1 May 1941. El Agheila, Libya.
Long before dawn the British 16th Brigade (1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment) accompanied by two Regiments of Valiant I* tanks from 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars (RGH), & 4th Sharpshooters, County of London Yeomanry (CLY), set off westwards. Above the British advance, during daylight, the RAF would provide a standing patrol over the advance of one squadron of Hurricanes. Two squadrons of Blenheims were available for bombing raids in support of the advance, while a squadron of Marylands were providing long range reconnaissance.
At the same time the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade (2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force), 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry), with the tanks of 3rd CLY set off from their positions inland through the desert to outflank any Italian or German defensive position, with the intention of approaching the German and Italian positions at Nofilia from the south and rear.
The 11th Hussars, XIII Corps’ reconnaissance regiment, had noted that the first thirty miles to Ras El Ali would be straightforward. After the initial German reconnaissance probes in March, O’Connor had pulled his forward units back to concentrate and train for the upcoming attack. The British reconnaissance efforts had identified that there was an Italian unit deployed at Ras El Ali in the fairly narrow strip between the sea and the desert escarpment. This was expected to be the first resistance that the British forces would encounter.
Because of the side ranging reconnaissance patrols of both the Italian and Germans, it hadn’t been possible to build up a forward stores area, as had been done before the battle of Sidi Barani. Just behind both British columns, the RASC and RAOC had loaded up three days’ worth of supplies which would be brought up and would create two Field Supply Depots, allowing the main columns to keep advancing on Nofilia.
The German commander, Irwin Rommel, had originally planned on a quick attack as soon as he could, but discovering that the British weren’t as weak as he had been led to believe, he had been forced to wait for the whole of 15th Panzer Division to arrive at Tripoli. Once it was fully prepared, then that, with the German 5th Light Division, supported by the two Italian Armoured Divisions (Ariete and Trieste), would provide Rommel with a potent force to knock the British out of Libya. General Paulus had been sent from Berlin to try to make sure that the probing attacks that Rommel had made in March, which had led to quite a lot of casualties, wouldn’t be repeated. Instead, the German forces were primarily meant to support the Italians and prevent the loss of Italian North Africa. Sending Rommel, whose 7th Panzer Division had been badly handled by the British at Arras, because, it was believed, he had taken too much of a risk, had always been a gamble by Hitler. But Hitler liked and admired Rommel and, while the whole of energy of the German forces were looking towards the Soviet Union; giving Rommel the chance to harry the British in North Africa appealed to the Fuhrer.
The Royal Navy had only managed to intercept one of the convoys conveying the 15th Panzer Division across the Mediterranean, and so while it had lost some of its men, and it wasn’t yet completely formed, but from Rommel’s point of view, it was now partially operational. While the Italians had fortified their main position at Sirte, and had outposts at Nofilia and Ras El Ali, Rommel had been preparing to take on the British, now that he was in a favourable position. As far as his intelligence people had been able to discern, the British had only two Divisions holding their positions at El Agheila, and only one Brigade of tanks. Therefore, he had been concentrating his forces around Sirte.
When news broke that the British were advancing, and that they were attacking Ras El Ali in force, Rommel immediately saw an opportunity to hit the British when they weren’t in pre-prepared positions, with minefields and artillery protecting them. Therefore, he ordered General Streich, commander of 5th Light Division, to advance inland towards Nofilia. The Ariete Division would also move forward to Nofilia, along the coast road, while the 15th Panzer Division and the Trieste Division would prepare to move to follow up any potential opportunity to exploit any success.
At Ras El Ali there was an Italian Bersaglieri force, reinforced by 47mm anti-tank guns. As the first companies of 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, with a squadron of 2nd RGH in support approached the Italian positions it became clear that the Italians weren’t giving up easily, the 8th Field Regiment RA deployed to support the advance. The Italians put up a stiff fight, knocking out eight tanks and causing the Argylls many casualties. By mid-afternoon, the Italian resistance had been overcome, and the British began advancing, with the Leicestershires and 4th CLY taking the lead.
An air battle had also been raging above the British column as the RAF attempted to keep the Luftwaffe off the strung-out vehicles. For much of the day the fight was evenly balanced, but the Hurricanes were finding it difficult to get among the German bombers as they were often in a fight to the death with the Bf109s. The one consolation was that the 3rd Indian Brigade’s advance inland wasn’t discovered by German reconnaissance, so the RAF only had to concentrate on defending one column.
The Italians had placed a number of units strung out along the coastal road, and these caused further delays to the British advance, though none as steadfast as that at Ras El Ali. By the evening the leading British units had defeated an Italian force at the Wadi Matratin, some thirty miles from Nofilia. General Michael Gambier-Parry, as OC 2nd Armoured Division was in command of Operation Brevity. With the information available to him he decided to halt the advance for the night, allowing the men and machines to be rested and refreshed. He expected that the main battle would take place either the next day, or the day after. Communication between the two columns had been spotty during the day, but eventually Brigadier Edward Vaughan, commanding the Motor Brigade was informed of the halt, and decided to hold his own positions to the south east Nofilia, so that the two columns could attack simultaneously from two directions. The information brought back from the RAF Marylands that two large columns of vehicles, including tanks, were approaching Nofilia from the west wasn’t passed on to Gambier-Parry until the next morning.