Chapter 7.1
05-30-42 23:59 Panzer Army Africa Command Post Bir El Harmat Libya Commander GeneralOberst Erwin Rommel, briefing presented by Oberst Seigfried Westphal (Chief of DAK operations) and Hauptman Albert Seebohme Commander 621st Radio interception company, also receiving briefings, Field Marshal "Smiling" Albert Kesselring commander OB Sud
It had been a busy day for General Rommel, on his staff's unanimous pleading, he had slept 7 hours the previous night and woken just before dawn greatly refreshed and clear headed. 21st panzer was asked to put in a very hard day, their regrouping cancelled overnight and the scavenging of the battlefield left to the Ariete tank division; they where ordered to drive east at day break
Rommel personally lead a supply convoy through swept paths in the mine field along the Trigh el Abd strip road into 21st panzer's encampment; he carried with him briefcases full of medals, but also crates full of ammunition, and a battalion of Ariete escorted corps artillery and AAA to the 21st panzer on Rommel's tail. Concurrent with this; companies of the 15th panzer's infantry regiment, in appropriated British trucks, with their British markings still on them, to confuse possible desert air force low flying aircraft, had driven south and then west, packed to the brim with fuel cannisters, food and water; appropriated from El Adem
Rommel's plan for the day, code named among his staff sudkanal (south canal), was intended to take advantage of his intelligence trump cards, namely that Hauptman Seebohme's operators had identified the guard's brigades, and their relative spacing en route to El Adem, and he had received a full read out of Bonner Fellers updates the previous 24 hours, which included him unintentionally leaking to Rommel that the 8th army expected 21st Panzer and Ariete to continue their drive north to try and perform a full encirclement of the Gazala line
Instead 21st panzer would be pushed, hard, weakened by detachments of crews of lost vehicles; and the need to facilitate captured equipment to the rear. The British again would have the sun in their eyes the entire day, as their attack to the east against 15th panzer evolved just before lunch, and they would be attacked from the rear by the 21st panzer late in the day with the sun at their back.
Although 21st panzer was tired and down 35 percent strength, 15th panzer had largely rested the last 48 hours, and fattened on the supply dumps. Two battalions of the 90th light had arrived early in the day to stiffen their infantry strength. 90th light had now received 2380 infantry replacements from the Crete garrison and was fairly close to full strength on paper and would begin more serious probing of the Tobruk perimeter soon, but today was recon in force
15th panzer was augmented by good numbers of captured British field and AAA guns; and they and their comrades in the 21st enjoyed strong air support arranged by Marshal Kesselring in conjunction with ground observers and Seebohme/Feller report suggested targets. Having flown 8 missions a day the previous 4 days, Kesselring however did rotate a few crews to have an earlier end to their day.
The guards brigades had arrived piece meal, the Scots first, this section of the desert having very little in the way of land marks or any terrain features at all; and with much of their own communications and intelligence network, much of their first clue that they had stumbled upon the 15th Panzer's defensive perimeter of El Adem, was engagement by British and German artillery and AAA (barrels depressed for horizontal fire) and visited by shrieking stukas, and diving ME-109s. The Scots planned suppressive artillery barrage was late and fell in many empty places when it did come, when the main body of the 201st arrived to try and stiffen the drive, the 15th panzer counter attacked, leap frogging their 50mm anti guns, covered by their 88mm cannons, mechanized infantry and tanks advanced under the cover of the artillery and inflicted considerable losses on the guards; and when the sun shifted into the western sky 21st panzers tanks and artillery where upon the guards from behind, with coordinates being radioed by 15th panzer and fixed by one of captain Seebohme's platoons
It wasn't a turkey shoot, the guard, where excellent infantry, but it was a DAK over run because of their concentration of nearly 220 tanks on the formation caught in the open. The guards scattered and fled north, with mechanized infantry in hot pursuit, multiple battalion commanders where killed or captured. The charge of the guards brigade would become a lingering story of the desert warfare and one of the cardinal criticisms against Ritchie; a culmination of all the worst habits of the 8th army and his command of not sending units with the proper support and frittering away material and manpower superiority to be impaled on German cannons
The strategic ball was in Rommel's court, in his mind it always was; the defeat of all of Ritchie's reserves in the south cemented his hold on British lines of communication, he was simply amazed that the enormous garrisons at Tobruk and Gazala wouldn't be called to dislodge his slender forces off their supply nodes, especially Kleeman's penetration at Belhamed which only ever was a scratch division, there where reports of reserves being rushed to the frontier to eventually be pressed against Kleeman, but this was still some time in the future
Seebohme and Westphal showed Rommel several captured maps and provided him with a composite of best known positions of the British and Panzer Army Africa, he essentially had two choices, rotate the 21st panzer to El Adem to rest for a day and allow 15th panzer and Ariete to drive on Knights Bridge box directly behind the Gazala mine fields, in a close envelopment
He stared at the map, and when presented with Westphal's more bold option, it had already been decided in his mind as the best course of action; 21st panzer would have to bear the burden be refueled tonight at El Adem, and drive with their sister division as soon as able, directly north along the Trigh Bir Hakeim road on Arcoma, west of Tobruk. His captured maps showed only scattered and light forces between himself and Arcoma, Kleeman's detached forces would have to maintain security and communications at El Adem. Possession of Arcoma and the road network at the coast there would allow the Panzer Army Africa to further dominate the supply lines to the troops at Gazala, and it would allow him to completely invest the Garrison at Tobruk. Rommel felt that if he held Arcoma and was able to keep his pressure coming from the south, that line of retreat options from the balance of the troops manning the Gazala line would become very limited
Whats more reports from the broken American codes showed the British where desperately concerned about their trapped Brigade at Sidi Muftah which had been encircled by Trieste and Trento. Rommel decided that he would use Sidi Muftah as a fire sack to draw in what British armor remained in the north; Trieste and Trento would be ordered to keep a belt buckle grip on the British, but not to perform a true assault, just recons in force and demonstrations, they where to otherwise dig in and prepare for a defensive battle; Ariete which had largely cleaned up the battlefield near Bir El Harmat would be ordered to move north west tonight and encamp on allagh ridge; and take defensive positions to screen the Ariete from British forces at Knightsbridge
Kesselring advised that many fighter and bomber pilots where falling asleep on their runway alerts and that missions had to be curtailed for at 12 hours to restore crews composure. Rommel having benefitted from some sleep himself agreed with his superior and would schedule his positions and movements accordingly. Rommel implored field Marshal Kesselring to keep up the air lift of troops, 21st panzer was down 45 percent strength and 15th was down 33 percent; Ariete was down 25 percent but would re-evaluate at dawn, they where making some progress repairing their equipment and may be closer to full strength. Kesselring advised that he had overflown the battlefield several times during the day and understood that Rommel had found the Schwerpunkt, and that OB Sud was calling on other commands in Germany, France, Norway and the Balkans to find aircraft and good troops to be lifted to Africa
The commander of OB Sud announced that he had conferred with Field Marshal Bastico and Ugo Cavallero, and that some assets ear marked for opteration Herkules would be made available as reinforcements in Libya; Kesselring's chief of staff was going to fly back to Berlin tomorrow to have a 1:1 meeting with Rudolf Schmundt Hitler's Army Personel adjudent, about requesting tank crewman who could be flown to Africa as replacements for the Panzer Army's lost crews. Rommel thanked Kesselring for his support and announced he would be riding with the 21st as soon as they could move out, they where tired, but he knew from experience that having the general traveling with them got tired asses and elbows moving
will make another post with authors thoughts and commentary
