Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

If the fall of Malaya is delayed by a few penny packets of Matildas (entirely plausible, IMO, as long as they're in an appropriate place and aggressively handled), then Burma benefits without any direct changes - much of the invasion force were transferred from Malaya after it fell.

Nobody wants to see a wank, but I think the interconnection of the UK position in different theatres at this stage of the war means the dominoes can fall pretty far if only a few operations go better than OTL - and the rising Japanese threat which was very much recognised OTL might find a more active response if the North African theatre is 'closed'. OTL it was a likely threat from Japan competing with an active campaign, the active campaign got almost everything. If instead it's a likely threat Vs garrisoning Libya, policing the Tunisian frontier and doing prep work for Sicily, the calculation is a bit different.

I'm not sure if the timelines will work out, but we'll find that out as Allan writes on.
 
Hm, I wonder if tanks might be sent to other places than just Malaya or Burma. There should be enough time to get tanks into Java, which, if they're Matilda IIs, will undoubtedly delay the Japanese.
 
Besides, from my understanding of the early Japanese advances the entire thing seems like a series of precariously interconnected Rube Goldberg machines. I mean, yes, all military operations are like that, but the early Japanese ones especially.

So even minor changes at and early enough stage could have vast cascading effects.
 
Hm, I wonder if tanks might be sent to other places than just Malaya or Burma. There should be enough time to get tanks into Java, which, if they're Matilda IIs, will undoubtedly delay the Japanese.
Sending any tank to the D.E.I. depends on whether the Dutch are willing to divert any they may buy from defending their already invaded homeland. That would be a very hard thing for the Dutch Government to explain to it's electorate. If anything the D.E.I. are going to have less to fight with than they did Otl, as if it's a choice between defending an already invaded homeland and a distant colony there's really no contest.
 

Orry

Donor
Monthly Donor
Virtually any tank would ruin the Japanese's day given how crap their own armour was.

Looking at the Battle of Kinmen even a very small number of tanks can have a devestating effect on light infantry.

The M5A1 tanks employed by the ROC forces on Kinmen proved to be effective in countering the human wave attacks employed by the initial PLA landing forces, which were mostly composed of light infantry. ROC tank crews who had depleted their ammunition used their tanks as road rollers to crush PLA infantry. The pivotal role these tanks played caused ROC troops to give the M5A1 the nickname "Bear of Kinmen" (金門之熊). The PLA's initial landing force of the 244th regiment at Longkou (壟口) was met by three tanks (#64, #65, #66) of the 1st platoon, 3rd company of the ROC 1st Battalion, 3rd Tank Regiment. The #66 tank had broken down on the beach the previous evening after company exercises, and the other two tanks in the platoon had been ordered to stay and guard it while repairs were attempted.

from wiki

 
Nobody wants to see a wank,
To be honest, I have absolutely zero problem seeing a wank, as long as it is well supported with facts and logic. I love this TL because it has been well supported. What improvements come, come because they are built logically out of what has come before. If Singapore holding can be logically built out of the TL I would love to see it. If not, not.

But to put my two cents (pence?) in on Singapore, there are a lot of opportunities for the Commonwealth forces to so better with some experienced and even passably equipped forces. Slim River is obviously a big one. That said, the Slim River tank attack could have been stopped dead by a well placed AT gun battery. Instead, the guns were caught in transit and wiped out.

It seems likely that any force in Malaya ITTL will still face some of the challenges of OTL.:
-They have the potential to be undermined by the area leadership
-They will be fighting alongside inexperienced troops
-They will be fighting an enemy they have not faced before and who uses unfamiliar tactics well suited to the area
- They will be short on air cover under enemy air superiority
- If they cannot hold at least some of the DEI Singapore will be untenable anyway.

Still, even a better showing could help slow the Japanese down and increase the cost to them, which could have a snowball effect as time goes on.
 
Regarding the Far East, the Japanese attack on Malaya (unlike the German attack on Greece) was not some overwhelming assault with massive materiel superiority and succeeded largely due to the poor training, equipment and organisation of the third-string units opposing it. In the short term, a viable armoured force, even if it's just a couple of battalions of older tanks, has the potential to to significantly affect the campaign (consider that many of the Japanese mobile forces were relying on bicycles, and their tanks made the Italians look good).

The two reasons for the collapse of the British in Malaya was due to the Japanese use of tanks and Japanese light infantry infiltrating around British positions and creating road blocks in the British rear that the Indian troups couldn't break through. These reasons could be drastically reduced if the British deployed even small numbers of (the ITTL second line) Matilda 2's to Malaya as they would be largely impervious to Japanese weapons, could engage the enemy tanks and smash through the Japanese road blocks (also pretty relevant given the POD of TTL). A few dozen 2 pounders and a somewhat greater number of 25 pounders would also help enormously (OTL the divisions in Malaya lacked all types of artillery).

If the fall of Malaya is delayed by a few penny packets of Matildas (entirely plausible, IMO, as long as they're in an appropriate place and aggressively handled), then Burma benefits without any direct changes - much of the invasion force were transferred from Malaya after it fell.

The reason for the collapse in Malaya was nothing to do with the quality of size of the British ground forces. While a better equipped and better led ground force could have inflicted more Japanese casualties any defence was doomed because Malaya is an island peninsular with no land link to British India and the Japanese have air and naval superiority. The could and did strategically isolate the peninsular from resupply and outflank any defensive line via naval landings. Isolated and cut off it was just a matter of time. Percival could and should have fought harder for Singapore to buy time for Burma but it would ended the same way Corregidor ended.

What would save the Far East is if North Africa is wrapped up in time and the Desert Air Force can be drawn down so No. 244 Wing with it's four Squadrons of Spitfires can be sent to Malaya, add in a wing of Hurricanes and a wing of Beauforts and the RAF can contest the air. That impacts the naval arena and if the RN can spare another pair of battleships and a pair of carriers and Malaya is safe. But without support form the other two services more Army troops just means more prisoners.
 
As for no foresight of Japanese intentions:
Includes the following (my emphasis):
"During the last week in March 1941, as a result of Britain’s capability to read Japanese top-secret diplomatic telegrams, Winston Churchill was able to follow the travels and discussions of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, in Rome, Berlin, and Moscow. While Matsuoka was in Berlin, he was pressed, on Hitler’s authority, to agree to a Japanese attack on British possessions in the Far East as soon as possible. Matsuoka was told an attack on Singapore would be a decisive factor in the speedy overthrow of England.

After reading Matsuoka’s own top-secret account of the German pressure, Churchill sent him a message with eight questions designed to make Japan pause before committing its fleets and armies against Britain."

The rest of the piece is about outrageous complacency that Malaya was already well defended, and Churchills incandescent anger when he found out that his, and everyone else in the general staffs, assumptions were ill founded.
One question, or an "action this day" note, would have burst the bubble.

Secondly Robert Menzies was in London from 20th February to early May, urging for reinforcement of Malaya and pressing the danger from Japan, including in cabinet with Churchill.

From the same article, In OTL, on 5th February 1942 Yamashita was down to 18 tanks, and short of ammunition and food. Before launching the attack on Singapore Island.
I think Yamashita is on record as saying the only way the campaign could be a success was as a single, prolonged, headlong charge. Any delay would allow the allies to reinforce faster than the Japanese could. Malaya was difficult to reinforce for the British empire, but it was also difficult for the Japanese, who were short of just about everything before the war even began.
 
Last edited:
Nobody wants to see a wank,
Vs OTLs Japan Wank and Brit Screw, with one side rolling natural 20s, and the other doing ones for the entire first 6 months of the war, between shots of Lead Paint

Anyone doing a TL with OTL events would be flamed into oblivion.
'What, won't dig trenches as that would upset the local Golf Course management, total BS!!'
 
With regards to Malaya and Percival, I'll just repost what I said on another thread about the subject:
To be fair to Percival, some of the things in the British Far East that went wrong weren't his fault (the lack of proper equipment, for example); however, IMO, he was not a good leader. By all accounts, he was a good staff officer (he'd have to be in order to get command of Singapore and Malaya, IMO) but he suffered from the flaw (which is common in a lot of wars) of being a good officer in a supporting role and a poor officer in a leading role (kind of like Madonna and movie roles--she's good in supporting movie roles, but cast her as the lead (like in, say, Shanghai Surprise or Swept Away) and she's in over her head)...
 
With regards to Malaya and Percival, I'll just repost what I said on another thread about the subject:
To be fair to Percival, some of the things in the British Far East that went wrong weren't his fault (the lack of proper equipment, for example); however, IMO, he was not a good leader. By all accounts, he was a good staff officer (he'd have to be in order to get command of Singapore and Malaya, IMO) but he suffered from the flaw (which is common in a lot of wars) of being a good officer in a supporting role and a poor officer in a leading role (kind of like Madonna and movie roles--she's good in supporting movie roles, but cast her as the lead (like in, say, Shanghai Surprise or Swept Away) and she's in over her head)...
I can see the show title.... "Percival - The Madonna of Singapore!"
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The British have taken the decision to halt their advance, and dig in and await their opponents next move. While at one and the same time giving their forces the chance to reorganise, rest, repair and resupply, all of which given the success of their recent campaign they need to do. The original plan had been for a large raid to disrupt the Italian advance into Egypt, and destroy as much of the Italian force as they could. This plan was changed to one where the British would advance as far as they could, causing as much damage as they were able, given the poor condition of their supply base and the size of their force in comparison to the Italian force. What the British hadn’t expected was the totality of their success, they were constantly surprised by just how quickly the Italian forces collapsed. This collapses of the Italians, did ITTL as it did in OTL, cause the British forces numerous problems, especially in supply, maintenance, and dealing with abandoned Italian equipment, plus dealing with the vast numbers of Italian POW’s. However the British ITTL have the advantage that they have achieved their success much sooner than the did, and thus have had more time to sort out their problems. And they have made the decision to call a halt to their advance for the moment, dig in in a defendable position, while they try to sort out the mess behind their front line. This in my opinion is the right thing to do, and will along with the extra time it allows before the Germans can get their act together, enable them to possibly prevent the disaster that happened IOTL, when the Germans attacked.

There are a number of things to take into consideration re the upcoming German attack. The first and most important is who is in command of the German forces. Is it an aggressive thruster like Rommel, who is going to ignore his instructions, throw the dice and try to defeat the British with a sudden uncoordinated attack. Or is it someone who will obey their instructions, dig in themselves while trying to build up their own forces to carry out an attack and drive the British out of Italian North Africa. If it’s a thruster, then he has one chance of getting it right, if he doesn’t succeed in his first attack, then he will have destroyed his chances and a lot of his equipment. And given the better preparation that the British have been able to make, our thruster needs to throw constant series of sixes. If he doesn’t, then the British will be able defeat the attack, destroy a significant amount of equipment, while suffering minimal damage themselves to the now vital infrastructure they are building up. If the British manage to hold their position up to the invasion of Greece, and retain it until the Greek campaign is over, then the Germans in North Africa, have a serious problem. Once the Greek campaign is over including any attack on Crete, the Germans will be very much an after though to the High Command, who are now concentrating on the invasion of the Soviet Union.

With the British established in Benghazi, and not forced to run back east, they have the ability to change their tactics completely. No need to run convoys from Gibraltar to Malta, with all the problems that caused, and the strain it put on the Royal Navy. They can now be run out of Alexandria via Benghazi, which does have problems, it’s a much longer journey from Britain via the Cape. But the level of input required from the Royal Navy, is far less with only major units needed for the last stage. Which in the long run will reduce the number of losses, which will have an effect on the events in the Far East. The other advantage comes from the fact that with Malta getting more supplies, the interdiction of the trans Mediterranean Italian supply line, will reduce the effectiveness of the Italian and German forces in North Africa. And given that it will not be to long before the British have removed the Italians from their position in East Africa, the restrictions that the Americans placed on their shipping, not being able to sail into a war zone, will be lifted.

Ighmas, thank you for the information about the Italian airfields in Rhodes, which I found to be very interesting. However I question just how developed the airfields were, given the poverty of the Italian state at the time. Were they fully developed with hangers, fuel dumps, fuel lines linked to a port, hard standings and all weather runways. Or are they just dusty open fields, with a few sheds and a control tower. Do they have fixed communication links with each other, and any central command position on the island. There is so much more than goes into making for an effective air station than just a flat peace of land. As for the Italian attack on the Bahrain oil fields, great propaganda, especially for the home crowd, but military virtually worthless. Same with the German attacks on the Suez Canal, while the attacks did cause the British some inconvenience, they were in the end minor. But they did divert the Luftwaffe from its principal task, that of supporting the Army in the field, which they didn’t do to the extent that they could.

While the pace of tank development in Britain is now far ahead of what it was IOTL, the tactics of how to use them, hasn’t yet caught up with the improvements made. The is a lot of experimentation, and examining of reports from the North African campaign, to be undertaken now. Britain has developed what might be considered as the first Main Battle Tank, but it is still focused on the theory of different tanks for different roles. It is going to take time for the penny to drop, and the realisation that while its nice to have infantry and cruiser tanks, you can never be sure to have the right tank in place when you want it. And having a general tank that can preform both roles, if not perfectly, is the best option. The essential work on development of SP guns and specialist armoured vehicles has started, and by mid 42 Britain should have the beginnings of a number of successful designs.

Crete and Singapore, might not play out in the way they did IOTL, both were very close run events, and its not going to take a lot to change their outcomes. The presence of a few tanks around the airfields in Crete, being used by experienced crews, will make a major difference. And if Crete is held, while Greece falls, along with the British being able to retain their position west of Benghazi, the dynamics of the war in both North Africa and the Far East, are changed. While there were many failings in Malaya, the biggest was in leadership. And it is here that events in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean will effect events in Malaysia. By mid 1941 IOTL, the British had been driven out of their position east of Benghazi, Tobruk was under siege, O’Conner had been captured, and the British forces kicked out of both Greece and Crete. Wavell was in Churchill’s mind very much a busted flush, and needed to be replaced. Now ITTL, Britain possible, it all depends on how the author decides to play it, Britain has retained its position west of Benghazi, O’Conner is still in command, while Greece has fallen, as was very much expected, Crete has been retained. Wavell while not Winston’s favourite is going to be hard to replace. And odds are is going to be left in overall command of the Middle East. Instead of being replaced and sent out east, worn out and lacking the PM’s confidence.

So the shortage of experienced generals that Britain suffered in mid 1941, and the lack of anyone with the knowledge of modern war to send out east, doesn’t exist. Britain can afford to send some experienced men to Singapore to take charge, and get a grip on the forces out there. Remember IOTL, by the time the Japanese got to Singapore they were basically out of ammunition and supplies, outnumbered by the defenders, and basically bluffed their way to a win. Yes Percival was a deserter as a commander, he just wasn’t up to the task of commanding forces in combat. But it should always be remembered he was a brilliant staff officer, who had laid out the basic plan that the Japanese would follow to invade Malaya. If he can be given a suitable commander, and sidelined to a staff position, while a suitable fighting general, is put in place as commander land forces Malaya, things might be very different. The British only need to hold on to mid 1942, to upset completely the Japanese plan. Tied down in a siege of Singapore, or driven back due to lack of resources to the near the Thailand border. The Japanese effort in Burma is a none starter, there is no threat to India, Australia is covered to an extent, and doesn’t feel so letdown by Britain. And once both the Germans and Italians have been driven out of North Africa, and the major threat that was the Italian Navy, is reduced, Britain will be able to concentrate more resources in the Far East. So who is my dream team to get a grip on the Far East, overall commander Alexandria, ground commander Malaysia Montgomery, with Percival as Chief of Staff to the Commander British Forces Far East.

RR.
 
Ighmas, thank you for the information about the Italian airfields in Rhodes, which I found to be very interesting. However I question just how developed the airfields were, given the poverty of the Italian state at the time. Were they fully developed with hangers, fuel dumps, fuel lines linked to a port, hard standings and all weather runways. Or are they just dusty open fields, with a few sheds and a control tower. Do they have fixed communication links with each other, and any central command position on the island. There is so much more than goes into making for an effective air station than just a flat peace of land. As for the Italian attack on the Bahrain oil fields, great propaganda, especially for the home crowd, but military virtually worthless. Same with the German attacks on the Suez Canal, while the attacks did cause the British some inconvenience, they were in the end minor. But they did divert the Luftwaffe from its principal task, that of supporting the Army in the field, which they didn’t do to the extent that they could.

P45 under Maritsa.
Quite a significant air base.
 
The British have taken the decision to halt their advance, and dig in and await their opponents next move. While at one and the same time giving their forces the chance to reorganise, rest, repair and resupply, all of which given the success of their recent campaign they need to do. The original plan had been for a large raid to disrupt the Italian advance into Egypt, and destroy as much of the Italian force as they could. This plan was changed to one where the British would advance as far as they could, causing as much damage as they were able, given the poor condition of their supply base and the size of their force in comparison to the Italian force. What the British hadn’t expected was the totality of their success, they were constantly surprised by just how quickly the Italian forces collapsed. This collapses of the Italians, did ITTL as it did in OTL, cause the British forces numerous problems, especially in supply, maintenance, and dealing with abandoned Italian equipment, plus dealing with the vast numbers of Italian POW’s. However the British ITTL have the advantage that they have achieved their success much sooner than the did, and thus have had more time to sort out their problems. And they have made the decision to call a halt to their advance for the moment, dig in in a defendable position, while they try to sort out the mess behind their front line. This in my opinion is the right thing to do, and will along with the extra time it allows before the Germans can get their act together, enable them to possibly prevent the disaster that happened IOTL, when the Germans attacked.

There are a number of things to take into consideration re the upcoming German attack. The first and most important is who is in command of the German forces. Is it an aggressive thruster like Rommel, who is going to ignore his instructions, throw the dice and try to defeat the British with a sudden uncoordinated attack. Or is it someone who will obey their instructions, dig in themselves while trying to build up their own forces to carry out an attack and drive the British out of Italian North Africa. If it’s a thruster, then he has one chance of getting it right, if he doesn’t succeed in his first attack, then he will have destroyed his chances and a lot of his equipment. And given the better preparation that the British have been able to make, our thruster needs to throw constant series of sixes. If he doesn’t, then the British will be able defeat the attack, destroy a significant amount of equipment, while suffering minimal damage themselves to the now vital infrastructure they are building up. If the British manage to hold their position up to the invasion of Greece, and retain it until the Greek campaign is over, then the Germans in North Africa, have a serious problem. Once the Greek campaign is over including any attack on Crete, the Germans will be very much an after though to the High Command, who are now concentrating on the invasion of the Soviet Union.

With the British established in Benghazi, and not forced to run back east, they have the ability to change their tactics completely. No need to run convoys from Gibraltar to Malta, with all the problems that caused, and the strain it put on the Royal Navy. They can now be run out of Alexandria via Benghazi, which does have problems, it’s a much longer journey from Britain via the Cape. But the level of input required from the Royal Navy, is far less with only major units needed for the last stage. Which in the long run will reduce the number of losses, which will have an effect on the events in the Far East. The other advantage comes from the fact that with Malta getting more supplies, the interdiction of the trans Mediterranean Italian supply line, will reduce the effectiveness of the Italian and German forces in North Africa. And given that it will not be to long before the British have removed the Italians from their position in East Africa, the restrictions that the Americans placed on their shipping, not being able to sail into a war zone, will be lifted.

Ighmas, thank you for the information about the Italian airfields in Rhodes, which I found to be very interesting. However I question just how developed the airfields were, given the poverty of the Italian state at the time. Were they fully developed with hangers, fuel dumps, fuel lines linked to a port, hard standings and all weather runways. Or are they just dusty open fields, with a few sheds and a control tower. Do they have fixed communication links with each other, and any central command position on the island. There is so much more than goes into making for an effective air station than just a flat peace of land. As for the Italian attack on the Bahrain oil fields, great propaganda, especially for the home crowd, but military virtually worthless. Same with the German attacks on the Suez Canal, while the attacks did cause the British some inconvenience, they were in the end minor. But they did divert the Luftwaffe from its principal task, that of supporting the Army in the field, which they didn’t do to the extent that they could.

While the pace of tank development in Britain is now far ahead of what it was IOTL, the tactics of how to use them, hasn’t yet caught up with the improvements made. The is a lot of experimentation, and examining of reports from the North African campaign, to be undertaken now. Britain has developed what might be considered as the first Main Battle Tank, but it is still focused on the theory of different tanks for different roles. It is going to take time for the penny to drop, and the realisation that while its nice to have infantry and cruiser tanks, you can never be sure to have the right tank in place when you want it. And having a general tank that can preform both roles, if not perfectly, is the best option. The essential work on development of SP guns and specialist armoured vehicles has started, and by mid 42 Britain should have the beginnings of a number of successful designs.

Crete and Singapore, might not play out in the way they did IOTL, both were very close run events, and its not going to take a lot to change their outcomes. The presence of a few tanks around the airfields in Crete, being used by experienced crews, will make a major difference. And if Crete is held, while Greece falls, along with the British being able to retain their position west of Benghazi, the dynamics of the war in both North Africa and the Far East, are changed. While there were many failings in Malaya, the biggest was in leadership. And it is here that events in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean will effect events in Malaysia. By mid 1941 IOTL, the British had been driven out of their position east of Benghazi, Tobruk was under siege, O’Conner had been captured, and the British forces kicked out of both Greece and Crete. Wavell was in Churchill’s mind very much a busted flush, and needed to be replaced. Now ITTL, Britain possible, it all depends on how the author decides to play it, Britain has retained its position west of Benghazi, O’Conner is still in command, while Greece has fallen, as was very much expected, Crete has been retained. Wavell while not Winston’s favourite is going to be hard to replace. And odds are is going to be left in overall command of the Middle East. Instead of being replaced and sent out east, worn out and lacking the PM’s confidence.

So the shortage of experienced generals that Britain suffered in mid 1941, and the lack of anyone with the knowledge of modern war to send out east, doesn’t exist. Britain can afford to send some experienced men to Singapore to take charge, and get a grip on the forces out there. Remember IOTL, by the time the Japanese got to Singapore they were basically out of ammunition and supplies, outnumbered by the defenders, and basically bluffed their way to a win. Yes Percival was a deserter as a commander, he just wasn’t up to the task of commanding forces in combat. But it should always be remembered he was a brilliant staff officer, who had laid out the basic plan that the Japanese would follow to invade Malaya. If he can be given a suitable commander, and sidelined to a staff position, while a suitable fighting general, is put in place as commander land forces Malaya, things might be very different. The British only need to hold on to mid 1942, to upset completely the Japanese plan. Tied down in a siege of Singapore, or driven back due to lack of resources to the near the Thailand border. The Japanese effort in Burma is a none starter, there is no threat to India, Australia is covered to an extent, and doesn’t feel so letdown by Britain. And once both the Germans and Italians have been driven out of North Africa, and the major threat that was the Italian Navy, is reduced, Britain will be able to concentrate more resources in the Far East. So who is my dream team to get a grip on the Far East, overall commander Alexandria, ground commander Malaysia Montgomery, with Percival as Chief of Staff to the Commander British Forces Far East.

RR.

I have a couple of Generals who can do that.

William Edmund Ironside, 1st Baron Ironside,
Maj. Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart
 
This is how Far East Command should be at this time:

Far East Command

Commander - Field Marshal Edmund Ironside

Malaya Command

Commander - Lt. Gen. Arthur Ernest Percival

Deputy Commander - Maj. Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart
 
This is how Far East Command should be at this time:

Far East Command

Commander - Field Marshal Edmund Ironside

Malaya Command

Commander - Lt. Gen. Arthur Ernest Percival

Deputy Commander - Maj. Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart
I would have Carton de Wiart in charge of training.
By the time troops had been through a scheme designed by him, there would be a few less of them, but the rest would scare the Japanese rather than the other way round.
Either Auchinleck or Montgomery as Malaya command, with Percival as Chief of Staff.
I'd find space for Orde Wingate, probably as commander of Malayan or Burmese troops.
He had already created and led a counter-insurgency unit in Palestine, under Wavell.
And another in Abyssinia, harassing supply lines and making a general nuisance of himself.

I can see de Wiart and Wingate getting on like a house on fire, and right up the noses of every other officer within a 500 mile radius.
Not that either of them would care.
 
Sending any tank to the D.E.I. depends on whether the Dutch are willing to divert any they may buy from defending their already invaded homeland. That would be a very hard thing for the Dutch Government to explain to it's electorate. If anything the D.E.I. are going to have less to fight with than they did Otl, as if it's a choice between defending an already invaded homeland and a distant colony there's really no contest.
Actually, I was more counting on it being the 5,500 British and 3,000 Australians who'd be bringing the tanks.

As to Malaya, given the leadership, and the fact that no-one's going to do anything until after the invasion has actually started, I don't think it can be saved, nor Singapore. What can be done though, is to delay the Japanese long enough to get some of the OTL 130K captured out of the trap.
 
Last edited:
Top