Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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Two things everyone needs to remember

  1. The best is the enemy of the good enough. Yes, a solution may not be optimal, but it doesn’t mean that it should be chosen.
  2. Not all decisions are rational, nor are all decisions made by rational actors. Mistakes will be made, with the best of intentions. Poor decisions will be made, some with good intentions, some with bad. Current farrago over the French 75s from the US is an example of this- we can tell it’s not going to work, but the decision makers are desperate, under pressure, and operating without our hindsight regarding future needs and development.
 
I think it might be worth a view from the Ministry.

As far as can be seen there isn't a tank gap (except in numbers). Current models appear as good as if not superior to German tanks and planned developments appear to be sufficient to maintain that lead.

More tanks not necessarily better tanks are what is required and supporting troops (infantry and artillery) to go with them. Both arms are motorised but tracked versions of infantry and artillery carriers to support the tank regiments could be useful as combined arms attacks were proven at Arras and the Germans showed that tanks only could not break the line at Calais / Dunkirk.

Relearn the lessons of the 100 days in 1918

So maybe those M1897s will get a place on recycled A10s and/or something like the Kangaroo will get produced from lend lease M3s
 
So whilst I think there was a lot of good stuff in that post I just don't see the 75mm happening for Britain at this point. I feel I need to add the disclaimer here that this is NOT about the merits of the 75mm. The 75mm is a very good gun for 40-42, I do not dispute that. The issue I have had throughout all of this is that any attempts to get the UK to adopt the 75mm earlier than they did OTL run up against both Official and Doctrinal resistance along with logistical issues around actually building the guns and ammo in Britain which will need to be done before 1942 and the US entry into the war.
Fair enough, don't disagree.
Now to the actual post. Firstly as @marathag points out, the 75mm Britain has just got probably wont fit. See this post.
Or if it could be made to fit then it needs a bit of work first. That will not only slow down the initial fitting of the Gun to the Valiant but also the process of converting the guns to put them into Valiant's if it were to become an adopted practice making the whole process less appealing.
The issue confronting Carden is that there's a demand for HE, the 3-inch howtizer isn't ready, all they have is the 3.7-inch howitzer. Looking at the M1898 is an alternative that will be rejected for the very reasons you mention.
Then we have the issue of securing the Guns themselves. You are asking the Royal Artillery to give up guns they need so that Vickers can see if they can fit in a tank and if they do fit we want a few hundred off you so we can put them in tanks. I can not see the RA looking too kindly on that. these are guns Britain feels it needs right now as artillery pieces, not experimental tank guns. Yes getting one or two to experiment with may be a possibility but in the short to medium term getting many more will be very difficult. OTL the guns were in service to 1945 as coastal artillery so they were felt to have a place. Even as they go from being home defence front line issue they will likely go to training roles etc. That again is a valuable role for the guns for Britain. Getting them will not be easy.
Absolutely, which is another part of the reason that this won't work.
Next we come to where we are in the war, its July 1940, the 25th to be precise. We are 15 days into the Battle of Britain, past the nuisance raid stage and into the shipping attacks and night time bombings. Invasion fear and preparation will be real despite the improvements in France. At this point Britain is still very short of Heavy equipment and will want to maximise its production as much as possible. Carden looking to tinker with a new, interim CS tank gun will be looked at poorly I suspect. Even if it isn't, even if Carden has the pull to get the guns to experiment with it will be a fair few months before the mounting is ready, the guns have been pried from the hands of the RA and the situation has calmed down enough for Britain to really start thinking about switching up production from things already being built or in the works. That takes you probably into 1941 so not far from the 3" being ready anyway. That kind of makes the whole process of developing a stop gap weapon redundant if it wont really be ready much sooner than the weapon it is meant to be filling in for.
All true and valid points. The only outcome of the failed experiment should be helpful to the Victor, of having worked on a mounting for the gun being developed from the Vickers 75mm AA gun, which will be basically OTL's 77mmHV.
We also have the issue of actually supplying enough ammo for the guns. As it stands Britain does not make 75mm guns or ammo. Yes it can set up production but that is not a quick or easy task. Britain can't rely on sourcing everything from America at this stage of the war. The cost will be enormous if they can get around the neutrality act and shipping things from America to Britain to then get sorted and put on a different ship to go to wherever Britain is fighting is a massive hassle and one that Britain would like to avoid if it could. Yes once Lend Lease starts that eases the problems and once America enters the war they mostly go away but that is making decisions with foresight that does not exist. Also relying on captured German stock to supply your guns is not a way to fight a war. If you can go it then it is nice but not something to rely on.
The million shells delivered for the 75mm guns was mentioned, so there wasn't any particular need to open a new ammunition production line for them.
Finally we have the issue of actually building more Guns. As I have already argued the likelihood of getting the 75mm of the RA is likely to prove difficult. In addition to that we have the cost and time of modifying them. If this was an option Britain wanted to seriously look at they would need to build the guns themselves. Again you cant rely on America until Lend Lease and that is 9 months from being signed into law let alone becoming the war winning juggernaut it would eventually end up as. Any production in Britain would run into problems. Firstly who would make it? we have already had a post about how stretched Vickers is producing what is already adopted and working on the new 3" HV gun so they are likely out. Pretty much every other manufacturer would be in the same position. Secondly what do you make it with, all of Britain's production is set up for calibres other than 75mm and any that may be useful like the M1931 AA gun by Vickers is being co-opted for another purpose. Then you may have someone come up with the genius idea of boring out the 6pdr, its already cropped up in this thread. Can you imagine the reaction if you suggested, in 1940, that we are going to take barrels that could go towards making the fancy new 6pdr that can either go into tanks or be used as AT guns and instead we are going to bore them out so we can have a new CS gun. People won't be happy with that idea, again we need as much as we can get now, anything that disrupts short term production is a non starter for the time being.
I'm not suggesting that the OTL QF 75mm is going to appear here any sooner than it did OTL, there was an interesting comment a couple of days ago about the capture of French shells and powder in Syria which contributed to the development of the the QF 75mm. I'm trying to lay the groundwork for a much better Close Support Gun, which, hopefully by the time we get to the Victor, probably late 1941 the British armoured doctrine will have gone from some CS tanks offering smoke shells, to most tanks being able, a wee bit like the Panzer IV, to have a good HE capability, while still able to take on something with 80-90mm armour.
@allanpcameron I am sorry if this post comes across as overly harsh or critical, that really is not my intention. The timeline you have written has been truly excellent, you have written something that is not only a good piece of literature but also a well researched (pom pom kerfuffle aside) and completely plausible alt history. I have enjoyed every post and much of the surrounding discussion. I just feel that with this post you are potentially swerving too far into the territory of wanking the TL. I could well be wrong, it may in part be because of my own frustrations surrounding the discussions of guns in this thread that are causing me to read too much into one post. We already have posters almost giving the British a 75mm gun with APDS and HEAT rounds whilst they are being bombed by the Luftwaffe. I understand you wanting to move the UK in the direction of a dual purpose gun earlier but I think (and am fully willing to admit I could be wrong on this) you are too concerned with it when what you have already done has not only sped up the process but made it inevitable. Again sorry if this comes across as harsh or judgemental, I truly don't mean it too.
Neither harsh, nor critical. Happy to have any feedback, and especially such well thought out and argued as yourself has contributed regularly. Anyone who has a look at all the weird and wonderful experimentation and British (built in a shed) armoured vehicles that appeared because of the threat of invasion (Beaverette, I'm looking at you) will know that nothing was too outlandish to look at, most of which was never given any real production capacity (Standard Beaverette notwithstanding).
Getting to a Universal Tank with a dual purpose gun is a matter of trial and error, experimentation and frustration. Am I trying to skip a few steps (Covenanter, Centaur, Cavalier and Challenger)? Yes I am. The Valiant is a better Valentine. The Victor will be a better Cromwell. The Comet, well, we'll have to see.
Please don't apologise for trying to keep me honest!
Allan
 
But as noted above, Wikipedia states, "...The genesis of APDS was development by engineers working for the French Edgar Brandt company of saboted ammunition, in which a sub-calibre core was surrounded by a lightweight 'sabot' (from the French term 'shoe') that was retained by the round for the duration of its time in flight until impact, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armour-piercing_discarding_sabot#cite_note-2 and was fielded in two calibers (75 mm/57 mm for the Mle1897/33 75 mm anti-tank cannon, 37 mm/25 mm for several 37 mm gun types) just before the French-German armistice of 1940.[2] The Edgar Brandt engineers, having been evacuated to the United Kingdom..."

So if Vickers install French 75's as an interim measure, there may already an APDS shell potentially available in advance of any HESH/HEAT development.
That was sabot ammunition. Not discarding sabot. To quote further on the same Wiki page:
Whilst the adoption of the sabot improved the performance of the ammunition, the retention of the sabot until impact contributed additional drag that caused the performance of the shot to fall off dramatically with increasing range. What was needed was a sabot that could be discarded after leaving the barrel so that the smaller, heavier, sub-projectile could carry on at the much higher velocity imparted to the whole round while suffering less drag due to the smaller diameter and hence lower frontal area. The resulting APDS - the 'D' standing for 'discarding', projectile type was developed in the United Kingdom between 1941–1944 by Permutter and Coppock, two designers with the Armaments Research Department (ARD). In mid-1944 the APDS projectile was introduced into service for the UK's QF 6 pounder anti-tank gun and later in September 1944 for the QF 17 pounder anti-tank gun.[3] [ii]
Supposedly the Canadian General Andrew McNaughton also contributed to this, I assume along with others:
McNaughton's contribution to the development of new techniques was outstanding, especially in the field of detection and weaponry, including the discarding sabot projectile.[1]
 
It seems a lot of folks believe the American embargo on arms exports was still in effect.In November of 1939 this was replaced by Cash and Carry so anything could be bought for cash and delivered to the point of export.
 
It's a pity you didn t find GM's V16-184 diesel which was sliced diced and rotated to bring forth the V8-184 producing 600hp@1800 rpm and 1910 FtLb of torque at 1000 rpm.Apparently it made the M4 a hotrod.Another late war tank engine shelved.the v-16 was in production in June 1941. I stumbled across this on the Sherman tank site.
 
It's a pity you didn t find GM's V16-184 diesel which was sliced diced and rotated to bring forth the V8-184 producing 600hp@1800 rpm and 1910 FtLb of torque at 1000 rpm.Apparently it made the M4 a hotrod.Another late war tank engine shelved.the v-16 was in production in June 1941. I stumbled across this on the Sherman tank site.
The Americans didn't either until 1942-43. Brits still have the Thornycroft RY-12 for that anyway.
 
The Americans didn't either until 1942-43. Brits still have the Thornycroft RY-12 for that anyway.
But the Thornycroft was gas and the GM diesel.Certainly a possibility.I see no reason why the GM couldn t develop the V8 in parallel with the V16.Both would be interesting.
 
Getting to a Universal Tank with a dual purpose gun is a matter of trial and error, experimentation and frustration. Am I trying to skip a few steps (Covenanter, Centaur, Cavalier and Challenger)? Yes I am. The Valiant is a better Valentine. The Victor will be a better Cromwell. The Comet, well, we'll have to see.
Indeed we'll have to see, if anything the Valiant/Victor cover short-medium term needs so well that it gives a lot of breathing room for the other tank design teams who had to keep developping questionnable designs/ rushing stuff OTL (though I frankly love the simplicity of the A27). Both Vickers tanks will also give a high bar to reach.

I don't remember the complete stats for the Victor, but IIRC it still had the diesel Lion, was closer to 35 tons, had rather thick armor and a 66" turret ring with the Vickers long 3". This certainly sounds excellent but I highly doubt the British will stay idle after that, especially once they encounter the Tiger (and Panther but I don't remember when so maybe it would have been too late to develop much stuff).

As good as the Vickers gun is it will still have roughly the power of a 76 M1/77 gun, which is okayish against the Tiger but a bit low against a Panther. The 66" turret ring even with a good mount/mantlet/trunion design and a generous bustle will be a tight fit for the 17pdr (turret rings for guns of that class tended to go closer to 69-73" diameter). The Victor IIRC remains rather compact which explains its relatively low weight but this will limit the amount of ammo carried and overall comfort. The appearance of even more powerful German guns will require more than 4" of effective armor. The Tiger's 88mm will be interesting in terms of HE power. More engine power or mobility will be needed and the Horstmann suspension will probably see yet another redesign or more suspension types will be experimented.
Britain might even get confident enough to consider developping something that can carry a big fuckoff gun like the 28 or 32 pounder.

Vickers may be able to meet many of those future requirements with their own tank, but any company still interested in tank design can be a contender and can have the advantage of starting with a clean sheet design, so all bets are off. The Victor itself remains an outgrowth of the Valiant and some features of the overall design will likely become dated by 1943. And if different designs are required because the new needs are conflicting, then it's almost guaranteed that someone other than Vickers will get a tank to production.

We never know, maybe Nuffield will have worked on new hull layouts, engines and suspensions at this point and will propose a highly mobile cruiser with good armor, a 17 pounder in a large turret and a completely redesigned independent coil spring suspension. Maybe someone will have been able to work on torsion bars. Maybe someone made a 32 pounder tank work.

It may not even be a normal tank at all. Maybe Vickers will be so busy with everything else that the A46 light tank program is taken by someone else and we get a Brit Chaffee (biggest comeback would be LMS proposing a radically redesigned Covenanter with an upgraded Meadows DAV and a bigger gun at 20-22 tons, this thing looks so much like a Chaffee). Vickers did most of the job at this point, so everyone is free to submit some wonky ITTL designs.
 
I think for logistical reasons a victor follow up having a 25 pounder rather ur proposed 28-32 pounder range would make abit more sense in keeping ammo with the artillery the same altough production facilties for them should be set up cause thats the only way ur kinda prying 25 pounders out of artillerys hands ?

And i still think there is room especially for ww2 for a slow infantry tanks who assigned to infantry and are mostly meant to fight with them rather being pressed into tank on tank battle like the valiant and victor will be . Probably something like a black prince but with a either the 500 or 600 hp engine to make them move abit better than they did otl with half the power would be best .
 
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Then we have the issue of securing the Guns themselves. You are asking the Royal Artillery to give up guns they need so that Vickers can see if they can fit in a tank and if they do fit we want a few hundred off you so we can put them in tanks. I can not see the RA looking too kindly on that. these are guns Britain feels it needs right now as artillery pieces, not experimental tank guns. Yes getting one or two to experiment with may be a possibility but in the short to medium term getting many more will be very difficult. OTL the guns were in service to 1945 as coastal artillery so they were felt to have a place. Even as they go from being home defence front line issue they will likely go to training roles etc. That again is a valuable role for the guns for Britain. Getting them will not be easy.
All of this is rather ignoring the fact that tanks are far more mobile, and far more protected than towed guns, and so far more effective.


Next we come to where we are in the war, its July 1940, the 25th to be precise. We are 15 days into the Battle of Britain, past the nuisance raid stage and into the shipping attacks and night time bombings. Invasion fear and preparation will be real despite the improvements in France. At this point Britain is still very short of Heavy equipment and will want to maximise its production as much as possible. Carden looking to tinker with a new, interim CS tank gun will be looked at poorly I suspect. Even if it isn't, even if Carden has the pull to get the guns to experiment with it will be a fair few months before the mounting is ready, the guns have been pried from the hands of the RA and the situation has calmed down enough for Britain to really start thinking about switching up production from things already being built or in the works. That takes you probably into 1941 so not far from the 3" being ready anyway. That kind of makes the whole process of developing a stop gap weapon redundant if it wont really be ready much sooner than the weapon it is meant to be filling in for.
The 75mm isn't a stopgap weapon, is a general-purpose weapon

We also have the issue of actually supplying enough ammo for the guns. As it stands Britain does not make 75mm guns or ammo. Yes it can set up production but that is not a quick or easy task. Britain can't rely on sourcing everything from America at this stage of the war. The cost will be enormous if they can get around the neutrality act and shipping things from America to Britain to then get sorted and put on a different ship to go to wherever Britain is fighting is a massive hassle and one that Britain would like to avoid if it could. Yes once Lend Lease starts that eases the problems and once America enters the war they mostly go away but that is making decisions with foresight that does not exist. Also relying on captured German stock to supply your guns is not a way to fight a war. If you can go it then it is nice but not something to rely on.
That's an argument against any employment of the 75mm, not against putting it in tanks.

Finally we have the issue of actually building more Guns. As I have already argued the likelihood of getting the 75mm of the RA is likely to prove difficult. In addition to that we have the cost and time of modifying them. If this was an option Britain wanted to seriously look at they would need to build the guns themselves. Again you cant rely on America until Lend Lease and that is 9 months from being signed into law let alone becoming the war winning juggernaut it would eventually end up as. Any production in Britain would run into problems. Firstly who would make it? we have already had a post about how stretched Vickers is producing what is already adopted and working on the new 3" HV gun so they are likely out. Pretty much every other manufacturer would be in the same position. Secondly what do you make it with, all of Britain's production is set up for calibres other than 75mm and any that may be useful like the M1931 AA gun by Vickers is being co-opted for another purpose.Then you may have someone come up with the genius idea of boring out the 6pdr, its already cropped up in this thread. Can you imagine the reaction if you suggested, in 1940, that we are going to take barrels that could go towards making the fancy new 6pdr that can either go into tanks or be used as AT guns and instead we are going to bore them out so we can have a new CS gun. People won't be happy with that idea, again we need as much as we can get now, anything that disrupts short term production is a non starter for the time being.
Again, that's an argument against using the 75mm, but since the RA is going to be using it, hey, that's another factor outside the control of the people producing tanks. Also, right now, the only place you can put the 6-pounder is in tanks, because the towed mount isn't ready, so boring the 6-pounder out to 75mm is a problem for tanks, because that's the only place you can stick them right now.

Again I feel I need to clarify this is not about the qualities of the 75mm gun. It is about what British doctrine, policy, manufacturing and procurement of arms in WW2. Carden can change some things but not everything and as good as the 75mm is it is not, at least in my opinion feasible for Britain to adopt it or some version of it at this time. TTL we have not had that full wake up call yet that a dual purpose gun is required, yes HE has had a light shone on and yes it is on it's way but not close enough to start changing British doctrine or changing up production lines right after the fall of France. Even OTL when they had been using and loving the gun in North Africa Britain was not going to use it on it's tanks right up until they realised the gun they wanted wouldn't fit. Again when given the option to put the 75mm in there own tanks Britain said no until it had no other option. Britain still wanted a good hole puncher, just one with a useful HE round.
Here things are different, they've actually had a HE round for comparison and loved it. And the 75mm still punches holes, just not as effectively as the 6-pounder. If anything, that's an argument against the 3" (which can't punch holes), not against the 75mm (which can).

@allanpcameron I am sorry if this post comes across as overly harsh or critical, that really is not my intention. The timeline you have written has been truly excellent, you have written something that is not only a good piece of literature but also a well researched (pom pom kerfuffle aside) and completely plausible alt history. I have enjoyed every post and much of the surrounding discussion. I just feel that with this post you are potentially swerving too far into the territory of wanking the TL. I could well be wrong, it may in part be because of my own frustrations surrounding the discussions of guns in this thread that are causing me to read too much into one post. We already have posters almost giving the British a 75mm gun with APDS and HEAT rounds whilst they are being bombed by the Luftwaffe. I understand you wanting to move the UK in the direction of a dual purpose gun earlier but I think (and am fully willing to admit I could be wrong on this) you are too concerned with it when what you have already done has not only sped up the process but made it inevitable. Again sorry if this comes across as harsh or judgemental, I truly don't mean it too.
There are a lot of ways that TTL could have been wanked, but the British realising, upon trying it, that HE is actually a good idea for tanks to have isn't one of them.
 
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All of this is rather ignoring the fact that tanks are far more mobile, and far more protected than towed guns, and so far more effective.
execpt unless you are going to give the tanks to the royal artillery to be used as spgs they still need guns to defend Britain from invasion until enough 25lbers are built.
The 75mm isn't a stopgap weapon, is a general-purpose weapon

I am fairly certain MarcH is referring to mounting the M1897s into tanks as a stopgap measure not 75mm's in general.
 
1-3 August 1940. Salisbury Plain, England.
1-3 August 1940. Salisbury Plain, England.

The first full exercise of the 2nd Armoured Brigade since it had returned from France was taking place. A hundred tanks had been returned from France in various states of disrepair. These had been fixed up, then delivered to the Brigade, along with various other tanks which had been under repair in British depots, and twenty brand new A13 Cruiser Mark IVA from the Nuffield factory. It meant that the three Regiments had an odd mixture Light and Cruiser tanks, and for this exercise, each Regiment had been given one Company of (16) Valiant Infantry tanks, on loan from 44th Bn RTR, 21st Army Tank Brigade, to bring them up to full strength.

1st Armoured Division was now being led by General Charles Norrie, who’d commanded 1st Armoured Brigade in 2nd Armoured Division. Norrie was watching the exercise to see if the lessons learned on the Somme were being taken to heart. The idea of the Support Group for the Armoured Division had undergone a considerable post-mortem. The lack of infantry and artillery had hurt the 2nd Armoured Brigade badly, while the 3rd Armoured Brigade when working with the 51st (Highland) Division had done much better. The new system they were trying out was that the Support Group would consist of an Infantry Brigade, a Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, and one each of a full Light Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Regiment. One of the motorised Infantry Battalion would be under Divisional control, while the other two Infantry Battalions would be under each Armoured Brigade’s control.

This was the first exercise since the 1st Support Group had been reconstituted along the new lines, using 24th Guards Brigade who were refitting after their exertions in Norway until another Brigade became available. In this part of the exercise the 1st Battalion Scots Guards were working with 2nd Armoured Brigade. The 11th (Honourable Artillery Company) Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, a territorial unit now becoming operational, provided the artillery support, one of the few in the country fully equipped with 25-pdr guns. The survivors of the 101st LAA/Atk Regiment continued in their role in the Support Group, as there still weren’t enough complete LAA or anti-tank regiments to replace them.

This exercise, in a sense a re-run of the attempts to dislodge a dug-in enemy like the Germans on the River Somme, was an attempt to see if it could actually be done. 3rd Infantry Division, now commanded by General Whitaker after General Montgomery’s promotion, supplied the opposing force. The 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars, with their embedded Companies of Infantry tanks leading the way, approached the enemy force. The Scots Guards Battalion, working with the tanks were judged by the umpires to have successfully achieved their objectives eventually, but only after considerable casualties, rendering most of the Brigade hors de combat. The Cruiser and Light Tanks of the Queens Bays then moved through to exploit the opening achieved. At the end of the exercise General Norrie held a meeting for all the officers involved to do some further study of the lessons learned. There were two that he felt were particularly important.

The first was that, while the infantry tanks were far less vulnerable to enemy anti-tank guns, they weren’t invincible. During the fighting on the Somme some of the German anti-tank gunners had held their fire until the range was almost point blank, or they were sited on a slope able to fire upslope at the vulnerable bottom of the nose of the tanks as they crested the slope. This meant that the tanks, with only their 2-pdr guns had to rely on the smoke of the Close Support tanks to cover their advance. The problem arose because the tanks and infantry had advanced on the pre-planned timings which had been worked out with the Royal Artillery. An umpire had called a Stuka attack on the artillery which meant that the bombardment didn’t happen when it was supposed to, but the tanks stuck rigidly to the timings. Norrie, along with Brigadier McCreery, the Brigade commander, noted that this had happened on the Somme too. It was clear that better communications between the various elements of the Brigade Group had to be better, and that the armoured regiments needed to be more flexible about their approach to an objective, not to rigidly stick to timings when it was obvious that something else had upset the plans.

The second point that Norrie noticed was that when the Queens Bays broke through and exploited the gap created by the rest of the Brigade, they were unsupported. Had they run into a second anti-tank gun line, they would have suffered severely. That implied that a single battalion of infantry supporting three armoured regiments wasn’t enough. It was possible, that he, as Divisional Commander, could have deployed the infantry battalion under his direct command to support the exploitation phase, but that would have meant they were unavailable either to the other Armoured Brigade under his command, or for any other purpose they might be fulfilling.

The discussion about these two problems went on for a considerable time. The end result was that the next day’s exercise would be rearranged so that the 2nd Armoured Brigade would act roughly in the manner of a German Panzer Brigade, with two armoured regiments, each supported by a battalion of motorised infantry, the third armoured regiment would act as the reconnaissance element. The Division’s artillery regiment would be wholly devoted to this unit. Norrie set McCreery and his staff an outline objective and invited them to try to achieve it ‘the German way’, with dash, flexibility and initiative. General Whitaker’s 3rd Division had been one of the infantry divisions which was judged to have done particularly well in Flanders. Many of the troops in the exercise were replacements for the many casualties the infantry brigades had taken. But Whitaker was keen to keep up Montgomery’s training regime, so he was trying to get them up to speed, and playing the opposing force to a German style panzer attack was a particularly good training exercise.

At the end of the second day’s exercise once again there was a lengthy meeting to discuss the results. The 3rd Infantry Division proved itself a very capable opponent, and it was clear that a well-prepared infantry position, with a reasonable number of anti-tank guns, was an extremely difficult nut for an armoured brigade, even pretending to be a panzer brigade, to crack. Once again there were two main lessons that Norrie wanted to examine.

The first, as learned in Flanders, was an opponent with the ability to use aircraft in support of an attack was always at an advantage. The lack of integrated anti-air defences was a problem, and while tanks were very difficult to hit while moving, the soft skinned vehicles, especially those carrying the infantry were vulnerable. A note was made to see if anything could be done to provide an anti-aircraft weapon that was more mobile than towed guns or machine guns on special mounts.

The second lesson was once more about communications. The idea that the three armoured regiments would use initiative and flexibility to achieve their objectives were a failure, not because they couldn’t, though some officers were quite poor at it, but because they didn’t have the necessary equipment to coordinate properly. Leaving the second in command of the regiment in the ‘rear link’ tank to keep radio communications between the Brigade and the forward elements showed up the limitations of the current radios being used in British tanks. Part of the reason for the strict sticking to pre-set timetables was due in no small measure to not being able to communicate effectively. Some officers had been lost in the fighting in France because they had had to get out of their tank to go and personally speak to other tank commanders while under fire.

What had been clear was that having a battalion of infantry to support a regiment of tanks was a much better balance. The problem arose when the tanks and the infantry got separated when the tanks proceeding at pace left behind the infantry on foot. This had been seen at Arras, and could have had terrible consequences there. During a free for all, some ideas were suggested as solutions. These ranged from having some kind of handholds welded onto the tanks so that a half section of infantry could ride on the tank into action (not a popular opinion); to having more carriers, perhaps bigger ones, to carry the infantry at the same pace as the tanks, allowing them to dismount and attack as close to the enemy as possible (much more popular, especially with the infantry officers). The commander of the Royal Horse Artillery noted that there were gaps in his ability to support the attacks while his troops were moving, and that there were times when not being road bound would have helped his capability. The communication between the artillery, infantry and tanks also left something to be desired. He did suggest that if his Observation Post Officer was forward, in a tank, with a radio link between the artillery batteries as well as the tanks and infantry that might help.

The third day’s exercise was focused on the armoured brigade attempting to overcome some of the German Panzer Division’s tactics. The fighting at the Somme hadn’t been a tank battle, but the British tanks attempting to attack dug in infantry. The nearest the British had come to a tank battle was at Arras where the Tank Brigade had effectively ambushed the 7th Panzer Division. Enough had been learned however about the way the Panzer Divisions were trained and organised. If and when a British armoured division went toe to toe with a Panzer Division, and it was clear that the tanks of the two nations were relatively similar, then superior tactics, training and communications would be the key to victory. Most of the day was spent with the three armoured regiments attempting to outfox and out-manoeuvre one another in various ways.

Once more the day ended with a long debriefing about lessons learned. As had been noted by 4th and 7th Bn RTR at Arras, the tanks falling back onto a prepared anti-tank battery was a clear winner every time. The opposing force would chase the retreating tanks, and then find themselves at the mercy of the anti-tank gunners. Then the tanks which had withdrawn would advance again and complete the destruction of the attackers. General Norrie and Brigadier McCreery had noticed that the Lancers, Hussars and Queens Bay had a real tendency to falling for that trick, which the attached RTR tankers didn’t seem to be as susceptible to it.

There was a lot of discussion about the Valiant Infantry Tank Mark III. Although it was far heavier and better protected than the Cruisers, it still had a fairly good turn of speed, in fact it wasn’t much slower than the A9 and A10 tanks they were used to. Before the exercise there’s been some grumbling that the Infantry tanks would just slow everybody down. After the exercise there was a grudging admiration. The Valiant didn’t completely fit into the 2nd Armoured Brigade’s way of thinking, but it wasn’t so far off the pace as had been feared. Having three companies of them for the exercise had been an eye opener.

Another lesson that was noted was that while there weren’t quite as many mechanical breakdowns that had plagued the 2nd Armoured Brigade in France, there were still some, and retrieving these had taken on a more acute need since there were so few tanks in the country. The tank transporters had been extremely useful, and again a note was made by General Norrie that even more would have helped. The Valiants had shown up another particular skill: they easily could tow a broken-down cruiser or light tank without breaking anything. Norrie noted that having a few dedicated recovery vehicles based on the Valiant hull, to protect the crews from enemy fire, would also be useful to the Royal Engineers if they were to recover tanks still on the battlefield.

The tired men and machines made their way back to barracks and depots. Officers completed their after-action reports, while General Norrie and Brigadier McCreery’s staff compiled the report of the various exercises to be passed up the chain of command. Norrie decided to send a copy to General Tilly, his opposite number at 2nd Armoured Division, for his information. Just as the two home Armoured Divisions had received a report of the 7th Armoured Division’s last big exercise in Egypt, Norrie asked that a copy of the report on the exercise be sent to General Creagh. Norrie guessed that Creagh would be busy getting his Division ready to up against the Italians, but there may be something in what had been achieved in the last few days that may be of interest to him.

NB There isn't much here different from OTL, though it is a fictional exercise, and 2nd Armoured Brigade was tankless, and some of the appointments are a few days or weeks ahead of schedule. The changes to the basic organisation of the Support Group was finalised in October 1940, so this experimentations is feasible. Obviously the methods of the German Panzer Division were less understood OTL, but here the captured information can be used proactively. In some ways the lessons @Astrodragon took from his
exercises in the mid-30s are being discovered here in the summer of 1940. Better late than never.
 
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execpt unless you are going to give the tanks to the royal artillery to be used as spgs they still need guns to defend Britain from invasion until enough 25lbers are built.
Why give them to the RA? The RA doesn't know how to use tanks. Better to attack squadrons of tanks to RA batteries, but still using tank crews.

I am fairly certain MarcH is referring to mounting the M1897s into tanks as a stopgap measure not 75mm's in general.
He also criticised the QF-75mm, so I'm pretty certain he was talking about the 75mm in general.

Good update. those training exercises should weed out the idiots.
 
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