Chapter 8.1
05-31-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Cairo Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ
Urgent updates:
Briefings are off schedule due to chaotic nature of battle and fatigue/stress of staff officers; will provide 2-3 updates per day as appropriate and ordered
Guards troops routed by Africa Corps, many prisoners taken including commanders
Axis controls all recoverable battlefields and roads south and east of Gazala and the coastal road
Failure of guards attack, and prior army internal supply reshuffle to support relief attack, and continued axis grip on El Adem creates supply shortages for 8th army
29th Indian still relocating to counter attack Belhamed from the East, London continues to forbid withdrawal or participation of Tobruk garrison to relieve Belhamed
Local spies and British intelligence sources believe axis bringing in fresh troops by air
Auchinlek over rode Ritchie early in day and ordered 8th and 9th Indian and 32nd tank brigade to counter attack axis forces at Sidi Muftah to relieve trapped 150th brigade
Per private conversations with staff officers, attacks proceeding poorly due to axis field and anti tank artillery, lack of 8th army advance artillery and surprise arrival of large numbers of Italian tanks; Ritchie and Auchinlek do not acknowledge outcome of attacks; they portray optimism about relief of 150th brigade
Reports of heavy air attacks against counter attack troops at Sidi Muftah
Desert airforce commanders acknowledge supply and condition difficulties inside of Gazala battle area, they advise difficulty maintaining required sortie rates, air force staff officers more vocal today about recommending withdrawal of troops who are yet in close battle/encirclement
More, but not majority of GHQ staff officers recommending withdrawal of entire 8th army including garrisons to the Egyptian border
Auchinlek developing plans for fresh troops to drive on the coastal road and restore supply conditions to front line troops, units for this are still many days out, Auchinlek says he believes troops at Gazala can hold on; says Rommel has lost many tanks
Royal Navy staff officers advise siege supply of Tobruk impossible and naval evacuation of Tobruk impossible, majority recommend demolition and overland troop withdrawal. They advise all ships committed or under repair. Privately Royal Navy staff officers regard threat to entire 8th army as grave and believe Rommel will invade Egypt
Communications problems have escalated; 8th army reports less than 10 percent communication efficiency for remaining forces south and east of Gazala; communications with units on Gazala line reduced to GHQ estimated 50 percent efficiency (see personal observations) this may be a generous over estimate by GHQ
GHQ believes based on Rommel's moves yesterday, that he will drive east to the Egyptian border, a repeat of his "dash to the wire" from last year; GHQ is hopeful that fresh formations arriving from Egypt can engage and defeat him there separated at great distances from his bases
Auchinlek and Ritchie jointly request freedom/authority to move troops at Gazala to support operations, London denies
URGENT 2nd UPDATE
GHQ estimation of Rommel drive to border incorrect; large axis tank columns reported in Arcoma
South African staff sections disrupted, captured or dispersed by DAK at Arcoma; staff officers not providing proper briefings, they advise situation as critical and evolving rapidly
South African staff officers privately advise that many supplies and much of their command sections possibly lost at Arcoma
South African staff officers privately advise that arrival of DAK at Arcoma creates mortal peril to their troops at Gazala and Tobruk
South African staff officers request Ritchie to order withdrawal of 1st South African to east of Arcoma to avoid encirclement
South African staff officers reject proposed counter attack at Arcoma siting failure of guards attacks and limited ability to restock ammunition at Gazala
Ritchie defers decision about Arcoma counter attack
Our staff urgently revaluating situation
Rumors rampant in GHQ and city of Cairo itself; some GHQ staff officers losing nerve over arrival of tanks at Arcoma
Rumors at GHQ that all commanders will be relieved by London
London and GHQ now have numerous impasses regarding command authority of troops on the coastal road
GHQ now presenting 3 simultaneous estimates of Rommel's remaining tank and infantry strength; Ritchie is accepting middle case, Auchinlek chief of staff accepts best case and bases counter attack proposals at Arcoma on these
Auchinlek chief of staff ignores context of DAK retaining battlefield for estimated tank strength; due to loss of communications and many units captured it has become hazardous to guess how many tanks the DAK is destroying vs capturing/repairing for their own use
Personal observations:
GHQ command temper gravely impacted tonight, many staff officers whom had been confident, heavily impacted by Rommel arrival at Arcoma
Our staff (will provide further review tomorrow) now estimates ability of Tobruk garrison to withstand a 4 week siege as 1/15
Going on private disclosure of heavy losses at Sidi Muftah, which is still difficult to obtain a clear picture of; we regard the 150th brigade chance of relief as hopeless; 150th brigade beginning to report shortages of ammunition, water and fuel; collapse or surrender is likely; Ritchie and Auchinlek do not acknowledge this possibility and do not have a contingency plan for troops further north once the box falls
Privately, South African staff officers acknowledge ranging by captured heavy British (captured) guns on Tobruk, and significant probing/recon in force activity on the south east of the perimeter; they privately advise the south east defenses are very weak, and that a full throated assault from the south east could break into the port and heavily impact the garrison
Using our own analysis, and an assumption that the 32nd tank brigade is in worse condition than Ritchie has acknowledged, our staff is near certain Rommel has tank superiority on the Gazala battlefield
We regard threat to Tobruk garrison as mortal in light of Axis probes and disclosures from South African staff
We regard threat to troops at Gazala as greatly escalated from previous estimate
One staff officer says "this is Dunkirk with no one to bring us home"
South African staff officers appealing directly back to their political leaders to apply pressure on Ritchie and London; command impasses creating significant strategic impairment to the army
We regard all forces south and east of Gazala as defeated as lost, which Ritchie has not acknowledged
We regard degraded communications as mortal threat to all remaining troops at Gazala
End Transmission
Same time and date Bletchley Park Britain desk of Jean Alington; Project Ultra code breaker
Decryption pile on her desk for Abwehr field communications grows, unworked on due to desperate need to keep up efforts on decrypting PAA communications and increased Luftwaffe theater communications
Those messages, languishing on her busy desk contain information on operation Salaam and Condor
The platoon of Hauptman Seebohme's assigned to operation Salaam makes contact with secret agent Eppler in Cairo at their command post in Arcoma
