4-10 June 1940. The Somme to the Seine.
The 51st Division had moved up on the morning of 4 June to attempt once more, in conjunction with French troops, to unseat the German bridgeheads over the Somme. As with all previous attempts it ended in failure.
The next day the German plan, ‘Fall Rot’ began. All along the front of the 51st Division the German forces struck and struck hard. The frontage that the Highlanders held made it difficult for units to be able support each other, and as the day wore on the 154th Brigade was reduced considerably, its survivors withdrawing towards the river Bresle during the night, often covered by the tanks of the 5th Bn RTR, whose support had been invaluable in preventing the German infantry attacks to gain as much traction as they would have liked. The 153rd Brigade were also heavily engaged, but the full force of the Germans had been on their neighbours in the 154th Brigade. Likewise, the 152nd Brigade and the French 31e Division also were attacked, and by the evening of 5 June were falling back to the river Bresle. During the night of 5/6 June, General Fortune made it clear that his division could not continue to hold the length of front, especially after the casualties taken that day. Orders were received to withdraw behind the river Bresle, the British Division holding the river from the sea to Gamaches, a frontage of about 10 miles. The 31e Division would hold the next section from Gamaches to Senapont.
6 June was relatively quiet along the front, but the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions, and the rest of XV Corps had begun their thrust towards Rouen, making good progress across country, the French forces once more found they had no real answer to the speed and combined arms tactics. General Weygand ordered that the Bresle was to held ‘at all costs’. Reinforcements for the 51st Division were brought up from A Brigade, some 900 men, of the Beauman Division. Fortune also brought the Support Group of 1st Armoured Division back from their position on the other side of the French 31e Division, trying to keep the men under his command within communications. Communication problems beset the command of control of 10e Army, with the Highlanders and General Weygand’s HQ. As the German push towards Rouen continued Fortune could see that he had two options. Either his forces would have to retreat towards Le Harve, with the probability of having to be evacuated, or they would have to cross the Seine before the Germans did. It was obvious that the Germans had already outflanked the Bresle Line, so Weygand’s order to hold it ‘at all costs’ made little or no sense. The rest of the French IX Corps, made up 31e, 40e Division, 2e DLC and 5e DLC, as well as the two British Divisions, were under the command of General Ihler. The rest of the Beauman Division were dug in along the River Bethune, while the two Light Cavalry Divisions held the flanks of the Corps against the 12th and 32nd Infantry Divisions of the German army.
7 June was another quiet day along the British front, the Germans seemed content to hold the British and French troops in place, while the mobile German columns approached Rouen. Fortune took an opportunity to contact General Karslake, who as Commander of the Lines of Communications, was the senior British commander. Fortune noted that the Beauman Division, under Karslake’s command, was being ordered back across the Seine, and asked whether it might be able to bring the whole of the IX Corps back too, as they were cut off from the rest of the French army, something that had happened before to the BEF and French First Army. Karslake, who was in contact with London asked for clarification.
On 8 June as the forward elements of the German were making serious progress towards the Seine, General Ihler finally got orders to withdraw to Rouen. Since the Germans were almost there, Karslake informed London of the problem and requested a plan to made to evacuate the forces cut off north of the Seine. There were already British ‘useless mouths’ who were being evacuated from Dieppe, and that was the advice given to General Fortune, to prepare his forces to fall back into Dieppe and be prepared to have the Royal Navy lift them off. The offer to evacuate the French troops was also made, to cover General Ihler’s blushes. Ihler, on being informed, looked at pulling the Corps back to the River Bethune, and pivot on Torcy, pulling back into Dieppe. The first moves were to be completed that night and then completed on the night of the 9/10 June.
The Royal Navy were struggling between the situation in Norway and the losses and damage to ships at the evacuation at Dunkirk, but nonetheless a naval operation 'Cycle' for the evacuation of the northern base troops had already started and shipping began assembling off the coast early in the morning. The Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir William James) had planned to use Le Harve, but it was becoming clear that Dieppe was going to be the main place to pick up the 51st Division and associated French troops.
As previously the roads were clogged making the movement difficult, but with the coverage of the tanks of the 3rd Armoured Brigade and the Yeomanry Regiment provided a cloak under which the infantry could move relatively unmolested by enemy action. With the capture of Rouen on 9 June, the German Panzer Divisions turned their attention to cutting the IX Corps off from Le Havre and began to move northwards on 10 May. With the falling back into Dieppe of the British and French troops, covered by the mobile forces of the two French DLCs and the 3rd Armoured Brigade, who had a clear role. The men of the Royal Tank Regiment knew that there was no chance that their tanks would be lifted off by the navy. They were therefore keen to make the most of them while they could. There was only so much fuel and ammunition, but since they couldn’t take it with them, they decided to not to waste it.
As the elements of the 5th Panzer Division and 2nd Motorised Division pushed north they began to encounter resistance about ten miles from Dieppe, the 7th Panzer Division headed for the coast at Veulettes-sur-Mer to cut off the roads to le Havre. The 11th Motorised Brigade, with the German 57th and 31st Infantry Divisions pushed forward from the east of the River Bresle, but they were delayed by D Company of the 4th Border Regiment and A Company of the 1st/5th Sherwood Foresters. Orders for the withdrawal failed to reach these two companies and in default of orders to move they stood fast. For six days they held on, denying for that week the passage of the river which they had been ordered to guard.
Dieppe was a relatively small port, but the Royal Navy had got plenty of experience, and once more the RAF did their best to cover the evacuation. The French also provided small craft to lift the troops, and these were generally taken to Trouville and unloaded there. The British ships crossed the channel to Newhaven to unload their evacuees. Over two days and nights British and French ships collected first the supply troops who had fallen back first, then the engineers, signallers, artillery men who’d exhausted their ammunition and then spiked their guns. The infantry, whose pull back had been supported by the tanks, started being picked from the docks on 10 June.
The British A10, being the majority of the RTR tanks, found themselves in a favourable situation. While slower than the Panzer II and IIIs, their frontal armour was fairly well protected against the German 20mm and 37mm cannons except at close range. On the other hand, the 2-pdr gun on the British tanks was deadly to the German tanks at a good distance. The men of the Royal Tank Regiment were nearly all pre-war professionals, and so far, their war had been a frustration. Now they worked together with some of the Territorial Division’s Carrier Platoons to hold up the German advance, and fall back towards the town. Eventually the cavalrymen of 2e DLC and 5e DLC acted as the rear-guard, which allowed whatever surviving tank crews of 3rd Armoured Brigade and 1st Lothian and Borders Yeomanry, and the last of the infantry to fall back to Dieppe and be carried home. As the cruiser and light tanks burned, the promise of new and better tanks awaited them at home. The A9 and A10 had been considered as stopgap tanks, until the fast Christie Cruisers could make up the numbers. A lot was going to be learned from the battle of France, the survival of most of the men of the 1st Armoured Division, but not their tanks, would prove to be crucial. The A13s hadn’t covered themselves in any glory, but the lessons learned were in the people who were carried home on the ships of the Royal Navy.
On 11 June, seeing that all the crews of 1st Armoured Division were back in Britain, all the surviving cruiser and light tanks that had been gathered at Louviers for repair were loaded onto to trains for Nantes, where they would be shipped back, along with their fitters and mechanics of the Armoured Corps. They could be repaired at leisure at home, and so by 18 June the entire First Armoured Division were back in England, the workshops filled almost 100 tanks, a mixture of Lights and Cruisers which had been loaded at Nantes and sailed to Southampton.
NB Text in italic differs from OTL. The primary difference here is the decision on 6/7 June to look at evacuation, then it being ordered on 8 June, and implemented 9/10/11 June from Dieppe, a better port and with less pressure. The presence of an armoured Brigade to support the 51st Division, as opposed to a composite regiment, is the other main difference. As to the last points, a good percentage of 1st Armoured Division men did make it back to Britain, and so did a few of their tanks. After the Germans crossed the Seine the survivors just made their way back to Cherbourg, losing most of their tanks to mechanical breakdowns. Here, the 100 tanks that were under repair are shipped back, which is a much better return on what actually happened. There is a fundamental weakness of the French army command, witnessed by Weygand's order to stand on the Bresle and delay in allowing IX Corps to pull back to Le Havre, leading to their complete loss. No matter how much more battered some of the Panzer Divisions are, is still as likely to lead to the capitulation. A slightly better showing by British armoured formations aren't going to change that. The good news is that this marks the end of this chapter in the annals of the Royal Armoured Corps.