Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war

[cardcarrier]

Rommel's supply demands where never met, even with the clandestine use of Tunisian ports the highest amount he ever received in a month was ~52k tonnes; he had to steal it from the British or it would never come at all

The booty of captureable British fuel was at Belhamed and El Adem, not Tobruk itself; most of the fuel the Axis used for the balance of the campaign was confiscated from El Adem and from other British stocks when their armored formations and defensive boxes where over-run.

I do not believe that transporting infantry replacements, at a rate of <60 flights per day, when the Demyansk campaign had been completed for 3+ weeks qualifies as handwaiving. I put down the historical marker to point out, why and how this could be accomplished

Now, could this have implications for case blue, as the transports where used to facilitate Army Group B's advances to a very large degree; yes, could Kesselring beginning to draw on strategic reserves 3-4 weeks earlier than the original timeline have implications for case blue; yes. Can a superior outcome for Rommel in Summer 1942 exist in a timeline where the Axis has a worse outcome for case blue in the same Summer of 1942; yes

 

[Post]

Now, could this have implications for case blue, as the transports where used to facilitate Army Group B's advances to a very large degree; yes, could Kesselring beginning to draw on strategic reserves 3-4 weeks earlier than the original timeline have implications for case blue; yes. Can a superior outcome for Rommel in Summer 1942 exist in a timeline where the Axis has a worse outcome for case blue in the same Summer of 1942; yes

The Germans were always going to prioritze Case Blue over NA, no matter who makes the decisions.

 

[oldironside]

I do not believe that transporting infantry replacements, at a rate of <60 flights per day, when the Demyansk campaign had been completed for 3+ weeks qualifies as handwaiving. I put down the historical marker to point out, why and how this could be accomplished

The handwaving I was referring to was the notion that what was done after Demjansk OTL could be done just the same TTL a few weeks earlier. You haven't addressed any of the points I made about the logistics of getting the Ju 52s to Crete earlier that OTL and getting them operational.

 

[oldironside]

The Germans were always going to prioritze Case Blue over NA, no matter who makes the decisions.

Indeed. Decisions were made from the top, and the guy in charge never left anyone in doubt as to what he wanted.

 

[David Flin]

According to one source at least, this involved ten to fifteen flights per hour into the pocket. The aircraft, aircrew and ground crew must all have been absolutely worn out. They would then have a grand total of 24 days to get things back in order, rest, service the aircraft, make good any losses or deficiencies and then relocate, lock, stock and barrel to Heraklion to start all over again. That is a journey of over almost 2,000 miles. The “a few weeks later” you cite is probably the bare minimum they would have needed to be even close to 40% servicable (You quote sixty Junkers 52s, with a servicability rate of 50%, although 40% was more normal for the Luftwaffe in that theatre).

Even with that, these supplies and reinforcements from Crete are a drop in the ocean. The Axis forces in Africa needed 100,000 tons of supplies every month. I make that around 3,300 tons per day. Kesslering promised Rommel that he would be able to fly in 400 or 500 tons of fuel a day (sources vary on the actual figure he promised). In reality, these later supply flights only provided 25 tons per day. These flights were intercepted and, more importantly, not massively escorted. As far back as December 1941 a resupply flight of eleven Junkers 52s were intercepted by sixteen Martin Maryland bombers. The Junkers' escort consisted of no more than two Bf110s.

Just to do a bit of number crunching here.

We'll use ASB as originally intended by their creator, and say that every Junkers 52 is available and can fly around the clock without incident. The flights are never interrupted, never have mechanical breakdowns, never have to detour. We'll grant that for the purpose of crunching numbers. We'll also toss in that landing, take-off, loading and unloading takes zero time.

A Junkers 52 had a carrying capacity of 3 tons. With 3300 tons per day required, that's 1100 flights per day. Call it 1200 to make the numbers a fraction easier. That's 50 landings every hour, nigh on 1 every minute. That's basically equivalent to Heathrow.

With 50 landings per hour, and 60 planes, that pretty much means each plane does a round trip in an hour. Given that it's around 700 miles from Tripoli to Tobruk, that means that the airspeed the planes need to achieve is around 1400mph, or well over Mach 2.

As was demonstrated time after time after time in WW2, resupply by air was only achievable under very exceptional circumstances. This isn't one such circumstance.

Relying on capturing enemy supplies is a desperation measure. It allows for no margin of error. Fail to capture a supply dump, for whatever reason, and you're screwed.

Relying on the one road for supplies (which is consuming 20 gallons to get one to the front) leads us to the historical situation where the tanks are running on fumes, but that's OK, because they've broken down for lack of spare parts.

Relying on air to supply rapid movement of armour is laughable in a WW2 context.

I do not believe that transporting infantry replacements, at a rate of <60 flights per day, when the Demyansk campaign had been completed for 3+ weeks qualifies as handwaiving. I put down the historical marker to point out, why and how this could be accomplished

Infantry is more than warm bodies. Infantry may need less supplies than artillery or armour, but they do need a constant flow of supplies, and the supply lines you've got are already stretched well beyond breaking point.

More men means more supplies needed, and the logistics at this point are moving into what can most kindly be described as implausible.

 

[oldironside]

Relying on capturing enemy supplies is a desperation measure. It allows for no margin of error. Fail to capture a supply dump, for whatever reason, and you're screwed.

This was essentially the downfall of Unternehmen Wach am Rhein.

 

[cardcarrier]

The Germans were always going to prioritze Case Blue over NA, no matter who makes the decisions.

I am going to try to make it a point to not relitigate the historical timeline

For as much in the great context of 1940-43 what you say is true, your exact words are not true

Kesselring, historically had the authority to pull aircraft from the mainland to fly in reinforcements to Rommel, and did so in July 1942... not when Army Group South (B didn't exist yet) was still marshaling for their attack like they are in my timeline, but when they where in their full throated offensive; and critically dependent on transports for everything from fuel/ammunition delivery to evacuating their wounded

Those same Germans who "prioritized" case blue and Russia above all else, sent 3 divisions from the strategic reserve, and replacements for Rommels existing divisions in the fall when case blue was at its height

Those same germans who where prioritizing case blue, sent 3 additional divisions from the strategic reserve and most of their transport fleet in a hopeless battle against the allies in Tunisia when the 6th army was on the last legs of it's offensive, and continued that air resupply; when the 6th army was surrounded and withering on the vine

It's often lost in many histories of the war that Tunisgrad was as great a strategic debacle for the axis as Stalingrad

 

[cardcarrier]

Indeed. Decisions were made from the top, and the guy in charge never left anyone in doubt as to what he wanted.

The guy in charge vacilitated greatly, if the operational objectives of case blue are looked as they developed the entire second half of the year; the entire experience of the Italian alpini corps in south Russia that campaign season could be described as one of ~evolving orders~

 

[oldironside]

The guy in charge vacilitated greatly, if the operational objectives of case blue are looked as they developed the entire second half of the year; the entire experience of the Italian alpini corps in south Russia that campaign season could be described as one of ~evolving orders~

That doesn't alter the fact that he was almost totally focussed on the Eastern Front. His whole philosophy was about conquering and exploiting everything that lay to the east of him.

 

[cardcarrier]

The handwaving I was referring to was the notion that what was done after Demjansk OTL could be done just the same TTL a few weeks earlier. You haven't addressed any of the points I made about the logistics of getting the Ju 52s to Crete earlier that OTL and getting them operational.

service rates of Luftwaffe aircraft where gradually increasing as the spring wore on because the army had settled on a defensive line, which let them operate from permanent bases; also with the end of the Russian winter non combat issues where reduced.

The luftwaffe as a general rule treated their transport pilots like trash and ran their entire pilot/service corps into the ground no matter how worn out they where; see war results 39-45 for relevant context. The benefits they would have (and did have) at Crete was that some of the more exhausted crews could have their sorties undertaken by HE-111/JU-88 pilots/crews who where already there, and that the airbases where in working order with ok ground conditions

 

[cardcarrier]

That doesn't alter the fact that he was almost totally focussed on the Eastern Front. His whole philosophy was about conquering and exploiting everything that lay to the east of him.

that is of course why there wasn't a southern campaign in 1941 and true; I was pointing out that even if his books and personality where dominated by events in the East, he authorized the release of 6 reserve divisions and significant amounts of his air forces, when they could have made a decisive difference in the case blue campaign; which was to directly rebut Post who said case blue would be prioritized no matter what; when clearly, historically, that wasn't always the case

 

[oldironside]

service rates of Luftwaffe aircraft where gradually increasing as the spring wore on because the army had settled on a defensive line, which let them operate from permanent bases; also with the end of the Russian winter non combat issues where reduced.

The luftwaffe as a general rule treated their transport pilots like trash and ran their entire pilot/service corps into the ground no matter how worn out they where; see war results 39-45 for relevant context. The benefits they would have (and did have) at Crete was that some of the more exhausted crews could have their sorties undertaken by HE-111/JU-88 pilots/crews who where already there, and that the airbases where in working order with ok ground conditions

Okay, you are ignoring the my point that the aircraft involved in supplying the Demjansk pocket would have needed serious maintenance or possibly even replacement after having worked so hard for such a long time. The aircraft at the end of that operation were in no condition to undertake long flights over water while heavily laden.

If you are going to strip the bomber squadrons of their aircrew in order to keep up this rather ineffectual air bridge (delivering only 25 tons a day at best), this will have a knock on effect on other areas of operation. Suddenly the Luftwaffe has reduced its own bomber force, easing pressure on Malta and allowing the Operation Harpoon convoy an easier passage.

 

[cardcarrier]

Okay, you are ignoring the my point that the aircraft involved in supplying the Demjansk pocket would have needed serious maintenance or possibly even replacement after having worked so hard for such a long time. The aircraft at the end of that operation were in no condition to undertake long flights over water while heavily laden.

If you are going to strip the bomber squadrons of their aircrew in order to keep up this rather ineffectual air bridge (delivering only 25 tons a day at best), this will have a knock on effect on other areas of operation. Suddenly the Luftwaffe has reduced its own bomber force, easing pressure on Malta and allowing the Operation Harpoon convoy an easier passage.

I'm not ignoring the point at all, the transport fleet got worked to the bone with bad operational rates well through the middle of the following year; they demonstrated an ability to still perform at a reduced capacity during that time. They flew thousands of sorties for Case Blue in July/August, in far worse conditions than the small contingents that had to work from Crete starting in July historically; and the transport fleet was receiving approx 40 new JU-52's (and other models) every month to make good their losses

2 short sorties to Gambut a day is far less of a workload than the transport pilots conducted historically, and far less stressful than the 8-10 sorties per day that was expected of the tactical bombers and fighters on the front lines

It's not an airbridge like Tunisia, its just a shuttle service of infantry replacements

 

[oldironside]

I'm not ignoring the point at all, the transport fleet got worked to the bone with bad operational rates well through the middle of the following year; they demonstrated an ability to still perform at a reduced capacity during that time. They flew thousands of sorties for Case Blue in July/August, in far worse conditions than the small contingents that had to work from Crete starting in July historically; and the transport fleet was receiving approx 40 new JU-52's (and other models) every month to make good their losses

2 short sorties to Gambut a day is far less of a workload than the transport pilots conducted historically, and far less stressful than the 8-10 sorties per day that was expected of the tactical bombers and fighters on the front lines

It's not an airbridge like Tunisia, its just a shuttle service of infantry replacements

So, risky overwater flights using worn out aircraft in order to deliver 1000 troops a day (in the best case scenario, with no mechanical issues and no enemy action) without heavy weapons or any other support. They are going to be joining a force of worn out and broken down Panzer IIs , IIIs and IVs, desperately short of spares and in real need of rest and repair which is going to involve cannibalising some vehicles to keep others running. And robbing your own bomber force of pilots during the Harpoon and Pedestal convoys is just handing the enemy a tactical victor for very little potential gain. Any competent staff officer will look at that and see that it's just not worth the effort.

 

[cardcarrier]

So, risky overwater flights using worn out aircraft in order to deliver 1000 troops a day (in the best case scenario, with no mechanical issues and no enemy action) without heavy weapons or any other support. They are going to be joining a force of worn out and broken down Panzer IIs , IIIs and IVs, desperately short of spares and in real need of rest and repair which is going to involve cannibalising some vehicles to keep others running. And robbing your own bomber force of pilots during the Harpoon and Pedestal convoys is just handing the enemy a tactical victor for very little potential gain. Any competent staff officer will look at that and see that it's just not worth the effort.

any competent staff officer would see the Africa Korps strategic situation and probably resign; one had to make war with the army they had

Rommel's army was supplied for an offensive on 5/26 because it had sat still and recovered its strength for 18 weeks after their recapture of Bengahzi; worn out and broken German equipment would be a problem, but not by 5/29 when each division has only fought 1 battle so far. Most of Rommel's tanks had only been delivered to Libya since January, so they where not beaten to hell (yet) It's not fair to compare the DAK 3 days into the battle no more than 80 miles from their start lines, to the shattered mass of human suffering it was after 5 weeks of non stop combat; 400+ miles from its start lines at 1st battle of El Alamein

yes 1000 men a day, just bodies to refill Kleeman's division; that's all they are in the timeline to the moment

 

[Protagoras]

A Junkers 52 had a carrying capacity of 3 tons. With 3300 tons per day required, that's 1100 flights per day. Call it 1200 to make the numbers a fraction easier. That's 50 landings every hour, nigh on 1 every minute. That's basically equivalent to Heathrow.

If the timeline claimed that Rommel's forces were fully supplied and were going to have no supply problems going forward, this might be in some way relevant. I haven't actually read anything like that in the timeline; perhaps you have some ability to read between the lines that I lack? Because all I can see in the actual timeline is that Gazala (which may be the decisive victory of the title, I would note; we haven't even gotten to El Alamein, so if you argument is that Rommel couldn't possibly win El Alamein, perhaps wait for someone to say he will?) has gone even better for Rommel than historically, with the result that Rommel is in a slightly better position. I fail to see what is supposed to be so mind-bendingly implausible in that.

 

[David Flin]

If the timeline claimed that Rommel's forces were fully supplied and were going to have no supply problems going forward, this might be in some way relevant. I haven't actually read anything like that in the timeline; perhaps you have some ability to read between the lines that I lack? Because all I can see in the actual timeline is that Gazala (which may be the decisive victory of the title, I would note; we haven't even gotten to El Alamein, so if you argument is that Rommel couldn't possibly win El Alamein, perhaps wait for someone to say he will?) has gone even better for Rommel than historically, with the result that Rommel is in a slightly better position. I fail to see what is supposed to be so mind-bendingly implausible in that.

Because in the discussion, the author stated that using air transport significantly greater than OTL wasn't invoking handwavium, and that piling yet another risky gamble onto things is within reason.

Maybe the gambling is something that would happen, maybe not. We are, however, drifting closer towards reliance upon capturing British supplies as the logistical support.

We'll see how things go, but I am putting down a marker that the German logistical position here is a nightmare, and the better they do tactically, the worse that logistical situation will get.

 

[cardcarrier]

Because in the discussion, the author stated that using air transport significantly greater than OTL wasn't invoking handwavium, and that piling yet another risky gamble onto things is within reason.

Maybe the gambling is something that would happen, maybe not. We are, however, drifting closer towards reliance upon capturing British supplies as the logistical support.

We'll see how things go, but I am putting down a marker that the German logistical position here is a nightmare, and the better they do tactically, the worse that logistical situation will get.

Rommel's entire drive into Egypt was on the basis of captured supplies, not his own organic logistics, I believe I have been clear eyed about identifying the supply conditions such as they where, and where I have altered them in the timeline, to be more favorable to him within the battle of Gazala, without granting him a long string of 6's

Some of the objection has been falling under categories of

1. The DAK logistics where terrible; that is accepted and was mentioned in the prologue and never been disputed
2. Objecting to Rommel winning Gazala conceptually, which is arguing with the original timeline

Your marker that their logistical position on 5/29 would be a nightmare in this timeline would not be true. Historically by this point of the battle, yes because of the long detour around Bir Hakeim the DAK, was strung out and had to withdraw from the dumps they had captured, and where sustaining their fair share of vicious air attacks on their loc

In this time line Belhamed fell and the Desert Air Force was disrupted, the DAK can be fed along the paths in the south, without the long exposed detours, and 15th panzer/90th light can partially live off the land on the bases they captured; easing the burden on the quartermaster companies

If we look at the objective balance of forces against the axis for operation thesus and case blue, everything before them was a huge gamble; both after spectacular initial success failed and begat their inevitable strategic destruction from the much greater powers aligned against them

its not hard to see the parallel of rommel's last gasp at Alemein, 90 miles from the paradise of his objective (so he would have thought anyway); and Paulus troops reaching the volga and having cleared 90 percent of Stalingrad, and so to being close to their prize before collapsing on themselves

they where both close run affairs, they shouldn't have been, but allied command in the summer and fall; was what it was and made the mistakes they made; the axis at this time is very close to a zero sum game, reserves and fuel are scarce, aircraft are very much committed and the troops where pushed to the limit, the margin of items I can give Rommel without inventing things for him out of thin air is very small

 

[22000 Kevin]

I feel bad for the people who came here for a timeline and not this endless cycle of "Objections and counter arguments for why 1+1=2 and not 4"

Anyway great discussions kind of feel bad for the OP doing his best to prove that its plausible and that the TL is not a dumbed down quantity over quality story with poisoned drinks or foods hidden everywhere, plenty of notes here to find whenever you need to know about the battle for North Africa.

Also great to see that people care extremely on the historical accuracy of this TL, maybe a bit too much on something that's supposed to be alternative history but oh well.

 

[Issei Uzumaki]

I feel bad for the people who came here for a timeline and not this endless cycle of "Objections and counter arguments for why 1+1=2 and not 4"

Anyway great discussions kind of feel bad for the OP doing his best to prove that its plausible and that the TL is not a dumbed down quantity over quality story with poisoned drinks or foods hidden everywhere, plenty of notes here to find whenever you need to know about the battle for North Africa.

Also great to see that people care extremely on the historical accuracy of this TL, maybe a bit too much on something that's supposed to be alternative history but oh well.

Agree. I am one that just wants to enjoy and not deal with the incessant nit picking.