The Hurricanes most important role post D-Day was as a beer bomber. Barrels of Ale carried on bomb shackles and delivered to airstrips in the beach head.
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
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marathag
Banned
there was 2pdr APHE, but thought in France it penetrated less(it did) but it was found to be more deadly to Italian Crewed Tanks than Solid Shot rounds
I wasn't able to find reference to them getting an APHE shell to work well. Would you be able to provide references? I'm really interested in that regard.
What's interesting is that the OTL QF 2-pdr did have different reticles for shells with different MV, presumable for the HE shells that were issued to the Royal Artillery, etc. from this Australian training video: (
There are pictures on the WT forum about how the APHE Shell. QF., 2-pr., AP/T, Mk. I looks like:
Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index....152-40mm-qf-2-pounder-missing-shell-apt-mk-1/)
Now now, he's not entirely wrong. Instead of the American practice of "there's room for another gun on top, they can use it against planes", British practice (if I oversimplify correctly) was to either button down and proceed with the mission (because air support was never far off) or to get the tank under cover (assuming it was operating away from air cover, which they hated doing).
I have it under good authority that for armoured cars and unarmoured vehicles doing raids (see desert pirates and other fun tales involving the SAS/SBS), the practice was to exit vehicle post-haste, take cover and wait for the nasty people to go away, then get back in the car that's had a few new holes punched clean through it and carry on.
marathag
Banned
A not widely known fact is that the earliest (1936) ammunition for the 2-pdr was not the plain solid shot AP, but an AP-HE, an explosive round just like the regular armour piercing round of the 47/32. Before long the British Army decided that a solid shot round was to be preferred on account of the higher muzzle velocity solid shot rounds could be fired at. So in 1938 production of AP-HE rounds was discontinued and the classic solid shot AP was adopted in its stead. However, it seems that in the Western Desert in 1940 the British still had a stockpile of older AP-HE rounds for their 2-pdr, and they DID use them in combat against the Italians along with the newer model. The article draft states that there is an extant British battlefield report which points out the difference in the type and amount of damage caused by the older AP-HE and the newer AP on Italian armour.
The solid shot AP was like a big size antitank rifle round. If, as it was flying through the enemy tank, its trajectory didn't cross any human body, the crew could get away with total penetration of their armour unscathed, although in real life that must have been an unlikely case considering how crammed those little (by our standards) tanks were. (It could in any case critically damage the engine or other vital parts of the tank). By contrast, once inside the tank the AP-HE was supposed to be lethal to the crew. The 47/32 armour piercing shot would release on explosion about 15 splinters weighing over 20 grams each flying at high speed inside the tank. Combined with the blast, that was theoretically enough to put the crew out of combat.
There was then a request to re-start production of the APHE shell, which had been discontinued due to its reported poor performance in France 1940, but this never happened. It is worth noting that the APHE shell is often referred to as a "HE" shell in contemporary documents, and this has led to the erroneous belief that there was a HE shell available for the 2 pounder during the early war period, but this is in fact not the case.
It's also worth noting that some APHE shells had their explosive charge removed and replaced with sand when they were declared obsolete after the Battle of France, and I believe Brigadier George Davy discovered a batch of these sand-filled rounds a few weeks prior to Operation Crusader.
The figures for 2 pounder AP penetration given in Mechili's chart above refer to rolled homogenous armour (RHA) only, and not to face hardened armour. In practice, a standard 2 pounder AP round could not defeat the 50mm face hardened frontal armour of the Panzer III beyond 200 yards. The "supercharged" 2 pounder AP round could not penetrate the same armour beyond 400 yards.
It was estimated that the 2 pounder APCBC round could penetrate 50mm face hardened armour at between 800-1000 yards, but I have yet to find any test results that back up these estimates. As far as I can tell, no 2 pounder APCBC rounds arrived in time to be used in the desert campaign, at least for tank use.
Glyndwr01
Banned
I just object to the inference on the bravery of the British personnel who had been fighting 3 years more than the Americans!
marathag
Banned
But not bravery, but realism. the USA started putting AAA machine guns on tanks in 1939, British never did, so they really couldn't fight back, unless they threw cans of Bully Beef at Hermann and Fritz flying overhead
Glyndwr01
Banned
And about as much use as a fart in a wetsuit! Hermann and Fritz had AAA mg's on their tanks they still opened up like bully beef tins when hit with a rocket from outside mg range.
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marathag
Banned
Going from after action reports, rockets knocked out few AFVs. Trucks and Trains, sure, but not armored vehicles.
And when not trying to use as an AAA, you can go the Audie Murphy way and machinegun a German company with the .50 on an M10.
This would explain all the pictures of UK AFVs with MGs mounted on top in a contraption called the "Lakeman Mount"?
The British Army put their trust in dedicated AAA units.
Armoured Regiments had an AA troop attached to the HQ squadron.
(Something that does not appear on the ToE of a US Tank Battalion)
Initially towed or en portée on the back of a truck, by 1943 on dedicated Tank hulls.
marathag
Banned
what percent of British tanks since 1939, the 28,000 or so of them, had that bedspring contraption fitted?
Apparently several in every troop. It was though, an indication that your original comment was made from ignorance, rather than reality.
As reported to me first hand by veterans of WW2. Armoured cars included. Their logic was that a hit close enough to kill them would do the same on a trench and a tank is a very small target to hit with a bomb. Their worry was artillery and mortar fire with airbursts catching them opened up or out of the vehicle. I think that after two engagements in an infantry regiment I may have already grown up somewhat enough to have been fit for the Sergeant's Mess. Whilst tanks came with an AA mount for their Bren it was almost only used dismounted for guard duties.
the RAF was very enamoured with rockets, but they were never as accurate as was claimed and were not the great tank killer they thought they were because they were so darn inaccurate. The Soviets largely stopped using rockets in the AT role and instead used cluster bombs and their 23mm cannons were considerably more powerful than the 20mm Olerikon.
The Lakeman Mount as I understand it was utterly reviled by the crews - Fletcher is not very nice about it
"According to Mr.David Fletcher from the Bovington Tank Museum, Tom Lakeman, the designer of the AA mount installed on numerous British tanks of the early war years, was a Royal Tank Regiment officer, slightly mad according to people who knew him, who devised all kinds of strange machine-gun mountings.
The principle was a balance of arms and springs, like an office desk lamp, the idea being to reduce the weight of the weapon when used against aircraft. In practice they were usually more trouble than they were worth and most soldiers hated them and tried to throw them away at the first opportunity."
As I understand it - the fitting of AA machine guns on tanks was phased out due to the number of TCs being killed by sticking their heads out of the otherwise bullet and fragment proof tank and the BA was trying to stop them from doing so.
The .50s that came with the Sherman's in British service where 'generally' removed and given to the Armour Brigade's Rifle Regiments to mount on their Half Tracks and other support vehicles.
Certainly by the time you get to Normandy and beyond - the Sherman's and Cromwell's do not appear in photos and from what I have read over the years to mount any AA MG
Obviously by mid war the number of dedicated AAA weapons in a given Brigade/Division unit was significant as was the air superiority enjoyed by the Western allies.
The exception - again IIRC - was when the Valentine initially went to the 6 pounder gun and lost its coaxial MG and the Lakeman (or similar) device was fitted to provide the tank with a secondary MG armament.
Later versions of the Valentine design re-added the BESA
And of course the Achilles (M10) Tank destroyer retained the .50 cal - as it did not have a coaxial MG.
But it does seem that the mounting of AA MGs was rare on British tanks
"According to Mr.David Fletcher from the Bovington Tank Museum, Tom Lakeman, the designer of the AA mount installed on numerous British tanks of the early war years, was a Royal Tank Regiment officer, slightly mad according to people who knew him, who devised all kinds of strange machine-gun mountings.
The principle was a balance of arms and springs, like an office desk lamp, the idea being to reduce the weight of the weapon when used against aircraft. In practice they were usually more trouble than they were worth and most soldiers hated them and tried to throw them away at the first opportunity."
As I understand it - the fitting of AA machine guns on tanks was phased out due to the number of TCs being killed by sticking their heads out of the otherwise bullet and fragment proof tank and the BA was trying to stop them from doing so.
The .50s that came with the Sherman's in British service where 'generally' removed and given to the Armour Brigade's Rifle Regiments to mount on their Half Tracks and other support vehicles.
Certainly by the time you get to Normandy and beyond - the Sherman's and Cromwell's do not appear in photos and from what I have read over the years to mount any AA MG
Obviously by mid war the number of dedicated AAA weapons in a given Brigade/Division unit was significant as was the air superiority enjoyed by the Western allies.
The exception - again IIRC - was when the Valentine initially went to the 6 pounder gun and lost its coaxial MG and the Lakeman (or similar) device was fitted to provide the tank with a secondary MG armament.
Later versions of the Valentine design re-added the BESA
And of course the Achilles (M10) Tank destroyer retained the .50 cal - as it did not have a coaxial MG.
But it does seem that the mounting of AA MGs was rare on British tanks
1 October 1938. 10:00hrs. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. England.
allanpcameron
Donor
1 October 1938. 10:00hrs. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. England.
Like most of the men turning up for work that day, Sir John Carden had read the newspaper reports of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in our time” speech. As he entered Sir Noel Birch’s office and took a cup of tea that was the only topic for conversation.
Birch’s contacts in the army had been on high alert. There had been quite a lot of watching of the German army’s preparations for the possible invasion of Czechoslovakia. The War Office was buzzing with rumours and counter-rumours about what would have happened between the German troops and the Czechs if it had come to war. Knowing how the German Condor Legion were doing in Spain, there weren’t too many who gave the Czechs much hope for success.
Reading between the lines of all that had been going on, Birch was of the firm opinion that re-armament was now very firmly on the agenda for Britain. It wouldn’t be just the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force either, the chances were that the British army would soon be thinking seriously about a British Expeditionary Force. Obviously, Hitler wasn’t going to be satisfied with just the Sudetenland, and looking at the state of the British army, especially its tank forces, Birch hoped that Chamberlain had bought the country enough time to get its act together. Carden noted that especially now that the Germans would likely benefit from Czechoslovakian industry, including tank manufacturers, the need for rearmament was ever more pressing.
The first 60 A11s which had been ordered in April 1937 were under construction and progressing well. Deliveries would begin in the new year and be completed before the summer of 1939. The second and third batches, for another 120 tanks, which had been ordered in April and September 1938, would be for the A11 mark II. The army had been persuaded to allow Vickers to replace the Meadows engine (used in the light Mark VIB tank) in the A11 mark I with the AEC bus engine, producing 135hp, as used in the A9 and A10. This would give the 12 ton tank a bit more power and therefore speed, taking it up to about 10-12mph. The first 60 A11 Mark IIs would be in the hands of the army by Autumn 1939, the other sixty being delivered in the winter of 1939/1940. Knowing the problems with Vulcan Foundry’s A12, Birch was confident that the company would receive orders for more A11s before the end of the year.
The fact that the most recent order for another 70 Mark VIbs had just been given to Vulcan Foundry was interesting. There had been a downturn during 1937 and Vulcan had shed workers that year. The War Office was obviously concerned about the A12 program that giving such a large order of light tanks to Vulcan Foundry was an incentive to increase the workforce so that when the A12 went into full production they would have the men to build it. So even although there was a recession during 1938, Vulcan, like Vickers, had been expanding the workforce.
What concerned Carden was how the company were going to get the Valiant into full scale production. If the last order for the A11 was only being fulfilled in early 1940, then realistically that would be when the Valiant would be able to be produced. Birch was confident, from his conversations with Martel at the War Office, that allowing for the prototype to successfully complete its trials, then a substantial order, over 200 Valiants, would follow. If that came before the end of 1938, then beginning to produce the Valiant in early 1940 would be about right. That would mean the first fully equipped and trained units would be ready around the late summer of 1940.
An alternative suggestion from Carden was for the company to do in Chertsey what it had done in Elswick: expand the facilities and create a new tank shop. Creating a complete tank factory would take about a year, but it would mean that orders for the Valiant would more likely stay within Vickers itself rather than going, as with the A9 and A10, to companies like Harland & Wolff, Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company and Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage & Wagon Company. If war was coming, then the dribs and drabs of orders for tanks from the War Office would become a flood. If Vickers had the production facilities to put its designs into fast production, then the company, and the country would prosper. Hopefully Neville Chamberlain had won the country enough time to rearm, because neither Birch nor Carden really believed that there would be peace in their time.
Like most of the men turning up for work that day, Sir John Carden had read the newspaper reports of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in our time” speech. As he entered Sir Noel Birch’s office and took a cup of tea that was the only topic for conversation.
Birch’s contacts in the army had been on high alert. There had been quite a lot of watching of the German army’s preparations for the possible invasion of Czechoslovakia. The War Office was buzzing with rumours and counter-rumours about what would have happened between the German troops and the Czechs if it had come to war. Knowing how the German Condor Legion were doing in Spain, there weren’t too many who gave the Czechs much hope for success.
Reading between the lines of all that had been going on, Birch was of the firm opinion that re-armament was now very firmly on the agenda for Britain. It wouldn’t be just the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force either, the chances were that the British army would soon be thinking seriously about a British Expeditionary Force. Obviously, Hitler wasn’t going to be satisfied with just the Sudetenland, and looking at the state of the British army, especially its tank forces, Birch hoped that Chamberlain had bought the country enough time to get its act together. Carden noted that especially now that the Germans would likely benefit from Czechoslovakian industry, including tank manufacturers, the need for rearmament was ever more pressing.
The first 60 A11s which had been ordered in April 1937 were under construction and progressing well. Deliveries would begin in the new year and be completed before the summer of 1939. The second and third batches, for another 120 tanks, which had been ordered in April and September 1938, would be for the A11 mark II. The army had been persuaded to allow Vickers to replace the Meadows engine (used in the light Mark VIB tank) in the A11 mark I with the AEC bus engine, producing 135hp, as used in the A9 and A10. This would give the 12 ton tank a bit more power and therefore speed, taking it up to about 10-12mph. The first 60 A11 Mark IIs would be in the hands of the army by Autumn 1939, the other sixty being delivered in the winter of 1939/1940. Knowing the problems with Vulcan Foundry’s A12, Birch was confident that the company would receive orders for more A11s before the end of the year.
The fact that the most recent order for another 70 Mark VIbs had just been given to Vulcan Foundry was interesting. There had been a downturn during 1937 and Vulcan had shed workers that year. The War Office was obviously concerned about the A12 program that giving such a large order of light tanks to Vulcan Foundry was an incentive to increase the workforce so that when the A12 went into full production they would have the men to build it. So even although there was a recession during 1938, Vulcan, like Vickers, had been expanding the workforce.
What concerned Carden was how the company were going to get the Valiant into full scale production. If the last order for the A11 was only being fulfilled in early 1940, then realistically that would be when the Valiant would be able to be produced. Birch was confident, from his conversations with Martel at the War Office, that allowing for the prototype to successfully complete its trials, then a substantial order, over 200 Valiants, would follow. If that came before the end of 1938, then beginning to produce the Valiant in early 1940 would be about right. That would mean the first fully equipped and trained units would be ready around the late summer of 1940.
An alternative suggestion from Carden was for the company to do in Chertsey what it had done in Elswick: expand the facilities and create a new tank shop. Creating a complete tank factory would take about a year, but it would mean that orders for the Valiant would more likely stay within Vickers itself rather than going, as with the A9 and A10, to companies like Harland & Wolff, Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company and Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage & Wagon Company. If war was coming, then the dribs and drabs of orders for tanks from the War Office would become a flood. If Vickers had the production facilities to put its designs into fast production, then the company, and the country would prosper. Hopefully Neville Chamberlain had won the country enough time to rearm, because neither Birch nor Carden really believed that there would be peace in their time.
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