I think by this stage on the war the effectiveness of paratroopers and glider troops had been well established. Given the angst in Britain during the summer of 1940 alone regarding paratroopers would probably ensure that the allies would still raise their own.
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
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Yep. Plus, if the allies manage to entrench themselves behind the Corinth Canal, I could see the paratroopers being used there, which would probably acheive broadly the same effect.
How close would the airfields need to be for an air drop trying to cutoff the retreat at Kalamata?
I'm just trying to think where the Germans would have enough air fields and be able to assemble the paratroopers in relative secrecy as once Allied Command gets word, they'll obviously adjust their own deployments.
Italian-held Albania is likely close enough but doubting their airfields would have capacity for more than a token deployment. What about Southern Bulgaria? Would it be in range?
I'm just trying to think where the Germans would have enough air fields and be able to assemble the paratroopers in relative secrecy as once Allied Command gets word, they'll obviously adjust their own deployments.
Italian-held Albania is likely close enough but doubting their airfields would have capacity for more than a token deployment. What about Southern Bulgaria? Would it be in range?
So as my knowledge of the Greek campaign is deplorable, how do we stand in relation to otl , In time and in saved extra resources ?
The German's are a day or two behind but suffering heavy losses and advancing over a destroyed landscape. Meanwhile large numbers of Greek's are escaping to fight again and British forces are withdrawing in good order instead of being routed as OTL.
Derek Pullem
Donor
Well the Germans got around 1000 troops into Narvik by air and that would have been working with makeshift airstrips so as long as they are not looking at Divisional drops then I don't think airstrips are going to be a real problem.
From what distance though?
That has to have been from Central-Norway as opposed to from Denmark or Germany?
So looking at a scale map of Greece, to land in the Peloponnese, they wouldn't even need Northern Greek airfields. They could have deployed fully from anywhere in Albania and Southern Bulgaria and been well within their normal drop ranges. Interesting consideration for Allied planners to have to work into their calculus....
I'm not sure how relevant that is, since the Fallschirmjäger didn't go near northern Norway. The range of the Ju-52 is ~620 miles, but that's both ways, so it's realistically more like 300 miles, ie, central Greek fields, most of which are still being put in order right now after allied demolition efforts.
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Derek Pullem
Donor
As 7th Air Division they did and so did some hastily converted troops from 137th Mountain Regiment. It wasn't 1000 but around 600 men in penny packet drops up to 130 at a time.
They can't have come from Trondheim then, that's outside the return range of the Ju-52. For their initial drops in southern Norway, they operated from Aalborg, because there was no other airfield close enough.
Derek Pullem
Donor
I was guessing Trondheim - can't have been that much further north as they were shipped in to Narvik from May 23 and the Germans front line was near Mo i Rana (170 miles from Narvik). But that shows that Ju-52 and German paratrooper either have the range or can hop from rough fields close to the front line.
Pre-war, it was often used in under-developed areas, so it would be perfectly capable of operating from rough airfields, but not from Trondheim, which would be outside it's range.
Lots of discussion on paratroopers and gaining a few days to evacuate more equipment and people.
Nothing on the stand out issue that the entire thread is about.
The A13 has been a success, it's blunted any armored attack its fought against, supported troops in rearguard actions and it's reliability has been good with the improved tracks and unstressed Liberty engine.
It's mainly fought in defensive actions but these can be some of the hardest to get right without the correct training between the armoured and infantry sections, it will emphasize the need for joined up training routines. It shows how poorly British tanks were used in the deserts at times and the effect it had on the reputation of British designed armoured vehicles.
I think this will have a knock on effect on the Crusader and Churchill situation, almost any modern tank is useful as long as the training is up to scratch.
Allan, it's a great thread still, I've learnt a lot from the interlude in Greece.
Nothing on the stand out issue that the entire thread is about.
The A13 has been a success, it's blunted any armored attack its fought against, supported troops in rearguard actions and it's reliability has been good with the improved tracks and unstressed Liberty engine.
It's mainly fought in defensive actions but these can be some of the hardest to get right without the correct training between the armoured and infantry sections, it will emphasize the need for joined up training routines. It shows how poorly British tanks were used in the deserts at times and the effect it had on the reputation of British designed armoured vehicles.
I think this will have a knock on effect on the Crusader and Churchill situation, almost any modern tank is useful as long as the training is up to scratch.
Allan, it's a great thread still, I've learnt a lot from the interlude in Greece.
Defensive actions may be difficult to get right without correct training, but they're nothing compared to offensive operations, especially against prepared enemy defences (such as dug-in anti-tank guns).
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27 - 28 April 1941. Greece.
allanpcameron
Donor
27 - 28 April 1941. Greece.
The first night of the evacuation had the men of the New Zealand 4th Brigade taken off the beaches Raphina and Porto Raphti, and it went ahead with very few problems. The three ‘Glen’ ships’ landing craft meant the men were able to be brought aboard very quickly from the beaches. The men had covered the last two miles under careful control from collecting area to assembly area, and finally to the point of embarkation. With them they took small packs, respirators, steel helmets, rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition, groundsheets and one blanket per man. Most of the men were able to bring their entrenching tools, and, the Machine Gun Battalion’s Vickers HMGs and company mortars were also brought aboard. The destruction of much of the Brigade’s transport was a sore trial, but the emphasis was on getting the men off the beaches.
HMS Glengyle, Glenroy and Glenearn had come directly from Crete where they had been dropped off the Polish Brigade. The need to clear the area to give the ships enough time to get as far from the shore, and the Luftwaffe, meant that they had to weigh anchor at 03:40hrs. The escorting destroyers also picked up men that the Landing Ships (Infantry) couldn’t hold. The convoy was attacked by the Luftwaffe after daylight, but under the protective care of the cruisers HMS Calcutta and HMAS Perth, safely reached Suda Bay at 16:00hrs. The landing craft had been left behind so that they could be used the next night to bring off the 6th Brigade from the same beaches, there wasn’t quite enough time for the ships to disembark the New Zealanders and return the same night.
With the Thermopylae Line now abandoned, the need to protect its flank from a possible crossing from the island of Euboea was no longer necessary. The elements of 1st Armoured Brigade at Chalcis, (1st Rangers Battalion, a squadron of 4th Hussars, and batteries from 2nd Royal Horse Artillery and 102nd Anti-tank Regiment) were able to reinforce the 5th Brigade at Erithrai. The German advance was stalled, partly because of the extensive use of demolitions, but also because the 5th Panzer Division had been pulled back to allow the 72nd Infantry Division and 6th Mountain Division assault the Thermopylae positions. Bringing the panzers forward, passing through Molos, as the road over the Brallos Pass was still impassible, took time.
The New Zealand Divisional Cavalry acted as the eyes of the Anzac Corps, keeping tabs on the progress of the Germans, and with attached engineers, detonating demolitions as they withdrew. Brigadier Charrington managed to get a meeting with his senior officers. Generally, the Brigade had been split up, and hadn’t fought as a complete unit. They had also been on the move almost constantly, and like most of the British and Dominion troops, were exhausted. The plans that Generals Wilson and Blamey had shared with him, meant that this would continue to be the case. Lt-Col McCorquodale (OC Kings Dragoon Guards) had argued for bringing the three regiments together and facing down the advancing Panzer Division, to give them a proper fight. Unfortunately, this wouldn’t be possible. The tanks, with the Australian 17th Brigade, would continue the very important job of covering the main infantry withdrawal.
Charrington informed his Officer Group that his orders were that the majority of the Brigade and Regiments’ support units were to make their way to Pireas. Here they would be evacuated with as much equipment they could load onto whichever ships were available. Charrington asked McCorquodale to consolidate his Dragoons at the Corinth Canal, where one of the Australian Battalions was already in position. Once the last of the Australian Division had crossed the canal, the KDG and the Australian Battalion would once again provide cover for the movement towards the embarkation points on the Peloponnese. They would have to consider the possibility of a crossing from the mainland around Patras, though the Greek army were responsible for that area. Once they got to Kalamata, they be the last to leave, and very likely would have to destroy their tanks when they did so.
Lt-Col Lillingston’s 4th Hussars were to consolidate all their squadrons with the New Zealand 5th Brigade at Erithrai, falling back with them to Megara, where they were due to be embarked. There were some landing craft capable of taking tanks, and Charrington had been informed that the Royal Navy would endeavour to have them at Megara on the night of the 29/30 April. Nothing however was certain, and Lillingston would likely have to order any remaining tanks to be destroyed. The 3rd Hussars had the fewest tanks left. Most of the squadron that had been with the New Zealanders at Molos had been destroyed either by enemy action or to prevent them falling into enemy hands. Charrington asked that the remaining tanks of that Regiment be split between the 4th Hussars and Kings Dragoon Guards to make up for their losses. While the A13 tanks had generally been reliable, there had been a number of losses to mechanical breakdown that the Brigade didn’t have the resources to fix. Other tanks had been lost to enemy action, but by splitting up the 3rd Hussars, would bring the other two Regiments nearly up to full strength.
Pireas had been heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, damaging the facilities and sinking some ships, including on 24 April the luxury yacht Hellas, which had taken an estimated 500 – 700 souls when she had rolled over and sunk. The British anti-aircraft guns, joined by the limited resources of the Greeks had endeavoured to limit the Luftwaffe’s efforts, and on the night of 27/28 April a number of civilian vessels of all sizes, filled with both men and equipment, left before 03:00hrs with an escort from the cruisers HMS Ajax and Coventry, and the destroyers, HMS Diamond, Griffon and Wryneck. This convoy was heavily attacked in the morning of 28 April and four of the transports were lost, the destroyers picking up some survivors from the water. During the action against heavy air attacks, on HMS Coventry a 4-inch shell exploded prematurely killing one Petty Officer and injuring other ratings. Thereafter, use of 4in gun mountings had to be restricted to emergencies only because of barrel wear. HMS Coventry was therefore one of the ships chosen to escort a convoy from Suda Bay back to Alexandria, where her gun barrels would be replaced.
At Navplion, just south of Corinth, the embarkation on the night of 27/28 April involved the Australian 19th Brigade, which had come directly from their positions at Thermopylae the previous night. The destroyers, (HMS Hasty, Nubian and Decoy) along with a troopship, MS Salween, picked up the men of the Brigade. The cruisers HMS Phoebe and Carlisle provided extra protection as the ships made for Crete, although MS Salween carried on to Alexandria in another convoy to unload the men there. Unlike the New Zealanders, much equipment that wasn’t man-portable had to be abandoned, along with the transport that had brought them. Many of the Greek Reserve Officers’ College Battalion, which had been transported with the Australians, although invited to join the embarkation, decided to stay and continue the fight.
Throughout the daylight hours of 28 April, the Luftwaffe continued to search for and attack any ships or troop concentrations they could find. The many olive groves provided excellent cover for many of the Australian and New Zealanders holding their positions, waiting for nightfall to make their way to the designated assembly areas and then onto the ships. Much of 16th Brigade spent the day in the vicinity of Argos, while waiting to be evacuated from Navplion, as their mates in 19th Brigade had done the previous night.
The progress of the German ground forces continued apace, but the NZ Divisional Cavalry reported that they wouldn’t likely reach the 5th Brigade positions until the following day at the earliest. General Blamey was now left in charge of British forces in Greece, as General Wilson had flown out along with the Greek King and Prime Minister to Crete on an RAF Sunderland. The plan to lift 5th Brigade on the night of 29/30 April from the beaches east of Athens would mean that they would need to leave their positions during the night of 28/29 April to be able to be transported during darkness towards the positions that 4th Brigade were currently occupying. The mobile elements of 1st Armoured Brigade would stay on and cover the New Zealanders before withdrawing to Megara.
The first night of the evacuation had the men of the New Zealand 4th Brigade taken off the beaches Raphina and Porto Raphti, and it went ahead with very few problems. The three ‘Glen’ ships’ landing craft meant the men were able to be brought aboard very quickly from the beaches. The men had covered the last two miles under careful control from collecting area to assembly area, and finally to the point of embarkation. With them they took small packs, respirators, steel helmets, rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition, groundsheets and one blanket per man. Most of the men were able to bring their entrenching tools, and, the Machine Gun Battalion’s Vickers HMGs and company mortars were also brought aboard. The destruction of much of the Brigade’s transport was a sore trial, but the emphasis was on getting the men off the beaches.
HMS Glengyle, Glenroy and Glenearn had come directly from Crete where they had been dropped off the Polish Brigade. The need to clear the area to give the ships enough time to get as far from the shore, and the Luftwaffe, meant that they had to weigh anchor at 03:40hrs. The escorting destroyers also picked up men that the Landing Ships (Infantry) couldn’t hold. The convoy was attacked by the Luftwaffe after daylight, but under the protective care of the cruisers HMS Calcutta and HMAS Perth, safely reached Suda Bay at 16:00hrs. The landing craft had been left behind so that they could be used the next night to bring off the 6th Brigade from the same beaches, there wasn’t quite enough time for the ships to disembark the New Zealanders and return the same night.
With the Thermopylae Line now abandoned, the need to protect its flank from a possible crossing from the island of Euboea was no longer necessary. The elements of 1st Armoured Brigade at Chalcis, (1st Rangers Battalion, a squadron of 4th Hussars, and batteries from 2nd Royal Horse Artillery and 102nd Anti-tank Regiment) were able to reinforce the 5th Brigade at Erithrai. The German advance was stalled, partly because of the extensive use of demolitions, but also because the 5th Panzer Division had been pulled back to allow the 72nd Infantry Division and 6th Mountain Division assault the Thermopylae positions. Bringing the panzers forward, passing through Molos, as the road over the Brallos Pass was still impassible, took time.
The New Zealand Divisional Cavalry acted as the eyes of the Anzac Corps, keeping tabs on the progress of the Germans, and with attached engineers, detonating demolitions as they withdrew. Brigadier Charrington managed to get a meeting with his senior officers. Generally, the Brigade had been split up, and hadn’t fought as a complete unit. They had also been on the move almost constantly, and like most of the British and Dominion troops, were exhausted. The plans that Generals Wilson and Blamey had shared with him, meant that this would continue to be the case. Lt-Col McCorquodale (OC Kings Dragoon Guards) had argued for bringing the three regiments together and facing down the advancing Panzer Division, to give them a proper fight. Unfortunately, this wouldn’t be possible. The tanks, with the Australian 17th Brigade, would continue the very important job of covering the main infantry withdrawal.
Charrington informed his Officer Group that his orders were that the majority of the Brigade and Regiments’ support units were to make their way to Pireas. Here they would be evacuated with as much equipment they could load onto whichever ships were available. Charrington asked McCorquodale to consolidate his Dragoons at the Corinth Canal, where one of the Australian Battalions was already in position. Once the last of the Australian Division had crossed the canal, the KDG and the Australian Battalion would once again provide cover for the movement towards the embarkation points on the Peloponnese. They would have to consider the possibility of a crossing from the mainland around Patras, though the Greek army were responsible for that area. Once they got to Kalamata, they be the last to leave, and very likely would have to destroy their tanks when they did so.
Lt-Col Lillingston’s 4th Hussars were to consolidate all their squadrons with the New Zealand 5th Brigade at Erithrai, falling back with them to Megara, where they were due to be embarked. There were some landing craft capable of taking tanks, and Charrington had been informed that the Royal Navy would endeavour to have them at Megara on the night of the 29/30 April. Nothing however was certain, and Lillingston would likely have to order any remaining tanks to be destroyed. The 3rd Hussars had the fewest tanks left. Most of the squadron that had been with the New Zealanders at Molos had been destroyed either by enemy action or to prevent them falling into enemy hands. Charrington asked that the remaining tanks of that Regiment be split between the 4th Hussars and Kings Dragoon Guards to make up for their losses. While the A13 tanks had generally been reliable, there had been a number of losses to mechanical breakdown that the Brigade didn’t have the resources to fix. Other tanks had been lost to enemy action, but by splitting up the 3rd Hussars, would bring the other two Regiments nearly up to full strength.
Pireas had been heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, damaging the facilities and sinking some ships, including on 24 April the luxury yacht Hellas, which had taken an estimated 500 – 700 souls when she had rolled over and sunk. The British anti-aircraft guns, joined by the limited resources of the Greeks had endeavoured to limit the Luftwaffe’s efforts, and on the night of 27/28 April a number of civilian vessels of all sizes, filled with both men and equipment, left before 03:00hrs with an escort from the cruisers HMS Ajax and Coventry, and the destroyers, HMS Diamond, Griffon and Wryneck. This convoy was heavily attacked in the morning of 28 April and four of the transports were lost, the destroyers picking up some survivors from the water. During the action against heavy air attacks, on HMS Coventry a 4-inch shell exploded prematurely killing one Petty Officer and injuring other ratings. Thereafter, use of 4in gun mountings had to be restricted to emergencies only because of barrel wear. HMS Coventry was therefore one of the ships chosen to escort a convoy from Suda Bay back to Alexandria, where her gun barrels would be replaced.
At Navplion, just south of Corinth, the embarkation on the night of 27/28 April involved the Australian 19th Brigade, which had come directly from their positions at Thermopylae the previous night. The destroyers, (HMS Hasty, Nubian and Decoy) along with a troopship, MS Salween, picked up the men of the Brigade. The cruisers HMS Phoebe and Carlisle provided extra protection as the ships made for Crete, although MS Salween carried on to Alexandria in another convoy to unload the men there. Unlike the New Zealanders, much equipment that wasn’t man-portable had to be abandoned, along with the transport that had brought them. Many of the Greek Reserve Officers’ College Battalion, which had been transported with the Australians, although invited to join the embarkation, decided to stay and continue the fight.
Throughout the daylight hours of 28 April, the Luftwaffe continued to search for and attack any ships or troop concentrations they could find. The many olive groves provided excellent cover for many of the Australian and New Zealanders holding their positions, waiting for nightfall to make their way to the designated assembly areas and then onto the ships. Much of 16th Brigade spent the day in the vicinity of Argos, while waiting to be evacuated from Navplion, as their mates in 19th Brigade had done the previous night.
The progress of the German ground forces continued apace, but the NZ Divisional Cavalry reported that they wouldn’t likely reach the 5th Brigade positions until the following day at the earliest. General Blamey was now left in charge of British forces in Greece, as General Wilson had flown out along with the Greek King and Prime Minister to Crete on an RAF Sunderland. The plan to lift 5th Brigade on the night of 29/30 April from the beaches east of Athens would mean that they would need to leave their positions during the night of 28/29 April to be able to be transported during darkness towards the positions that 4th Brigade were currently occupying. The mobile elements of 1st Armoured Brigade would stay on and cover the New Zealanders before withdrawing to Megara.
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