Chapter 5- Aftermath of Black Thursday, Napoleon's position
05-29-42 1000 hours
HQ 8th Army and Middle East Command, Cairo Egypt, LT General Neil Ritchie and Field Marshal Claude Auchinlek commanding respectively
The options for general Ritchie, where boundless as they where fraught with danger. Although communications where patchy, especially with the disappearance of General Gott and the XIII corps staff HQ, he was starting to grasp the disaster that befallen the 8th army on Black Thursday
The glaring emergency was the presence of DAK formations currently occupying the 8th army's supply structure at El Adem and Gambut respectively. This was a knife at the 8th army's throat. The theater commander agreed that the highest priority had to be the restoration of communications to the troops on the Gazala line
There was another concern as well. Namely reports had been received by the 150th Brigade that 2 big divisions of Italian troops had arrived at Sidi Muftah and that the minefields had been penetrated to their north, by what was tentatively identified as the Trento division. Ritchie could see that except for a supporting battalion of the 7th armored brigade that had been in reserve just outside Sidi Muftah, the 150th brigade was cut off, and in grave danger
The communications issues and the heavy disruption to the airforce made things all the more difficult. A more shrewd and experienced commander than General Ritchie would have recognized that he had many tanks in depots in Egypt and more ability to reinforce than Rommel, and would have massed the two strong guards Brigades and the remaining two brigades of the 50th British division to pierce the Italian infantry on the coastal road, drive on Bengahzi and end the campaign in Africa right then and there, but Neil Ritchie was not that general.
Not only did he concur with his superior that the restoration of communications was the most important, he had telegrams from London that almost smoked arriving every few hours asking how the army could possibly have left Gambut undefended and that Tobruk should be defended like it had been in 1941 should it become surrounded. Ritchie's grumbling that the raw and poorly rated South Africans where not the Elite Australian infantry that had defended the place before, and that the defenses had been allowed to fall into disrepair under his predecessor fell on deaf hours, as London continued to extoll him that he had 1100 tanks under his command and that the axis couldn't have many more than 300, and that he should seek battle and destroy the DAK (These notes from Churchill to Middle East HQ are historical except for the Gambut part)
General Ritchie could only grit his teeth at the interference. At least London was only 250 miles away in the last war, their meddling then was more well informed in his opinion. London was now 2200 miles away, and never apologized or changed their ways of constantly underestimating Rommel's strength and ability to reinforce. He was on the attack now, that was for sure, yet London had said he wouldn't be able to attack for another 8 weeks. They had said he had 20 tanks left in the winter and we should drive like hell for Tripoli, instead he had received many dozens of replacement vehicles, which our own local informants warned us about, which we passed on to London, but where ordered to continue on; Rommel catching us badly over extended and defeating us at the Second Battle of El Agehlia. Ritchie was heard to remark in the Officers club once even before Black Thursday that if he heard about Rommel's last 20 tanks ever again he would punch the Prime Minister in the gut
Historical map of Gazala 5-27 for reference; credit to Master Sargent Napoleon Spencer (British Royal Army) white paper on the battle of Gazala
To counter the Germans on the supply nodes, the army had been damaged, and the choices where difficult. The 4th tank brigade had been defeated by the 21st and elements of the 15th panzer, and had lost all of their grant tanks and in no position to help as their supply tail had been captured. The 7th tank brigade would have to be completely rebuilt from scratch with a new commander after their devastating encounters with the 90th light and 15th panzer division.
That left the already hard pressed 22nd and 1st armored brigades whom where in correct position to reform and attack El Adem, but both formations had lost significant rear command and control HQ units, and much of their truck companies to 21st panzer and 90th light respectively the day before. 22nd also had axis tank divisions on either side of it and was being bombed heavily from the air. This left Ritchie's only intact striking power as the 32nd tank brigade and the 2 guards infantry brigades; with Ritchie and Auchinlek concurring that pulling the 50th division or the 1st South African Division off Gazala would invite Field Marshal Bastico's other divisions to advance up the coastal road and drive on Tobruk. Ritchie didn't even want to imagine London's reaction if he was to do that
X corps would have the formations reassigned to them the formations would move along the Trigh Capuzzo trail at best independent speed to dislodge the axis from El Adem, and then hopefully victorious, drive on Gambut
Coordination and other problems would make the earliest possible move out appoximately 1600 hours. General Ritchie could just hope the 150th could hold on until he restored the rear areas
Will edit in authors note and perspective this evening