their fuel while troubling do not tell how many fighting men they have left, General Smith and our laison officer refuse to comment on this question and say it is still being evaluated in the face of disrupted communications
General Smith doesn't regard the troops at Knights bridge as surrounded, our staff review of GHQ position maps shows axis forces on all sides; but it is not clear if that is currently a coincidental battle placement due to other events or if Rommel intends to invest Knightsbridge now that he has broken through in the center
Commander at Knights Bridge requests execute operation free born, whilst our staff is evaluating the prospects of freeborn on the whole, the Indians at Knights bridge have Italian armor to their south and west and German armor to their north and east; we regard their ability to evacuate as the most hazardous of the 8th army (except for the Tobruk garrison whom we identify are already in a close battle or state of siege)
GHQ staff officers privately advise that some surviving elements of the Guards formations, driven into the Tobruk perimeter by German armor; when pressed about remaining strength of these forces we are only told "limited"
GHQ staff officers even privately will not put timetable even best case on ability of 50th division and 1st south african to with stand a siege or close envelopment, our staff will perform it's own evaluation after the recon photos are assessed tomorrow
GHQ staff officers privately hope that Rommel will attack the remaining Northumbrians and the South Africans, instead of investing the forces at Knightsbridge; they advise formations in the north have good artillery and anti tank support; and the units are largely full strength; some defeated armored units being reconstituted in their sector; no concrete answers from Smith concerning their number of running tanks or fuel availability
No answers from Smith or any GHQ officer as to what equipment would be left behind when and if freeborn is launched; only private answer received is "dunkirk" which my staff takes to mean that large amounts of army equipment would be intended to be abandoned
I asked our laison officer if the 8th army could reasonably fight any battles in Egypt if the army equipment is "dunkirk" in the Libyan desert, he excused himself from the room; our staff will try to prepare own estimate of defensive options in Egypt under the possibility of catastrophic defeat of the 8th army
General Smith is impressing a very difficult atmosphere on the GHQ, Ritchie tries to exclude him from discussions with Auchinlek
Privately Royal Navy and Desert Air Force officers lobby their superiors to apply pressure for the relief of Ritchie and Smith
Privately GHQ officers lobby Auchinlek to relieve Ritchie and Smith
I tried asking General Smith and South African staff officers if operation freeborn could include the 1st south african and the Northumbrians trying to recover the Tobruk garrison during their proposed evacuation, this produced several different answers; and escalated into confrontation between Smith and South Africans, with Smith saying that the 2nd South Africans had their own evacuation plan to execute for freeborn.
Per previous report South African staff officers have already privately advised their second division doesn't have enough vehicles for freeborn, regardless of their combat situation; this is likely the source of their conflict with General Smith's statement
Privately South African staff officers appealing to their government to apply pressure to London for the relief of Smith and Ritchie... and Auchinlek
Our best objective view, is that the South Africans in the Tobruk pocket are receiving conflicting or possibly no instructions at all; the fortress by all accounts so far has been ill prepared for a siege and the pressure applied from London to hold the fortress poorly matches the field conditions or the quality of the troops in the fortress
Auchinlek requests ICGS officers come to Egypt to see situation first hand; command impasse is very troubling
GHQ private disclosure of deserter/morale problems is concerning, no staff officer will answer questions on this currently
Auchinlek, Smith and Ritchie all shaken by fall of Sidi Muftah box
Auchinlek questions why box would fall so quickly, this escalates among the staff; morale issue is brought up; we are removed from the room
Will try to use our interviews at the frontier to make our own staff analysis of morale/discipline/desertion problems
End transmission