Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war

[Belisarius II]

Simply because the Bf109F was superior to the Hawker Hurricane II and the Curtiss Tomahawk, doesn't give the Luftwaffe a free pass to fly unmolested from Crete to North Africa. During the invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940, the Bf109E was definitely top of the food chain. It was simply better than the Hurricane I, Dewotine 520, MS406, Curtiss P-36, Fokker D.XXI, and any other fighter the Allies employed until the arrival of the first Spitfires over Dunkirk. Nonetheless, the Lufwaffe managed to lose 1,129 aircraft to enemy action (source Frieser, Karl-Heinz (1995). Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940 ).

The notion that the Tante Jus flying in from Crete would have an effective close escort of 109s also needs closer examination. The lesson from the Battle of Britain clearly show the that Bf109 was not well suited as an escort fighter. Let us look at the details of the proposed operation.

The distance from Heraklion to Gambut is around 250 miles one way, as the crow flies. Sources differ, but in general the Bf109 F had a cruising speed of around 310 mph and a cruising range of around 520 miles with a 300 litre drop tank. Superficially, this looks like a simple assignment.

However, the Ju 52s were considerable slower. They had a cruising speed of 153 mph and an economical cruising speed of 130mph. Given that they would be carrying as much as possible, it would be fair to go with the lower figure. So, it's a minimum two hour flight, with perfect navigation, no headwind and no enemy interference. The 109s would either have to throttle back and fly at a very uneconomical speed to stay close to their charges, or to weave pretty patterns above and around them, all the way to Gambut and then all the way back with the empties. Not only would they burn more fuel in either scenario, but they would also be exposing the Ju52s to attack. They would either be too close and too slow to be able to react, or they would have to react to an attack that was already underway. Given the extremely poor combat effectiveness of the Junkers 52, even a single coordinated gunnery pass against them will undoubtedly cause heavy losses. This was proven every time they were used in contested air space in daylight – including the OTL resupply runs across the Med.

In addition, any weakening of Luftwaffe units in Sicily to provide escorts for supply runs from Crete would undoubtedly ease the passage of the Operation Harpoon convoy to Malta between 12th and 15th June. This would further hamper any Axis resupply missions across the Strait of Sicily.

Given the need for the Luftwaffe to continue to dispute air supremacy over several battlefields at once (in just this theatre), it is far more likely that the Luftwaffe would assign Bf 110s as escorts. They had a far longer range and were much less in demand over the battlefront than the hard worked Bf109Fs. Of course having seen the 110s performance during the Battle of Britain, these aircraft would find it much more of a challenge to try to dogfight with Hurricanes and P-40s.

Probably more crucial than anything mentioned above, there is also the question of the availability of Ju 52s. From 20th February 1942 Ju 52s were withdrawn from all other theatres (including training machines from Germany itself) to fly in supplies for troops encricled in the Demjanks and Cholm pockets. Although they had to fly 160km over Soviet control territory, around 600 Junkers 52s succeeded in flying in around 305 tons of supplies per day. A fairly impressive achievement. However, they only face limited resistance from the Soviet air force, which was still weakened from the initial attacks of June 1941. Even with this limited air defence, the Luftwaffe still lost almost 300 Ju 52s in an operation which lasted until 18th May. (source Pimlott, John, 1998, Die Luftwaffe, Neuer Kaiser Verlag).

To then immediately reassign the surviving aircraft to the Mediterranean theatre for a similar resupply operation, over greater distances and with more effective opposition is an unlikely recipe for success. The aircraft needed maintenance, the crews needed rest, and the multi engined flying schools in Germany needed their surviving instructor pilots and planes back.

So, to summarise, resupply flights from Crete would not be an easy undertaking.

Several points please. In France 1940 most of the Luftwaffe losses were from ground fire, and operational loses. The Spitfire I/II could hold it's own against the Bf-109E. It could turn faster in most cases, and was probably a few MPH faster in level flight at most altitudes. The 109E could out climb, and dive the Spitfire, and had superior performance at high altitudes. The F model was superior in all but tight turns. The Spitfire V was a significant improvement over the I/II, but was still out preformed by the Fredrick in most measures, especially at high altitude, which wasn't that relevant in North Africa, where most fighting was at low-medium altitude. The F model was far superior to the P-40's, and Hurricane II's it faced at that time. The air to air loses at this time were nowhere near close. German Experts were raking up amazing scores at this time, but were making the mistake of slaughtering escorting fighters, and letting the bombers get through. The F wasn't as good a bomber killer as the E, or later G versions.

The Axis frequently used bombers for transports, and in addition they could tow some of the gliders for Operation Hercules to move men, and small arms. Their not trying to fly in heavy equipment, mostly men, with small arms, and personal kit, to serve as replacements. Gliders with their landing gear in place can be towed out, and reused, since their landing at airfields, not making combat landing in open fields. One squadron, (staffel) of Bf-109F's would be enough for escort duty, using the weaving method to keep their speed up. They don't have to do round trips, they land to refuel with their charges, and fly back with them.

Since the Desert Air Force would be forced back to airfields in Egypt what would make you think sending fighters over the sea to look for troop transports would be a priority? Most of their fighters would be busy escorting their own bombers, and trying to give cover to their own ground troops. Again since the Axis did fly in reinforcements in the OTL why is it so far fetched that they could do it in this TL? Since cardcarrier is only talking about moving 4,000 men, were only talking about 200 bomber sorties, or less over several days.

 

[Marco Rivignani]

Agree. I am one that just wants to enjoy and not deal with the incessant nit picking.

Me too. I like the premise of this story and I want to see how it evolves. Even if there are some things that are a bit forced one can easily gloss over them since this is an alternate history, not a history lesson.

 

[cardcarrier]

I appreciate the follows and the academic part of the commentary

I honestly did search the forum looking for mid war alternate axis military histories, and while finding some debates, that mirror what we have in my thread, I didn't see much in the way of working timelines 42-43. Most of the developed products where Germany making a big push in Africa before Barbarossa and Pear Harbor; which is sort of uninteresting to me, they have strategic initiative at that time and would win a campaign like that handily

@Belisarius I only mentioned 4000 men as historical marker. Rommel in the original timeline in the first week in July received approx 4000 fresh infantry replacements from the Crete garrison. Although their history on immediate arrival isn't covered in any great detail in books I have read; they where initially used as replacements for the 90th light but where then separated out, back into their own formation which was renamed 164th light africa division. The troops had seen some combat in Greece in 1941, and one of their regiments had a strong cadre of veterans from Barbarossa. Most histories of Alemein-Tunisgrad rate the division as good

My timeline has to make greater use of airborne reinforcements than what Rommel received historically to make up for his attrition; which was unsustainable; much more than his equipment having issues, was the constant emergency that any personel losses on his meager 35k German combat troops presented; a good reason why we see things later in the campaign of DAK running only 60 or even 25 tanks, was that so many of the crews had been wounded in the previous fighting without being replaced; as opposed to their being a lack of tanks for them to operate at all

 

[nbcman]

I appreciate the follows and the academic part of the commentary

I honestly did search the forum looking for mid war alternate axis military histories, and while finding some debates, that mirror what we have in my thread, I didn't see much in the way of working timelines 42-43. Most of the developed products where Germany making a big push in Africa before Barbarossa and Pear Harbor; which is sort of uninteresting to me, they have strategic initiative at that time and would win a campaign like that handily

@Belisarius I only mentioned 4000 men as historical marker. Rommel in the original timeline in the first week in July received approx 4000 fresh infantry replacements from the Crete garrison. Although their history on immediate arrival isn't covered in any great detail in books I have read; they where initially used as replacements for the 90th light but where then separated out, back into their own formation which was renamed 164th light africa division. The troops had seen some combat in Greece in 1941, and one of their regiments had a strong cadre of veterans from Barbarossa. Most histories of Alemein-Tunisgrad rate the division as good

My timeline has to make greater use of airborne reinforcements than what Rommel received historically to make up for his attrition; which was unsustainable; much more than his equipment having issues, was the constant emergency that any personel losses on his meager 35k German combat troops presented; a good reason why we see things later in the campaign of DAK running only 60 or even 25 tanks, was that so many of the crews had been wounded in the previous fighting without being replaced; as opposed to their being a lack of tanks for them to operate at all

I'd suggest reading those 'developed products' / previous discussions on the Mediterranean options for the Germans / Italians after the fall of France more closely as it seems that your understanding of the political and logistic issues facing Germany in 1940/1941 are incomplete.

 

[22000 Kevin]

I'd suggest reading those 'developed products' / previous discussions on the Mediterranean options for the Germans / Italians after the fall of France more closely as it seems that your understanding of the political and logistic issues facing Germany in 1940/1941 are incomplete.

Ah of course our knowledge of Logistics and politics is not complete, as if that wasn't even obvious at this point of the war.

Seeing that we must maintain accuracy to the fullest extent here.

 

[cardcarrier]

Chapter 6.3 Napoleon's central position

05-29-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Cairo Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ

Transmission to Washington:
Eighth army reserves 2 infantry 1 armored brigade en route to dangerous Axis concentrations at El Adem
Desert Air Force on heals, many machines lost on ground
22nd Armored Brigade assumed defeated and broken; 75 percent of British armor formations defeated; Axis losses likely over estimated by Eighth Army
Many armored formations headquarters lost, many rear area staff headquarters lost, communications with remaining units south and east of coastal road heavily impacted
Remaining units on Gazala line imperiled, supply routes insecure, center section of line possible total loss
Italian units appear to marshal for assault on northern section of line
Axis position at Belhamed major strategic lapse, recriminations in HQ due to failure to defend
Axis supply situation boosted by capture of eighth army offensive supply depots
Discussion on going in GHQ relocate final assets in Egypt to Gazala, relocate divisions from deeper Middle East Command to Egypt
GHQ has orders from London to make iron stands at Gazala and Tobruk
British Royal Navy Med Command demands regular motoring time update between Rommel and Alexandria; assessed today with General Ritchie, heavy argument ensued, Navy considers itself senior service; may begin preparing demolition program if Rommel crosses into Egypt


Personal observations: Regard 8th army in Napoleon's central position; superior to any one grouping around it, but surrounded. Eighth army has morale problems and ongoing issues with combined arms. Rate counter attack chance of success no greater than 1/3, command disruption is dangerous and will take time to address; regard threat to troops along coastal road as mortal. South African division at Tobruk not rated as ready for combat. If Axis captures Tobruk, major security threat to Egypt emerges. Recriminations from London serious, rumors of partial or complete change to 8th army or GHQ command possible. Gott confirmed captured, was their best general. Ritchie overwhelmed and frustrated. Last command conference devolved into blame placement on failure at Gambut, some staff officers requesting to build defensive lines in Egypt and not immediately dispatch remaining reserves to Libya. Royal navy has no plans to evacuate or support Tobruk, they advise units all committed or under repair; loss of lines of communications and inexperience of remaining troops commands serious

End Transmission

Will edit in authors perspective and notes later

 

[Hetzer1901]

This timeline continues to be amazing. So much of history is one side rolling sixes when they shouldn’t have been able to. Keep it up and don’t mind the haters.

 

[Belisarius II]

This timeline continues to be amazing. So much of history is one side rolling sixes when they shouldn’t have been able to. Keep it up and don’t mind the haters.

Critics keep saying this, but only one change was made. If someone wrote what happened at Gazala in the OTL people who didn't know what really happened would say it was a one sided work of fiction. The same would be said of an account of the first 6 months of the War in the Pacific.

 

[TimTurner]

Critics keep saying this, but only one change was made. If someone wrote what happened at Gazala in the OTL people who didn't know what really happened would say it was a one sided work of fiction. The same would be said of an account of the first 6 months of the War in the Pacific.

The phrase 'reality is unrealistic' comes to mind.

 

[Belisarius II]

The phrase 'reality is unrealistic' comes to mind.

My father, who was a terrible cynic used to like to say, "Truth is stranger then fiction." To write good AH one is forced to try to be more realistic then reality is, or people refuse to accept it as plausible. "If that was in a movie I'd walk out."

 

[sonofpegasus]

Realistic is I think not the best term to use, Plausible is a more accurate description of the standard that AH writers should IMVHO aspire to. So much of OTL history over the whole history of humanity is so incredibly implausible that to an outside observer it would seem to be the work of ASB's. So working within the parameters of what is probable and plausible gives an ATL writer the realism that their story needs. Balancing those whilst writing a TL that engages the reader and causes them to think and engage is a fine line and a worthy achievement of the OP. For a first TL cardcarrier has certainly engaged the forum and I for one applauded the effort. The conquest of Egypt by the Axis under Rommel in 1942 OTL might be verging on ABS (in my personal view under OTL conditions it was just not possible) but to explore just how plausible it was via an ATL is I think a legitimate exercise and I look forward to seeing how this story goes.

 

[David Flin]

My father, who was a terrible cynic used to like to say, "Truth is stranger then fiction." To write good AH one is forced to try to be more realistic then reality is, or people refuse to accept it as plausible. "If that was in a movie I'd walk out."

The usual phrase used when writing fiction is: "The willing suspension of disbelief." Different readers have different points at which they go: "Oh, for pity's sake," and have the element of plausibility shattered. The author needs to decide just how plausible or otherwise they are prepared to make their fiction. This can, of course, vary for different works by the same author. For example, I've written a TL in which WW3 took place, with actual fighting, yet there was not a single casualty (except for a NATO general who sprained his wrist drinking a glass with too much whisky in it). This, I might venture to suggest, is not a high probability TL. This was despite the fact that every single event and strategic decision involved was taken straight out of OTL.

I wrote another TL centred on The Troubles, which (by and large) retained a high degree of plausibility.

Real life is not constrained by needing to adjust to the expectations of the readers. The late Alison Brooks once wrote a review of the Falklands War as though it were a piece of fiction, and tore it to shreds. Which was quite entertaining for her and myself, given where we were April-June 1982.

In make no judgement upon this particular TL. In my opinion, reality has an advantage over fiction when it comes to sounding plausible.

 

[cardcarrier]

the summer of 1942 is one of those stranger than fiction events; given the incredibly high losses the axis took in 1941, and the entry of the United states into the war, the material and manpower advantage vs the axis was at least 4-1 by even the most conservative measure... the war had been going on for 3 years, good commanders and tactics should long since have been identified, applicable vehicles to the desert with hard hitting cannons, and fighter aircraft which could hold sway by combination of numbers and superior engineering; and yet we had Neil Ritchie and Semyon Timoshenko commanding the armies at the decisive point, both sending their armies to be encircled and defeated, and pass theater initiative to the axis whom had no business having it; both under enormous and unhelpful political pressure to take the fight to the axis

I like to keep both fronts in parallel in my head, it should be remembered by the reader that the day after Rommel's offensive started the final resistance to Paulus/Kleist Bag at Kharkov collapsed, costing the Red army just about 300k casualties and over 1000 tanks; Bonner Fellers was told by laison officers and other attaches that Army Group South had come down on the Ukraine like a hammer on a pane of glass, and members of Auchinlek's staff regarded this as a real long term security threat to their theater (ie they believed the Germans could capture the Caucuses, and disrupt Lend Lease operations in Persia, and eventually threaten the canal zone from the north)... I use that as an example of just how far removed from plausibility mindsets were getting themselves worked into then because of how poorly that part of the war was going

Edits: Will consider this author's note and perspective for 6.3

The great calamity that occurred in the Summer and fall gave more craziness in allied staffs than any other time except for the fall of 1940. When Army Group A recaptured Rostov, Stalin emphatically demanded the western allies deploy 30!... 30!....30! divisions to the southern end of his front, the imperial general staff in London made contingency plans to deploy 3 divisions into the Caucuses, and the American joint chiefs made plans to deploy an entire air force to the middle east and numerous logistical and line of communications assets.

Churchill was all about doing this too until, if one believes the rumors that only the vote of no confidence after the Tobruk disaster, and Brook threatening to resign if a single British or Commonwealth soldier was deployed to Russian soil (after Brook had tried repeatedly reminding the PM about the poor fate of British soldiers in "allied" Russian territory in the north and south at the end of the last war) stopped that little operation from being born... Mr. Churchill did love him some peripheral death traps. He was very lucky Brook was a calm, intelligent level headed man

I could literally introduce into the timeline that 2nd New Zealand, the Australians and 5th British division get deployed to the caucuses instead of El Alamein and have it be completely plausible because of Churchill/Stalin's meddling and pressure on their staffs and public relations. I could have operation torch cancelled and have those forces sent to Egypt and Basra under these conditions as well.... strange times; Brook and Marshal never get enough credit for being adults in a room

final edit of items:

We discussed Rommel's "luck" in having a high quality intel apparatus against his opponents in the 8th army without even the slightest mention of the "luck" of the British having project ultra or operation double cross, or the Russians having the Red Orchestra; 6's existed throughout the war, and there where some intelligent people in charge of comms security and some really dumb people too

The abwehr, kriegsmarine and German foreign office decryption departments where all very good at their work (breaking enemy codes), as remarked by all post war reviews, and many former analysts where prized lecturers at NATO for years after the war

Fellers finding out he was compromised was honestly more of an exception than a rule, keeping in mind that he told his own superiors for 6! months before Gazala that he thought the black code was compromised by German agents and they told him to shut up.

The Germans captured high level allied officers throughout 1942 who knew either directly or scary amounts indirectly about project ultra and didn't change or figure out anything was wrong. Rommel requested a Gestapo investigation into signals security in November 1942 because he felt too many of his transports where being intercepted for it to be just chance, he was told to shut up. The allies risked sending high level officers; repeatedly into German territory who had knowledge of project ultra like Mark Clark and Matthew Ridgeway, if you tried writing that as fiction you would be laughed out of a forum

British bomber command radio practices tipped their raids THE ENTIRE WAR; even the blithering idiots in charge of Luftwaffe signals intelligence couldn't believe it; and they tipped their hand the entire second half of the war that they knew about the raids by having their intruders go on LOL visits to the bases before the missions would launch and concentrating their nightfighter wings directly along the bomber streams. The bomber barons never once for a second thought they might be tipping their raids even when Spaatz saw their practice and tried convincing that their radio practices where crazy; by comparison American radio discipline, which at best was average, was enough that the blithering idiots in charge of Luftwaffe signals intel couldn't figure out what their targets where... AFTER THEY HAD ALREADY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS

as stated above some 6's can only be defended by the fact they actually happened

 

[ferdi254]

Having now captured up and after having been through a couple of Gudestein threads (in some I defended him in others I callled out massive faults) I must say, yes it seems the Germans get more luck than OTL but IMHV nothing too extreme.

 

[EWHM]

The major powers learned a LOT about operational security, particularly information security during WWII. That's the reason a lot of that stuff was actually still classified for a LONG time after the war---they didn't want minor players to get the lessons they'd paid very dearly for at cut rate prices. There's a reason why a lot of us look at some of the moves and say...OMG boneheaded, drinking lead paint, etc. WW2 is where an awful lot of best practices were determined and that determination was, well, expensive.

 

[Belisarius II]

Realistic is I think not the best term to use, Plausible is a more accurate description of the standard that AH writers should IMVHO aspire to. So much of OTL history over the whole history of humanity is so incredibly implausible that to an outside observer it would seem to be the work of ASB's. So working within the parameters of what is probable and plausible gives an ATL writer the realism that their story needs. Balancing those whilst writing a TL that engages the reader and causes them to think and engage is a fine line and a worthy achievement of the OP. For a first TL cardcarrier has certainly engaged the forum and I for one applauded the effort. The conquest of Egypt by the Axis under Rommel in 1942 OTL might be verging on ABS (in my personal view under OTL conditions it was just not possible) but to explore just how plausible it was via an ATL is I think a legitimate exercise and I look forward to seeing how this story goes.

I really can't understand your definitions. If you think Rommel conquering Egypt in the OTL was not possible, then how can changing one event make it plausible? Since the French brigade box holding out for 2 weeks was a highly improbable event, and that's what saved 8th Army from envelopment, then Rommel's plan had a realistic chance of succeeding, which means victory was possible, since he came close to it anyway. Are you saying it was impossible for Rommel to win at 1st El Alamein, not matter what shape, or strength his forces were in when they got there, or even if they got there 10-14 days sooner?

 

[Belisarius II]

Having now captured up and after having been through a couple of Gudestein threads (in some I defended him in others I callled out massive faults) I must say, yes it seems the Germans get more luck than OTL but IMHV nothing too extreme.

If you wrote a story before the secret of Ultra was made public, about capturing a U-Boat, with it's encryption machine, and code books would anyone believe it? It would just seem so implausible few people would accept it. What's happened here was a fairly small tactical change, in a brigade level battle, that could effect the fate of an Army, and a major campaign.

 

[EWHM]

I really can't understand your definitions. If you think Rommel conquering Egypt in the OTL was not possible, then how can changing one event make it plausible? Since the French brigade box holding out for 2 weeks was a highly improbable event, and that's what saved 8th Army from envelopment, then Rommel's plan had a realistic chance of succeeding, which means victory was possible, since he came close to it anyway. Are you saying it was impossible for Rommel to win at 1st El Alamein, not matter what shape, or strength his forces were in when they got there, or even if they got there 10-14 days sooner?

I wouldn't say the heroic stand of the Free French brigade was ridiculously implausible, probably just the equivalent of a high quality unit and leader rolling the equivalent of a 5 or a 6 . 3:1 attacks fail about 30% of the time after all. Rommel's plan to envelop and largely destroy 8th Army probably had about a 50/50 shot of working. What that means to the overall campaign in Egypt I don't know. This timeline so far is a good exploration of that.
If we take the 'rolls' of baseline OTL as given, so far we've only changed one roll, the one on the 3:1 combat results table against the Free French, probably knocking a 6 down to a 3 or so (or raising a zero to about a 3 if the Axis player is rolling the die).

 

[Belisarius II]

I wouldn't say the heroic stand of the Free French brigade was ridiculously implausible, probably just the equivalent of a high quality unit and leader rolling the equivalent of a 5 or a 6 . 3:1 attacks fail about 30% of the time after all. Rommel's plan to envelop and largely destroy 8th Army probably had about a 50/50 shot of working. What that means to the overall campaign in Egypt I don't know. This timeline so far is a good exploration of that.
If we take the 'rolls' of baseline OTL as given, so far we've only changed one roll, the one on the 3:1 combat results table against the Free French, probably knocking a 6 down to a 3 or so (or raising a zero to about a 3 if the Axis player is rolling the die).

So if you think Rommel had a 50/50 chance of enveloping 8th Army at Gazala how do you figure he had a 0% chance of conquering Egypt?

 

[EWHM]

So if you think Rommel had a 50/50 chance of enveloping 8th Army at Gazala how do you figure he had a 0% chance of conquering Egypt?

I don't think he has a 0% chance of conquering Egypt. That's another poster's opinion. I suspect if he wins Gazala more heavily than OTL, he'll win in El Alamein. How the British and the Egyptians react if he wins El Alamein is a big question.