3 May 1940. Dorset, England.
With time running out before they were due to be mobilised for overseas service, the current situation of the 1st Armoured Division had been hampered by the switch to the Besa air cooled machine gun from the Vickers .303. The changeover meant that Nuffield’s production of A13 Mark IIA had been slowed, and some of the Armoured Regiments were complaining that they were dealing with two different types of ammunition for the machine guns, complicating an already messy business of preparing for war. The numbers of Besa machine guns coming from Birmingham Small Arms factory was still less than required, which also meant there weren’t a lot of spare part for the guns being delivered either.
It had also been noted that most of the Close Support tanks didn’t have 3.7-inch ammunition for the main gun. Only a small number smoke shells were available and there was no High Explosive ammunition at all. If the Division was to meet the deadline, there were serious deficits in its ammunition stores that would have to be addressed. Letters to the Ministry of Supply had asked for them to deal with the provision of the main 2-pdr ammunition. Hadfields Ltd of Sheffield was the only company making this ammunition. They had evolved a specialised production process that required skilled workmen, and an in-house designed rotary furnace. The order for ammunition for the growing number of tanks and anti-tank regiments who were equipped with the 2-pdr meant that the estimate was the army would need approximately 1 million rounds per month. Currently, since there was only one firm making the ammunition, the army was receiving less than 300,000 rounds per month.
A lot of the existing stock of APHE 2-pdr had been adapted for training purposes. When delivered originally, these shells contained a small bursting charge designed so that once the armour had been pierced, it would explode, providing for something of a ‘coup de grâce’ for the crew of an enemy tank. Before war had been declared Hadfields had changed over to a solid Armour Piercing shot as the War Office thought it provided greater penetration. Therefore, many of the APHE shells in stock had had the bursting charge removed and ‘plugged’ with sand or other inert material, so they could function as practice rounds. There was now a concern from the Armoured Division’s Quartermaster that the tanks would be deployed with only solid shot, and nothing at all with any kind of High Explosive capability. The Royal Tank Regiments equipped with the A11, firing the Vickers pompom 2-pdr, had found that even the relatively small HE charge in these shells were very effective. Without HE ammunition for the 3.7-inch tank mortar or APHE shells for the 2-pdr, the Quartermaster was concerned that the 1st Armoured Division would be at a disadvantage. Asking Hadfields to begin making APHE rounds again would probably mean that the deficit in 2-pdr ammunition would get worse.
The Ministry of Supply was overwhelmed with all the requests for making up deficits to just about every aspect of the army’s life. The conscription of so many into the army had meant that the training establishments were bursting at the seams, but didn’t have the staff or equipment to train the new recruits. There were shortages of everything, including uniforms. Trying to sort out ammunition for the small numbers of Close Support tanks was quite low on the list of priorities. Due to the lack of ammunition, more and more of the Armoured Regiments started using the CS tanks as the rear link tank. This was the tank the second in command of each squadron rode in. They acted as a conduit for communication back and forth between the Squadron and the Regiment HQs, and important task, due to the limitations of the wireless sets in the tanks. But it also meant that the tank wasn’t available for its main purpose.
The new drafts of men arriving in the Armoured Regiments had completed their basic training, then had some specialised training. Of those who had received tank training, it had been extremely limited. This was due in part because of how few tanks there were to be trained on. Those who had qualified as drivers admitted that had spent less than an hour actually driving a tank, and that was usually not the type they would be driving in the Regiment. Mechanics, fitters, and electricians all needed a lot more training and on top of all the other problems of getting the Regiments up to War Establishment, this was one more burden.
The other burden that was being felt especially in the Quartermaster’s and Technical Officer’s staff. The stores and equipment that were arriving from central stores, while peacetime equipment was being withdrawn from Squadrons and returned to the RAOC. Despite being at war, peacetime procedures of issue and receipt accountancy were supposed to be maintained, something that the clerical staff found almost impossible. As if this wasn’t enough, the Regiments weren’t yet all in possession of Army Form G1098. This should have provided them with a detailed scale of equipment, not only for their expected War Establishment, but also as personal weapons, wirelesses, tools, stores, spares, signals and cooking equipment.
All of this is OTL, no changes.
