Operation Compass. Preliminaries. 5 December 1940. Bagush Box. Egypt.
allanpcameron
Donor
Operation Compass. Preliminaries.
5 December 1940. Bagush Box. Egypt.
The arrival of the troops of 16th Australian Infantry Brigade by train had been completed the day before, the Brigade’s vehicles and heavy equipment arrived in a sandstorm during the night, completing the Brigade’s journey forward. With the 17th and 19th Brigades scheduled to arrive in the area over the next few days, 6th Australian Infantry Division of the Second Australian Imperial Force was about to put their training into practice. Various versions of plans had come and gone. At one point the 19th Brigade was going to wait at Alexandria and be moved forward by sea. However, things changed when General Wilson let slip to General O’Connor that General Wavell planned to transfer the 4th Indian Division to Sudan as soon as the planned attack succeeded.
O’Connor, taken aback, immediately made the argument that if the attack was successful, withdrawing the Indians would mean that the ability to exploit any success would be removed. Wavell, when confronted by this information, tried to reassure O’Connor that the Indians would be replaced by the 6th Australian Division. O’Connor knew it would take a certain amount of time for the Indians to be replaced with the Australians. Therefore, he argued, the 6th Australian Infantry Division should be brought forward, and be ready to replace the 4th Indian Division as soon as Wavell ordered them withdrawn, preferably on the fourth or fifth day, when they would need a rest anyway. He would prefer the Indians not be withdrawn at all, but if they absolutely had to be, he wanted the Australians in place and ready to take over. If the Australians moved up to the start line for Operation Compass once the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division moved off, then, they would be close enough to reinforce the success, or, in the worst case, cover the withdrawal of the Western Desert Force.
As an alternative, O’Connor wondered about the possibility of keeping the 4th Indian Division in Western Desert Force, and having the Australian 6th Division go to Sudan in their place, at which point Blamey had intervened. The orders he had from the Australian government were that the 2nd AIF weren’t to be used up piecemeal. I Corps was beginning to come together in terms of men and equipment, which the 9th Division would complete in due course. Sending the 6th Division to Sudan would undermine those efforts.
All this was thrashed out in stormy conference between the four generals, O’Connor (Western Desert Force), Wavell (GOC-in Chief Middle East Command), Wilson (GOC British Troops in Egypt) and Blamey (GOC 2nd AIF I Corps). The idea of Operation Compass had begun in Wavell’s mind as a raid, to knock the Italians off balance. Seeing how the Greeks had defeated the Italian invasion from Albania, O’Connor and Wilson could see that, with a bit of luck and enough punch, Compass could actually be a proper counter-attack which wouldn’t only throw the Italians out of Egypt, but possibly open up their positions in Cyrenaica to assault. Wilson had effectively presented this view and had, finally, managed to convince Wavell of the possibilities.
Wavell, with Greece, Sudan and Kenya to worry about, as well as Egypt, didn’t completely entertain such extravagant hopes of the operation as did Wilson and O’Connor. However, he was persuaded to make certain that if a big opportunity did occur, that the army was prepared ‘morally, mentally and administratively’ to use it to the fullest.
Wavell, therefore, in addition to ordering 6th Australian Infantry Division forward, he asked Blamey to bring his 7th Division up to as high a level of readiness as possible. Blamey thought it might well be January before they were fully prepared, but he could see that 6th Division would need to be allowed a rest sooner or later, so he agreed. Two Infantry Tank Battalions (40th and 44th Bn RTR) having arrived in mid-November were being readied for the North African theatre in the RAOC depots in the Delta. These would be available to reinforce the 48th Bn RTR by mid-December, creating an Army Tank Brigade. Wavell asked Blamey to have his two Divisions trained and ready to work with the Infantry Tanks as a matter of urgency.
Having decided to be as prepared as possible, Wavell then approached General Hutchison, Deputy Quarter-Master General, with the need to plan for Operation Compass to last for at least a month, not just the few days of the original plan. Hutchison’s plans therefore had been thrown into a degree of disarray. The stockpiles that had been built up in the Field Supply depots to last four or five days would now have to be vastly expanded. Just about every RASC unit in Egypt would be needed to for this. The Royal Navy would happily support the movement forward by sea of supplies if and when Bardia and Tobruk were taken. But what condition the port facilities would be in by then was anyone’s guess. Hutchison had therefore to plan for supporting the 7th Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division and then the 6th Australian Division; with the possibility of this becoming a Corps sized command; overland for at least a month. This would put enormous pressure on the supply chain. He needed assurances from Wavell that no further reinforcements would be sent to Greece during this operation, diverting limited resources away from the main effort. Wavell reluctantly agreed, mentioning various provisos that might well limit the promise.
Air Marshall Arthur Longmore, Air Officer Commanding in Chief Middle East, of all the senior commanders was being asked to spread his limited forces far too thin. RAF reinforcements were coming, the planes mostly being flown up from Takoradi in West Africa, while the men arrived by sea. Already he’d had to send squadrons to Greece, and now, with the expectation that Operation Compass would become a proper counter-attack rather than a raid, he had to add this to his already complicated equation. Stripping the Delta of its air cover meant that he’d been able to increase the level of support for O’Connor’s Western Desert Force. It was crucial to keep the Italian air force from being able to intervene, either beforehand with reconnaissance, or during with aerial attacks.
If Sidi Barrani was retaken, there was already an existing landing field there. It might need some work to make it operational, but at least it would give his fighters a base to move forward to. If Bardia and Tobruk really were objectives, then he would need support from the army engineers to fix up captured Italian fields, or create new ones to forward base his squadrons. This would be another headache for General Hutchison’s strained quartermaster department. Moving enough fuel, ammunition and spares forward, and all the other things RAF squadrons needed to keep them operational, was no small matter.
For each of the top commanders there was one over-riding need, the need for secrecy. For an attack to be made on the Italians to have even the slightest hope of success, at least initially, it had to have the element of surprise. If Egypt were a boat it would be very leaky indeed. Keeping the Italians from learning of the British plans had to be covered with subterfuge and slight-of-hand. The senior officers were aware that there was a real danger that keeping the secret from the Italians would mean that the British forces’ left hand would find itself not knowing what its right hand was up to at crucial moments. This was the most difficult of balancing acts, and there were all sorts of cover stories and false rumours being spread to keep the real story from being revealed.
NB Text in italic is from OTL, otherwise the rest is fiction. There is some dubiety in my sources about whether or not O'Connor knew the Indians would be withdrawn. Certainly in at least one book he is quoted as being completely taken by surprise, but I find that odd. The fact that Wavell wrote to Wilson on 28 November
5 December 1940. Bagush Box. Egypt.
The arrival of the troops of 16th Australian Infantry Brigade by train had been completed the day before, the Brigade’s vehicles and heavy equipment arrived in a sandstorm during the night, completing the Brigade’s journey forward. With the 17th and 19th Brigades scheduled to arrive in the area over the next few days, 6th Australian Infantry Division of the Second Australian Imperial Force was about to put their training into practice. Various versions of plans had come and gone. At one point the 19th Brigade was going to wait at Alexandria and be moved forward by sea. However, things changed when General Wilson let slip to General O’Connor that General Wavell planned to transfer the 4th Indian Division to Sudan as soon as the planned attack succeeded.
O’Connor, taken aback, immediately made the argument that if the attack was successful, withdrawing the Indians would mean that the ability to exploit any success would be removed. Wavell, when confronted by this information, tried to reassure O’Connor that the Indians would be replaced by the 6th Australian Division. O’Connor knew it would take a certain amount of time for the Indians to be replaced with the Australians. Therefore, he argued, the 6th Australian Infantry Division should be brought forward, and be ready to replace the 4th Indian Division as soon as Wavell ordered them withdrawn, preferably on the fourth or fifth day, when they would need a rest anyway. He would prefer the Indians not be withdrawn at all, but if they absolutely had to be, he wanted the Australians in place and ready to take over. If the Australians moved up to the start line for Operation Compass once the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division moved off, then, they would be close enough to reinforce the success, or, in the worst case, cover the withdrawal of the Western Desert Force.
As an alternative, O’Connor wondered about the possibility of keeping the 4th Indian Division in Western Desert Force, and having the Australian 6th Division go to Sudan in their place, at which point Blamey had intervened. The orders he had from the Australian government were that the 2nd AIF weren’t to be used up piecemeal. I Corps was beginning to come together in terms of men and equipment, which the 9th Division would complete in due course. Sending the 6th Division to Sudan would undermine those efforts.
All this was thrashed out in stormy conference between the four generals, O’Connor (Western Desert Force), Wavell (GOC-in Chief Middle East Command), Wilson (GOC British Troops in Egypt) and Blamey (GOC 2nd AIF I Corps). The idea of Operation Compass had begun in Wavell’s mind as a raid, to knock the Italians off balance. Seeing how the Greeks had defeated the Italian invasion from Albania, O’Connor and Wilson could see that, with a bit of luck and enough punch, Compass could actually be a proper counter-attack which wouldn’t only throw the Italians out of Egypt, but possibly open up their positions in Cyrenaica to assault. Wilson had effectively presented this view and had, finally, managed to convince Wavell of the possibilities.
Wavell, with Greece, Sudan and Kenya to worry about, as well as Egypt, didn’t completely entertain such extravagant hopes of the operation as did Wilson and O’Connor. However, he was persuaded to make certain that if a big opportunity did occur, that the army was prepared ‘morally, mentally and administratively’ to use it to the fullest.
Wavell, therefore, in addition to ordering 6th Australian Infantry Division forward, he asked Blamey to bring his 7th Division up to as high a level of readiness as possible. Blamey thought it might well be January before they were fully prepared, but he could see that 6th Division would need to be allowed a rest sooner or later, so he agreed. Two Infantry Tank Battalions (40th and 44th Bn RTR) having arrived in mid-November were being readied for the North African theatre in the RAOC depots in the Delta. These would be available to reinforce the 48th Bn RTR by mid-December, creating an Army Tank Brigade. Wavell asked Blamey to have his two Divisions trained and ready to work with the Infantry Tanks as a matter of urgency.
Having decided to be as prepared as possible, Wavell then approached General Hutchison, Deputy Quarter-Master General, with the need to plan for Operation Compass to last for at least a month, not just the few days of the original plan. Hutchison’s plans therefore had been thrown into a degree of disarray. The stockpiles that had been built up in the Field Supply depots to last four or five days would now have to be vastly expanded. Just about every RASC unit in Egypt would be needed to for this. The Royal Navy would happily support the movement forward by sea of supplies if and when Bardia and Tobruk were taken. But what condition the port facilities would be in by then was anyone’s guess. Hutchison had therefore to plan for supporting the 7th Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division and then the 6th Australian Division; with the possibility of this becoming a Corps sized command; overland for at least a month. This would put enormous pressure on the supply chain. He needed assurances from Wavell that no further reinforcements would be sent to Greece during this operation, diverting limited resources away from the main effort. Wavell reluctantly agreed, mentioning various provisos that might well limit the promise.
Air Marshall Arthur Longmore, Air Officer Commanding in Chief Middle East, of all the senior commanders was being asked to spread his limited forces far too thin. RAF reinforcements were coming, the planes mostly being flown up from Takoradi in West Africa, while the men arrived by sea. Already he’d had to send squadrons to Greece, and now, with the expectation that Operation Compass would become a proper counter-attack rather than a raid, he had to add this to his already complicated equation. Stripping the Delta of its air cover meant that he’d been able to increase the level of support for O’Connor’s Western Desert Force. It was crucial to keep the Italian air force from being able to intervene, either beforehand with reconnaissance, or during with aerial attacks.
If Sidi Barrani was retaken, there was already an existing landing field there. It might need some work to make it operational, but at least it would give his fighters a base to move forward to. If Bardia and Tobruk really were objectives, then he would need support from the army engineers to fix up captured Italian fields, or create new ones to forward base his squadrons. This would be another headache for General Hutchison’s strained quartermaster department. Moving enough fuel, ammunition and spares forward, and all the other things RAF squadrons needed to keep them operational, was no small matter.
For each of the top commanders there was one over-riding need, the need for secrecy. For an attack to be made on the Italians to have even the slightest hope of success, at least initially, it had to have the element of surprise. If Egypt were a boat it would be very leaky indeed. Keeping the Italians from learning of the British plans had to be covered with subterfuge and slight-of-hand. The senior officers were aware that there was a real danger that keeping the secret from the Italians would mean that the British forces’ left hand would find itself not knowing what its right hand was up to at crucial moments. This was the most difficult of balancing acts, and there were all sorts of cover stories and false rumours being spread to keep the real story from being revealed.
NB Text in italic is from OTL, otherwise the rest is fiction. There is some dubiety in my sources about whether or not O'Connor knew the Indians would be withdrawn. Certainly in at least one book he is quoted as being completely taken by surprise, but I find that odd. The fact that Wavell wrote to Wilson on 28 November
Wavell still sees it 'up to the Egyptian Frontier', but from my reading Wilson and O'Connor have higher hopes than that. So I've taken liberties, imagine that!"his belief that an opportunity might occur for converting the enemy's defeat into an outstanding victory. Events in Albania had shown that Italian morale after a reverse was unlikely to be high. Every possible preparation was therefore to be made to take advantage of preliminary success and to support a possible pursuit right up to the Egyptian frontier. 'I do not entertain extravagant hopes of this operation,' he wrote, 'but I do wish to make certain that if a big opportunity occurs we are prepared morally, mentally, and administratively, to use it to the fullest'." Official History