It's very nice that Von Rundsteadt wants Arras cleaned up, the question is what unlucky sods get ordered to do it?
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
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allanpcameron
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The main halt order happens 24 May. This is just a halt to the planned attack on Boulogne and Calais.
So am I correct in the presumption that this is a major movement of butterfly wings?
22 May 1940. 18:00hrs. Acq, France.
allanpcameron
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22 May 1940. 18:00hrs. Acq, France.
The Durham Light Infantry had withdrawn during the previous night back into reserve behind Vimy Ridge. Their place on the River Scarpe, to the west of Arras had been taken over by 17 Brigade (2nd Bn Northamptons, 6th Bn Seaforth Highlanders, 2 Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers). The day had been spent avoiding German air attacks, digging in and setting up fields of fire, and letting friendly forces pass through. Some French troops from 3e DLM had warned of approaching Germans, but in fact it was the armoured cars of the 12th Lancers. By 15:15hrs the German artillery started a bombardment which continued intermittently for the rest of the day.
Unknown to the British, because they had no reconnaissance to see it, the German 5th Panzer Division passed to their south. The German 20th Motorised Division were close behind them, and the 12th Infantry Division were arriving from the direction of Cambrai and taking up positions to the east of Arras facing the 13th and 150th Brigades who manned the Scarpe defences between St Laurent and Roeux.
The 3e DLM, because of their activities the day before hadn’t been able to deal with the Germans at Acq, but General Prioux, trying to concentrate his Cavalry Corps, was aware of the danger of this particular lodgement. Elements of 1re and 2e DLM were tasked with knocking the Germans back over the river, and requested support from the British on his left flank. When General Franklyn was appraised of the movement of panzers south of Arras, and with the request from Prioux, he asked Lt-Col Fitzmaurice of 7th Bn RTR to move forward from his position behind Vimy Ridge and support 17th Brigade. With the 12th Lancers providing the Tank Battalion with proper reconnaissance, and artillery support from the 5th Division’s artillery, 7th Bn RTR, short only one section of three tanks, moved up as best they could, dodging the regular Stuka attacks.
Lt Colonel John Hinchliffe, OC 2nd Bt Northamptons, or the 58th of Foot, as they liked to call themselves, ordered A Company (Captain Robert Melsome) and D Company (Captain Derek Houchin) to accompany the tanks as they tried to close the gap on the river between the British and French positions. A battery of 2-pdrs from the 52nd Anti-tank Regiment RA had been assigned to the Northamptons and these too were involved in the operation.
The 1re Regiment Dragoons Portee, with support from H35 tanks from 18th Dragoons began the push and inflicted more casualties on the 7th Panzer Division troops north of the Scarpe. The German losses were almost a hundred, much less than the day before, but one of the highest daily totals of the entire campaign. The British and French suffered casualties from both artillery and air attack, but the gap in the line had been closed.
With the position secure, Lt-Col Fitzmaurice, reluctantly agreed to leave his B Company of twelve A11 Infantry Mark I and three A12 Infantry Mark II tanks as part of 17th Brigade’s reserves, while the other two Companies withdrew into general reserve back towards Souchez and the Vimy Ridge.
NB Text in italic differs from OTL.
The Durham Light Infantry had withdrawn during the previous night back into reserve behind Vimy Ridge. Their place on the River Scarpe, to the west of Arras had been taken over by 17 Brigade (2nd Bn Northamptons, 6th Bn Seaforth Highlanders, 2 Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers). The day had been spent avoiding German air attacks, digging in and setting up fields of fire, and letting friendly forces pass through. Some French troops from 3e DLM had warned of approaching Germans, but in fact it was the armoured cars of the 12th Lancers. By 15:15hrs the German artillery started a bombardment which continued intermittently for the rest of the day.
Unknown to the British, because they had no reconnaissance to see it, the German 5th Panzer Division passed to their south. The German 20th Motorised Division were close behind them, and the 12th Infantry Division were arriving from the direction of Cambrai and taking up positions to the east of Arras facing the 13th and 150th Brigades who manned the Scarpe defences between St Laurent and Roeux.
The 3e DLM, because of their activities the day before hadn’t been able to deal with the Germans at Acq, but General Prioux, trying to concentrate his Cavalry Corps, was aware of the danger of this particular lodgement. Elements of 1re and 2e DLM were tasked with knocking the Germans back over the river, and requested support from the British on his left flank. When General Franklyn was appraised of the movement of panzers south of Arras, and with the request from Prioux, he asked Lt-Col Fitzmaurice of 7th Bn RTR to move forward from his position behind Vimy Ridge and support 17th Brigade. With the 12th Lancers providing the Tank Battalion with proper reconnaissance, and artillery support from the 5th Division’s artillery, 7th Bn RTR, short only one section of three tanks, moved up as best they could, dodging the regular Stuka attacks.
Lt Colonel John Hinchliffe, OC 2nd Bt Northamptons, or the 58th of Foot, as they liked to call themselves, ordered A Company (Captain Robert Melsome) and D Company (Captain Derek Houchin) to accompany the tanks as they tried to close the gap on the river between the British and French positions. A battery of 2-pdrs from the 52nd Anti-tank Regiment RA had been assigned to the Northamptons and these too were involved in the operation.
The 1re Regiment Dragoons Portee, with support from H35 tanks from 18th Dragoons began the push and inflicted more casualties on the 7th Panzer Division troops north of the Scarpe. The German losses were almost a hundred, much less than the day before, but one of the highest daily totals of the entire campaign. The British and French suffered casualties from both artillery and air attack, but the gap in the line had been closed.
With the position secure, Lt-Col Fitzmaurice, reluctantly agreed to leave his B Company of twelve A11 Infantry Mark I and three A12 Infantry Mark II tanks as part of 17th Brigade’s reserves, while the other two Companies withdrew into general reserve back towards Souchez and the Vimy Ridge.
NB Text in italic differs from OTL.
Not quite sure where 5th Pz think they are going. I can only assume the expect to be able to get behind the Arras defence, maybe cut the town off? Otherwise they are just going to run into a dug-in defence again
While that's unlikely to be literally true, given the shorter lines for the British at that point, you could end with a situation where German armour is significantly outnumbered, and a defeat would leave the Wehrmacht very short on armour.
allanpcameron
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men. 5 Officers, 5 NCOs and 90 other ranks, killed, wounded or missing, according to Arras Counter-attack 1940, Tim Saunders.
22 May 1940. 23:00hrs. Koblenz, Germany.
allanpcameron
Donor
22 May 1940. 23:00hrs. Koblenz, Germany.
It had been a long day and, unusually, operations in Army Group A had been at a slightly more sedate pace. The French counter-attack towards Cambrai had, like most French counter-attacks, been halted. If it had happened the day before, in concert with the British attack at Arras, it may well have had more serious consequences. The attack west of Arras in the evening convinced Von Rundstedt that his instinct to halt the attack on Boulogne and Calais were correct. The British and French in the north, were withdrawing from the Escaut line, after the battles there on 21 May. But the boil of Arras had to be lanced. If the French and British actually managed to make a combined counter-attack to cut off the Panzers from the Infantry, it could be a disaster in the making. With 5th Panzer Division, 20th Motorised Division and 12th Infantry Division now in place south of Arras, he would, the next morning, be able to get around Arras, and head north towards Lille. The 7th Panzer Division and SS Totenkopf Division had had a day to rest and refit. They would advance against the French to the left flank of 5th Panzer Division. As with the Fuhrer’s order in the morning, Von Rundstedt ordered the attack on Boulogne and Calais to be postponed again, an extra day would make little difference to the final outcome, even if Von Kleist complained again.
NB text in italic differs from OTL. The butterfly is at the end. A postponement now of two days instead of one of the attack on Boulogne and Calais.
It had been a long day and, unusually, operations in Army Group A had been at a slightly more sedate pace. The French counter-attack towards Cambrai had, like most French counter-attacks, been halted. If it had happened the day before, in concert with the British attack at Arras, it may well have had more serious consequences. The attack west of Arras in the evening convinced Von Rundstedt that his instinct to halt the attack on Boulogne and Calais were correct. The British and French in the north, were withdrawing from the Escaut line, after the battles there on 21 May. But the boil of Arras had to be lanced. If the French and British actually managed to make a combined counter-attack to cut off the Panzers from the Infantry, it could be a disaster in the making. With 5th Panzer Division, 20th Motorised Division and 12th Infantry Division now in place south of Arras, he would, the next morning, be able to get around Arras, and head north towards Lille. The 7th Panzer Division and SS Totenkopf Division had had a day to rest and refit. They would advance against the French to the left flank of 5th Panzer Division. As with the Fuhrer’s order in the morning, Von Rundstedt ordered the attack on Boulogne and Calais to be postponed again, an extra day would make little difference to the final outcome, even if Von Kleist complained again.
NB text in italic differs from OTL. The butterfly is at the end. A postponement now of two days instead of one of the attack on Boulogne and Calais.
allanpcameron
Donor
They were heading towards Acq where there was a bridgehead over the Scarpe. But, as OTL, the French closed it on 22 May. But yes, on 23 May, as we shall see, they will go up against 17 Brigade around Maroeuil. A company of Infantry Tanks weren't there on 23 May OTL...
Given what happened to them the previous day, I don't think this will be their biggest loss
The Battle of Slim River has been used as a case study in the use of AFVs in shock warfare - the defending 8th Indian Division, exhausted, underequipped and for many units not sufficiently trained with too few educated officers didn't even realise that the roads they were defending were the 'new straight roads' and the old 'looping' road network still existed allowing the IJA unit - which was 30 tanks and a motorised infantry battalion with some light guns and engineering support, to by pass the defensive positions and in 3 hours they had shattered the defending Brigade and went on to overrun the rest of the Division (much of it caught in column of march) shattering any pretence of defending the Slim river and unhinging the planned defence and the defenders subsequently fell back 300 KMs with contesting it.
Arguably the battle was the last chance of saving Malaya and by extension Singapore ended that day - although I always maintain it should have been defended at the Kra Isthmus in Thailand.
But that would have always required a better quality and quantity of troops and as to the main point - enough gun tanks to deal with the Japanese tanks
Even the worst British gun tank would probably have been more than a match for the Type 97 which was armed with a very small 97mm/18.5 calibre howitzer gun which could only penetrate 20mm at 500 meters.
I always wondered if the Australians started their own Valentine tank production at the same time as the Canadians - a 100 or so Valentines in country might have made a hell of a difference.
Given the extra day to prepair Calais for defence will the British/French use this opertunity to move out additional stores and line of communications personnel while at the same time reinforcing the port? OTL Churchill was keen to show solidarity with the Frech through a grand gesture at Calais. If there where some additional forces available I could see them committed here.
I recall reading that the tanks that OTL arrived at Calais despite only crossing the channel had been loaded on the ships 'according to the book' and the book assumed a long sea voyage so the guns had been coated with a preservation coating which had to be removed first before they could be used.
Other problems such as the deck covered in fuel cans and the Crusiers loaded first so were unloaded last - not helped by the ships crew (obviously communists from the midlands) going on strike for 4.5 hours, a power failure rendering the dock cranes U/S and the ships captain being prevented from leaving at first light only by 3rd RTR officers pointing their revolvers at him
One of the other issues they had was that the machine gun ammo was not in the belts which would not ordinarily have been an issue as the units armorers would have had a loading device that would have made short work of it.
Sadly said loading devices were still in the UK and the loading of belts had to be done by hand as rapidly as possible - hands that soon became sore and bloody
Many soldiers of the 30th Brigades two infantry battalions did not even have rifles and had to help themselves to abandoned weapons in the port, they had no 3" mortars and only smoke rounds for the 2" mortars.
Add to this conflicting and confusing orders to the commanders of the garrison and its quite frankly a surprise they managed to hold out for 4 days!
Other problems such as the deck covered in fuel cans and the Crusiers loaded first so were unloaded last - not helped by the ships crew (obviously communists from the midlands) going on strike for 4.5 hours, a power failure rendering the dock cranes U/S and the ships captain being prevented from leaving at first light only by 3rd RTR officers pointing their revolvers at him
One of the other issues they had was that the machine gun ammo was not in the belts which would not ordinarily have been an issue as the units armorers would have had a loading device that would have made short work of it.
Sadly said loading devices were still in the UK and the loading of belts had to be done by hand as rapidly as possible - hands that soon became sore and bloody
Many soldiers of the 30th Brigades two infantry battalions did not even have rifles and had to help themselves to abandoned weapons in the port, they had no 3" mortars and only smoke rounds for the 2" mortars.
Add to this conflicting and confusing orders to the commanders of the garrison and its quite frankly a surprise they managed to hold out for 4 days!
I can only assume they did have their Tea ration in OTL
Just the thought of them 'not having said tea ration' makes me nauseous
Should have told them: "It's on the ship but can't arrive until the Jerry's have been pushed back, as it's not safe for the ship to enter the harbour"
5 mins later, every German in France is rapidly running screaming back to Germany, pursued by very pissed off British troops who haven't had any tea yet
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