Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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Both types of kangaroos go right over fences which is why you can't farm them.
 
Phillips was aware of the threat of air power, but believed the Japanese did not have a TBR with the range to threaten Force Z from their bases in French Indochina. .....
Which still makes him almost unbelievably complacent ...
The Royal Navy had demonstarted at Tranto, over a year ago, that carrier TBR's can sink battleships ...
... and whilst it's obvious that SOME of the Japanese aircraft carriers are at Pearl, and he might have been assured by British Intelligence that they have a handle on exactly where each of the other Japanese carriers are, how much reliance would any sensible Admiral put on the accuracy ?
I mean, on what planet was he living not to take into account the possability that a Japanese carrier 'could' be somewhere in the region ? Indeed, it makes sense for them to have at least one carrier protecting their invasion force ... (which, I understand, he was actively seeking out ..)
 
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Problem solved.

IWM-NA-24043-Priest-Kangaroo-Conselice-19450413.jpg



Both types of kangaroos go right over fences which is why you can't farm them.

This got me wondering, ITTL are any of the base depots in North Africa getting creative with any of the older and now clearly obsolescent tanks (thinking A9, A10 and anything captured from the Italians)? OTL anything vaugly tank like was kept in service due to the shortage of armour. Here that's not such a problem.

I know that other uses for armour are being looked into by Vickers ITTL but enterprising REME types might be be tempted to figure out what the Army of the Nile needs and do a jury rigged solution in the field. If they did what might they produce?
 
The Royal Navy had demonstarted at Tranto, over a year ago, that carrier TBR's can sink battleships ...
I need to point out that Force Z was sunk by a sizable force of land bombers, carrier aircraft weren't involved at all.
Force Z was also one of the first times aircraft were used as the primary strike against capital ships under sail: Pearl Harbour and Taranto were both raids against ships at anchor.

I will agree that complacency was still a factor, the rather absurd ranges of Japanese combat aircraft weren't properly understood before the war, not helped by the general trend of people not looking.
 
Which still makes him almost unbelievably complacent ...
The Royal Navy had demonstarted at Tranto, over a year ago, that carrier TBR's can sink battleships ...
... and whilst it's obvious that SOME of the Japanese aircraft carriers are at Pearl, and he might have been assured by British Intelligence that they have a handle on exactly where each of the other Japanese carriers are, how much reliance would any sensible Admiral put on the accuracy ?
I mean, on what planet was he living not to take into account the possability that a Japanese carrier 'could' be somewhere in the region ? Indeed, it makes sense for them to have at least one carrier protecting their invasion force ... (which, I understand, he was actively seeking out ..)
As GrahamB has commented, original timeline Operation Judgement (Taranto - 1940) was an attack against ships at anchor, and not against moving targets, able to manoeuvre.
For the record, the Italians were also able, after the attack, to patch up and refloat all their damaged battleships.

Plus in December 1941, Admiral Phillips was supposed to be trying to sink any amphibious Imperial Japanese ships in the area so that he could prevent or slow down an invasion of the British-held territory of Malaya; if he had been able to drive off or sink any such invasions, to some extent any damage sustained to ships under his command could have been viewed (by Whitehall) as acceptable trade-offs - lose partially or completely task-force z, but cost the Imperial Japanese the opening round of their Malaya campaign and buy the British & Commonwealth armies time to try and get their acts together...
 
That aside, I don't think that, with all the other changes, HMS Formidable not taking a bomb is a big ask, given it happened during (or at least, at the same time as) the Battle of Crete.
 
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Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
As GrahamB has commented, original timeline Operation Judgement (Taranto - 1940) was an attack against ships at anchor, and not against moving targets, able to manoeuvre.
For the record, the Italians were also able, after the attack, to patch up and refloat all their damaged battleships.

Plus in December 1941, Admiral Phillips was supposed to be trying to sink any amphibious Imperial Japanese ships in the area so that he could prevent or slow down an invasion of the British-held territory of Malaya; if he had been able to drive off or sink any such invasions, to some extent any damage sustained to ships under his command could have been viewed (by Whitehall) as acceptable trade-offs - lose partially or completely task-force z, but cost the Imperial Japanese the opening round of their Malaya campaign and buy the British & Commonwealth armies time to try and get their acts together...
IIRC the transports at Kota Bharu had already been unloaded and, following sighting reports, were carefully routed on Ozawa's orders north into the Gulf of Siam to be well out of the way, as they would be needed for the invasion of Borneo, so Force Z would have had no effect to the landings that actually took place. To quote the Japanese Official History: "At this moment only a small amount of resupplying was continuing. Even if the British attacked from now onwards, there would be no damage done to the military units already landed... any damage would be to empty ships and a small amount of supplies. In other words, the British naval force had lost their best chance."

Phillips. now aware of the abilities of the IJN land-based bombers, was heading back to safety when he received an unconfirmed (& incorrect) report of landings at Kuantan, which threatened to outflank the whole defence plan for the Malaysian peninsular. He judged the risk of air attack worthwhile investigating in case the rumours were true. That there were no landings (water buffalo setting off land mines???) does not invalidate his decision - as GrahamB and LMCL have stated, that was the RN's job. But it does not explain or excuse his failure to request air reconnaissance or cover.

Osprey's "Sinking Force Z 1941: The day the Imperial Japanese Navy killed the battleship" by Angus Konstam.
 
IIRC the transports at Kota Bharu had already been unloaded and, following sighting reports, were carefully routed on Ozawa's orders north into the Gulf of Siam to be well out of the way, as they would be needed for the invasion of Borneo, so Force Z would have had no effect to the landings that actually took place. To quote the Japanese Official History: "At this moment only a small amount of resupplying was continuing. Even if the British attacked from now onwards, there would be no damage done to the military units already landed... any damage would be to empty ships and a small amount of supplies. In other words, the British naval force had lost their best chance."

Phillips. now aware of the abilities of the IJN land-based bombers, was heading back to safety when he received an unconfirmed (& incorrect) report of landings at Kuantan, which threatened to outflank the whole defence plan for the Malaysian peninsular. He judged the risk of air attack worthwhile investigating in case the rumours were true. That there were no landings (water buffalo setting off land mines???) does not invalidate his decision - as GrahamB and LMCL have stated, that was the RN's job. But it does not explain or excuse his failure to request air reconnaissance or cover.

Osprey's "Sinking Force Z 1941: The day the Imperial Japanese Navy killed the battleship" by Angus Konstam.
Well, at least not losing the ships (and maybe downing some of the Japanese planes) would allow them to later give Singapore some gunfire support, since they did at least have HE shells.
 
IIRC the transports at Kota Bharu had already been unloaded and, following sighting reports, were carefully routed on Ozawa's orders north into the Gulf of Siam to be well out of the way, as they would be needed for the invasion of Borneo, so Force Z would have had no effect to the landings that actually took place. To quote the Japanese Official History: "At this moment only a small amount of resupplying was continuing. Even if the British attacked from now onwards, there would be no damage done to the military units already landed... any damage would be to empty ships and a small amount of supplies. In other words, the British naval force had lost their best chance."

Phillips. now aware of the abilities of the IJN land-based bombers, was heading back to safety when he received an unconfirmed (& incorrect) report of landings at Kuantan, which threatened to outflank the whole defence plan for the Malaysian peninsular. He judged the risk of air attack worthwhile investigating in case the rumours were true. That there were no landings (water buffalo setting off land mines???) does not invalidate his decision - as GrahamB and LMCL have stated, that was the RN's job. But it does not explain or excuse his failure to request air reconnaissance or cover.

Osprey's "Sinking Force Z 1941: The day the Imperial Japanese Navy killed the battleship" by Angus Konstam.
IIRC Phillips didn't break radio silence even after he knew he had been spotted and not until after PoW took the crippling hit, even then only calling for tugs! Middleton worked out that if he had called for air cover once sighted it would have arrived after the bomb hit on Repulse but before the first torpedo attack. That's what happens when you send an armchair admiral who hasn't seen action since WW1 to face modern aircraft.
 
IIRC Phillips didn't break radio silence even after he knew he had been spotted and not until after PoW took the crippling hit, even then only calling for tugs! Middleton worked out that if he had called for air cover once sighted it would have arrived after the bomb hit on Repulse but before the first torpedo attack. That's what happens when you send an armchair admiral who hasn't seen action since WW1 to face modern aircraft.
That is perhaps true, but is interesting that as Vice Chief of the Naval Staff Phillips was instrumental in pushing for the development of support infrastructure for the FAA. He earned a pretty good reputation as a far-sighted admiral with a good vision for British Naval Airpower. Its interesting how events can change a mans perceived legacy.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
IIRC Phillips didn't break radio silence even after he knew he had been spotted and not until after PoW took the crippling hit, even then only calling for tugs! Middleton worked out that if he had called for air cover once sighted it would have arrived after the bomb hit on Repulse but before the first torpedo attack. That's what happens when you send an armchair admiral who hasn't seen action since WW1 to face modern aircraft.
"While all this [the first attacks lasting around an hour that crippled Prince of Wales] had been going on, Tennant waited in vain for any kind of instructions from the flagship. During a brief lull, he also had a chance to think about air cover - or more accurately the lack of it. He called the battlecruiser's radio room, and was told, to his horror, that so far no request for air cover had been sent from the flagship. It seemed as if Admiral Phillips was still maintaining radio silence, or more likely had forgotten about it when his battleship was hit and crippled. Clearly the time for radio silence had passed, so on his own authority Tennant ordered a signal to be sent to the naval base in Singapore reporting 'enemy aircraft bombing'. This was received at 1204hrs, and within 20 minutes 11 Brewster Buffalos of No. 453 Squadron were scrambled. Unfortunately for both Phillips and Tennant, they would arrive too late."
Konstam / Sinking Force Z 1941 as previous ref.

Well, at least not losing the ships (and maybe downing some of the Japanese planes) would allow them to later give Singapore some gunfire support, since they did at least have HE shells.
They would have been sitting ducks hanging around Singapore providing naval gunfire support. Despite the RN's honour, withdrawal to Ceylon would have been the best option to form the nucleus of the Far Eastern Fleet. Failing that, support the ABDA forces in the battles in the Java Sea, although likely they would be sunk then when the KB comes a calling. Now, whether Churchill would permit such a cowardly / sensible (delete to taste) strategic decision, abandoning Singapore to its fate...
 
Still think the timeline butterflys are finally starting to fall but probably not quick enough is my thought about singapore and it would only work if the desert wraps up by the end of september and then have the australian pm fly back to london and basicly threaten to withdraw now that desert is over but to keep up the pre war plans propose to send most of them to singapore as planned .

And thats it , if the desert wraps up later i think it might not be in time and a more extensive burma campaign would make sense with rather minimal british own forces but equipping indian army andsending a few good divisons and commanders would be needed . It would also benefit that it would be the main land conflict the british would be fighting for most of 1942 . And there is the factor if the author is interested in this since tanks would have a rather minor role there thanks to terrain but some would make sense especially later when valiants get replaced with victors they could be sent east maybe in 43 / 44 ?
 
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They would have been sitting ducks hanging around Singapore providing naval gunfire support. Despite the RN's honour, withdrawal to Ceylon would have been the best option to form the nucleus of the Far Eastern Fleet. Failing that, support the ABDA forces in the battles in the Java Sea, although likely they would be sunk then when the KB comes a calling. Now, whether Churchill would permit such a cowardly / sensible (delete to taste) strategic decision, abandoning Singapore to its fate...
Well at least they could offload a portion of the HE shells before leaving, which should help a little.

And even if Singapore/Malaya can't actually be saved, if you can provide enough support to turn Singapore into a siege (and allow a fighting withdrawal), you probably prevent an attack into Burma until the end of 1942, and also throw off some of Japan's plans for the DEI.
 
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So North Africa.

Greece is going to happen soon and be a disaster of some degree to Britain, that can't be avoided but in all honesty it is for the best.

North Africa on the other hand has all the hallmarks of another major success. For a start much of the forces involved in Compass are still in XIII corps, only they have more and better equipment. In addition those forces have received some reinforcements so XIII corps is significantly stronger. That is good as the opposition is going to be better, though likely deficient in some key areas. For instance the Germans have around 320 tanks total including Panzer 1's and Panzer 2's, Britain by comparison is sending 340 Valiant I's as replacements and that is before you count the Valiant I's and Valiant I's already in North Africa.
Another advantage Britain has is that they are actually preparing for a major advance. Operation Compass was a limited scope operation with some scope to expand, then it became a general advance. The fact that Britain was able to advance so far in such a short period of time will have come as a shock, even to the people predicting an advance was possible. The lessons learnt from the advance of Operation Compass will still be relevant for this next attack and will mean any mistakes or issues encountered can be avoided this time round. Things like how to drive and maintain Italian lorries for instance don't need to be relearnt so any captured vehicles can be put into service right away. In addition things like spare parts will be available in some quantities which combined with the knowledge learnt on maintenance and repair means less time will be wasted trying to fix things that can't be fixed for example or time to repair or replace parts will be lower.

Those advantages and others should lead to a good pace of advance being maintained once the British start. With a sufficiently fast advance the prospect of reinforcements being organised and shipped to North Africa is remote. You are then in a position again where the speed of the British advance likely cripples the Axis forces as while the Germans will be far more able to respond they can't be everywhere and if the Italian's around them collapse the options are withdraw or be surrounded.

What happens after that, well that is for another post. I will say again though, Singapore and Malaya can and probably should be saved ITTL.
 
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