30 April 1941. Cairo, Egypt.
General Wavell and Admiral Cunningham had been watching the progress of the withdrawal from Greece intently. The first convoys of the ‘useless mouths’ and wounded had arrived in Alexandria, having departed Pireas on the night of 24/25 April. Many of the support troops, including the large RAF contingent, would have a few days to get themselves sorted before they were given new tasks. Of the 62500 men who had been transported to Greece, it was expected that around 60000 men would be evacuated. The Greek Navy and merchant marine, as far as Middle East Command could estimate had evacuated at least 30000 men, mostly to Crete, though some were now making their way to Alexandria or Haifa. As far as they knew the Greeks had also brought out a large number of Yugoslavs, including many pilots and groundcrew, some five thousand in total.
The discussion about which units to leave on Crete, and who to bring back to Egypt, had been going on for days. Since the New Zealand Division were being taken directly to Suda Bay, they, under General Freyberg, seemed the obvious choice to take overall responsibility for the island’s defence. Currently Creforce consisted of 14th Infantry Brigade, the newly arrived Polish Brigade, and the commandos of Layforce.
Wavell still wanted the commandos to be available to eventually try to make a movement towards isolating and eventually capturing Rhodes. The Greek forces on Crete had been strongly reinforced by the evacuations from the mainland, and some of the ships plying between Alexandria and Suda Bay had carried as much of the captured Italian arms and ammunition that were still available to provide the Greeks replacement weapons. Once the three ‘Glen’ ships were done with the evacuation, Wavell wanted them to bring the commandos back to Egypt.
Wavell expressed the worry that the New Zealanders, having been through such heavy fighting, and perhaps not being able to have their full levels of heavy equipment, might not be the best choice to leave on Crete. He would prefer they be brought back to Egypt where they could properly rest and refit, along with the Australian 6th Division.
Admiral Cunningham again expressed his view that having both Malta and Crete to keep supplied by sea, as well as running convoys along the North African coast to keep supplying O’Connor’s army, would stretch his fleet’s capacity. While the remnants of the Greek Navy had joined their strength to his, including the majority of the Greek merchant fleet, it would still be a hard task. Already a number of his destroyers and cruisers were suffering damage which would need to be repaired. The previous Italian attack on Suda Bay, with the damage to, and beaching of HMS York, was a reminder that the Italian navy was still a force to be reckoned with. The fact that they were using unconventional means had caused a stir throughout the Mediterranean Fleet, with each naval installation having to look again at their defences with an eye on something unexpected.
Wavell asked for clarification, did Cunningham want to abandon Crete? Cunningham certainly didn’t want to abandon Suda Bay, he was simply asking to keep the need for supplies to Crete as minimal as possible, at least until things improved generally. Wavell agreed, he would need to consult with General Papagos about what the Greek army could do to defend the island, with the help of the Greek Navy. If possible, Wavell would like to keep the British presence on Crete to a maximum of three Brigades, the equivalent of one Infantry Division. He had every confidence in the regular 14th Brigade, and the Poles were itching to have another chance to kill Germans. Leaving all the New Zealand 2nd Division on Crete would strain the capacity to supply the island’s needs. He might ask if General Freyberg would be able to leave one Brigade, if it was complete and fully equipped, on Crete, bringing the rest of the Division back to refit in Egypt.
Admiral Cunningham agreed to have his staff prepare to run a large convoy from Suda Bay to bring to Alexandria as many non-essential personnel as possible. General Freyberg, with his 2nd Division staff, would need to work out who could be shipped off the island, and who he would need. It would also be important to take enough equipment and stores to allow the island to be held, even if the Royal Navy had to postpone supply convoys because of other eventualities.
The RAF were another problem. The campaign in Greece had cost the RAF 209 aircraft and 130 aircrew. While some Hurricanes, Gladiators and Blenheims had made it to Crete, there wasn’t enough strength to protect Crete from the expected assault that Wavell had been warned of from the most secret dispatches from London. The Hurricanes which had arrived with the last convoy were all being used to provide cover for General O’Connor’s attack which was due to kick off the next day.
While the American P40, the Tomahawk, were starting to arrive in numbers, but a great deal of training had to be done before the pilots got used to it. The way the landing gear was designed meant that RAF pilots had to change from their normal ‘three-point’ landing to a ‘wheels landing’, which involved a longer and lower angle of approach touching down on the wheels first. The aircraft built for the French had had to be worked on to make them suitable for British trained pilots. All of the aircraft delivered to Africa lacked armour, self-sealing fuel tanks and bulletproof windscreens, which had to be rectified before they could go into combat. The machine guns that had been supplied with the aircraft also had to be replaced with guns that fired the common .303 ammunition. This had delayed the Tomahawk into service, but it was hoped that four squadrons (two RAF, one RAAF and one SAAF) would be operational by the end of June.