Chapter 2. 10 June 1940. London, England.
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Chapter 2
10 June 1940. London, England.
The Tank Board had been convened on 29 May to ‘consider the whole situation regarding the production and design of tanks and to advise the Minister of Supply as to future action.’ Chaired by Sir Alexander Roger of BSA, who’d done the same job for the Ministry of Munitions during the Great War, the rest of the members were Mr A Durrant, a chief engineer of the London Passenger Transport Board; Mr J Moyses, Managing Director of Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company; and Mr G Thompson, Member of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.
Their initial report had been provided to the Ministry of Supply on 7 June which focused on five main recommendations. Firstly, the army should concentrate on a minimum number of types in order to achieve standardisation of design. Secondly, the army needed to state unequivocally, and through one focal point, the fundamentals of their demands in terms of armament, production, performance and numbers. Thirdly, control of the organisation in the Ministry of Supply should be in the hands of civilians familiar with and engaged in rapid commercial methods. Fourthly, since there was a civilian Director General responsible for both tanks and wheeled vehicles, a General Manager should be appointed whose sole responsibility was to the tank department, with two subordinates to take charge of responsibility for design and production. Lastly, tank construction should be simplified, and responsibility for complete assembly should be with the Ministry to avoid vehicles being issued without vital equipment.
In the War Office the after-action reports and recommendations that had flowed in were being digested and reflected upon. Brigadier Pratt, commander of First Army Tank Brigade, Vyvyan Pope, the BEF’s advisor on Armoured Vehicles, General Evans, commander of 1st Armoured Division, amongst many others had meant that a preliminary War Office response to the Tank Board’s recommendations was now ready to be sent to the Ministry of Supply.
Regarding the first point, all current production of the Vickers Light Tank Mark VI should be completed and no further orders made. The A17 Tetrarch, now being made in Glasgow, would from now on be the only light tank to be constructed. The army would prefer to focus on suitable Armoured Cars and reconnaissance vehicles for the Divisional Cavalry Regiment requirement. Production of the remaining Vickers A9, A10 cruisers and A11 infantry tanks on order were to be completed, but no further orders made. The production orders of the A13 cruiser tank, likewise, were to be completed but no further orders made. The orders made for the Vulcan A12 were to continue to be produced. The orders for the Vickers Valiant Mark I and I* were to be increased. Orders for the Nuffield A15 would be dependent on it being able take on board the lessons learned. This would mean that the minimum number of types of tanks would be: Light Tank: A17 Tetrarch; Cruiser tanks: Valiant Mark I* and possibly A15; Infantry tanks: Vulcan A12 and Vickers Valiant Mark I.
Regarding the next generation of tanks, the War Office recommendation was that work being done on the design by Vauxhall on the A22 infantry tank was to continue, and three prototypes built to be evaluated. These would be in competition with the Vickers Victor for the role of Infantry Tank. The Nuffield A15E1 had just recently arrived at Farnborough for evaluation. The need to thicken its armour and have a larger gun in its turret would mean it would need to be redesigned, delaying its entry into service. The Valiant I* would be the main cruiser tank at least through to late 1941. Work on the Valiant Mark II, with the larger gun would be prioritised, and would be preferred to be put into production by the end of 1940 at the latest.
The second element of the War Office’s reply to the Tank Board’s recommendations regarded the armament, production, performance and numbers of tanks. The War Office was clear that the armament of the tank should be the minimum of the 6-pdr under development, but much had been learned about the need for a tank to fire a good sized HE round. If the 6-pdr couldn’t provide a satisfactory HE round, then a tank gun of around 75mm would be required. The armour of the German tanks captured during the campaign was still being investigated, but the presumption was that the Germans would thicken their armour further after the losses the 2-pdr gun inflicted on them.
A study of the performance of the two main types of tanks, Infantry and Cruiser, had shown that in general the Infantry Tank’s armour was very important and lack of speed less important. The Cruiser tanks hadn’t been able to fulfil the role for which they had been designed, but had proved to be unreliable and too vulnerable. With the loss of so many tanks on the Continent, production of Infantry Tanks should be prioritised over Cruiser tanks. What was needed was a tank that was well protected, had a good gun, and was reasonably mobile, but, above all, was reliable. Production methods by the manufacturers of tanks should take reliability much more seriously, with some kind of systematic quality control over each component and sub-assembly, as well as the finished article. It was clear that tanks would have to travel far more on their own tracks than had been previously planned for. There was a need for both more tank transporters to move tanks by road, and an inbuilt capability for a tank to move itself over a good distance and still be fit to fight at the end of the road march.
The number of tanks needed by the army was now much greater, to replace losses as well as build up towards the planned number of armoured division and tank brigades. It was particularly important to plan for extra numbers for training purposes and as replacements and reserves on hand for the armoured units.
With regard to the other recommendations of the Tank Board, the War Office was concerned that the civilians responsible for the production, design and development of armoured fighting vehicles should work closely with the army to make sure that there was no divergence between the needs of the customer (the army) and the supplier (the manufacturers). The last recommendation, that all tanks should be handed over to the army fully equipped with everything needed, was strongly supported in the War Office response.
10 June 1940. London, England.
The Tank Board had been convened on 29 May to ‘consider the whole situation regarding the production and design of tanks and to advise the Minister of Supply as to future action.’ Chaired by Sir Alexander Roger of BSA, who’d done the same job for the Ministry of Munitions during the Great War, the rest of the members were Mr A Durrant, a chief engineer of the London Passenger Transport Board; Mr J Moyses, Managing Director of Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company; and Mr G Thompson, Member of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.
Their initial report had been provided to the Ministry of Supply on 7 June which focused on five main recommendations. Firstly, the army should concentrate on a minimum number of types in order to achieve standardisation of design. Secondly, the army needed to state unequivocally, and through one focal point, the fundamentals of their demands in terms of armament, production, performance and numbers. Thirdly, control of the organisation in the Ministry of Supply should be in the hands of civilians familiar with and engaged in rapid commercial methods. Fourthly, since there was a civilian Director General responsible for both tanks and wheeled vehicles, a General Manager should be appointed whose sole responsibility was to the tank department, with two subordinates to take charge of responsibility for design and production. Lastly, tank construction should be simplified, and responsibility for complete assembly should be with the Ministry to avoid vehicles being issued without vital equipment.
In the War Office the after-action reports and recommendations that had flowed in were being digested and reflected upon. Brigadier Pratt, commander of First Army Tank Brigade, Vyvyan Pope, the BEF’s advisor on Armoured Vehicles, General Evans, commander of 1st Armoured Division, amongst many others had meant that a preliminary War Office response to the Tank Board’s recommendations was now ready to be sent to the Ministry of Supply.
Regarding the first point, all current production of the Vickers Light Tank Mark VI should be completed and no further orders made. The A17 Tetrarch, now being made in Glasgow, would from now on be the only light tank to be constructed. The army would prefer to focus on suitable Armoured Cars and reconnaissance vehicles for the Divisional Cavalry Regiment requirement. Production of the remaining Vickers A9, A10 cruisers and A11 infantry tanks on order were to be completed, but no further orders made. The production orders of the A13 cruiser tank, likewise, were to be completed but no further orders made. The orders made for the Vulcan A12 were to continue to be produced. The orders for the Vickers Valiant Mark I and I* were to be increased. Orders for the Nuffield A15 would be dependent on it being able take on board the lessons learned. This would mean that the minimum number of types of tanks would be: Light Tank: A17 Tetrarch; Cruiser tanks: Valiant Mark I* and possibly A15; Infantry tanks: Vulcan A12 and Vickers Valiant Mark I.
Regarding the next generation of tanks, the War Office recommendation was that work being done on the design by Vauxhall on the A22 infantry tank was to continue, and three prototypes built to be evaluated. These would be in competition with the Vickers Victor for the role of Infantry Tank. The Nuffield A15E1 had just recently arrived at Farnborough for evaluation. The need to thicken its armour and have a larger gun in its turret would mean it would need to be redesigned, delaying its entry into service. The Valiant I* would be the main cruiser tank at least through to late 1941. Work on the Valiant Mark II, with the larger gun would be prioritised, and would be preferred to be put into production by the end of 1940 at the latest.
The second element of the War Office’s reply to the Tank Board’s recommendations regarded the armament, production, performance and numbers of tanks. The War Office was clear that the armament of the tank should be the minimum of the 6-pdr under development, but much had been learned about the need for a tank to fire a good sized HE round. If the 6-pdr couldn’t provide a satisfactory HE round, then a tank gun of around 75mm would be required. The armour of the German tanks captured during the campaign was still being investigated, but the presumption was that the Germans would thicken their armour further after the losses the 2-pdr gun inflicted on them.
A study of the performance of the two main types of tanks, Infantry and Cruiser, had shown that in general the Infantry Tank’s armour was very important and lack of speed less important. The Cruiser tanks hadn’t been able to fulfil the role for which they had been designed, but had proved to be unreliable and too vulnerable. With the loss of so many tanks on the Continent, production of Infantry Tanks should be prioritised over Cruiser tanks. What was needed was a tank that was well protected, had a good gun, and was reasonably mobile, but, above all, was reliable. Production methods by the manufacturers of tanks should take reliability much more seriously, with some kind of systematic quality control over each component and sub-assembly, as well as the finished article. It was clear that tanks would have to travel far more on their own tracks than had been previously planned for. There was a need for both more tank transporters to move tanks by road, and an inbuilt capability for a tank to move itself over a good distance and still be fit to fight at the end of the road march.
The number of tanks needed by the army was now much greater, to replace losses as well as build up towards the planned number of armoured division and tank brigades. It was particularly important to plan for extra numbers for training purposes and as replacements and reserves on hand for the armoured units.
With regard to the other recommendations of the Tank Board, the War Office was concerned that the civilians responsible for the production, design and development of armoured fighting vehicles should work closely with the army to make sure that there was no divergence between the needs of the customer (the army) and the supplier (the manufacturers). The last recommendation, that all tanks should be handed over to the army fully equipped with everything needed, was strongly supported in the War Office response.
