Situation of the Middle Eastern theater in a 1918 CP victory scenario?

[GauchoBadger]

Basically, assume that the US under Wilson doesn't join WWI on the side of the Entente around 1917. The German Spring Offensive of Q2 1918, thus, is a success, forcing Britain and France to the negotiating table.
The main question here is, what would happen in the Middle East theater, primarily around the Palestine and Iraq battlezones within the Ottoman Empire? Britain had already managed to make significant inroads into Iraq, capturing Baghdad in late 1917. The Palestine campaign wasn't yet yielding much fruit but the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, aided by allied Arab-Bedouin rebels, had managed to enter Jerusalem by the same time. At the same time as the Spring Offensive, they attempted an offensive towards Amman and Es-Salt, but were repulsed by German and Ottoman forces.
If the war ends in 1918 with a modest CP victory in the Western Front, what happens to the Near East? Will the Ottomans decide to continue fighting the British with hopes of kicking them out of their territory for good or would they accept a peace deal, giving up what they had lost in Iraq, Palestine and Arabia?

 

[Fries]

It depends on if the Ottomans are treated as a separate belligerent or not.

If not, we can assume a Middle East much like OTL; states manufactured by imperialism, rife with instability and civil discontent, the Turkish War for Independence, etc., etc.

If we assume the Ottomans are treated as a co-belligerent with Germany and Austria-Hungary, then there's 2 issues that we have to deal with: the Arab Revolt and civil discontent within the Ottoman Empire. If a clause of TTL's Treaty is an end of British funding for the Arab Revolt, it'll probably be defeated or at least severely hurt.

If it still succeeds, though, then there will be no Syria, Jordan, Palestine/Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc.. Instead, there will be one united Kingdom of Arabia under the House of Hashim.

If it fails, Ottoman hegemony over the peninsula is still as good as gone. Smaller-scale nationalist revolts will be commonplace, and they may succeed if these revolts are funded by foreign powers, notably Britain. However, the Ottoman Empire will still have its grip over the Vilayets.

 

[anotherlurker]

Some thoughts usually ignored in this reoccuring scenario.

-Importance of theaters, what's the point in keeping large formations in Mesopotamia when France is about to fall?
-Surplus equipment, if the Turks fight on they'd have near endless supply of quality equipment from Germany that's not needed now to fight the British, Germany has no reason or motivation to not deliver it, the more the UK loses the better for them in what will be long winded peace negotoations
-The domestic price of losing, can war in Mesopotamia be kept up with strikes and riots out of control in the UK over all the sacrifices for nothing?

 

[Riain]

A lot would depend on the particular form that peace negotiations took, as well as the situation on the ground. The Entente forces had made big advances in Palestine and Mesopotamia in 1917-18 so if the entire CP negotiates peace treaties the Ottomans will get these back, particularly if Germany adds to the otherwise defeated Asien Korps to increase leverage.

If the CP doesn't stay united then the situation on the ground isn't favourable for the Ottomans to negotiate a good peace. The CP leverage is their hold on the throats of Metropolitan France and Britain, which is basically Germany's advantage to use. if the Ottomans can't make this work the they're liable to not even return to their pre war borders.

 

[Fries]

A lot would depend on the particular form that peace negotiations took, as well as the situation on the ground. The Entente forces had made big advances in Palestine and Mesopotamia in 1917-18 so if the entire CP negotiates peace treaties the Ottomans will get these back, particularly if Germany adds to the otherwise defeated Asien Korps to increase leverage.

If the CP doesn't stay united then the situation on the ground isn't favourable for the Ottomans to negotiate a good peace. The CP leverage is their hold on the throats of Metropolitan France and Britain, which is basically Germany's advantage to use. if the Ottomans can't make this work the they're liable to not even return to their pre war borders.

I'd take anotherlurker's points into account, though. Why wouldn't Germany give weapons and supplies to the Ottomans if there's no Britain or France (and presumably Italy) to worry about?

 

[Mark E.]

Since you'd butterfly away the collapse of the German economy in 1923, the Second Reich (Weimar) remains stable. Anti-Semitism remains more conventional with no eventual Holocaust or the persecutions that drove many European Jews to Palestine in the thirties. Palestine remains a delicate balance point of faith-based focus with Arabs, Christians and Jews alike, as it was for centuries. How that works with a broken Ottoman Empire, I don't know.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

OTL, the Ottomans came round to accepting the idea of losing the Arab part of their Empire pretty quickly. They had increasingly lost influence in the Persian Gulf pre-War, so the outright revolt of the Hashemite-led Arabs might be the final nail in the coffin for the Empire south of Anatolia.

Might there be an Ottoman-backed Saudi drive northwards post-War, to remove the Hashemites? Maybe some form of Arab state that’s friendly to the Sublime Porte, yet still independent?

 

[Riain]

I'd take anotherlurker's points into account, though. Why wouldn't Germany give weapons and supplies to the Ottomans if there's no Britain or France (and presumably Italy) to worry about?

If the Ottomans fight on in late 1918 with german weapons after the British arrange a peace with Germany they are screwed. The British had powerful forces in the theatre winning battles, and will likely continue this if able to fight, as they can salvage something in the middle east to offset the nightmare on their doorstep. Any extra weapons will be too little, too late to undo the successes of 1917 and the first half of 1918.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

When are we saying the Spring Offensive gains its objectives? June or July 1918? Assuming a slightly different course of events (say Michael is successful, with far fewer losses, by March meaning a better Georgette can follow it up, leading to an alt-Hagen reaching the Channel in late May or early June) the peace treaty or cease-fire leading to it won’t happen until late July or August?

By that point (July 1918) the British have occupied the Jordan Valley, have bridgeheads across the River Jordan and are in possession of Jericho.

Would the Germans throw the Ottomans under the bus to secure a Peace in Europe, complete with the gains of Brest-Litovsk?

 

[MichaelWest]

My read of the situation on the Western Front is that French troops are no longer willing to conduct offensives but France has plenty of staying power on the defensive. The British could conduct an offensive but are losing the ability to sustain the Army on the ground for such offensive action as events at home unwind and are feeling ready to lose their grip even on the defensive. Real fear of defeat should be on the mind. That should motivate the Anglo-French to pull resources from the Ottoman theater and France has likely lost its ability to demand post-war gains just as Italy has. That should mean that the UK is alone in being able or wiling to push to destroy the OE.

Against this, my read is that by this point the Arab Revolt has lost its appeal, with any sign of a German led "win" the Arabs were ready to "beg for forgiveness," and the revolt was on the verge of ending. I do not believe the British were ever more than a lever the Arabs were exploiting (as much as the same vice versa), and the Arabs only stay on side so long as it looks like Britain will win and be there to give them what they want, here some form of OE is looking to exist and that has more fear in the Arabs than the British promises. So I will argue the Revolt has likely already evaporated in large measure. Germany has strong incentive to not throw the OE under the bus and the UK has strong incentive to not carve it up, handing off bits to France or Italy, indeed intact it is still worth more to London. This said I would predict that even taking Iraq or Palestine would turn the locals against the British more than endear them, it really is a "lose-lose" at this point.

My best guess is that London seeks a separate deal for the OE in order to free resources to try one last push back of Germany in Europe. That looks like a selling out of the Arabs who likely already figured they were going to be tossed back to the wolf, a surrender of most gains and assurances that safeguard British interests all around. so really status quo. If the Western Front is not resolved, and I do not think France is defeated but Germany holds in place, Italy begs its way into a separate peace, Britain cuts its loses to focus on its domestic fires and here the OE might emerge more or less intact, still indebted, the British gaining more influence but earning more antipathy. The more Britain takes the less hold she has, the more enemies she makes, the less likely those gains are held even as long as OTL. And Germany will be squeezing hard for terms that restore her, appease her or entice her off the vast swath of France she occupies. Some of that pressure will be in favor of Germany's interests in the OE, especially the oil she desperately needs in future, access to food stuffs, etc. France will be more desperate to come to terms, adding pressure on Britain to be reasonable, conquest in the OE will not serve to appease voters at home or earn Britain much sympathy in Paris, Rome, Washington or elsewhere. British diplomats can be stupid but I do not see them being that stupid, so the OE should be in a good position to come out status quo, but that still gives a big climb out of the hole. A really unsatisfying waste of effort and seeds for future strife, and the more it looks that will be the result the less the British will be able to do more than scramble to make the best of a genuine mess.

 

[sarahz]

hmm could you indicate your reasons for thinking that the Arab revolt was over by then despite great advances continuing to be made up to July 1918? Secondly even if it were could not the UK counter that by actually hardening its promises and actually delivering Syria to the Arabs, if the French are no longer a factor to be concerned with?

 

[M79]

An ironic though less likely outcome would be that the Ottomans somehow retain Iraq, northern Syria, and the Gulf States but lose the rest of the Arabian peninsula along with OTL West Palestine/Israel, East Palestine/Transjordan, southern Syria, and Lebanon. Thus they retain the (nascent) oil wealth while shedding much of their Arab population.

 

[Berat2beti]

well Germany could say screw it and leave the Ottomans to their own devices of getting attacked by Britain and France and than be probably internationally recognized as a faithless ally...

cause after that who would ever want to enter a deal with the Germans that requires both parties to be faithful to the letter and spirit of a contract? Britain’s “Splendid Isolationism” doesn’t really work for Germany whose nation isn’t separated by a body of water and a strong navy. Germany is better off propping it’s allies up and making them useful because anyone whose seen a factions map of the world in WW1 can see theirs a lot more Entente blue and Entente friendly nations than their was Central Powers Red. Ending Britain’s “Intolerable Hegemony” doesn’t mean its Germany’s turn considering they never planned on touching British Colonies in Africa only France and Belgium’s, and only had plans to really weaken France, demilitarize it’s northern border and end it’s trade with Britain.

I think the status quote before WW1 is the most desirable outcome for Germany when it comes to the Ottomans cause it’s probably the easiest to stomach situation, except for the Sharif of Mecca, who I imagine he and his supporters will be high tailing it either on a boat for Britain or deep in the Nejd interior. Yah that Arab Revolt is a bit overhyped in terms of National identity considering more Muslims probably had more loyalty to the Caliph than some idea of an Arab State.